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ABSTRACT
This thesis is on the law relating to the family, 
property and succession among the Northern Ewe-speaking people 
of Ghana.
The first Chapter offers a general description of the 
Ewe in both Ghana and Togo and proceeds to identify the 
section referred to as the Northern Ewe-speaking people of 
Ghana. In the second Chapter the political structure is 
described, showing the area as a congeries of small autonomous 
chiefdoms, each with its own system of law.
In Chapter III the nature of the Ewe family, which is 
patrilineal, is examined as the unit for purposes of citizen­
ship, succession to hereditary offices, entitlement to ancest­
ral property and assumption of certain obligations. The 
position of the head of family is considered in Chapter IV 
where it is submitted that succession to the office is auto­
matic and the holder of the office is accountable but generally 
irremovable.
Chapters V and VI concern interests in land. It is 
shown that as a rule the respective families hold the paramount 
title to land, with the dependent interest in the members of 
the family, and that stool lands as generally understood in 
Ghana are practically non-existent among the Northern Ewe.
In Chapter VII it is explained that, apart from the ancestral 
family lands, family property is rare among the Northern Ewe.
Alienation of interests in property by sale, gift, 
pledging and tenancy is discussed in Chapters VIII - XII, 
stating the formalities and the effect of each type of 
alienation.
The law of succession to interests in property is dis­
cussed in Chapter XIII. It is shown that succession is not 
by the family but by individuals as of right and that the 
interest of a successor is generally that of a purchaser, so 
that the interest is both alienable and inheritable.
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CHAPTER I
THE LAND. THE PEOPLE AND THEIR HISTORY
Geographical Location of the Ewe
The Ewe are but one of the many peoples of West Africa.
The late Armattoe has described them as one of the most 
intelligent peoples who inhabit the West Coast of Africa, 
as well as one of the most industrious, and he says the Ewe 
were the first iron-working people in Africa.'*'
The Ewe occupy generally an area stretching from the 
Gulf of Guinea to about latitude 7° iOt! north in the west 
(in the Republic of Ghana) and about latitude 7°4*north in 
the east (in the Republic of Togo). The western limit of 
Eweland is roughly delimited by the Volta River, while the 
Mono River is its approximate eastern boundary. The coast­
line measures about 80 miles from east to west, and its 
extension inland is of about the same length.
There are no other tribes between the Ewe and the sea 
to the south. The western sector, which in fact forms the 
south-eastern corner of Ghana, is the main component of the 
Volta Region, one of the eight administrative Regions of 
Ghana, the only main non-Ewe area in the Volta Region being
1. R.E.G. Armattoe, The Golden Age of West African Civilization. 
Lomeshie Research Centre, Londonderry, 1946, p.23.
the quasi-Akan population of the Buem-Krachi District. The 
eastern sector of Eweland comprises the southern half of the 
Republic of Togo, in which Republic the Ewe seem to occupy a 
more dominant position.
The Ewe have sometimes been confused with their neigh­
bours. For example, the work of Colonel Sir A.B. Ellis,'*’ a 
former colonial District Commissioner of Keta (in Eweland), 
which was published in 1890 and purported to be a work on the 
Ewe, entitled The Ewe-speaking Peoples of the Slave Coast of 
West Africa, was for long regarded as the locus classicus on 
the Ewe, written in the English language. This book has, 
however, been condemned by recent scholars, both historians 
and anthropologists alike. An Ewe historian, Amenumey, says
"The title is a complete misnomer. Ellis confused the Ewe
2
with other neighbouring people11. Indeed Ellis* book offers 
no contribution to our knowledge or understanding of the Ewe 
people because the subject of its treatment is Dahomey which 
is not part of the Ewe. It is true that Dahomey and other Fon 
languages seem to have an Ewe base, or at least bear a close 
resemblance to Ewe; but the areas in which these languages 
are spoken are not part of Eweland and should not be confused 
in the study of the Ewe..............
1. According to W.E.F. Ward, A History of Ghana. Allen and 
Unwin, London, 1966, p.314, Colonel Sir A.B. Ellis was appointed 
District Commissioner of Keta in January, 1878.
2. D.E.K. Amenumey, The Ewe People and the Coming of European 
Rule. 1850-1914. Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of London, 
1964, p.5.
A similar error was committed by Crowther when as late
as 1927 he attempted to write on the Ewe-speaking people.^
Crowther dealt with only the Anlo and the Tongu Ewe, then fell
into the error of including Ada, Akwamu and Cherepong-speaking
peoples among the Ewe. His was, of course, a double error of
exclusion and inclusion] The majority of the Ewe areas,
including the Northern .Ewe of Ghana, were omitted, while
obviously non-Ewe peoples were included in his work.
Perhaps one explanation for this confusion is that, quite
apart from the fact that they are not a centralised, single
political entity, the Ewe do not form a strict linguistic unit.
The Ewe language belongs to the "Kwa11 group of western Sudanic
languages to which also belong inter alia Twi, Fante and Ga in
2
Ghana, and Tomba, Nupe, Ibo, Ijaw, Yoruba and Edo in Nigeria,
However, the local variations in the dialects of the Ewe
language are such that an Ewe from say Glidzi in Togo has
considerable difficulty in understanding the G]ji (Hohoe) dialect
of the same Ewe language. Westermann has dealt with some of
3
these dialects in his monumental work on the Ewe language.
1. F.G. Crowther, nThe Ewe-speaking People*1, (1927) 3 G.C.R. 
11-53.
2. D. Westermann, A Study of the Ewe Language (translated 
by A.L. Bickford Smith), O.U.P., London, 1930, pp.199-200.
3. P. Westermann, A Study of the Ewe Languages. 1930. See 
pp.2^6-256 where (though with some minor errors) he records 
passages in the Gbi, Ve and Ho dialects.
It is nevertheless the same Ewe language, and variations in 
dialect are not a peculiarity of only the Ewe language. There 
is, therefore, no excuse for including other ethnic and lin­
guistic groups among the Ewe.
The expression f,Ewelandfl has been used and will be used 
in this work only for the purpose of ethnic and cultural 
identification, and not in reference to a political entity as 
such. The Ewe have never lived together as a single political 
unit even in early times.^ In more recent times, unlike some 
other tribes of West Africa, their cultural homogeneity has 
been destroyed by their colonial experiences, with the result 
that they are now divided between the two republics of Ghana 
and Togo,
Before the First World War, the Ewe came under two
separate colonial administrations, A large portion of them
were together with other ethnic groups in the then German
2colony of Togo, where they formed the main ethnic group.
1. Though Amenumey says that at Notsie MThe entire community 
/T.e. the Ewe7 lived each in its own section, but all alike were 
ruled by one supreme King11. See Amenumey, op,cit.. p.l6. The 
"King** was Agokoli. If this meant having a centralized political 
unit, the people would probably have destooled the nKingl! 
rather than dissolve the union because of his despotism which
is discussed in pp.30-31 infra.
2. This dominance may account for the suggestion that "Togo11
is a corruption of the Ewe word !Ito go” or tltogodo,t meaningVthebank 
■0S.&river, lake or lagoon.11 It seems that this name was 
applied to the whole country because the German Consul, Dr.
Gustav Nachtigal, signed the first treaty with the chief of the 
village of Togo. See Togoland. British Foreign Office 
(Historical Section), Foreign Service Handbook No. 117, 1919, 
p.14.
The rest were in the south-eastern corner of the then British
colony of the Gold Coast, in which territory they were one of
the large minorities. As a result of the defeat of Germany in '
the 1914-18 war, Togo was divided between Great Britain and
France and placed under their respective administrations under
the Mandatory System of the defunct League of Nations.'*' Writing
on the Ewe, Miss Barbara Ward says,
Their territory is now divided ... between the French 
and British administration. The Franco-British boundary 
was fixed by a commission appointed by the League of 
Nations in 1920-22, after a considerable time spent in 
ethnic and economic survey ..." 2
It is impossible, however, to convince the Ewe that Eweland
has been partitioned on any rational ethnic basis; for the
border is indeed an arbitrary international boundary.
These "mandated territories11, as they were then called,
later became "trust territories11 of the same administering
powers after the Second World War, under the Trusteeship System
of the United Nations which replaced the League of Nations.^
1. E.g. the British Section by virtue of the Mandate granted 
to Great Britain by the Council of the League of Nations and 
dated 20th July, 1922.
2. B.E. Ward, The Social Organisation of the Ewe-speaking 
People. Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of London, 1949, P#l.
\
3. Thus British Togoland became a Trust Territory under a 
Trusteeship Agreement between His Britannic Majesty and the 
U.N., approved by the General Assembly of the U.N. on 13th 
December, 1946. See Cmd.7083.
This, of course, meant very little to the indigenous inhabitants 
in terms of administration and policy. While France constituted 
French Togoland into a separate colonial entity, Britain admin­
istered western Togoland, to all intents and purposes, as if it 
were an integral part of the Crown Colony of the Gold Coast.
The result of these different colonial administrations was . 
that the Ewe on either side of the inter-territorial frontier 
developed along entirely different lines. The awareness of this 
fact, as well as the hardships experienced when the frontier 
was closed during the war years, led to the emergence of an Ewe 
irredentist movement soon after the 1939-45 War, with the 
objective of uniting all Ewe-speaking people under one adminis­
tration.
For a variety of reasons, however, the Togoland unification
movement did not succeed. Instead, by a plebiscite held in 1956,
1conducted by Britain through the Gold Coast Government, Togoland
p
under United Kingdom Trusteeship decided by a majority to be 
integrated into the then Gold Coast as the independent state of
1. The Government of the internally self-governing colony of 
the Gold Coast was at the time formed by the C.P.P. Both the
C.P.P. and its leader, Kwame Nkrumah, were strongly opposed to 
Togoland unification,
2. The final figures were 93,095 to .6.7,492. in favour o f .......
integration into the Gold Coast (Ghana), or>&% against 42%. See 
Report of the U.N. Plebiscite Commissioner for Togoland under 
U.K. Trusteeship to the l8th session of the U.N. General 
Assembly, 1956, U.N. General Assembly Document No, T/1258 of 
19th June, 195b, paragraph 494*
Ghana which attained her independence in March, 1957* The 
overwhelming majority of voters in the Southern part of British 
Togoland, which was the Ewe area, voted against integration 
into the Gold Coast (Ghana)'*'; but the Southern majority was 
engulfed when the votes were taken together with the whole of 
the Trust Territory (including inter alia the Mamprusi, the 
Dogomba and other non-Ewe tribes in the North). This was a 
defeat for the declared objective of the Ewe and Togoland 
unification movements; but it resulted in the formal unific­
ation of the eastern half of the Ewe under one administration 
in Ghana. As far as can be seen now, therefore, the Ewe are 
permanently divided between the Republic of Ghana and the 
Republic of Togo, Thus we now have anglophonic and franeophonic 
Ewes.
The Early History of Ewe People
The actual origin of the Ewe-speaking people can at best 
be only a matter of conjecture. What appears certain, however, . 
is that they must have migrated in a westerly direction to 
their present places of abode. Fiawoo says:
1. The voting in the Ewe area was 36,010 to 15,798 or about 
69% to 31% against integration into the Gold Coast (Ghana). 
See para. 495 of above report, reference Ho District (18,981 
to 7,217) and Kpandu District (17,029 to 8,581).
the Ewe-speaking people appeared to have emigrated 
to Yoruba country ... from ^there7 first to Dogbo 
... then to Tado, situated east of the River Mono 
.,. from Tado the next settlement was Notsie to the 
west of the River Mono .... 1
The Ewe historian, Amenumey, also says:
Ewe tradition recalls a migration from the east -
from Ketu, a town lying to the west of the River
■ ■ Niger  ...................... ........................
p
and that from Ketu they eventually came to Notsie, Similar 
accounts of Ewe migration are also given by Spieth^ and 
Wiegrabe.^
Perhaps the Ewe migratory process, together with those
of the neighbouring Akan began somewhere in the Sudan and
progressed in a south-westerly direction to avoid the dry
Sahara. The various points in their journey have been lost
in the mist of unrecorded history. Unanimous tradition is,
however, that the Ewe eventually settled in the historic city
5of Notsie, sometimes referred to as "Glime", because of the 
great wall that surrounded it. The old walled city of Notsie 
is now the town which goes by the same name in the Republic
1. D.K. Fiawoo. The Influence of Contemporary Social Changes 
on the Magico-religions Concepts and Organisationof the 
Southern Ewe-speaking People of Ghana. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
University of Edinburgh, 1959# pp.29-30.
2. D.E.K. Amenumey, op.cit.. pp.15-17.
3. Jakob Spieth, Die Ewe-StUmme. Dietrich Reimer (Ernst 
Vlohsen), Berlin, 19067 PP.53-55.
4. P. V/iegrabbe, Ewegbale xexle: Akpa Enelia. Berlin, 1906, 
pp.18-43*
5* Glitne in Ewe means "inside the walls", a reference to the 
great wall around the city of Notsie. Other names are Amedzofe, 
Agbogbome and Hahome.
1
of Togo* All the inhabitants of ancient Notsie were enclosed
by a thick wall, the remnants of which can be seen even today*
The original purpose of the wall might have been the usual one
of affording protection against the incursions of hostile
forces. In the course of time, however, it was to ensure the
incarceration of the entire people, serving as a means whereby
the despotic chief, Agokoli, the ruler of the city, prevented
the exit of the people whom he ruled with iron cruelty. Life
in the walled city of Notsie became so intolerable that the
chiefs and their people tore down the great wall at a point that
had deliberately been weakened by being kept wet for this
reason over a considerable period of time with waste water by
the women. Thus the Ewe made their exodus from Notsie and
moved in differing directions to the places where they have now
respectively settled. Amenumey thinks that the exodus must
2
have been around the middle of the 17th century. There was 
no organised direction of the exodus, there being no single 
chief who ruled all the Ewe. Instead, each group moved away 
under its own chief, being only in the company of other friendly 
groups. The history of each Ewe group from Notsie to the 
present day, therefore, varies from place to place. Notsie, 
then,represents a sort of Biblical Babel for the Ewe, being 
the point from which the Ewe dispersal commenced.
1. Sometimes spelt as Nuatja or Nouatche.
2. D.E.K. Amenumey, op.cit.. pp.20-21.
The Anlo Ewe And The Ton^u Ewe of Ghana
As has been already pointed out,"*" part of the Ewe- 
speaking people are in Togo and the other portion in Ghana.
This thesis, strictly speaking, concerns itself with only a 
section of the Ewe who are in Ghana, that is the Northern Ewe 
of Ghana. Hence, although for convenience we may in the suc­
ceeding pages use expressions like "the Ewe11, "Ewe law" and 
"Eweland", unless the context indicates a wider application, 
they should be understood strictly as references to only the 
Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana. It is necessary, there­
fore, to identify that area more precisely.
The Ghana Ewe occupy three main areas. One is the Anlo 
area. The other is the Tongu area. The third is the area of 
the group which we would like to refer to as the Northern Ewe- 
speaking people of Ghana, this last group being the one with 
which the present work is more precisely concerned. Our area 
of study will also be described; but, before then, we shall 
look at the first two areas, the Anlo and the Tongu.
The Anlo: The Anlo area comprises the Anlo proper and the
surrounding people with whom they can be classified into one 
dialect group. They form the southernmost part of the Ghana 
Ewe and stretch northwards from the sea. This is a very 
important area because it established early contact with 
European settlers, and, because it had been continuously under
1. See pp.26-29 supra.
sole British rule (having never been part of the former German 
Togoland), the general level of education in the area is com­
paratively higher than in the other Ewe areas of Ghana.
The dialect of the Anlo Ewe is basically the written Ewe, 
which is, however, christened "Standard Ewe". Indeed one would 
be more honest in saying that the so-called "Standard Ewe" is 
in fact simply the Anlo dialect. It sounds foreign to the 
other Ewe people. The" orthography is so linked with the Anlo 
dialect that certain expressions in other Ewe dialects cannot 
be reduced into Ewe writing. In this thesis, however, the 
dialect forms of the Northern Ewe of Ghana are preferred to 
the so-called standard Ewe when giving the Ewe words and 
expressions which are necessary for this study.
In their political and social structure, the Anlo present 
some points of difference from the other Ewe areas. One impor­
tant aspect of the Anlo political organisation is that it is 
far more centralised than that of any other Ewe area. Although 
each Anlo town or village has its own chief as one would find 
elsewhere in Eweland, yet there is a Paramount Ruler, the 
Awoamefia, to whom all other chiefs owe political allegiance.
The seat of the traditional administration is at Anloga, where 
the Awoamefia lives. In this respect the Anlo political 
organisation is a departure from the general Ewe pattern and 
it bears a great similarity to that of the centralised Akan 
states of Ghana such as Akim Abuakwa or Akwapim; but the degree
of centralisation does not go as far as we find in Ashanti 
with an extra tier in the hierarchy.
Another feature of Anlo social organisation which differen­
tiates it from other Ewe groups is that it is organised on a 
kind of "clan system". The Anlo clan system is similar to the 
Akan one in the sense that the members of each clan claim 
descent from a common ancestor and they are scattered throughout 
the various towns and villages of Anlo; and each clan has its 
respective totems, taboos and avoidances. This type of social 
organisation is not found among other Ewe-speaking people of 
Ghana. There is some uncertainty about the number of clans 
among the Anlo. Some think that there are thirteen clans. 
Recently Gaba has condemned as unwarrented an attempt to fix 
the number of clans at twelve, so as to correspond to the twelve 
tribes of Israel as stated in the Bible, an attempt whose 
objective seems to be to trace the Anlo origin to a connection 
with ancient Israel.^
The Anlo are a coastal people whose livelihood is linked 
with the sea, lagoons and rivers. Their mode of living is, 
therefore, very similar to that of other neighbouring coastal 
peoples, such as the Ga, the Ada and the Fante. They bear some 
resemblance to the Ada and other Ga-Adangbe people with whom 
they have constant intercourse. This may explain why so many 
Ada people bear Ewe names!
1. C.R. Gaba, Anlo Traditional Religion. Unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, University of London, 1965* PP#29-30.
In present-day Ghana, the Anlo form one political adminis­
trative district in the Volta Region. The district is known as 
the Keta District; but some refer to it as the Anlo District. 
The reason is that, while the traditional seat of administration 
is at Anloga, the modern political administration has its head­
quarters at Keta just a few miles away.
The Tongu: The Tongu'*' area stretches generally closely along 
the Volta River. In fact the meaning of ,fTonuTI in Ewe is 
"along the river" and it is only a term of reference applied 
by other Ewe groups to those of their colleagues bordering the 
Volta River and whose livelihood and industry are intricately 
bound up with that river in fishing and other riverain trade.
The Tongue Ewe also share some common modes of living with the 
Ga-Adangbe people near the Volta River, which the Ewe of the 
north do not.
Tongu is not a traditional political unit in any sense 
similar to the Anlo. It is more a means of identifying an area 
than a term of political application. For, unlike the Anlo, the 
Tongu people have no centralised political organisation and 
each town or village is an independent unit. Indeed it would 
seem that the only unifying factor is the common dialect over 
the area along the Volta which they occupy; and another con­
sideration is that because of their closeness to each other 
and their common riparian livelihood, they have similar customs
1. Sometimes spelt as "Tonu".
and living habits. These are the distinguishing features 
which justify referring to them here as a single unit.
The people of the Tongu area were never in the German 
colony of Togo. They have remained in the Gold Coast colony 
and under British rule until Ghana attained independence. But 
the Tongu area is a relatively backward one. Their dialect 
differs from the Anlo dialect of the Ewe, but is regarded by 
some to be fairly close to the latter; at least it is closer 
to Anlo than to the northern Ewe dialects.
At present all the Tongu area is administered as one 
district, known as the Tongu District, with the district head­
quarters at Sogankope, a small village which is rapidly 
developing into a township. A few of the Tongu villages lie 
across the River Volta (i.e. west of the Volta), but these 
are unimportant ones, save Tefle.
The Northern Ewe-speaking People of Ghana
The Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana, as here 
referred to, are those Ewe-speaking areas of Ghana which lie 
outside both the Anlo and Tongu areas. The people included in 
this area are indeed geographically north of both the Anlo and 
Tongu people. ................................................
The area is covered by a large number of dialects, each 
of which is identifiable with a particular chiefdom. For 
example, the Ho dialect differs from both the Kpando and Gbi 
dialects, but the latter two are also different from each other.
However, people from one chiefdom in the Northern Ewe area 
easily understand the dialects of all the other chiefdoms of 
the area (unlike the difficulty in understanding, say, the 
Anlo dialect). This mutual comprehensibility of dialects, of 
which all are basically the same, especially when contrasted 
with Anlo and Tongu dialects, is a unifying factor and one 
fact which marks out the area as a convenient land area for 
the present study. In addition, their living habits, social 
and political organisation and systems of laws are very 
similar.
Most of this area, with the notable exceptions of Peki, 
Awudome and part of Kpeve, was formerly in the western part 
of the old German colony of Togoland. We may, therefore, also 
correctly describe the Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana 
as being the people of the Ewe-speaking area of the former 
British Togoland, together with Peki, Awudome and the rest of 
Kpeve. It must be understood, therefore, that the area, unlike 
the Anlo area, came under continuous British administration 
only after the 191^-18 War, following the defeat of Germany. 
This is an important fact which accounts for the comparatively 
undeveloped state of the area, as well as the fact that the 
generation of British-type educated people in this area is a 
relatively young one (there are still some old German scholars 
living in the area).
The Northern Ewe-speaking area of Ghana, as stated above, 
lies north of both Anlo and Tongu areas. It is entirely in the 
hinterland, without any sea belt, because it borders southwards 
on the Anlo and the Tongu who are nearer the sea. Towards the 
north it shares boundaries with the non-Ewe area of Buem- 
Krachi District. Its uppermost area is the Hohoe district, 
Hohoe being the last Ewe town northwards, after which one would 
come to Santrokofi, Lolobi and Likpe, who have their own dif­
ferent languages. On the east the boundary is formed with 
other Ewe people in the Republic of Togo; and on the west the 
Volta River roughly separates them from the Akan tribes of the 
Eastern Region of Ghana.
For the purposes of central government administration in 
Ghana, the area here described as comprising the Northern Ewe- 
speaking people falls precisely into two administrative dist­
ricts. These are the Ho District and the Kpando District, with 
each of the district headquarters located in the towns by which 
the districts are respectively described. Ho is also the 
regional capital of Volta Region which comprises all Eweland 
in Ghana, together with the non-Ewe people of the Buem-Krachi 
District.
The area contains small enclaves of non-Ewe-speaking 
people with their own native languages which are entirely 
different from and wholly unlike the Ewe language. These are 
Logba, Tafi and Nyangbo in the Kpando District and Avatime in 
the Ho District. Some of these people are usually described
by writers as being autochthonous, in the sense that they were 
the original inhabitants of the area before the advent of the 
Ewe people. It is not the aim of this work to enquire into 
this claim.
The people of Logba, Tafi, Nyangbo and Avatirae have been 
described as non-Ewe people, but only because they have their 
ov/n native tongues. It would be perhaps more accurate to 
describe them as bilingual because, by and large, every adult 
in these areas speaks some Ewe as well. The fact remains, 
however, that they are not Eve properly so called and should 
not be confused with them as is sometimes done.
It must be mentioned, however, that these non-Ewe 
populations have a great deal in common with their Eve neigh­
bours because they are minorities enclosed here and there by 
the Eve people, v/ith whom they have daily intercourse. As a 
result, much of what is said about the Eve may be applicable 
to them as well. However, for the purposes of this thesis, the 
non-Eve "islands11 have been excluded from strict consideration. 
Although it was possible to talk to some people from these 
areas, no field research was conducted in these pockets of 
non-Ewe-speaking people. Hence any statement of the law that 
may be made shall not be taken to refer to them; and this 
though in fact it may well be that there is"hardly any material 
difference between theirs and the customary laws of the 
Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana.
It has already been stated that the Northern Ewe-speaking 
people of Ghana fall precisely into two Districts, viz. the 
Kpando District and the Ho District. Each of these adminis­
trative districts is further sub-divided into Local Council 
areas, each consisting of several chiefdoms.
Under the present structure the Kpando District is con­
stituted by three Local Councils, viz.
(a) The Kpando Local Council, with its headquarters at 
Kpando, comprises:
(1) Kpando (5) Liate (with Gbledi) (9) Have
(2) Gbefi (6) Tsome (10) Logba
(3) Ve (7) Sovie (11) Tafi
(h) Leklebi (8) Agate (12) Nyangbo
(b) The Dayi Local Council, with its headquarters at 
Kpeve, consists of:
(1) Kpeve (5) Botoku (9) Kpalime
(2) Anfoega (6) Tsrukpe (10) Aveme
(3) Vakpo (7) V/oadze
(Lf) Wusuta (8) Peki
(c) The Gbi Local Council has its headquarters at 
Hohoe and is formed by:
(1) Gbi (3) Fodome
(2) Alavanyo (A) Wli.
Similarly there are now four Urban and Local Councils in 
the Ho District. These are:
(a) The Ho Urban Council, having its headquarters at Ho 
(the Regional and District Headquarters), with its area of 
authority extending over:
(1) Ho (5) Akoefe
(2) Tanyigbe (6) Tokokoe
(3) Takla (7) Kpenoe
(4) Hodzo (8) Nyive (Ghana)
(b) The Dutasor Local Council, with Awudome-Anyirawase 
as its seat, embraces:
(1) Awudome (5) Etodome (9) Ziavi
(2) Hlefi (6) Kpale (10.) Kiefe
(3) Tsyome (7) Abutia (11) Akrofu
(4) Anfoeta (8) Sokode (12) Goviefe
(c) The Adaklu-Anyigbe Local Council, with its head­
quarters located at Agotime-Kpetoe, consists of:-
(1
(2
(3
(4
(5
Adaklu 
Ave-Dakpa 
Dzalele 
Ziofe 
Agotime.
(d) The Yingor Local Council has its headquarters at 
Dzolokpuita and comprises:
(1) Dzolo (6) Kpoeta (11) Shia (16) Ho
(2) Kpedze (7) Matse (12) Taviefe
(3) Saviefe (8) Akoviefe (13) Akome
( If) Avatime (9) Dodome (14) Atikpui
(3) Honuta (10) Lume (15) Klave
The chiefdoms listed above, excepting the non-Ewe- 
speaking areas already mentioned, constitute the Northern 
Ewe-speaking people of Ghana. They are the people with whom 
this work concerns itself. When we look at the Ewe within 
the frontiers of Ghana alone, they are the. Northern Ewe and 
so are described as "the Northern Ewe-speaking people of 
Ghana". When, however, we consider the whole of Eweland, 
then the area would be properly described as Northwestern 
Eweland.
The Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana, as we have 
seen, lie entirely in the hinterland without a coastal belt.
The area falls roughly between Latitudes 6° 20tf north and 
7° 10" north, more or less. Thus it lies on roughly the same 
latitudinal parallel with the forest areas of the Brong-Ahafo, 
Ashanti and Eastern Regions of Ghana. The land has been des­
cribed in these terms:
The southern section lies within a zone of savannah land, 
with light forest which extends inland ... the bush 
thickens gradually towards the north, the northern part 
of the section being true forest country. The southern 
quarter consists of flat plain with one conspicuous hill 
(Adaklu - 1,965 feet) in the centre ... 1
The main occupation of the people is farming. Formerly this
meant subsistence farming; but now cocoa, coffee and palm
fruit are among the agricultural produce of the area. There
is, then, an occupational difference between this area, and
the Anlo and the Tongu areas whose main industries are fishing
and other work connected with the sea, lagoons and rivers.
In fact, in terms of occupation, staple foods and living
habits, the Northern Ewe of Ghana have perhaps more in common
with the Akan people than with the Anlo and Tongu. For example,
fufu is the staple food of the Northern Ewe-speaking people of
Ghana as it is of the Ashanti and other Akan people; but the
Anlo have, as their staple food, akple which is made of roasted
corn flour and cassava dough.
T] Report of His Majesty's Government in the U.K., to the 
Trusteeship Council of the United Nations on the administration 
of Togoland under United Kingdom Trusteeship, 1947; Colonial 
No, 225; P.4.
k3.
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In addition to farming of all types, pottery is a 
traditional industry of Kpando, Gbi (Hohoe) and other areas.
In some chiefdoms cloth weaving and wood carving are among
their industries. Those who live close enough to the Volta 
River engage in fresh-water fishing, and this sphere of 
activity is assuming a greater importance as a result of the 
artificial Volta Lake which has led to an increase in the 
different species of fishes.
Some old German geological survey maps seem to suggest
that there are some mineral deposits in the area. However, no 
mines have been opened and this may mean that any such mineral 
deposits that there may be are not in commercial quantities to 
justify the expense of prospecting therefor. There is a total 
absence of modern industries in the Northern Ewe-speaking area 
of Ghana. Several of the towns like Ho and Hohoe have pipe 
borne water; but there is no electricity supply in any of the 
towns except Ho.
It may be desirable to refer to the name by which the 
people are generally callved. Just as the other Ewe have given 
a name to the Tongu people, so also have the Anlo given a name 
to the Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana. The Anlo call 
the area "Ewedome11. This literally means "inside the Ewe".
It would seem, therefore, not to be far from correct when a
foreigner translates this as "Ewe proper". For sometimes the
TT. Amenumey disagrees with Ward, for instance, who translated 
this as "Ewe proper" in the sketch map of her thesis already 
cited. See Amenumey, op.cit.. p#39, n.l. However, Amenumey does
not offer an alternative English rendering.
Anlo also refer to this area as "Ewe me", meaning "the Ewe area".
It seems that this is also the area which the Europeans of the
18th and 19th centuries referred to as "Krepi" (sometimes spelt
"Crepe" or "Kereaapey")**^ Certainly this is the term used for
2
the area by Ward in his work on the history of modern Ghana*
It would, appear, however,.that "Krepi" properly refers to the 
people of Peki and its environs, like the Guan people of Anum 
and Boso which were under Peki suzerainty.^ The origin of the 
term is not clear; neither is its meaning certain* Needless 
to say, the people do not call themselves "Krepis"* They refer 
to their area as "Ewe me", which is "Eweland",
1. See D.E.K. Amenumey, op.cit* * p,38*
2. W.E.F. Ward, A History of Ghana* Allen & Unwin, London, 
1966, p.13k et passim*
3* See esp. W.E.F. Ward, op* cit * * p*134*
CHAPTER II
THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE
The General Political Structure
The Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana are organised 
in politically centralised chiefdoms of varying sizes. In 
contradistinction to the Anlo Ewe, the Northern Ewe of Ghana 
are not organised in large political units of any size approach­
ing that of the Anlo Ewe or the highly centralised Akan peoples 
of Ghana. The Northern Ewe units are generally smaller, often 
only of the size of a township or even a village, but with 
different population levels. Nevertheless, these Ewe units 
exhibit the common feature of a central political organisation 
with a Head Chief or Fiaga at the apex of the political power 
structure.
The result of the organisation of the Ewe in small (though 
centralised) political units is a proliferation of "native 
states" in Ghana's Northern Eweland. Each chiefdom being 
separate and independent of all others, we have in this area 
alone about seventy autonomous chief doms. In 193*f, the 
following observation was made on the native state structure
in the Southern Section of the then British Mandated Territory 
of Togoland which embraced most of the area now under consider­
ation:
... In the Southern Section frequent mention has already 
been made that at the time when this area came under 
British Mandate there were no less than sixty-eight^ 
mutually independent divisions, several of which con­
sisted of only one village, and one having a population 
at the last census of not more than forty-nine. Whether 
the divisions had always been independent it is difficult • 
to say at this stage of the history of the country.
Various chiefs asserted paramountcy over others, but it 
is probable that alliances for defensive purposes existed 
among some of the divisions which did not involve alleg­
iance of one to another during times of peace. 2 
But whatever the reasons, the numerous small independent 
divisions were a big hindrance to any form of local 
government, and Political Officers carried out extensive 
propaganda on the advantages of amalgamation. The first 
natural reluctance to abandon an independence long since 
acquired soon disappeared when it was realised that the 
paramount chief of an amalgamated state would have no 
right to interfere with the management of the internal 
affairs of the respective divisions unless invited by
them to do so ... 3
1, This figure included, in addition to the Northern Ewe of 
the present Ghana, also the semi-Akan areas of Buem and other 
non-Ewe enclaves in the area; but it also excluded Peki, Awudome 
and other areas then in the Gold Coast Colony,
2, In particular, Peki claimed suzerainty over most of the 
area, as far as Alavanyo* Kpando and Kpedze. On the other hand 
Kpando also claimed paramountcy over places like Sovie, Awate 
and Tsome - see, e.g. Le Lievre, "The Kpando Division" (1925)
1 G.C.R. 29-52.
3, Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 
to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration 
of Togoland under British Mandate, 193^; Colonial No, 107; 
pp. 5-6, paragraph 7.
The facts emerge from the above report that small 
independent chiefdoms had been existing under the traditional 
political structure and that whatever amalgamations of the 
units later developed were deliberate creations of the 
colonial authority. It is necessary to emphasise this be­
cause the Administering Power indeed succeeded in creating 
"States" out of the independent chiefdoms in the 1930s. Those 
relevant to our area are the Peki' State under Peki, the Asogli 
State under Ho, the Hokpe State (sometimes called Avatime State) 
under Avatime, and the Akpini State under Kpando,^ The Ewe 
areas which rejected the merger with others under the "native 
states" system are the independent chiefdoms of Gbi, Ve and 
Anfoega. Later, in about 19^9, Gbi, Ve and the strictly non- 
Ewe chiefdom of Likpe formed the short-lived Atando Native 
Authority with its headquarters at Hohoe, This was not a 
"State" but merely a local government unit. In any case, the 
Atando Native Authority disintegrated on the introduction of 
elective local councils in 1952, Therefore, the four "States" 
of Peki, Asogli, Hokpe and Akpini and the three independent 
chiefdoms of Gbi, Ve and Anfoega were those in existence in 
the area in 1952.
1, These "States" were created under the Native Administration 
(Southern Togoland) Ordinance (No.l of 1932).
Following the independence of Ghana, the Government
encouraged the dissolution of the amalgamations because they
were clearly unpopular with both the chiefs and the people.
They were thus broken up by a policy of indiscriminate
elevation of chiefs to the status of "Paramount Chief". To
rectify the anomalies inherent in the indiscriminate elevation
of chiefs by the old regime, however, the Military Government
of Ghana^ took an equally unpopular step by decreeing that
every chiefdom and division should revert to what is in effect
2
the status of 1952. The present legal position, therefore, 
is that the four "States" have been resuscitated, though nov; 
known as Traditional Areas,^
The principle on which the amalgamations of the chiefdoms 
were founded was non-interference in the internal affairs of 
the composite units. It was, of course, not always respected. 
For instance, this principle did not prevent the Akpini State 
Council at Kpando from deciding in 1935 that Togbe Gayi (who 
objected to joining the Akpini State) was destooled as Head 
Chief of Wli and, by the same decision on the same day, 
declaring Togbe Titi enstooled as its Head Chief. This was 
not only a usurpation of the rights of enstoolment and
1. i.e. the National Liberation Council which assumed power 
since the coup d'etat of 2£fth February, 1966,
2. The Chieftaincy (Amendment) Decree, 1966, (NLC Decree No. 
112), of 2nd December, 1966, especially paragraphs 1 and 2 
thereof.
3. By virtue of Section 11 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1961,
(Act 81).
destoolment which were inherent in the people of Wli, but has 
also been the one cause of constant friction, instability and 
trouble in Wli right up to today. In any case, as the policy 
declaration made clear, the formation of the amalgamations 
did not alter the independent status of the composite chief­
doms, especially with respect to their internal affairs and 
the regime of laws applicable to them. What we shall say, 
therefore, will not take account of the amalgamations of 
"Traditional Areas" or chiefdoms as a result of pressure from 
successive central governments of the Gold Coast and Ghana,
For, although Kpando and Alavanyo are both in the Akpini State, 
yet a rule of law applying in Kpando is not ipso facto applic­
able in Alavanyo. As we see from the report quoted above, the 
original purpose of the amalgamations in the 1930s was to 
facilitate "local government" under the colonial policy of 
indirect rule. This was necessary because elective local and 
urban councils had not been introduced. Customary law and 
traditional institutions and their structure were, therefore, 
by and large, not interfered with.
That the amalgamations into "native states" was a 
deliberate innovation of the British Colonial Government had 
not been denied nor regarded as a secret by that Government.
On its general policy with regard to native states in Southern 
Togoland, the British Government in 1936 said:
In order to understand the present position, it must be 
remembered that the formation of these States does not 
represent a restoration of an earlier system of native 
rule such as existed among the majority of the Gold 
Coast tribes, where a Head Chief exercised authority 
over a number of sub-chiefs* The Ewe speaking divisions 
of the Southern Sphere, from the time of their settle­
ment in this area two centuries ago, existed as complete 
and independent patriarchal groups varying in strength 
from 6,000 people to less than 3 0 0, the largest groups 
. . comprising several villages and occupying a considerable 
area of land, while the smaller ones consisted of one 
village only. Apart from their common origin, language 
and customs, there has been no bond to unite these 
independent groups into larger political units and 
although friendship for mutual protection no doubt 
existed, these alliances for purposes of war never 
appear to have developed into permanent unions *,* 1
In describing the traditional political and legal system, 
therefore, we shall concern ourselves only with the pattern 
and structure evolved by the people themselves, notwithstanding 
any measure of central government efforts at re-grouping or 
control. For, to many people of this area, the word 
"amalgamation11 has unpleasant connotations and evokes in­
glorious memories of the past* The people live and organise 
their affairs in accordance with only the law and practice 
recognised within the frontiers of their traditionally indepen­
dent chiefdoms. They can hardly think in terms of the so- 
called "States" forged out of the process of amalgamation*
1. Report by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom 
to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration 
of Togoland under British Mandate, 1936; Colonial No* 130;
p.2, paragraphs 8 and 9*
The Internal Political Structure; The du
The internal political structure of any unit of Ewe 
society is organized on the basis of a de-centralisation of 
authority. Each political unit is thus a microcosm or macro­
cosm of a hierarchical state, depending on its population 
strength.
The largest political unit is known as du in Ewe. In 
some dialects it is edu. Sometimes it is also referred to 
as duko; but duko is also a word used in reference to a nation, 
so that we have Ewe duko ("the Ewe people") and Ghana duko 
("the state of Ghana"). To avoid confusion, we shall confine 
ourselves to the word du, which is the more popular term.
What is the du? To find an apposite expression for it 
in the English language.has always been difficult."1' Some 
call it "town", which in a sense it is, especially in the few 
cases where all the divisions are grouped in one place; but 
this is unsatisfactory because it does not portray its 
political significance. In his Ewe-English dictionary, 
Westermann translates du as "1. village, town, together with 
the territory belonging to it; a chieftainship, 2. a foreign
1. That is perhaps why Barbara Ward says there is "confusion 
in the Ewe terminology". See B.E. Ward, op.cit.. p.216.
There is really no confusion in the terminology for those who 
speak the language; the difficulty of finding English equiva­
lents should not be confused with "a confusion".
town".^" However, as this is the same unit that both Spieth
2
and Westermann called st£mm in German, it has come to be 
known sometimes as "sub-tribe". Perhaps this is how the term 
sub-tribe crept into usage in relation to the Ewe, It is for 
instance used by Ward^ and other writers. The term, however, 
appears to be most inappropriate because the idea of a "sub­
tribe" postulates some major sub-division of a tribe, whereas 
the units so referred to are small settlements without any 
sub-tribal significance, A near analogy would be the inac­
curacy of referring to Bristol or Woking as a sub-tribe of 
England, or Aberdeen or Edinburgh as a sub-tribe of Scotland, 
Neither can we refer to Jamasi, Mampong or Ejisu as a sub­
tribe of Ashanti in Ghana, or Begoro as a sub-tribe of Akim 
Abuakwa,
The alternative would be to refer to the units as "states", 
which indeed they are within the contemplation of the customary 
law, insofar as politically each unit is autonomous and not 
subject to any other power. But this could be confused with
1, D. Westermann, Ewefiala or Ewe-English Dictionary, Dietrich 
Keimer (Ernst Vohsen)/ Berlin, 1928, p. 18.
2. The term "st&mm" in German is used passim by D, Westermann 
in his Die Glidyi-Ewe in Togo. Berlin, 1935, and by Jakob Spieth 
in his Die Ewe-St&mme, Berlin, 1906, and in other works by 
these scholars.
3. B.E. Ward, op.cit,. passim.
the modern "State11, as well as the "State11 in the Akan sense 
of popular usage in Ghana, Moreover it could cause an even 
greater confusion with the larger groupings or "States" formed 
in the Ewe area itself through the Colonial Administrations 
policy of amalgamation. The solution adopted by the Colonial 
Government was to designate the units as "divisions". The 
word "division" being a sufficiently neutral term, it could 
conveniently be applied to an area consisting of only one small 
unit as well as large ones with several settlements. One 
objection to this term, however, is that the du is politically 
an entity in its own right and not a division of any other 
unit.
It is suggested, if only for lack of a better terra, that 
we should refer to the du as a "chiefdom". The term "chiefdom" 
is suggested because the du is the largest political unit which 
is under the authority of a Head Chief. It is a term which by 
its very meaning gives due expression to the emphasis on the 
political aspect of the du as an autonomous political entity 
which is ruled by a Head Chief.
Among the Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana, the du
or "chiefdom" is the largest political unit. It is constituted
by people who are united politically under a recognised Head
Chief. It is a sine qua non that each du must have a Head
Chief; in other words, there is no du without a Head Chief or
an
Fiaga, In the political sense, the chiefdom or du is/autonomous,
sovereign and independent unit. The Head Chief, properly known 
as Fiaga. is its Paramount Huler, and the Fiaga is not subject 
to any other political superior.
The chiefdom occupies a definable land area over which 
the Fiaga has absolute jurisdiction and authority, including 
legislative, judicial and executive powers for the maintenance 
of the social and political order. In most cases, however, the 
divisions constituting the chiefdom are scattered over a 
stretch of land. In a recent interview with Togbe Addai Kwasi 
X, Fiaga of Awudome at Awudome-Anyirawase, he lamented that 
because his divisions of Tsito, Anyirawase and Avenui are 
separated from each other, there is a tendency to treat them 
as different towns whereas in fact they are only part of the 
seven divisions of his chiefdom of Awudome. It is still a 
single chiefdom, although its divisions are scattered. We 
would say, therefore, that each chiefdom-...- is a political unit 
which exists within a territorial framework.
Every chiefdom has a fixed and determinable population, 
though population census is unknown to the traditional rulers. 
Citizenship is ordinarily acquired only by birth and it seems 
that ordinarily it cannot be renounced by a voluntary act.^
j
In the past it would seem that citizenship could be acquired 
by settlement and integration, and it could also be lost through
1, The possible exceptions are through the customary form of 
naturalisation. See pp. 175" 174 infra.
slavery; but it is extremely doubtful whether these can apply 
today. Every citizen owes allegiance to the Fiaga. and serves 
the Fiaga through a lesser political authority. Allegiance to 
Fiaga is expressed for instance, in.an obligation to render 
military service in time of war, and a duty to join in communal 
labour to avert disaster or a calamity, and in operations to 
preserve the territorial integrity of the chiefdom. Generally 
the payment of tribute does not seem to be an Ewe practice..
Common descent is not necessary for the identification of 
the du or chiefdom. Indeed the idea of a common descent is 
hardly ever canvassed and it is certainly not a unifying fac­
tor. The du is a political' and not a kinship organisation.
In larger chiefdoms like Peki, Gbi, Anfoega, Kpando and Ho, the 
tradition rather seems to be that their numbers had been 
enlarged by a fusion of people of different ancestral origins.
It would seem, however, that the integration of new members 
into the community is no longer a continuing process. The 
once amorphous units have now become -stabilised with permanent 
populations, so that new members cannot now enter them en masse.
In view of what we have said of the du, we may describe 
it as a sovereign and autonomous political unit, united by the 
acceptance of. a common legal system and organised within a 
territorial framework, under a Head Chief or Fiaga. to whom all 
citizens owe their ultimate political allegiance. The citizens
need not, and usually do not, share a common descent. They are, 
however, clearly and fairly easily identifiable, in the Northern 
Ewe areas of Ghana by their respective dialects of the Ewe 
language. ^
Although each chiefdom is organised on the basis of a 
central political authority, it does not imply an absolute 
concentration of power at the centre as understood in the 
modern political concept of "democratic centralism". It only 
means that there is a central authority, from whom all subor­
dinate authorities derive their power. In the Ewe chiefdom, 
authority is largely decentralised with the devolution of 
powers and functions to the constituent divisions. For, 
structurally each chiefdom consists of a number of divisions 
which are known as duta or gbota. Each division has its own 
chief, the fia or "divisional chief". In practically all cases 
the divisions are scattered about with considerable distances 
separating them from each other and from the headquarters 
division. Effective administration, therefore, can only be 
in the hands of the divisional chief. The divisional chief 
has a free hand in the exercise of his political, administrative, 
judicial and executive functions; but in all these he remains
1. This may require a qualification. Some of the dialects 
are very similar, especially when a foreigner hears them. The 
dialects of Peki and Gbi (Hohoe), for example, are very iden­
tical though the two areas are separated by many miles and have 
many other chiefdoms lying between.them; but this is because 
Peki and Gbi constituted a single chiefdom until after the 
Notsie days.
answerable to the Fiaga and an appeal lies to the Fiaga from 
anybody aggrieved. The legislative power of the divisional 
chief is limited because generally the same rules of law are 
enforceable throughout the whole chiefdom, so that divisional 
legislation is void to any extent that it is repugnant to a 
generally applicable law. The Fiaga is not only a primus inter 
pares but a real political overlord. The fia or divisional 
chief is a vassal of the Fiaga. but curiously enough he is not 
appointed by him but by his own division. Every citizen serves 
the Fiaga through the fia of his own division.
The number of constituent divisions in any chiefdom varies 
according to size and population. A place like Woadze is only 
a single duta or division constituted into a chiefdom. This 
is, of course, an exceptional case; but it nevertheless 
presents a microcosm of the state structure because the Head 
Chief has subordinate chiefs under him. It may be a classic 
example of Fordefs "miniature state".^ A chiefdom like Awudome 
has seven divisions, Ho has four, Anfoega has twelve, Peki has
seven and Gbi formerly had seven but now has nine. The number
\
of divisions offers no index to the size or population of a 
chiefdom because a division may be a tiny settlement whereas
1. In a survey of traditional political systems in West Africa, 
Forde observes that "... they differ enormously in scale,
ranging from ..... populations of hundreds of thousands down
to miniature states in the size of a village". See D. Forde, 
"The Conditions of Social Development in West Africa", in 
Civilizations. (1953) Vol. Ill, No. P#V73#
others are very large; but it does mean that the Fiaga has 
many divisional chiefs under him.
The seat of administration is located in one of the 
divisions, v/here the Fiaga resides. The headquarters division 
of Anfoega is Anfoega-Akukome, that of Kpando is Kpando-Gabi, 
that of Awudome is Awudome-Anyirawase and that of Gbi is Gbi- 
Hohoe. In most places, like Kpando, Anfoega, Ho end Gbi, the 
Fiaga. in addition to his position as head of the whole chief­
dom, is also chief of his own division. Thus Togbe Gabusu is 
Fiaga of Gbi as well as fia of Gbi-Hohoe division; Togbe 
Dagadu is Fiaga of Kpando and at the same time the fia of the 
division of Kpando-Gabi. In Fodome the information is that 
the Fiaga has no direct divisional responsibility but.is 
responsible for the affairs of the chiefdom as a whole.
As between the different divisions of the chiefdom, there 
is a definite order of seniority inter se. This is reflected 
in the table of precedence as affecting the divisional chiefs 
or fiawo at state functions, where seniority is shown even 
in the sitting arrangements.
The above has been a description of the du or chiefdom 
in its political construction. This is irrespective of size 
because size is irrelevant, once there is the state structure 
exhibiting the essential form outlined above and there is a 
single regime of law applicable throughout the territory. It 
is as irrelevant as is the relative difference in the sizes of
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Gambia with a population of about 300,000, Togo with 1,660,000, 
Ghana with 8 million, and India with over 400 million people, 
when recognition is extended to each of these as sovereigh states 
in international law. Some of the Ewe chiefdoms, however, have 
not been relatively too small. For instance, the chiefdom of 
Gbi consisted of 7,822 people, Kpando had 7,661, Ho had 7,481 and 
Anfoega had 4,976 in 1948.^ The comparative figures for some 
Akan areas show that Sefwi-Bekwai had a population of 7,546, 
the Essumeja State (in Ashanti) had only 3,776 people and 
Eguafo State in the Cape Coast District (now Central Region) 
had only 3,208. In spite of the smallness of these sizes, 
these Akan areas were granted the "state11 status with their 
traditional rulers designated as "Paramount Chief". If the 
criterion was the size of population, then, on the basis of 
the figures, there could be no justification for not having 
recognised as "states" the chiefdoms of Gbi, Kpando, Ho,
Anfoega and the other larger ones within that population range. 
Perhaps it was due to a lack of proper understanding of the 
Northern Ewe political organisation.
1. The Gold Coast Population Census. 1948. Crown Agents, 
London, 1950.
2. Ibid. Other examples from Cape Coast District are 
Mankessim State with a population of 6,048, Esiam State 
with 3,704 and Hemang State with 1,356 in 1948.
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The Internal Political Structure: The Duta
We have said that each du or chiefdom consists of 
divisions which are known as duta or gbota (pi. dutawo and
gbotawo). The division is the unit for effective political 
administration. As far as the strict position of the Fiaga 
or Head Chief is concerned, this is the unit known to him and 
whose ruler, the fia. owes direct allegiance to him and is 
responsible to him. Every duta or division is, therefore, 
ruled by a fia or divisional chief, who is immediately sub­
ordinate to the Head Chief.
The duta or division, however, is an exact replica of 
the du or chiefdom in its political and administrative organ­
isation. For each division is again split for political and 
administrative purposes into smaller units which are called 
saa (pi. saawo). V/e may refer to the saa as a nsub-division11. 
Each saa or sub-division normally has its own chief, known as 
the saamefia or "sub-divisional chief”, who is responsible to 
the divisional chief as his immediate political overlord. The 
sub-divisional chief administers the affairs of his sub­
division only, while the divisional chief has the overall 
responsibility for the administration of the division as a 
v/hole. We see then, that the chiefdom is a macrocosm of the 
division in its hierarchial political structure and devolution 
of power.
The number of sub-divisions in any division is not 
fixed. To take examples from Gbi, Gbi-Wegbe has five sub­
divisions, Gbi-Kpeme has four, and Gbi-Hohoe (the capital) has 
four. The sub-divisions of Gbi-Kpeme are Wodevi, Asedukluvi, 
Daklovi and Kitivi; in Gbi-Hohoe they are Tokoni, Ahado,
Tsevi and Trevi..............................................
It has been pointed out that the constituent divisions 
of each chiefdom are usually separated from each other. It is
not so with the divisions. As a rule, each division is a com­
pact unit. All the inhabitants of each division live in one 
place, though they are organised into their component sub­
divisions. Therefore, unless one section is separated from 
the rest by natural or physical phenomena such as a marsh, 
lake or physical elevation, one should find the division or
duta as a single territorial unit.
The fact of the compactness of the division should not, 
however, give rise to any suggestion of a common descent for 
its members. For the division, like the chiefdom, is not a 
kinship but a political organisation. In Gbi-Hohoe, for 
example, there is no common descent of members of say the 
Ahado and Tokoni sub-divisions or any other sub-division for 
that matter; but they all dwell in the same place and are 
territorially identifiable as a single unit. It is perhaps 
only the fact of common local residence and the resulting 
facility of inter-marriage that make the inhabitants of a
division fairly closely related by both affinity and consan­
guinity.
Just as in the chiefdom as a whole we speak of seniority 
of the divisional chiefs, we see also that within the division 
itself the sub-divisional chiefs have their order of seniority 
inter se. If we look at the Gbi-Bla division of Gbi, we find 
that the ruling chief is Togbe Buami of the Tsrivi sub­
division, who is also the divisional chief of all Bla. The 
Tsrivi sub-division is thus the first in political superiority 
in Gbi-Bla. The next in order of seniority is the sub-division 
of Bla-nyigbe; and this is followed by Bla-dzigbe.
The normal position is, as we have stated, that each 
sub-division is ruled by a political head known as saamefia 
or sub-divisional chief; but there are exceptions. In Gbi- 
Kpeme in Gbi for example, the Kitivi sub-division has no sub- 
divisional chief. This means that this sub-division has no 
ancestral stool on which a chief can be installed. When this 
is the case, it seems that some other office of a comparative 
importance is reserved to the sub-division. In the Kitivi 
example, the sub-division has the constitutional privilege 
and responsibility of providing the tsiami ("spokesman” or 
"linguist") to the divisional chief of Gbi-Kpeme as a hereditary 
office.
The Internal Political Structure: The Saa.
Of the chiefdom and the division, we said that they are 
not kinship but political units. We cannot say the same of the 
sub-division or saa. a number of which constitute the division 
or duta. In the saa or sub-division we see the kinship organ­
ization dovetail into the political structure, so that we have 
a sort of a politico-kinship organization.
The word saa has not been found its appropriate English 
rendering. More often it has been translated as "clan". In 
so far as a "clan" means "a number of persons claiming descent 
from a common ancestor, and associated together","** it is 
difficult to argue that the term is inapplicable to the saa 
as constituted among the Northern Ewe. However, a long period 
of usage in Ghana has hallowed the word to such an extent that
it seems to have a special application to a different social
2
organisation among the neighbouring Akan of Ghana. Among the 
Akan, the "clan", though its unity and identification is the 
belief in descent from a common mystical ancestress, does not 
involve a common local residence of members. The genealogical 
tree in all cases is lost, so that a member of, say, the "Asona
1. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary.
2. See, e.g. R.S. Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution. 
Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1929. pp.6>2-71 et passim; J.bT Danquah. 
Akan Laws and Customs. Routledge, London, 1928, pp. 243-2 and 
K.A. Busia, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political 
System of Ashanti. Oxford University Press, London, 1951? PP# 
85-86. .
clan" of Jumapo in New Juaben cannot establish any blood 
relationship between himself and another member of that clan 
in Mampongten in Ashanti or even in Effiduasi in the same 
New Juaben. The Akan "clan" is in effect only a sort of 
fraternity traversing political boundaries and having local 
chapters in the multitude of settlements in the Akan area.
It is, therefore, inappropriate to apply the same terminology 
to what the Ewe call saa. For, among the Ewe, members of the 
same saa live close to each other in the same sector of the 
division.
Among the Ewe, the saa is a unit which has kinship and 
political facets in a harmonious combination. In its political 
aspect, it is the major component into which every division or 
duta is broken for political administration. For this reason,' 
each saa has political officers answerable to the divisional 
chief; for the Ewe saa is organised only within the territ­
orial limits of a division of a chiefdom. In this sense it 
obviously bears no resemblance to the "clan" in the Akan sense 
of a dispersed membership throughout all Akan areas and without 
any political functionaries devoted to clan affairs.
In the kinship aspect of its organisation, the saa. in 
a rather superficial sense, is likely to be taken to resemble 
the "clan" of the Akans. The reason is that the basis of the 
organisation of the Ewe saa is the descent of all its members 
from a common ancester. The difference, however, is that 
while the Akan theory of common descent is mystical, the common
descent of members of the saa in Eweland is real. There is 
no Akan citizen who can relate his genealogical connection 
with the founding ancestors of his "clan11. On the other hand, 
among the Ewe, even if some of the connecting links are mis­
sing, the important personalities of the past can all be named, 
thus forming a coherent line of descent traced to the founding 
ancestor of the saa. While the "clan" of the Akan is totemistic, 
the Ewe saa is devoid of totemism and is usually named after 
its founding ancestor. As examples, the saawo known as 
Asedukluvi and Wodevi in Gbi Kpeme in Gbi were founded by 
Aseduklu and Wode respectively. The suffix "-vi" , which here 
means "children of", is added to the name of the founder to 
denote the name of the saa. To take the example of the 
Asedukluvi saa of Gbi-Kpeme in Gbi, the originator of the unit 
was Asedu. The only son of Asedu was Klu, who was, therefore, 
known as Aseduklu or "Klu, the son of Asedu". The man Aseduklu 
became very important for the group because he was the fore­
bear of the three great grandfathers who mark the point at 
which the families crystallised. Members of this saa are, 
therefore, known as "Asedukluviewo" or "Asedukluvitowo", which 
means "the children of Aseduklu".
Continuing with.the Asedukluvi saa. we are told that 
after Aseduklu we come to his descendants known as Amega Edze, 
Katsriku and Atifufu. These three are the founders of the 
three families or dzotinuwo constituting the saa. Taking it 
from these great grandfathers, each member of the Asedukluvi
saa can trace his descent directly to the present generation 
through one of the three family heads. Amega Edze, with his 
paternal brother Ativoe, gave birth to Ave, Ave-Klu, Ave- 
Klutse, Edze Kosi, Kondobre, Eko, Dogbe, Nuvor, Gbogblovor and 
others. These and their patrilineal descendants are known as 
Amega Edzeviwo. The Katsriku-viwo include such names as Kudzi, 
Osai, Dade, Yordor, Kotoku and others; and Atifufuviwo are 
Danjfrtsu, Agbodo, Soklitor, Akator and others. In the Asedukluvi 
saa. Amega Edze founded a stool and became the sub-divisional 
chief or saamefia of all Asedukluvi. The descendants of Amega 
Edze, or Amega Edzeviwo, are, therefore, the ruling house of 
the Asedukluvi sub-division.
It is suggested that this scheme of direct relationship
of members of the saa is typical of all the Northern Ewe-speaking
people of Ghana. The same neat and coherent genealogical line 
* '
was related to me in all places in my personal interviews.
These are not the only points at which the Ewe saa differs 
from the Akan "clan". Membership of the saa usually implies 
common local residence in a part of the territorial area of a 
.division. In each division it is normally possible to identify 
the saa or sub-division physically; for it used to be the rule 
that all members of the same saa built closely near each other. 
So, in Gbi-Kpeme in Gbi, for example, one can say "I am going 
to Asedukluvi" or Wodevi; similarly in Gbi-Hohoe one may say 
"I am just returning from Ahado, and will pass Tsevi before I 
get to my house in Tokoni". Such territorial integrity is not
associated with the Akan-type "clan".
Since the members of the saa are, as a rule, to be found 
occupying specific areas of each division, one may wish to call 
the unit a "quarter" in English. This is the term that Ollennu 
uses in describing the Ga political and social organisation.
As far as the Ewe are concerned the only objection to its use 
is that the term "quarter" does not adequately portray the 
political aspect of the unit as part of a division. It is 
proposed, therefore, to call the saa a "sub-division" in English, 
to emphasise that it is the major component of the division.
The saa or "sub-division", because it is, in addition to 
its kinship nature, also a political unit, has certain political 
offices. The first is that it is headed, as a rule, by a chief, 
though of a lesser authority, known as saamefia (i.e. chief of 
the saa). We may call him "sub-divisional chief" or "divisional 
sub-chief". As the sub-division is the unit through which the 
divisional chief rules his division, the saamefia or sub- 
divisional chief owes a direct allegiance to the divisional 
chief or fia. A few of the sub-divisions have no sub-divisional 
chiefs; but, as pointed out earlier, such sub-divisions have 
other traditional offices in lieu of chieftainship.
The sub-divisional chief or saamefia has a stool and is 
enstooled in almost exactly the same manner as the superior 
chiefs. A sub-divisional chief, however, is the lowest grade 
of chief known to the Ewe. His stool is the lowest in the 
hierarchy. Nevertheless, the saamefia is also addressed by
the same title of Togbe which is used for the divisional and 
head chiefs. The rank and position- of a chief addressed as 
"Togbe So-and-So" can, therefore, only be revealed by enquiry.
In addition to the saamefia or sub-divisional chief, there 
is also another functionary who partakes in the administration 
of the sub-division. He is the ametsitsi, or properly saame* 
metsitsi, which means "the elder of the sub-division". The 
ametsitsi is not a chief, but an elder; therefore he has no 
stool and there is no formal ceremony of induction for him.
The office rotates among the families or dzotinuwo which con­
stitute the sub-division. He is in the position of a "father" 
to the whole membership of the sub-division, rather by an appeal 
to kinship ties than to the political allegiance that is due to 
a chief.
The sub-division or saa itself, though the smallest 
political unit, is not indivisible. For every sub-division is 
composed of a number of families, known in places as dzoti or 
dzotinu. The families or dzotinuwo are kinship and not political 
units, each of which is headed by an elder who is directly 
responsible for its members1 protection and welfare. This unit 
and its elder will be referred to again in our discussion on 
the family and property.
The Position Of The Chief
The political as well as social organisation of the 
Northern Ewe-speaking people,of Ghana hinges on the institution 
of chieftaincy. The symbol of office of an Ewe chief is the 
stool (kpukpo or ziknui). as among the neighbouring Akan of 
Ghana. The stool is known as kpukpo or reverently as togbe 
kpukpo,^  Sometimes it is called fia kpukpo; however, as
kpukpo in Ewe means "a seat" or "a stool", this is likely to
be confused with the actual stool on which the chief sits.
The name togbe kpukpo. which really means "ancestral stool" 
is, therefore, the proper one for referring to the sacred 
symbol of office on which the chief actually never sits and 
which is, in fact, never exposed to public view. Every Ewe 
chief of whatever status must have a stool or togbe kpukpo.
The togbe kpukpo is considered as containing and symbol­
izing the soul of the people. Because of its identification 
with the great forebears and because the soul of the people is 
considered as enshrined in it, it is regarded as being of some 
spiritual potency. Hence, although it is wrong to equate it
with fetish or tro. it has its own rituals. It is regarded
as possessing the power of succour and protection for all who 
seek its refuge in times of adversity and to promote fertility
1. Kpukpo is the dialect form for the Northern Ewe of Ghana.
In the literary Ewe it is zikpui; so we would have fiazikpui 
and togbui zikpui.
in barren women, among other things. Persons embarking on 
distant journeys or hazardous enterprises, or those in quest 
of general prosperity, longevity or fertility, or requiring 
any type of spiritual intervention, say prayers by libation 
to the stool. Vows are made to it and are usually paid in 
sheep, fowls and.eggs on the realization of one’s wishes.
The office of chief at any level of the hierarchy is both 
hereditary and elective. It is hereditary in the sense that 
eligibility for election is determined solely by patrilineal 
membership of the ruling house by birth. The definition of 
the ruling house for this purpose, however, has not been without 
difficulty. Normally there is not much doubt about which saa 
or sub-division contains the ruling house; but there is often 
a dispute as to which family within the sub-division is entitled 
to fill the office. Often the substance of such disputes is 
that one of the families in the acknowledged sub-division 
claims an exclusive right to the stool, while others contend 
that succession to the office is on a rotatory basis within 
the families of the sub-division.'*' In view of the controversy 
in many areas on this point, all that can be said as a general 
proposition is that in certain chiefdoms a particular family 
in a sub-division constitutes the ruling house exclusively,
1. Usually there are three or four families in each sub­
division or saa. but this is variable.
while in others the ruling house consists of an entire sub­
division or saa. so that each of the constituent families 
takes its turn in offering a candidate for the stool when a 
vacancy occurs through death, deposition or abdication."1'
In addition to the hereditary element, the office of 
chief at all levels is elective, and there cannot, therefore, 
be an heir-apparent. Once a vacancy occurs on the stool, 
every male member of the entitled ruling house, adult as well 
as infant, is prima facie eligible for election to fill the 
vacancy. The final determinants are the general personal 
qualities of the individual as assessed according to the 
opinion of the "king-makers", who are the principal elders of 
the ruling house. Physical deformity as such is not a disqual­
ification. The election itself is not a process involving the 
votes of all the subjects, nor even of all the members of the 
ruling house, but a secret choice by concensus among the king­
makers. The choice is made at a secret meeting and the 
deliberations are not disclosed. The electors do not assign 
reasons for preferring a particular candidate; but, depending
1. In Larteh-Ahenease in Akwapim, where the Benkumhene of 
Akwapim comes from, the office rotates between Obrentiri,
Owurae and Ntow families,. See D.W. Brokensha, Social Change 
at Larteh. Ghana. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1966, pp.109-110.
2. The election meeting is secret in Larteh also. See D.W. 
Brokensha, op.cit.. pp.112-113# The secret process in Larteh 
and among the Ewe is in contrast with the open and public 
election of Chiefs in Ashanti and some other Akan areas as 
reported in e.g. K.A. Busia, op.cit.. pp.9-13#
on the category of chief, the choice must he acceptable to 
the subordinate chiefs and elders of all the divisions, sub­
divisions or families over which the chief is to rule. The 
leaders of the youth or sohewo are also consulted in secrecy. 
Because of the secrecy of the elective process it is difficult 
for ambitious individuals to canvass directly for their election, 
thus minimising the dangers inherent in open competition for 
election. The secrecy of the election also ensures that the 
chief-elect does not flee the realm; for, as a rule, there is 
unwillingness to hold the office of chief among the Ewe and 
candidates would run away on knowing of their choice for the 
office. The reasons for the unwillingness to serve include 
the fact that the exercise of the powers and functions of the 
office is very much circumscribed through control by the elders 
and other dignitaries. Furthermore, stool property among the 
Ewe is so meagre that the stool occupant cannot be sustained 
in comfortable circumstances from such property. The new chief 
is not made aware of his election until he is suddenly and
forcibly seized and daubed with a traditionally sacred white
1clay. He is then taken into customary confinement for the 
week-long installation ceremonies and rituals.
1. Similar to the Larteh custom; but among the Ewe any part of 
the body, and not only the right arm, may be daubed with the 
white clay. See D.W. Brokensha, op.cit.. pp.113, 11*+*
7k*
Because the Ewe chief occupies an ancestral stool in
which are enshrined the soul of his people,^ he stands between
the living and the dead. For this reason his person is inviolate
and sacred, and he has to observe some taboos and traditional
avoidances. For this reason also he is connected with some
rituals and ceremonial sacrifices, such as the purification of
his ancestral stool; but his sacerdotal functions are minimal
2
even if they exist at all.
The chief combines in his person the legislative, 
executive and judicial functions of the realm. The Ewe chief, 
however, is not an autocrat; for on important issues he acts 
only on the advice of his traditionally constituted council.
A chief who persistently refuses to heed such advice quickly 
risks the sanction of deposition. The chief, however, is not 
outside the council which "advises" him but personally presides 
over the sessions of that council in its deliberative, executive, 
legislative and judicial capacities.
Every Ewe chief has a spokesman or tsiami. The chief on 
all formal occasions addresses the public through his spokesman 
or tsiami.
In addition every chief has an official known as fiato. 
zikpuito or kpukpoto. He is legally the "owner of the stool" 
and stands in loco parentis to the chief. The stool is kept
1. This notion existed among the Ewe in pre-Notsie days and 
before Akan contact. See, e.g. D.K. Fiawoo, op.cit., p.3^ -.
2. A similar view is expressed in B.E. Ward, op.cit.. pp. 
2*f2-2i+3.
by him and he is responsible for the custody and administration 
of other stool property. For reasons unknown he has come to be 
referred to as "stool-father". When the stool is vacant or the 
chief is absent or incapable of discharging his functions, the 
"stool-father" becomes the locum tenens.
Women may not be chiefs in Eweland in the sense of ruling 
the whole realm including the men. The Ewe women, however, have 
a traditional office to themselves alone. We, therefore, have 
tke nyonufia. which may be translated as the "chief of the 
women".^  Often she is referred to in English as "queen mother", 
which she is not. Normally the nyonufia or "chief of the women" 
has no stool; but the office is both hereditary and elective in 
exactly the same sense as the office of a male chief. She is 
also installed with a specially adapted ceremonial formality as 
a chief. She has her own female tsiami or spokesman and, on 
proper occasions, is accompanied by a retinue of women.
The function of the nyonufia is that, subject to the 
authority of the male chief, she has jurisdiction over all 
the female members of the community as their chief and she 
represents them. There is, therefore, a nyonufia at all levels 
that we have male chiefs, that is at the chiefdom, divisional 
and sub-divisional levels. The hierarchical structure is 
exactly the same as for male chiefs so that the position of the
1. Cf. the iyalode. the chief of women among the Yoruba of 
Nigeria. See A.K. Ajisafe, The Laws and Customs of the Yoruba 
People. Poutledge and Sons, London, 1924, PP.19-20 and D. 
Westermann, The African Today and Tomorrow. International 
African Institute, London, 1934, p.110.
nyonufia at any level corresponds exactly to that of the male 
chief of her unit. This is because the same ruling house that 
provides the actual chief also provides the nyonufia. So if a 
nyonufia is from the family of the divisional chief, then she 
is of divisional status and will, therefore, have sub-divisional 
nyonufiawo under.her. ...........................................
The Ewe Legal System
As has been observed by many writers on the subject, there 
are many similarities in the essentials of customary lav/s through 
out the entire African continent.^ The laws of the Ewe are not 
an exception.
However, such generalizations about African customary 
laws, while true in-so-far as we consider only the essentials 
of the legal framework and the legal rules, can be misleading 
if pressed too far. Quite often, by a classification of the 
peoples of Africa on ethnic and linguistic bases, we hear of 
Akan, Yoruba or Ewe customary law. The tendency is to presume 
that "Yoruba customary law", for instance, would uniformly 
apply throughout the whole of the land peopled by the Yoruba.
A closer examination would in most cases reveal that below the 
superficial appearance of similarity are concealed the diver­
gencies and variations of detail. When, for instance, we 
examine the so-called "Ewe customary law", we realise that it
1. See, e.g. T.O. Elias, The Nature of African Customary Law. 
Manchester University Press. 1936. pp.8-9 et passim.
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is subject to local variations in the several areas. Particularly, 
as the Northern Ev;e-speaking people of Ghana are not organised 
on large territorial basis like the Ashanti, their legal systems 
are more easily susceptible to local variations.
We may, therefore, ask ourselves whether we can legitim­
ately speak of an Ewe customary law or an Ewe customary legal 
system. It is submitted that, in a sense, we cannot; for to 
think of "Ewe customary law" as a uniform body of ascertainable 
laws applying throughout all Eweland would be erroneous. What 
we have in Eweland, particularly in the northern part which lies 
in Ghana, are separate bodies of customary laws, albeit generally 
similar, which have been evolved, and are recognised, by the 
people in their respective chiefdoms.
Now, as we have tried to explain, the Northern Ewe-speaking 
people of Ghana are organised in politically centralised chief­
doms, each chiefdom, however small, constituting a traditional 
state with all the incidents of political sovereignty. As every 
Ewe chiefdom constitutes an autonomous traditional territorial 
state, it is regulated by its own system of laws. The du or 
chiefdom, then, is the entity which we may designate as a 
customary law area. For the du or chiefdom is the largest unit 
which is politically, united under a .Fiaga or Head Chief, who is 
not himself subject to any other political overlord. Con­
sequently this is also the largest unit which is subject to the 
same regime of laws because political authority is combined 
with judicial and legislative power in the traditional Ewe
administration. We, therefore, have as many systems of law 
as there are chiefdoms or duwo, Hence, when we speak of the 
customary law in Eweland, it may often be necessary to identify 
with some certainty the area or locality within which a specified 
rule of lav/ is applicable. This is a problem particularly en­
countered among the Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana because 
of the proliferation of small but independent and autonomous 
chiefdoms,
The Ewe express the political philosophy of the sovereignty 
of each chiefdom, and its corresponding right to determine its 
own set of lav/s, in the aphorism dusiadu kple efe koklo koko.
This means literally that each chiefdom has its own mode of 
dressing its chicken for the table. Its underlying philosophy 
is that each du or chiefdom, being sovereign and autonomous, is 
unfettered in devising its own mechanism for the ordering of its 
political, social, economic and legal systems as well as its 
conventions and usages. This, of course, is only an early Ewe 
recognition of the essence of sovereignty in modern political 
thought.
We have tried to point out that, since the legal order is 
necessarily one facet of political sovereignty, among the 
Northern Ewe of Ghana who consist of a congeries of small, 
independent chiefdoms, we encounter a different set of customary 
lav; rules as we pass from one chiefdom to another. In other 
v/ords, each customary law area in Ghana’s Northern Eweland is 
co-terminous with a chiefdom. Insofar as the differences are
sufficiently pronounced in the opinion of the sages of old to 
justify the dictum of dusiadu kple efe koklo koko. it is sub­
mitted that we cannot speak of "Ewe customary law" as a corpus 
juris. Instead of "Ewe customary law" we have only Ewe 
customary laws.
It is realised that by emphasising the autonomous 
character of each of the Ewe chiefdoms, with its separate 
system of laws, the impression may be given that the Ewe people 
have nothing in common in their jurisprudence. Strictly and 
theoretically, it would be correct to accept such separateness 
and distinctiveness, because the authorities of one chiefdom 
have no legal power or other direct means to procure the enact­
ment, repeal or amendment of laws in another area. However, 
since all Ewe enjoy a measure of cultural homogeneity and a 
similarity of social organisation, a broad similarity of rules 
is discernible. Customary lav/, perhaps more than any other 
type of law, is usually an expression of the mores of the people 
and their modes of life, and these are being continuously 
formulated and adapted to the changes, resulting, inter alia, from 
intercourse with people in other areas. Linguistic ties and 
territorial contiguity make contact between Northern Ewe people 
of different chiefdoms a matter of course, and this naturally 
generates a unifying process in the evolution of their customary 
lav/s. As a natural result, certain customary law rules are of 
general application in Eweland. An example is the one of common
knowledge that, generally,>succession to property and traditional 
offices among the Ev/e people is along the patrilineal line of 
descent. In this sense we can speak of "Ewe customary law" 
when we employ that expression in contradistinction to the laws 
of, say, the Akan or the Ga of Ghana, in order to demarcate a 
broad area for an applicable lav/.• Otherwise we'can only speak 
of Ewe customary lav/s.
The Legislative and Judicial Process
The chief combines in himself not only political authority 
but also legislative, judicial and executive functions. The 
chief, however, is only a personification of the sovereignty 
of the state. As such, he is not a personal ruler who can decree 
laws or hand down decisions according to his own personal wishes 
alone. For, in the discharge of his functions, he is advised 
by a council consisting of certain officials, the principal 
elders and members representing the main political units and 
families within his domain. More often than not, the decrees
T
promulgated by the chief, and verdicts delivered by him in his 
judicial capacity, are those decided by him and his council.
We may even state it in more practical terms that the chief acts 
only in accordance with the advice tendered by his council. 
Decisions taken or orders issued by the chief may, therefore, 
properly be regarded as having been taken or issued by the 
nchief-in-council!l.
The chief-in-council may on occasion promulgate specific 
legislation. This is a form of direct legislation, and 
tradition sometimes ascribes certain laws to particular chiefs 
of the past. Legislation of this type, when approved by the 
chief-in-council is publicly proclaimed by the sounding of the 
"gong-gong” to announce the new law. Owing to the principle 
of consultation between members of the chief’s council and those 
whom they represent, such' legislation hardly takes the people by 
surprise. The "gong-gong” then is a formality almost equivalent 
to publication in the Government Gazette to constitute public 
and official notification of the enactment. With central govern­
ment interfering in most of the fields of activity in modern 
times, the volume and frequency of such direct legislation has 
been very severely curtailed. These days it is more common to 
hear the announcement of specific orders, such as an order by 
the local chief requiring all the inhabitants to clear the foot­
path leading to the village’s source of water supply on a 
specified day. Such an order, though apt to be confused with 
direct legislation, is not one; it may be regarded as approach­
ing executive orders in a modern state. The legislative and 
executive functions are carried out by virtually the same 
personnel acting in different capacities.
The chief is the supreme judge of his people; but, again, 
he discharges his judicial functions with the assistance of his 
council of practically the same composition. In addition, on 
most occasions when the chief sits in his judicial capacity,
most of the important male personalities, whether members of 
the chief’s council or not, join in the deliberations. Because 
almost the whole of the adult male population would be partaking 
in the adjudication upon the issue being tried, it is difficult 
to mis-state the law. When a miscarriage of justice does occur, 
it is usually in relation to the acceptance of the facts or the 
application of the law thereto; scarcely can it arise from the 
exposition of the law, because the Ewe law does not lie only in 
"the bosom" of the chief.
The presence of the entire population and the members of 
the chief's council does not detract from the chief's position 
as the custodian of the judicial power of the people. Charges 
and complaints are lodged through the appropriate channels to 
him personally. The issues are not merely tried by judicial 
officers exercising the chief's authority as do the Queen’s 
judges in England. The Ev/e chief must be personally present 
and physically preside over the trial or settlement, which 
would take place in his courtyard or the open place reserved 
for public gatherings (call it "market place" if you like). A 
wise chief, however, reserves his own personal views on the 
merits until most people have expressed their views so that, 
after consulting silently with his principal advisers, his 
verdict reflects a consensus of opinion at the tribunal.
The judicial power of the traditional chief has been sub­
stantially eroded away by the imposition of colonial rule and
the resulting emergence of the modern state of Ghana. As a
result of a series of Courts Acts,"** the tribunal of the chief
has been reduced to the status of an arbitral tribunal because
it lies outside the hierarchy of the statutory courts estab-
plished-under these enactments. Much as one regrets it, it may 
cause confusion if the chief's tribunal is still referred to as 
a court. To avoid such confusion, the judicial sessions of the 
chief-in-council may be referred to as a "tribunal", being a 
somewhat neutral word.
The great bulk of Ewe customary laws emerge from the 
sessions of the chief’s tribunals rather than through a series 
of direct promulgations of specific pieces of legislation. The 
tribunal normally conducts its sessions in public. Practically 
every adult male citizen, not necessarily a member of the 
chief's council, is entitled to attend the important sessions
1. At first the Courts Ordinances, then the Courts Act, I960, 
and now the Courts Decree, 1966 (N.L.C. Decree No..84).
2. This is not a problem of only the Ewe but of all Ghana.
The power of a chief in arbitration in Ghana is contained in 
Section 5 of the Chieftaincy Act, 1961 (Act 8l) which says 
simply that "The power of any chief to act extra-judicially . 
as an arbitrator under customary law in any dispute in respect 
of which the parties thereto consent is hereby preserved". If 
consent be the basis of a chief's power of arbitration, then 
the Section is hardly necessary because any person in Ghana, 
whether a chief or not, may act as arbitrator if the parties 
consent to his so acting. The fallacy of the Section, however, 
is that the "power" of a chief "under customary lav;" was not 
of "arbitration" but of an enforceable determination of dis­
putes which was not conditional on the voluntary submission
of the defendant.
and examine parties and witnesses. Every citizen of any sex and 
age may attend and listen to the proceedings. Precedent plays a 
very important role, and the tribunal is always anxious to 
examine cases in the light of the rules and directives handed 
down from the great grandfathersWhere no known rule exists 
in the customary.law area, or where an existing rule manifestly 
works injustice, the tribunal is guided by the methods of 
solution adopted elsewhere. New rules are formulated in this 
way, and existing ones are thus being constantly reviewed and 
adapted to changing circumstances, novel situations and factual 
problems through a process of "legislation by adjudication".
By this process, which is almost equivalent to the English law 
doctrine of "judicial precedent", an exposition of the law on 
a variety of subjects is publicly made regularly, and the 
younger generation goes through its traditional form of free 
legal education.
In the same manner that there is a pyramidal organisation 
of the political power structure, there is also in Ewe law a 
hierarchy of tribunals. In practice, the services of any 
reputable person may be requested for the settlement of any 
dispute or misunderstanding. This may not be a judicial pro­
ceeding in the strict sense; otherwise it should be the base 
of the pyramid. The next is the tribunal of the ametsitsi
1. The Ewe say xoxoa nu wogbina yeyea do. that is "the new 
is grafted onto the old and fashioned after it".
(also known as saame1metsitsi) or the elder of the sub-division. 
The ametsitsi is not a chief, but his power to hold ‘tribunals is 
indisputable. The next in the hierarchy is the tribunal of the 
sub-divisional chief or saamefia. Above the sub-divisional chief 
is the divisional chief's tribunal. Finally we come to the 
tribunal of the Fiaga or Head Chief, which is the highest 
tribunal of the land.
The right of appeal lies normally from a lower tribunal 
to a higher one, so that a citizen aggrieved by the decision of, 
say, the divisional chief of Anfoega-Dzana may appeal to the 
Fiaga's tribunal at Anfoega-Akukome, In practice, however, 
almost all the appellate tribunals have both appellate and 
original jurisdictions of a concurrent nature. Hence a citizen 
of the division of Kpando-Dzigbe may elect either to sue directly 
in the tribunal of the divisional chief, Togbe Asumadu, or come 
there by way of an appeal from a decision of his saamefia or 
sub-divisional chief. Similarly, in certain cases, especially 
in serious cases, the matter may be brought directly to the 
tribunal of the Fiaga, the highest tribunal in the land, without 
a journey through the lower tribunals. Indeed it seems to be 
the rule that where it is a serious offence such as murder, the 
lower tribunals have no jurisdiction and the matter must be 
brought directly and immediately to the tribunal of the Fiaga 
who only has the power vitae necisque. In the same way, certain 
types of cases are above the jurisdiction of both the sub- 
divisional chief and the sub-divisional elder or ametsitsi, so
that they can only be started in the divisional chief's tribunal 
as a tribunal of first instance.
The Ewe method of legislation by adjudication is not a 
peculiar one. It is common to most of Africa, and this was the 
foundation process for the development of the English common 
law. However, as already mentioned, when it is coupled with 
the fact of the smallness of the sizes of the agglomeration of 
independent chiefdoms that inhabit the Northern Eweland of 
Ghana, we have a large number of customary law areas marked out 
from each other. Our study of the customary laws of the Northern 
Ewe-speaking people of Ghana will, therefore, impose on us the 
difficult task of often identifying our propositions with 
particular areas. . Attempts will be made to state general 
propositions of the law; but, over such a large land area, 
local variations exist which we may have to take into account.
CHAPTER III
THE FAMILY
The Nature of the Ewe Family
The family is the central institution in the customary 
lav/s of Ghana. It permeates every branch of the customary lav/, 
ranging from marriage, domestic authority, legal transactions 
and legal proceedings to succession and rights in property of 
all kinds. In all these cases the family features prominently.
In particular, in any discussion of the lav/ of property in Ghana, 
the family is a very important unit because of the concept of 
family property. Although the notion of family property is not 
very developed among the Ewe, yet the composition and nature of 
the family as well as its-interest in property, whether ancestral 
or self-acquired, is very relevant to the Ewe law of property.
For, whether the property is family property or one in which the 
family has a vested or contingent interest, may profoundly affect 
or even determine the individual's interest therein, as well as 
his power of alienation inter vivos and his testamentary capacity.
In English law the family is of a comparatively minor 
importance. Perhaps this accounts for the uncertainties about 
the meaning of the term "family", both in law and in non-technical
usage. The ordinary, non-legal meaning of "family11 in English, 
what we may call the dictionary meaning, is that it embraces 
only a man and his wife and their children, possibly adding 
domestic servants.^ In some cases this comes very close to the 
legal definition of the family, especially in the construction 
of wills. For instance, in Re Terry1s Will. Romilly, M.R., said:
I have looked into the authorities, which have 
confirmed the opinion which I entertained during the 
argument, that the primary meaning of the word 'family1
is 'children', and that there must be some peculiar
circumstances, arising either on the will itself or 
from the situation of the parties, to prevent that 
construction being given to it. In ordinary parlance, 
the word 'family' means children. 2
In other cases, however, it has been held that the word "family"
when used in English law is susceptible of a wider interpret­
ation to include brothers and sisters,-^ illegitimate children^ 
and others. In family arrangements under English law it has
been held that the family is a wide one which includes illeg-
6itimate members and persons yet to be born.
In most recent English statutes the word "family" appears 
to be avoided; thus in legislation for such purposes as income 
tax, immigration, intestate estates and family provisions there
1. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary.
2. Re Terry's Will. (1854) 19 Beav. 580, 581.
3. Price V. Gould.. (1930) 143 L.T. 333, 334.
4. Humble v. Bowman. (1877) 47 L.J. Ch. 62, 6 5.
5. Blackwell v. Bull. (1836) 1 Keen 176, 181.
6. Stapilton v. Stapilton. (1739) 1 Atk. 2, 5; Re New«(l901)
2 Ch. 534.
seems to be a preference for specific references to "husband",
"wife", "son" and "daughter". Where the word "family" is used, 
its statutory definition varies from Act to Act. In the Work­
men's Compensation Act, 1925, for instance, the statute gave the 
family an exhaustive list of members by providing that:
member of a family means wife or husband, father, 
mother, grandfather, grandmother, stepfather, step­
mother, son, daughter, grandson, granddaughter, 
stepson, stepdaughter, brother, sister, half- 
brother, half-sister. 1
In legislation covering family allowances the statutory defin­
ition says:
A family consists of a man and his wife living 
together, any phild or children being the issue of 
both or either* of them, and any child or children 
being maintained by them. 2
This is a much narrower meaning than under the Workmen's 
Compensation Act, 1925. In contrast to all these, however, is 
the wide meaning given to the word "family" in other cases.
As an example, it was held that in an Order-in-Council to dis­
continue burials in a churchyard except to "members of families
3
of parishioners", "families" was equivalent to descendants.
The term "family law" in English law, however, primarily 
covers the husband-wife relationship, together with the children 
of the union. Because of these differences in meaning, in his
1. Section k of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1925 (15 &'l6 
Geo. 5, c.84).
2. Section 3(1) of the Family Allowances Act, 1965 (Eliz. 2, 
c^59).
3. Re Sargent. (1890) 15 P.D. 168.
work on English family law, Bromley says:
The word 'family1 is one which it is difficulty if 
not impossible, to define precisely. In one sense it 
means all blood relations who are descended from a 
common ancestor; in another it means all the members 
of a household, including husband and wife, children, 
servants and even lodgers. But for the present pur­
pose both these definitions are far too wide ... 1
Bromley, therefore, decided on a narrower definition and is
content to say that for his purposes the family may be regarded
as:
a basic social unit which consists normally of a 
husband and wife and their children. 2
This view of English family law concentrates on the law of 
marriage and domestic relations, including marital duties, 
rights and obligations, divorce, legitimacy, adoption, and 
custody of children and similar matters. To most people, 
therefore, family law means the law of domestic relations.
Most Africans, and certainly the Ewe, do not understand 
the family to mean "a man, his wife and children” . The con­
cept of a family consisting of just a man., his wife and children 
does not exist among the Ewe. It is not surprising, therefore, 
that the Ewe language has no single word for the "family11 in 
the ordinary dictionary meaning of that English word. The only 
accurate way to express the ordinary, non-legal English meaning 
of "family" to an illiterate Ewe without misleading him is to 
give the composition of the unit by saying nutsu. esro kple
1. P.M. Bromley, Family Law. Butterworths, London, 1966, p.l.
2. Ibid.
eviawo. that is !,a man, his wife and children11 # However, the 
word "family" is commonly used in Ghana, both in law and in 
social relations, and the meaning ascribed to it seems to vary 
according to each community. Among the Northern Ewe-speaking 
people of Ghana the unit known as the family is the dzotinu. 
Members of the dzotinu are in principle descended patrilineally 
from a common ancestor and they constitute a corporate entity 
in Ewe law for the purposes of title to certain property, 
entitlement to hereditary offices and some other privileges 
and obligations. This is generally a large unit. In all cases 
it consists of a number of households or sections, and it is 
far larger than a group consisting of just a man, his wife and 
children. It is such a large unit that members of the same 
dzotinu or family may inter-marry.
This wide but special meaning of the term "family" is not 
confined to the Ewe but applies generally throughout Ghana,
The word "family", therefore, has become a term of art in 
Ghanaian lav;. However, there is a great confusion about the 
ambit of the term. Often one finds that neither the Ghanaian 
courts nor the Ghanaian lawyers are clear in their minds when 
they use the term "family". In different circumstances they 
seem to ascribe different meanings to the word even in the same 
context of succession to interests in property. Sometimes it 
is used to refer to only the children and descendants of a 
living or a deceased person, thus embracing only several persons.
T] E.g, In re Eburahim. (1953) 3 W.A.L.R. 317; Ennin v. Pratt," 
(1959) G.L.H. kk and Larkai v. Amorkor. (1933) 1 W.A.C.A. 323.
At other times the word "family” is used in reference to a 
much larger group of persons, the descendants of a remote 
ancestor.'*' Perhaps this is because the "family" has a dif­
ferent meaning in every community, so that the Ga conception 
is different from, say, the Akan, the Dagbani or Ewe conception. 
This is the source of the bewildering confusion of attempting 
to draw a distinction between the so-called "immediate" and 
"wider" families. The composition of the unit, therefore, is 
not clear when in Ghanaian law mention is made of the "family". 
There should, however, be no confusion in Ewe law if it is 
borne in mind that among the Ewe the family is the dzotinu.
In saying that the family is the dzotinu among the Ew^^_ 
we are giving the word "family" a special meaning. It is not 
the family .within the context of the law of domestic relations. 
We are, therefore, excluding from our consideration such issues 
as marriage and divorce and matrimonial rights and obligations. 
V/e are concerned here with the family as a unit for the purposes 
of rights in property and succession to hereditary offices, 
related issues which are often considered together in Ev/e law. 
More important for our purpose, however, is the family as a 
unit in relation to property. Within this context, therefore, 
the Ewe family is known as dzotinu.
1. E.g. Amarfio v. Ayorkor. (195k) l*f W.A.C.A. 55k and 
Krakue v. Krabah. Unreported, Supreme Court, Accra, 2.kth 
June, 1963#
Ollennu describes the "family" in Ghana as "the social 
group into which a person is born", and then he goes on to say 
that the Ewe call it fome or xome or hlo,"*' It is apparent,
although he does not say so, that Ollennu was relying on
2 AWestermann who was quoted by both Ward-^ and Manoukian. The
two ladies interpret forne as a patrilineage, and it seems that 
it is this view that the learned Judge had adopted. The error 
is the familiar one that sometimes arises from undue dependence 
on anthropological sources in a legal work.
As far as the Ewe word hlo is concerned, it seems to have 
different meanings in the several dialects of the Ewe language; 
but in none does it mean "family". Among the Anlo Ewe, it 
seems that it means a "clan" of the Akan type, which is totemic, 
non-cognatic and of presumed rather than demonstrable relation­
ship, with its members scattered over the whole of the Anlo area. 
In this form it would appear to be incapable of holding interests 
in property as an entity because of the dispersed membership. 
However, v/e have it on the authority of Nukunya, the Ewe 
anthropologist, that "Land, palm groves and fishing creeks are
1. N.A. Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession 
in Ghana. Sweet & Maxwell, London, 1966, p.71.
2. D. Westermann, Die Glidyi-Ewe in Togo. Berlin. 1935, P* .133#
3. B.E. Ward, The Social Organisation of the Ewe-Speaking 
People. Unpublished M.A. Thesis, University of London, 19^ -9, p.70.
k. M. Manoukian, The Ewe-speaking People of Togoland and the 
Gold Coast. International African Institute, London, 1952, p.22.
owned by clans. They have appointed leaders in whom are vested 
legal and ritual powers".^ Among the Northern Ewe-speaking 
people of Ghana, the hlo seems to be the same unit as that
p
which we have referred to.as the saa or sub-division. That 
is why Westermann was told by an informant from the Anlo Ewe 
area that,
Hlo is not the same thing as fome; fome is different 
from hlo. Hlo is a larger unit than fome. because 
several 'fomewo constitute one hlo. 3
It is submitted that this information is correct, and that the
hlo is not the Mfamily’1 as Ollennu suggests.
The other synonym given by Ollennu is xome. The word
xome. however, in this sense of its usage, is the dialect of
the Ewe of Glidzi in the Republic of Togo, with whom Westermann
was primarily concerned in his book, Die Glidyi-Ewe in Togo.
The word is not known to be used by any of the Ghana Ewe;
certainly it is not used by the Northern Ewe-speaking people
of Ghana. Among the Ghana Ewe, xome means ITa room" and just
that. We shall, therefore, not be detained by this word.
The other Ewe term which is usually given (e.g. by Ollennu)
as a translation of "family" is fome. Among the Northern Ewe-
speaking people of Ghana, fome properly only means "relations".**
Y] G.K. Nukunya. Kinship, Marriage and Family: ' A Study of 
Contemporary Social Changes in an Ewe Tribe. Unpublished Ph.D. 
t ! T e s i F / T j n i v ¥ r s i T 5 r ^ T ™ L o n d o F ^  .
2. See pp.6f.-63 supra.
3* D. Westermann, Die Glid.yi-Ewe in Togo. p.l/*3. This is a 
literal translation from the Ewe text recorded by Westermann.
Jf. It seems, however, that, among the Anlo Ewe, fome is'some­
times used to denote the "family".
It comprehends an indeterminate circle of persons related by 
consanguinity.on both the maternal and paternal sides and extends 
to relations of any remove. A member of this circle of relations 
is known as fometo (pi. fometowo). which means "a relative". The 
expression do fome means the state of being related. The Ewe, 
therefore, say Medo fome. kple,Ativoe to mean "Ativoe and I are 
relatives". If Ametorxewu1s great-grandmother Maabo came from 
Abutia nearly a hundred years ago, Ametorxewu and his descendants 
in Gbefi would regard Maabo and her ascendants and descendants in 
Abutia and elsewhere as fometowo and they would be of the same 
fome. So Ametorxewu can say Amu fometowo le Abutia. meaning 
"People of my fome (i.e. some of my relatives) are in Abutia".
All relations, both agnatic and cognatic, are known as fometowo. 
and this may, and often does, include persons in different chief­
doms. As to which set of relations is meant by the referents 
fome and fometowo on any occasion, one has to consider the context 
in which the word is used and perhaps request a further explan­
ation. We cannot, therefore, strictly refer to the fome as a 
unit unless we emphasise that it is protean in form and assumes 
different shapes and sizes in different contexts. The word 
fome is essentially a kinship, and, therefore, a social termin­
ology. It would only be appropriate if we were simply concerned 
with "the social group into which a person is born";^* for the 
word fome is too imprecise to employ in legal terminology.
1. N.A, Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession 
in Ghana. 1966, p.71.
In legal usage, the unit which may he referred to as 
"family" among the Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana is 
generally known as dzotinu. This is the word used in most areas, 
including Gbi, Aveme, Anfoega, Peki, Kpando and Ho. In some 
places the same unit is known as togbevime. meaning literally 
"grandfather’s children". In Matse, it is known as avadzidzi.
The Matse word avadzidi is a more precise, even if somewhat 
inelegant word, which means persons of the same male descent.
The word dzotinu, however, is preferred because it seems to be 
used over a wider area.
What is dzotinu? The word dzoti literally means "a burning 
piece of firewood", that is "a firebrand". The symbolism here 
is that it is the commencement of a thing that continues to 
expand for ever. The word dzotinu is a derivative from dzoti, 
and it is the designation of what is the Ewe "family".
The dzotinu or family originates from a remote male 
ancestor whose name the unit usually bears, though this need 
not necessarily be so. Even where it is not specifically named 
after the founding ancestor, his name is never forgotten by the 
members of the unit. When the unit is named after its founder, 
its name usually consists of the ancestor’s name with the suffix 
viwo. Thus, "Atifufuviwo" are members of the dzotinu originating 
from Atifufu, In the Atifufuviwo would be the main grandfathers 
who were themselves children of Atifufu, such as Soklitor, 
Danutsu, Akator and Agbodo. Their children and children’s
children ad infinitum would constitute the family or dzotinu
known as Atifufuviwo. This group of descendants in the male 
line constitutes a single unit recognised in Eweland as having 
the legal capacity to hold the paramount interest in ancestral 
property, particularly land, and to be entitled to offer its 
members for traditional offices vested in it on a hereditary 
basis. They are, therefore, known as nu deka dulawo or "the 
group of people who eat one thing". To say of a set of persons 
that they are nu deka dulawo is another way of saying that they 
are members of the same dzotinu or family. A person belongs to 
different sets of fome or relations, depending on the relative 
with respect to whom he is considered in any context or circum­
stances. But every person in Eweland belongs to only one 
dzotinu or family, and one only. The dzotinu or family is 
constantly changing its membership through death and the pro­
creation of new members; but, as a legal entity, it has a 
permanent existence and the right of perpetually holding the 
interests in property which are vested in it.
Every family or dzotinu has a head, known as dozotinu1 
metsitsi (a contraction of dozotinu fe ametsitsi) or "the elder 
of the dzotinu" , The position of the head of the family will 
be discussed later in some detail,^” but at this stage, we may 
say that he. represents the legal personality of the family or . 
dzotinu. The dzotinu1metsitsi is also sometimes referred to 
simply as ametsitsi or "the elder"; but the dzotinu1metsitsi or 
head of family should not be confused with the saame ’metsitsi
1. See Chapter IV infra.
or sub-divisional elder.
The dzotinu or family may be seen within the context of 
the Ewe political structure as a whole. We have already 
explained that the chiefdom consists of divisions which in turn 
are composed of sub-divisions or saawo. The sub-division or 
saa is a kinship unit inasmuch as it embraces persons claiming 
a common descent, although it is also a political unit as a 
major administrative component of the division or duta. When 
we examine the composition of the sub-division or saa. it is 
noticed that it is composed of families or dzotlnuwo. Generally 
the saa or sub-division is constituted by two or three, but 
sometimes more, dzotinuwo. As a rule, it is the dzotinuwo which 
take their turns in providing the sub-divisional elder or saame 
1metsitsi. and the general rule is that the dzotinu ’metsitsi 
or head of family automatically becomes saame ’metsitsi or sub- 
divisional elder when it comes to the turn of his dzotinu. Every 
saame ’metsitsi or sub-divisional elder thus holds a dual office 
of dzotinu ’metsitsi or head of family as well; but not every 
dzotinu ’metsitsi is a saame ’metsitsi.
In considering the composition of the dzotinu or family, 
we may start with a man and his children. In the patrilineal 
Ewe community, the wife is excluded because she does not belong 
to her husband’s family. This group of persons, consisting of 
a man and his children, is what anthropologists tend to term
the “elementary family11 or “nuclear family",'*' Most Ghanaian 
jurists would call it the "immediate family". It is, however, 
neither necessary nor relevant to classify this group in Ewe 
lav/ as a legal entity; for such a group does not possess a 
legal personality in Ewe lav/. It is only part of a family and 
not a family of whatever description in its own right.. The man 
and his brothers, together with their children, form a wider 
group. We may continue enlarging the circle until v/e come to 
the family unit, but none of the composite segments is in itself 
a family. By tracing the genealogical tree in that manner, we 
discern the clear existence of branches within the family or 
dzotinu. Indeed every d.sotinu is composed of such branches. In 
our example of the family known as Atifufuviv/o, v/e can identify 
a branch consisting of the lineal descendants of Agbodo or of 
Soklitor. This group of descendants of Soklitor, or any sub­
branch thereof, does not possess any legal personality in Ewe 
lav/. It cannot hold the paramount title to ancestral property, 
nor have any hereditary offices vested in it, as a unit. There 
is no legal right, duty or privilege in relation to which such 
a unit may be described as a family within the context Of Ewe 
customary law. If self-acquired property is held in Ewe law to 
be inheritable by a manfs children, it is not because such 
children constitute a "family" but because by right of birth 
they succeed to rights in the property in a position somewhat
1. See, e.g. A.R. Radcliffe-Brown in A.R, Badcliffe-Brown 8c
D. Forde, African Systems of Kinship and Marriage. O.U.P., 
London, 1950, pp.4-5.
analogous to that of a next-of-kin in English lav/.
The authorities, however,' seem to point in a different 
direction. These authorities were not specifically formulated 
in relation to the Ewe situation; but the generality of the 
propositions makes it obvious that they are intended to be 
applicable throughout all Ghana.. Ollennu,.for instance, says:
Each man in a patrilineal family area starts a family 
and each woman in a matrilineal family area starts a 
family. The family v/hich originated from a remote 
ancestor or ancestress is called the ancestral family; 
it is sometimes called the wider or the trunk family.
Within that ancestral, wider or trunk family are a 
number of smaller families originating from descendants 
of the common remote ancestor or ancestress. Those 
smaller families are called the immediate, the narrow 
or the branch families. 1
p
Ollennu based this proposition on the case of Serwah v. Kesse 
v/hich was decided by himself in the then Land Court and was 
confirmed on appeal by the Supreme Court. The effect of that 
decision in the context of the devolution of self-acquired 
property is more relevant to the discussion of the law of 
succession. On its proposition that there are immediate, as 
contrasted with ancestral families, the significant point is 
that the learned Judge, v/hen he spoke ex cathedra in his judgment 
in Serwah v. Kesse. v/as concerned with a matrilineal family area 
of New Juaben and he did not, by his choice of v/ords, purport
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana. 
Sweet & Maxwell, Lon don, 1962, P .151.
2. Serwah v. Kesse. Unreported, Land Court, Accra, 10th April, 
1959. Reproduced in Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Lav/ 
in Ghana. 1962, pp.201-207.
to lay down any general proposition of law for all the areas of 
Ghana. If it was his intention that the proposition should 
apply to all areas of the country, including the patrilineal 
Ewe, it is respectfully submitted that he did not say so. It 
is later in his work, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana, 
that Ollennu attempts to extend the proposition in Serwah v .
Kesse to the patrilineal societies as well, and it is submitted 
that this is not a binding legal authority.
Ollennu himself points out quite rightly that his decision 
in Serwah v. Kesse was later confirmed by the Supreme Court. In 
generally confirming the decision in Serwah v. Kesse. however, 
the appellate court only gave a limited confirmation of Mr. 
Justice Ollennufs dictum on the existence of immediate or smaller 
families. The Supreme Court indeed relied on Mills v. Addy^ 
also another decision of Ollennu, J., which had been confirmed 
on appeal. But, as regards the existence of immediate families,
van Lare, J.S.C., delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court,
said:
This decision is in accordance with the principle of
our customary law that among the Akans the immediate
beneficial interest in a woman’s self-acquired property 
descends to her children and their children - children’s 
children meaning the children of daughters only. 2
1. Mills v. Addy. (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 357.
2. Serwah v. Kesse. (I960) G.L.R. 227, 228. Emphasis supplied.
The decision in Serwah v. Kesse must, therefore, be confined to
the Alian communities with which it was concerned. There is no
doubt that Mr. Justice van Lare, being himself an Ewe, was
anxious that the proposition should not be extended beyond the
Akan areas and he said so, even if only ex abundanti cautela.
Insofar as Ollennu confines himself to the matrilineal
communities he may be right. His own exposition of the lav/ in
Mills v. Addy when he said~ "Every woman becomes the originator
of a family" and that "the family she so originates is a branch
of the mother’s or grandmother’s family" was confirmed and
1adopted by the Court of Appeal. This is also the view of
p
Bentsi-Enchill. Moreover, there are other decisions to this 
effect on- the matrilineal communities.
Although Bentsi-Enchill says that "like the woman in 
matrilineal communities, each man in a patrilineal community 
is a potential apex or originator of a family",^ he does not 
rely on any authority from the Northern Ewe area. He only thinks 
that it "can be stated with confidence". When, indeed, Bentsi- 
Enchill comes to identify the so-called "immediate family", he
1. Mills v. Addy. (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 357.
2. K. Bentsi-Enchill, Ghana Land Lav/. Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
196k, pp.lkl-157.
3. E.g. Ghamson v. Wobill. (19k7) 12 W.A.C.A. 181; Amarfio v . 
Ayorkor, (195k) lkW.A.C.A. 55k; Re Eburahin. Ansah v. Ankrah, 
(1958) 3 W.A.L.R, 317; and Ennin v. Prah, (1959) G.L.R. kk.
k. K. Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit.. p.157.
runs into immediate difficulty because he ends up with what is 
the same as the wider or ancestral family. At first he says, "We 
can say then that the expression ’immediate family’ or immediate 
next-of-kin means in the first instance the deceased’s children."*** 
By constituting a man’s children alone into a family", we would 
get a family in an even narrower sense than the English one.
That certainly is not the view of Ewe law. We may contrast this 
with the more comprehensive and meaningful definition of the 
"immediate" matrilineal family by the same author. He says the 
"immediate family" in matrilineal communities is "a man’s mother,
p
uterine mothers and sisters, and the issue of such sisters".
When Bentsi-Enchill himself realised the difficulty with patri­
lineal areas, he tried to get round it by saying of the so-called 
"immediate" patrilineal family that,
clearly it can include the deceased’s paternal brothers 
and sisters and his father. Failing these, those in 
line of succession to him come from within an ever 
widening circle of relations traced patrilineally 
through deceased’s grandfather, then his great­
grandfather, and so on, 3
This latter rider makes the so-called "immediate family"
co-extensive with the so-called "ancestral family" and shows
that there is no justification for such a distinction.
In the light of the authorities, it is submitted that,
while the idea of an immediate family may exist among the
matrilineal communities of Ghana, it certainly cannot be said
1. K. Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit., p.158.
2. K. Bentsi-Enchill, op,cit,. p.1^1.
3. K, Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit,, p.158. Emphasis supplied,
to exist among the patrilineal Ewe, The Ewe have only one 
type of family. That is the dzotinu.
As will be clear in the discussion on land and the 
succession to interests in property generally, the legal concept 
of "family" among the Northern Ewe of Ghana, apart from the 
obligations it imposes, is meaningful only within the context 
of land holding and succession to rights in property and 
traditional hereditary offices. Within this context, every 
adult Ewe is clear in his mind about what is the family or 
dzotinu, When an Ewe is told that some property is family 
property, it has only one meaning for him; it belongs to the 
dzotinu as an entity. He will not ask whether it belongs to 
the "immediate family11,"nuclear family", "wider family", 
"extended family", "trunk family", "ancestral family", "wider 
ancestral family" or "what-not family". It will not be nec­
essary, as it was for instance for the West African Court of 
Appeal in Amarfio v, Ayorkor. to say that "the first enquiry 
must be to what family did Ayiku belong during his lifetime".^ 
The branches or segments of the family are not regarded as 
legal entitles among the Ewe. It is the attempt by the 
judiciary of the statutory courts and text-writers to raise
1, Amarfio v. Ayorkor. (195k) lk W.A.C.A. 53k, 556. See also 
the Fanti case of Ghamson v. Wobill. (19k7) 12 W.A.C.A, 181,
and another Ga case of Mills v, Addy. (1958) 3 W.A.L.R, 357, 
and other cases, when the court had to decide whether an 
intestate was a member of the "immediate" or "wider" family.
these composite segments to the level of "family" that is 
causing confusion and uncertainty. . If the E\ve law is properly 
interpreted, there can be no question of what family an intestate 
belonged to; for there is only one family known to Ewe lav/, and 
that is the dzotinu. It is a strain on the meaning of the word 
to refer, to each of these segments of families as a family, thus 
carving a multiple of "families" out of each family, Ollennu!s 
metaphor is that the ancestral family may be likened to the 
trunk of a tree, with the immediate families as its branches.
To carry the metaphor further, it would be patently y/rong to 
refer to every branch and bough as a trunk. With this type of 
terminology, the word "family" would be devoid of meaning in 
Ewe lav/. For only the dzotinu may be referred to as "family" 
in the lav/s of the Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana. Among 
the Ewe, succession to property by the so-called immediate 
family means nothing more than a right of succession by the
j
next-of-kin within the family in a predetermined order of 
precedence, an order which is, however, subject to variation 
by the family for good cause.
We cannot fail to point out that, even as regards the 
matrilineal communities, the Courts are becoming apprehensive 
of the dangers of the application of the notion of the "immediate 
family". In a recent Akan case in which the issue was raised, 
Blay, J.S.C., sounded a cautionary note in the Supreme Court 
when he said:
It seems to me that this so-called doctrine of 
the immediate family ... if allowed to be extended 
unchecked, the whole of our family system would be 
in jeopardy. 1
It is hoped that this warning from the Supreme Court will be 
heeded, particularly to avoid the extension of the doctrine of 
immediate family to areas like Eweland where it does not really 
exist.
Membership of the Family
Having tried to identify the unit which we may refer to 
as "family” among the Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana, our 
next issue is to determine how its membership may be acquired.
The general rule is that a person belongs to his or her 
family as an incident of birth. In other words, barring the 
rare exceptions to which we shall presently advert, birth is the 
criterion for the determination of membership of an Ewe family. 
However, we have to determine to which family a person is 
ascribed, that is whether it is his fatherfs family or that of 
his mother.
The Ewe are a patrilineal people. This implies both patri- 
d.escent and patri-succession among the Northern Ewe-speaking 
people 1 of Ghana. The principle of patri-descent means that a
1. Pobee v. Arhin III. Unreported, Supreme Court, Accra, 27th 
January, 196k. Reproduced in Ollennu, The Law of Testate and 
Intestate Succession in Ghana. Sv/eet & Maxwell, London, 1966,
p.122.
person belongs to his or her father’s family which is traced 
unilineally through the male line only. This may be termed the 
political aspect of patrilineage. It is the nationality prin­
ciple in patrilineal descent. As the family is the unit of 
v/hich the sub-division is composed, and the sub-divisions 
constitute, the divisions which form the■chiefdon, it is only 
through membership of a specific family on the principle of 
patri-descent that we can say that a person is a citizen of the 
chiefdom of Peki, Abutia, Ho or Alavanyo. It is thus the means 
by which we determine the chief to whom a person owes allegiance. 
That also determines his personal lav/ or the system of customary 
law to which he is ordinarily subject.
The principle of patri-succession means that the right to 
succeed to and enjoy rights in property or hereditary office is 
derived from membership of the family traced through the male 
line. A people may be patrilineal in the sense of patri- 
descent only, while at the same time they practice matri- 
succession or succession to hereditary offices and interests 
in property through the female line. The Anlo Ewe are patri­
lineal in the sense of patri-descent; the Anlo Ewe are also 
patrilineal with respect to ancestral property generally, but 
succession to the Anlo Paramount Stool is open also to certain 
matrilineal descendants. It seems that it is this mixture of 
patri-descent and patri-succession to property with matri- 
succession to the Paramount Stool that has probably led many to
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think that the Anlo Ewe are matrilineal.^ As far as the 
Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana are concerned, however, 
they are patrilineal in the senses of both patri-descent and 
patri-succession to property and hereditary offices.
This would seem to be indisputable, and it would be 
suggested that the principle of tracing a person’s family 
unilineally through the male line is applicable to all Ewe- 
speaking people of Ghana. However, a decision of the High 
Court suggests that the unit is wider and includes even per­
sons only maternally connected with the family. This case 
did not come from any of the chiefdoms in the Northern Ewe 
area of Ghana, but it is from the Anlo Ewe and there is no
reason to suppose that it was not intended to apply to all
2
Ewe people. This is the case of Nunekpeku v. Ametefe.
In Nunekpeku v. Ametefe. the defendant (Ametefe) occupied 
a portion of Bawe land belonging to the Agbeve family. While 
in such occupation, the defendant and another junior member of 
the Agbeve family alienated a portion of the said land to a 
stranger, without the knowledge or consent of the head and 
principal members of the Agbeve family. The head of the 
Agbeve family and its principal members were displeased and 
sought inter alia to eject the defendant even from the portion 
of the said Bawe land that he still occupied, on the ground
1. See, e.g. M. Manoukian, op.cit,, p.2^.
2. Nunekpeku v. Ametefe. (1961) G.L.H. 301.
that the said defendant was not a member of the Agbeve family 
which held the paramount title to the land and that the defen­
dant was, therefore, only a licensee of the Agbeve family. The 
evidence was uncontradicted that the defendant’s only connection 
with the Agbeve family was through his mother. The South Anlo 
Local Court "A”, therefore, found that the defendant was not a 
member of the Agbeve family and accordingly granted the order 
for his ejection. From that decision the defendant appealed 
to the High Court at Ho.
.It was held by Prempeh, J., as regards the question of 
membership of the family, that on the evidence on record it 
was clearly established that the defendant belonged to the 
Agbeve family through his mother. For this and other reasons, 
he allowed the appeal. Prempeh, J., explained:
In the second paragraph of the particulars of claim, 
the respondents claimed that the appellant was not a 
member of the Agbeve family, but in giving evidence for 
and on behalf of the other respondents, the second 
plaintiff-respondent admitted that the defendant was 
a member of the Agbeve family on the maternal side, and 
it is not insignificant to observe that the second 
plaintiff himself admitted that he was a member of 
the said Agbeve family on the maternal side.
It having been established that the appellant is a 
member of the Agbeve family, whether it be of the wider
or immediate family, it is my view that he is entitled
to occupy any available part of the Agbeve family land, 
and that once he has occupied that portion, he has a
limited right to it, and cannot be ejected therefrom
at the will of the individual members of the family.
It has been contended on behalf of the respondents 
that the appellant was a licensee of the respondents,
but I am unable to accede to that argument since 
as a member of the family he has limited rights to 
the family land. 1
It is respectfully submitted that the learned Judge was 
wrong. The Ewe law on this point is so clear and so settled 
that the surprise is that a contrary view could have been 
taken at all by the High Court.. Among the Ewe, unlike the 
Akan, descent is patrilineal. Although a person’s maternal 
connections with a family are highly valued, this can never 
be a legal basis for membership of the mother’s family. 
Accordingly, it is submitted that the defendant (Ametefe) 
belonged in law to his own father’s family and not to the 
Agbeve family with which he was only maternally connected.
It is further submitted respectfully, therefore, that the 
plaintiff, -respondents were right in contending that the 
defendant-appellant was only a licensee of the Agbeve family 
without any inherent right of occupation of that family’s 
lands, Whether his conduct justified a revocation of the 
licence of occupation in those circumstances is a different 
issue on which it is not necessary to express an opinion here.
Prempeh, J., emphasised the fact t'hat one of the 
plaintiff-respondents was also a person connected with the 
Agbeve family through, only his mother, and this fact seems 
to have weighed heavily on the mind of the learned Judge in
1. Nunekpeku v, Ametefe. (1961) G.L.P. 301, 303-30^-.
deciding that the defendant was also a member of the Agbeve 
family. The argument seemed to be that if the second 
plaintiff-respondent sued with the other plaintiff-respondents 
when he in fact had only a maternal connection with the Agbeve 
family, then it followed that the defendant’s own membership 
could also be established through a similar maternal con­
nection therewith. It is respectfully submitted that this 
argument is fallacious. If, as the second plaintiff-respondent 
himself admitted, he was connected with the Agbeve family but 
only through his mother, then the only course open to the 
learned Judge in law was to declare that even he the second 
plaintiff-respondent was not a member of the Agbeve family 
and then nonsuit him because he had no locus standi, unless 
he could show that he had been specifically and specially 
authorised by the Agbeve family in that behalf.
The Nunekpeku case also underlines the danger of equating 
the family and fome, the word suggested as a translation by 
Ward, Manoukian and Ollennu. If we regard the family as fome 
then there is no doubt that the defendant (Ametefe) belonged 
to the "Agbeve fome"; for, as we have said, fome embraces 
both agnatic and cognatic relations of any degree. Accordingly, 
if in the course of the proceedings a witness was asked whether 
the defendant was a member of the "Agbeve family", and this 
was translated to him in the Ewe as "Agbeve fome" . the witness 
was bound to give an affirmative answer. If, however, it was
explained to the witness that by family was meant that unit 
which held the paramount title to the land, the witness would 
immediately say that the defendant was not a member of the 
Agbeve family in that sense. The maxim is Ewe meduna nyroe 
nu o; to nu Ewe duna, which means, "The Ewe do not inherit
on the mother side:, they inherit on the father side"..........
Such cases are understandably rare among the Ewe because 
the principle of patrilineal entitlement to ancestral property 
is hardly ever questioned.. In one case when the issue arose 
before the Asogli Native Appeal Court at Ho, the Native Appeal 
Court, contrary to the decision of the High Court in Nunekpeku 
v. Ametefe. had no difficulty in stating the law that maternal 
connection with the family does not create an inherent right 
to family property. In Agblevoe v. Dankradi. a case from 
Abutia, the Asogli Native Appeal Court said:
It has also been agreed in evidence on record that 
the Defendant-Respondent maternally belongs to the 
Plaintiff’s family which, in accordance with the native 
customary law among the Ewe-speaking'people, gives no 
absolute right to the Respondent over the disputed land, 1
The disputed land was family land of the defendant’s mother’s
family. The above dictum is in the same terms as the decision
of the South Anlo Local Court in Nunekpeku v. Ametefe. For in
Agblevoe v. Dankradi also the defendant based his entitlement
to the family land on his connection with the family through
only his mother. ‘ It is submitted with respect that the Asogli
1. Agblevoe v. Dankradi. Unreported, Asogli Native Appeal 
Court, Ho, i+th September, 1952, at p. 17 of Civil Appeal Record 
Book,
Native Appeal Court was right in Agblevoe v. Dankradi and 
that the decision in that case, rather than that of the High 
Court in Nunekpeku v, Ametefe. represents a correct statement 
of Ewe law.
It is to be hoped that Nunekpeku v. Ametefe will be 
rejected as having been wrongly decided. No doubt this- erron­
eous decision raises a legal problem. On the principle of 
stare decisis the decision in Nunekpeku v. Ametefe is strictly 
the law, until over-ruled by a superior court. However, \ for­
tunately it is only a High Court decision and one may hope 
that, as other High Court Judges are not bound by the decision 
of another High Court, Nunekpeku v. Ametefe will be dissented 
from by the other Judges. As regards the Court of Appeal it 
is hoped that it will seize the earliest opportunity to correct 
the law. Such erroneous decisions of the higher courts are 
regrettable because they result in the crystallisation of 
rules of judicial customary law which are patently at variance 
with the practised customary lav/. It is a platitude that the 
Ewe are a patrilineal community, and contrary decisions of 
this type only tend to create confusion and uncertainty in 
the areas where the law is settled.
The Child With a Father From a Matrilineal Community.
Since the Ewe are patrilineal, it means that the expansion 
of the family tree ends with its female members, because a
female member's child would belong to the child's father's
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family. To this general deduction there are certain exceptions.
'The first exception is in the case of a child born of an 
Ewe mother, but with a father from a community like the Akan 
of Ghana where descent is traced matrilineally. If the Akan 
accept such a child as one of them, the matter rests there and 
the Ewe community cannot lay any claim to him. What happens, 
however, if, as is often the case, by the application of their 
own.law, the Akan do not regard him as belonging to the Akan 
family? All my informants are unanimous in stating that, in 
such a situation, the child is absorbed into the mother’s own 
patrilineal family as a full member in the eyes of Ewe law.
For the rule is that no person may be without a family. The 
legal position then is that such a child is regarded as a son 
of his maternal grandfather and so he becomes in law a brother 
to his mother and a brother to his maternal uncles and aunts.
He would thus enjoy most of the benefits and privileges and 
assume all the responsibilities of the membership of his 
mother’s family, such as the right to the occupation and use 
of the family land, like any other member of the family.
However, in the matter of hereditary offices, such as 
occupation of a chiefly stool, such a child and his descendants 
are excluded because they are not strictly of the patrilineal 
line o f  descent. It seems, however, that such a child and 
his descendants may hold the office of head of family.
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The Child With a Mother From a Matrilineal Community
The situation converse to the above, is where a child is 
born of an Ewe father and an Akan mother. Such a child would 
appear to be in a particularly favourable position of belonging 
to two families. The Akan-would regard him as an Akan because 
he would rightly belong to their matrilineal family as a full 
member, entitled to succeed to offices and interests in property 
vested in that family. Similarly the Ewe would also regard 
him as an Ewe belonging to his father’s family, since the 
Ewe descent is patrilineal.
The answer given to such a situation in most areas is 
that such a child is prima facie a full member of the patri­
lineal Ewe family for all purposes. This means that he is 
regarded as a member of the Ewe patrilineal family unless by 
his mode of living it can be unequivocally concluded that he 
intends to be regarded as a member of his matrilineal Akan 
family only. It is suggested that even in such a case his 
rights Of membership in the Ewe family do not lapse but remain 
in abeyance; for the Ewe have no power or process for depriving 
a person of the rights of membership of his patrilineal family. 
Accordingly, such a child, notwithstanding his other rights 
and connections with the maternal Akan family, can always 
assert his rights of membership of the paternal Ewe family on 
the sole ground of his paternity.
In Gbi, Peki and Anfoega the child’s membership of the 
patrilineal Ewe family is an absolute one which does not 
depend on whether he elects to settle in the Ewe community. 
Therefore, such a child, though living with the Akan family, 
can properly be elected to occupy any stool or other hereditar 
office in the Ewe family. When it was pointed out that on the 
same principle the lucky child could occupy two stools simul­
taneously, one in the Akan family and the other in the Ewe 
family, the Peki solution was that in that event he would be 
put to the choice of abdicating one, otherwise he would be 
deposed. The argument is that he could be deposed because, 
by accepting the Akan stool and swearing to be always availabl 
to answer the.call of that community, he would by implication 
have violated a similar oath to be always available to the 
Ewe community as well; for a man cannot always be available 
for the service of tv/o different communities separated by 
distance and which may on occasion be at war with each other. 
In practice, however, the two families settle by negotiation 
the question of which stool the child may occupy, so that 
anomalous situations of this type are unlikely to occur.*
Effect of Marriage on Family Membership
Marriage has no effect on a woman’s membership of her 
family in Ewe customary law. A woman does not, by virtue of 
her marriage, become a member of her husband’s family. She
retains the membership of her own family even on marriage 
and she, therefore, remains a citizen of her native chiefdora. 
Hence, even if a woman from Matse is married to a man from 
Abutia and settles in Abutia for the rest of her life, she 
is still regarded as a Matse woman. This principle is carried 
so far in, some areas that a married woman who dies in her 
marital home abroad is brought to her native home for burial.
In the traditional view, a married female retains her 
original surname, (i.e. her maiden name). Today, European 
influences have induced literate married women to adopt their 
husband*s surnames; but most of those married under the 
customary law frown upon such a change of name.
A man’s marriage does not affect the membership of his 
own family; for he does not adopt the family of his wife.
Paternity and Legitimacy: Mother Unmarried
The Ewe law is that marriage is not necessary for the 
paternity or legitimacy of a child.1 If a man and a woman, 
both of whom are unmarried, have a sexual relationship which 
results in the birth of a child, that man is the father of 
the child and the child is perfectly legitimate, provided his 
paternity is duly acknowledged. The child is automatically,
1. This is also the ratio decidendi of In Re Adadevoh, (1951) 
13 W.A.C.A. 30*t, and Akeke v. Pratt. (1955) 15 W.A.C.A. 20.
1 1 8 ,
by the fact of birth, a legitimate member of his father’s 
family in Ewe law. This is so even though the child’s mother 
and father do not eventually marry each other. For legitimacy 
is conferred by the mere acknowledgment of paternity, so that 
there is no need for the application of the canon law and 
Roman law procedure of legitimation per subsequens matrimonium
, . i
w m c h  has also been introduced into English law.
Writing on the Akan law, however, Danquah has stated that
p
"Marriage is necessary to make a child legitimate". For that
reason he went on to say that if a child was born of unmarried
parents, he would become legitimate only on the subsequent
marriage of his parents. In this sense he saw a parallel
between the Akan procedure and the Roman law process of
legitimatio per subsequens matrimonium. It is highly doubtful
if Danauay’s statement of the Akan law on this point is
correct. If Danquay is right then Akan law of legitimacy
differs from Ewe law.
The Ewe child is still legitimate even if the man is
married to a different woman, and no complications arise if
the child’s mother is herself unmarried. The child is
legitimate even if the father is married to another woman
■5
under the Marriage Ordinance, although such a child suffers
1. By virtue of Section I of the Legitimation Act, 1926 (16 &
17 Geo. 5, c.60).
2. J.B. Danquah, Akan Laws and Customs, Routledge, London, 1928, 
p.186.
3. Gap, 127 of the 1951 Edition of Laws of the Gold Coast,
Vol. III.
certain disabilities under the said Ordinance. In particular, 
such a child is not regarded as legitimate as regards entitle­
ment to a share of the two-third portion of the estate of his 
father which, under the Ordinance, is distributable in accor­
dance with the provisions of the law in force in England on 
19-th November, l88k.^" He is, however, legitimate for all other 
purposes, including the right to share in the remaining portion 
of the intestate’s estate which devolves on members of the 
family under the Ordinance, This is adequately explained in
p
the case of Coleman v. Shang. ' v/hich has become the locus 
classicus on the point. That case itself involved the appli­
cation of the rule earlier enunciated in the Nigerian case of 
Bamgbose v. Daniel-  ^ that children may be legitimate even if 
procreated in adultery by a man married under the Marriage 
Ordinance, because the question of legitimacy is decided by 
the lex domicilii and the Nigerian lex domicilii, including 
the customary law, accords’ the status of legitimacy to such 
children.
In Coleman v. Shang. the intestate had three children by 
a customary law marriage but, after the termination of the 
customary law marriage, he married another woman under the 
Marriage Ordinance. The plaintiff was the sole survivor as
1. The Statute of Distribution, 1670 (22 & 23 Car. 2, c.10), 
read with the Administration of Estates Act, 1685 (1 Jac. 2, 
C.17) and Sec. 2k of the Statute of Frauds, 1677 (29 Car,2, 
c.3).
2] Coleman v, Shang. (1961) A.C. k8l.
3. Bamgbose v. Daniel. (195k) 3 All E.R. 263.
an issue of the Ordinance marriage. During the subsistence 
of the Ordinance marriage, the intestate had ten children by 
a different'woman whom he later married under customary lav; 
after the death of the Ordinance wife. On the intestate!s 
death, the plaintiff, as the only surviving issue of the 
Ordinance Marriage, contended that he was the only legitimate 
child of the deceased and so claimed exclusive right to suc­
ceed to the two-thirds of the estate under the provisions of 
Section k8 of the Marriage Ordinance. The Privy Council up­
held the decision of the Court of Appeal of Ghana that this 
contention was wrong. It was held that the first three chil­
dren of the customary law marriage, prior to the marriage 
under the Ordinance, were perfectly legitimate and entitled 
to equal shares in the two-thirds portion with the plaintiff. 
As regards the ten children of the adulterous relations 
during the pendency of the Ordinance Marriage, they were held 
to be not entitled to share in the two-third portion under 
the Statute of Distribution; but they were held to be 
legitimate children who, together with other members of the 
family, were entitled to succeed to the one-third portion of 
the estate which, under the Ordinance, devolved on members of 
the family under the customary law. The reason for this 
decision is that legitimacy and illegitimacy are questions 
of status for the lex domicilii, and since the Ghanaian lex 
domicilii regarded the children as legitimate by virtue of
the applicable customary lav/, they were legitimate for all 
purposes, save the disability which they incurred under a 
statutory enactment.
In its decision on the matter, the Ghana Court of Appeal
said:
........ Under the Statute of Distribution a ’wife1 means a
’lawful wife’, and child means ’a lawful child’. The 
question of 'lawful wife' and ’legitimate’ child are 
questions of status to be decided by the law of the 
domicil. Therefore, if a marriage between a man and 
a woman is by the lav; of their domicil a valid marriage, 
the ’wife’ is a lav/ful wife for the purposes of the 
Statute no matter v/hether or not the marriage is in­
valid by the law of England or of any other place. 
Similarly, if a child is legitimate by the law of the 
country where at the date of its birth its parents 
were domiciled, he is a legitimate child for the pur­
poses of the Statute, no matter whether or not that 
child would be illegitimate by English law. 1
This would appear to be a decision only within the meaning
of the Statute of Distribution, but the Court of Appeal clearly
expressed that it intended it to be a general proposition on
legitimacy and referred particularly to Re Goodman’s Trust.
where Cotton, L.J., had said;
If, as in my opinion is the case, the question
v/hether a person is legitimate depends on the lav/
of the place where his parents were domiciled at 
his birth, that is, on his domicil of origin, I 
cannot understand on what principle, if he be by 
that lav/ legitimate, he is not legitimate every­
where, and I am of opinion that if a child is 
legitimate by the law of the country where at the 
time of its birth its parents were domiciled, the 
law of England, except in the case of succession . 
to real estate in England, recognises and acts on 
the status thus declared by the lav/ of the domicil, 2
1, Coleman v. Shang. (1959) G.L.R. 390, i+06.
2. Re Goodman’s Trust. (1887) 17 Ch.D. 266, 292.
Then, in the course ox its judgment, referring to that part
of the intestate's estate which under Section k8(l) of the
Marriage Ordinance devolved in accordance with the relevant
customary law, the Ghana Court of Appeal said:
Again, by customary law, all children, however born, 
are entitled to enjoy equally. Consequently, all 
the three sets of children ... are part,and parcel 
of his family entitled to share in the personal 
property and to continue the enjoyment of the real 
property ... 1
In dismissing the plaintiff-appellant1s appeal against this 
decision of Ghana's Court of Appeal, the Privy Council made 
no direct comment on the legitimacy of the ten children pro­
created in extra-marital relations during the subsistence of 
the Ordinance marriage, It must be taken, therefore, that 
the Court of Appeal stated the law correctly. The position 
in Ghana common law, therefore, is that stated by the Ghana 
Court of Appeal that children born in adultery by a man married 
under the Marriage Ordinance are nevertheless legitimate, 
because legitimacy is conferred by the customary lav; as part 
of the lex domicilii of Ghana.
Coleman v, Shang was a Ga case from Osu, which is a 
patrilineal family area. It is submitted that a similar 
conclusion would have been reached if it had been a case 
from the Ewe area. Children born out-of extra-marital 
relations to a married man are fully legitimate by Ewe law 
on acknowledgment of their paternity and are accepted as
1. Coleman v, Shang. (1959) G.L.R. 390, Z+09.
full members of the father's family. Such children are fully 
entitled to the enjoyment of family property and are eligible 
for traditional and hereditary offices reserved to their 
father's family of which they are members. The Ewe law makes 
no distinction between them and the children born in lawful 
wedlock. , The rationale of the rule is that in Sv/e law a 
married man is entitled to take other wives, and his sexual 
relations with a woman other than his wife are strictly not 
acts of "adultery" but a mere "extra-marital relationship" 
which the customary law permits.
In the case of a child of an unmarried mother, therefore, 
the only criterion for determining the child's legitimacy is 
the acknowledgment of paternity by the putative father. The 
Ewe lav/ of legitimacy is thus different from that of the Tswana 
of Botswana where the child is not a legitimate child of its 
father unless the marriage consideration, the bogadi. consist­
ing of cattle, has been paid to the mother's family,^ It also 
differs from other southern African tribes v/here the similar 
payment of the lobola is necessary for legitimacy. It is 
wholly immaterial in Ev/e law that the putative father is al­
ready married to a different woman under customary lav/ or 
under the Marriage Ordinance.
1. I. Schapera, A Handbook of Tsv/ana Law and Custom. 
International African Institute, London, 1955, p.139.
It follows that the only case which may produce a dif­
ficulty in Ewe lav/ is where the child is without a known father. 
The father may be "unknown" in either of tv/o senses. One sense 
is where the biological father is factually known but is not 
legally acknowledged; and the other case is v/here the biolog­
ical father is not known either in fact or in law..............
The first case is where the physiological father is 
factually known but, while the said physiological father is 
both willing and prepared to be officially recognised as 
father, the child's mother's family frustrate his intentions 
by declining to accept him. For where the mother's parents 
or family feel that their family pride has been v/ounded by a 
pre-marital deflowering of their daughter, or where the girl 
had been promised to another man but the intruder had lured 
her away, or where the mother's parents consider the putative 
father as unacceptable socially, or for any other reason, they 
may refuse to acknowledge the putative father as father, , Such, 
a refusal of recognition of the putative father would render 
the child technically "fatherless".
The child's mother's family are able to frustrate the 
intentions of the putative father because the formal acts of 
recognition are inextricably, connected with'the mother's 
family. Ordinarily, in Ewe law, the acknowledgment of pater­
nity of a child consists in the putative father naming the 
child or performing the "outdooring ceremony" or in some way 
assuming responsibility for the maintenance of the child. It
is the prerogative of the father of a child to name his child 
and the ceremony is performed by the child’s father or authorised 
members of his family; but it must be in the presence of the 
child’s mother and her family and with their co-operation and 
involvement. The "outdooring ceremony" or videde de go is an 
occasion for merry-making to welcome the arrival of a new - - 
member of the family and the community. Its real purpose, 
however, is the formal presentation to the mother of the baby’s 
clothing, toilet articles, the mother’s clothing, some money 
and other requisites essential for the weaning of the new baby. 
These items are presented to the mother through her own family, 
and their acceptance constitutes recognition from the mother’s 
family. To be able to name the child or perform its outdooring 
ceremony, therefore, the putative father must first have intro­
duced himself to the family of his lover, and this is done with 
a pot of palm wine (but today this- has changed to imported 
drinks like schnapps and whisky). This is preferably done when 
the mother is still pregnant and before the delivery of the 
child. If this preliminary move is rebuffed by the mother’s 
family, the putative father will be unable to name the child 
or perform the "outdooring ceremony" for it. This is how the 
child’s mother’s family can refuse to regonise the putative 
father.
In describing the position, Ollennu says that, in naming 
the child, there must be given to the child "a name of his
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father, his paternal uncle, his paternal sister, paternal
grandfather, in short, the name of a paternal relation".1
He continued that "whatever other name a child may bear, it
must bear a paternal family name, what may be called his ntoro 
2
name". Ollennu relied mainly on Rattray and Sarbah for this 
3
statement. It is also said by Field that family names are
imperative among the Ga^ and it is not unlikely that Ollennu
was influenced by his own Ga experience. We may point out here
that the idea of ntoro is a matrilineal Akan notion which is
unknown to the Ewe society, and the Ewe, therefore, have no
"ntoro name". Furthermore, we must point out that among the
Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana, the father of a child
is unfettered in the choice of a name for his child. Although
it is the indisputable prerogative of the father to choose a
name for the child, the better practice today is to discuss
it with its mother. In the event, the child may, if the
parents so desire, bear any name and even the name of its
mother’s relations, especially if it is a female child. The
only name that a child must have from his father’s side is the
"surname"; but this is not a name given to the child at its 
cerempny
naming/and it is assumed as a name only later in official
1, N.A. Ollennu. The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession 
in Ghana. 1966, p ,206,
2. Ibid.
3* R.S. Rattray, Ashanti, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1923, pp. 
k3-5k; and J.M. Sarbah, op,cit,. p.5k.
k. M.J. Field, Social Organisation of the Ga People. Crown 
Agents, London, 19k0, pp.1-2.
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matters. Moreover, a "surname" in its present form seems to 
have come only with European rule,
Ollennu has also made the general proposition that, "To 
become recognised as the father of a child, a man must perform 
the naming ceremony on the eighth day of its birth or on a 
subsequent day."'*' We would qualify this proposition by saying 
that such recognition as father may be subsequently conferred 
on a father xvho did not name his child and did not perform its 
"outdooring ceremony", if he properly introduces himself after­
wards to the motherfs family and is accepted or if he can 
otherwise establish his paternity. We would further dissent 
from the categorical tone of that statement and say that, while 
in any dispute as to paternity the fact of naming the child is 
a vital issue, the naming of a child is not a sine qua non to the 
recognition of paternity; it is only of an evidentiary value, 
though a strong one at that. In other words, if paternity can 
be otherwise established, then the mere failure to name the 
child would not be fatal. It is the same with the performance
of the "outdooring ceremony". It was held, for instance, in
2the Nigerian case of Akerele v, Balogun that notwithstanding 
the fact that the naming ceremony of the child did not take 
place in the intestate’s house as Yoruba law requires, it was 
a sufficient acknowledgment of paternity that the child’s birth
1. N.A. Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession 
in Ghana, 1966, p,206. Emphasis supplied.
2, Akerele v. Balogun. (196k) L.L.2.99.
certificate bearing the intestate’s name was obtained by him or 
on his instructions. This was so even though the birth of the 
child had been kept as a secret by the intestate from the 
members of his family. It is submitted that this is also true 
of the Ewe.
. . . . The naming of a child and the performance of its "out­
dooring ceremony" only raise a presumption of paternity which 
may, however, be rebutted with appropriate evidence. It is 
not unknown among the Ewe for a man who has named and outdoored
a child to be subsequently deprived of paternity. In Kpate.y v .
Iliadzit for instance, a husband had named his wife’s child, 
performed the "outdooring ceremony" or videde do go and main­
tained the child for about thirteen years. Nevertheless, against 
the mother’s evidence, paternity was awarded to another man 
because the evidence satisfied the Court that the other man was 
the father. The trial Native Court rightly said on this point:
Defendant’s /i.e. the mother’s/ contention that 
Plaintiff’s child is not with her for he never
performed any delivery custom is vague; for in
accordance with Plaintiff’s witnesses it would 
never be possible for Plaintiff to approach 
Defendant’s parents for such customary perfor­
mances, as they alleged of receiving the conception 
from him /sic7* as such this unperformed custom did 
not mean that the Plaintiff was never the conceiver 
of Defendant /sic7 ... 2
1. Kpate.y v. Hiadzi. Unreported, Asogli Native Court "B", 
Ho, 22nd September, 1959, at p.228 of Civil Record Book, See 
pp. 150-152 infra for the facts,
2. Kpate.y v, Hiadzi. supra.
In such a case, the man so deprived of paternity may be 
reimbursed the cost of the ceremonies if the circumstances, 
particularly his own innocence of the facts, justify it,
Returning to the main question of a child whose paternity 
is "unknown1* because the mother’s family decline to recognise 
the putative father, the position is that the mother’s father 
performs the naming and "outdooring" ceremonies and the child 
is absorbed into the mother’s family. Field says of the Ga 
that:
The kpodzierno. or naming ceremony of a child, neces­
sitates a ’father’, but this father need not be the 
child’s progenitor. The man in whose name the ceremony 
is done claims the child as his lawful issue.
The most usual person to father the child of a 
husbandless mother is her own father ... the child’s 
maternal grandfather does its kpodzierno ceremony 
and names it as his own son or daughter. It now 
counts as his own child in all matters of inheritance 
and succession. Even if he be a mantse it is eligible 
to succeed him, 1
Similarly, Ollennu also says:
Should the father’s family fail to perform the 
naming ceremony, or should they be denied the right 
to perform it, the ceremony v/ill be performed for 
the child by the mother’s father or the mother’s 
paternal family. 2
He adds that in that case the child will legally become the
child of the mother’s father.
1, M.J. Field, Social Organisation of the Ga People. Crown 
Agents, London, 1940, p .24*
2. N.A. Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession 
in Ghana, i960, p.207.
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It is submitted that Ollennu’s exposition is correct.
7/e vould also agree with Field until she says that such a 
"fatherless" child is eligible to succeed his maternal grand- 
fatter even if he is a mantse. that is, a chief.^ In Ewe law, 
a cliild so absorbed into his mother’s family is entitled to 
most of the rights and privileges flowing from membership of 
the family, but he is regarded as ineligible for succession 
to a hereditary office such as that of a chief. Owing to such 
disabilities, in practice, hardly any child today remains in 
this anomalous legal status after coming of age. In practically 
all cases, the adult child goes to his father, regardless of 
whether his mother’s father concurs or not. Because of the 
awareness that such a child would in any case eventually go to 
his actual father, parents today rarely persist in their 
refusal to recognise the fathers of their daughters’ children. 
The threat of refusal of recognition is, therefore, only held 
out these days in terrorem. to compel the putative father to 
make a formal approach for the marriage of his child’s mother.
The other situation when a child’s father is unknown is 
when the father is not actually known as a matter of fact. Such 
a situation may arise from a rare case when the mother is un­
able or unwilling.to name the father. The more usual case is 
that a man is named as the father but he denies paternity.
1. Notwithstanding that Field states that she had seen historical 
records of Ga stools occupied by such absorbed children. The 
answer may be that the Ga rules differ in this respect.
The refusal of a man, once named, to accept paternity, was rare
in the olden days. The maxim of the law was and still is
nyonu mefoa aka na ame won.yina gbona o. which means that it is 
practically impossible for a man to extricate himself from.the 
responsibility once he is taxed with paternity by the mother.
It finds a parallel in the modern notion that "mothers know . 
best". The presumption of paternity arising from the mention 
of a man by the mother was, however, not irrebuttable. The 
onus of dislodging the presumption was a heavy one in the eyes 
of the old Ewe law; but, if proper evidence could be led in 
disproof, the presumption could be destroyed, because its basis 
was the assumed truthfulness of the mother.
Today the rule is not enforced in its old form, and the 
courts have gone as far as to have recourse to blood tests to
determine issues involving the paternity of children. The old
rule was formulated within the context of the old social 
phenomena, in which moral laxity and sexual liberty in women 
were highly reprehensible and promiscuity was unknown. Further­
more, there was a general belief, rooted in superstition, that 
a woman who failed to make a full disclosure, or who deliberately 
lied about who impregnated her, would not have an easy delivery 
and might even die at child-birth.. Today, .however, new ideas, 
new social values and different moral standards prevail in the 
Ewe society. Moral laxity and promiscuity are certainly on the 
increase. The threat of a supernatural sanction which may be 
visited upon women guilty of infidelity is less effective today,
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especially among the literate class of women who have found that 
they can he safely delivered of their babies at the midwife1s 
home even with falsehoods locked up in their bosom. For these 
reasons, the weight attached to a woman's evidence today is not 
so great. In some cases, as in Kpatey v. Hiadzi.^ the Court may 
even reject the mother's evidence and award' paternity to the 
proper man on the evidence adduced before it.
When a child's father is unknown, either because the mother 
does not name anybody or because the man named denies paternity, 
the child is absorbed into the mother's family, in exactly the 
same way as that whose father is factually known but is denied 
the legal parental status.
A problem of entitlement to property arises when a father­
less child is later properly claimed by his father. Since the 
child, before /this paternity was determined, was regarded as a 
member of his mother's family, he was.entitled, as of legal right, 
to the use and enjoyment of that family's property. He may, 
therefore, have made farms on that family's land. What happens 
to the farms on his change of paternity when he ceases to belong 
to his mother's family? If the farms contain only foodstuffs or 
annual crops, he is fully entitled to harvest those already grown 
by him; but he has no legal right' thereafter to use those plots 
of land unless he is permitted by the maternal family to continue
1. Kpate.y v. Hiadzi. Unreported, Asogli Native Court "B", Ho, 
22nd September, 1939, at p.228 of Civil Record Book.
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In their use and occupation. The real problem is when there is 
a farm planted with permanent cash crops like cocoa, coffee or 
palm trees. The making of such farms means in effect that the 
land is permanently tied to the planter and his successors. If 
the child is permitted to keep the farm, therefore, it will 
devolve, according to the Ewe law of succession,, on his children 
and their children in the new paternal family. This means that 
the land is practically lost to the maternal family; for even 
though there is the legal argument that the child's interest is 
limited to only the trees, the fact is that the land will not 
revert to the mother's family because the child will not allow 
the farm to die out v/ithout replanting it with new trees.
One view is that when the fatherless child is claimed by 
his father, the farm of permanent crops cultivated by him on 
his mother's family land is forfeited to the mother's family, 
to be treated as belonging to his mother's father. . This is the 
view expressed particularly in Peki, Aveme, Gbi, and Abutia, 
though it was agreed that some basis of sharing was possible.
In Taviefe and Matse and some other areas, it is the view that 
the farm is physically divided into three parts with one part 
to the child and two parts to his mother's father; in Awudorne 
the, division is suggested.in equal halves. Even in the areas 
where the farm is divided, it is emphasised that only the crops 
are given to the child. The legal result of this provision is 
that the paramount title of the family to the land is unaffected
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so that, in the unlikely event of all the present trees dying 
out or being destroyed, the right to use the land itself reverts 
to the mother's family; but the more practical legal implication 
is that, while the child enjoys the fruits of his farm, he has 
210 rights over the palm trees or odum trees or other timber 
naturally growing- on the land or any minerals or treasure trove 
that may be discovered on the land. Furthermore, while perhaps 
the child may alienate his interest in the farm, he cannot in 
any way alienate title to the land itself.
In a recent case at Gbi-Kpeme in Gbi in about 1961, the 
whole farm was forfeited to the maternal grandfather when the 
fatherless adult child moved into his proper patrilineal family. 
The right of forfeiture was not disputed either by the child 
himself or by his paternal family. The maternal grandfather, 
however, did not insist on the refund to him.of his expenses in 
the up-bringing of the child who had been through elementary 
school. The paternal family provided a sheep and drinks as an 
expression of gratitude and to mark the formal assumption of 
paternity.
It is suggested that, as a general rule, where a father­
less child makes a farm of permanent crops on his mother's family 
land as a member of that family, but his paternity is subsequently 
acknowledged so that he becomes a member of another family, the 
farm so made by him is, in strict Ewe law, liable to forfeiture 
to the mother's father, but the practice is to give such a child
a portion of the farm. In any event, it is in the discretion 
of the maternal family to make an absolute gift of the whole 
farm to the child, and it seems that this is normally the case 
if the acknowledgment of paternity and the change are effected 
smoothly. Even when such a Tfgiftn is made, unless expressly 
provided otherwise, the paramount title to the land is not 
thereby conveyed to the child but remains vested in the family 
of his mother.
In the early Ewe law, a distinction was drawn between a 
child who was procreated in lawful wedlock and that whose birth 
v/as a result of an irregular union, or a mere sexual relation­
ship. A child born in lawful wedlock, by which is meant a full 
ceremonial marriage, was in a privileged position with respect 
to succession to his father's interests in property. The 
position was similar to that of the children of a "six-cloth" 
marriage among the Ga people of Ghana.^ A child in Eweland whose 
mother v/as not properly married to his father before his birth, 
was known as gbomevi. asikevi or ahasivi. The gbomevi. asikevi 
or ahasivi, because his mother was not joined to his father by the 
conjugal bond, was not regarded as fully "legitimate". Not only 
did he incur some social discrimination, but his right to 
inherit his father's self-acquired property was not recognised, 
so that a child of a married mother was entitled to most of the 
property. Nevertheless, we cannot say the gbomevi was not
1. As shown in Ga cases like Solomon v. Botchway« (l9*+3) 9 
V/.A.C.A. 127, and Amarfio v. Ayorker, (195^) W.A.C.A.55^.
"legitimate11, because he was a full member of his father's 
family, he had an inherent right of use and occupation of 
the family land, and was eligible for all hereditary offices 
enjoyed by the family, including a chiefly stool. It was an 
anomalous situation, not very different in conception from 
the position of the ten children procreated in adultery in 
Coleman v. Shang:^ they were held to be legitimate for all 
purposes, save as regards succession to two-thirds portion of 
the intestate estate under Section ho of the Marriage Ordinance.
The distinction between the children of married and un­
married mothers has now disappeared in Ewe law. The information 
in virtually all areas is that, in the present state of the law, 
all children, however born, are fully legitimate, once their 
paternity is duly acknowledged, and they are all equally 
entitled to succeed to their father's interests in self-acquired 
property. This change has already been reflected in a Nigerian 
case of apparently similar circumstances. In the Nigerian 
(Yoruba) case of Savage v. MacFo.y , it was contended that only 
the children of a customary law marriage were legitimate and 
entitled to the intestate's property, as against other children 
whose mother was never properly married to the intestate. This 
contention'Was rejected by Osborne, C.J., who said:
1. Coleman v. Shang. (1959) G.L.R. 590.
2. Savage v. MacFoy, (1909) Ren.50h-. See also In Re Sapara, 
(1911) Ren.60o.
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In this respect there appears to be no difference 
between children born in native wedlock and the off­
spring of fortuitous connection, provided that pater­
nity has been acknowledged. 1
The learned Chief Justice, in deciding as he did, relied on the
evidence of a native chief "who, as a chief, has had practical
experience in administering the native law". I respectfully
concur in this statement of the law and submit that it also
represents the Ewe law. That is why I also agree v/ith the
dictum of Ollennu, J,, in Carboo v # Carboo that:
In Ghana, except for the purposes of succession to 
two-thirds of a personfs estate under the Marriage 
Ordinance, every child of a man, however born, is his 
child, unless the child!s paternity was not proved, 
or unless during his life-time the man did not
recognise that child as his child. 2
It should be stated, however, that the terms gbomevi« asikevi.
ahasivi and similar ones are still retained, even if only as
terms of social distinction 'and devoid of any legal consequences.
The Yoruba of Nigeria, for instance, also call such a child of
an unmarried woman omo ale. Coker attempts to draw a distinction
between the omo ale and a child born in wedlock because the
latter is legitimate from birth while the fo.rtoer is not legitimate
unless his paternity is acknowledged.^  As far as succession to
hereditary offices and property rights are concerned, however,
it is a distinction without a difference once paternity is
acknowledged.
1. Savage v, MacFoy. (1909), Ren.30^, 308.
2. Carboo v, Carboo. (l§6l) G.L.R. 83, 87.
3. See G.B.A. Coker, Family Property Among the Yorubas, Swe.et &
Maxwell, London, i960, p.26b.
b. Ibid.
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Among some patrilineal tribes, a man without a male child
to raise issue for his line of descent may designate one of his
daughters to remain a spinster, so that any children born by her
would become legally the children of her father, Rattray, for
instance, has written of the practice among the Nankanse people
of Ghana.where a daughter may be made "a stayed at home" (i.e.
unmarried), so that her child, known as yie-ble (meaning "house
child" or "sister!s child") may be regarded as her father’s
child.^ Rattray, however, says that the "stayed at home"
daughter is "laughed at" and "The children, too, have not the
same status as the ’legitimate sons’ ... e.g. they may never
■ 2become heads of sections". Ollennu criticises Rattray’s assess' 
ment of the status and standing of the "stayed at home" daughter 
and her children.^ From the very sketchy treatment that Rattray 
gave the subject, it is not possible to justify his conclusions. 
There is no doubt, however, that if the institution were to be 
found among the Ewe, the position would be approximately that 
given by Rattray; for total absorption within the Ewe family 
through one’s mother is not possible without some practical dis­
abilities. Apparently Ollennu criticised Rattray because he 
found a close similarity between the yie-bie of Nankanse and
1. R.S. Rattray, Tribes of the xA.shanti Hinterland. Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1932, Vol. 1., pp.31, 263.
2. Ibid.. p.265.
3. N.A. Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession 
in Ghana. 1966, pp.209-2.10.
the pla bi of the Ga-Adangbe of the Eastern Region of Ghana.
It seems to be a fairly common practice among the Krobo and 
other Adangbe people where, although the girl may not be express­
ly requested to remain a spinster for this purpose, the child of 
an unmarried girl is sometimes retained in the girl’s family. 
Such a .child is. known as pla bi;. b ut.the term is also applied 
to a child of any unmarried woman, even if the child’s paternity 
Is acknowledged. The difference between the two types of pla-bi 
is that that retained in the mother’s family later becomes yo bi 
and fully entitled to succeed to property and hereditary offices 
in his mother’s patrilineal family. The other type of nla bi 
is similar to the ahasivi« asikevi, or gbomevl in Eweland; he 
belongs to his own father’s family as. a legitimate member, so 
that the term Is only a social indication that he was not pro­
created in lav/ful wedlock. The practice of keeping one’s 
daughter as a spinster for the deliberate purpose that she 
should raise seed to her father is not known among the Ewe. If 
ever it was, it has disappeared. In any case, as already sug­
gested, it seems impossible among the Ewe to achieve a fully 
legitimate status for a child so absorbed into his mother’s 
family; he would be subject to certain disabilities, especially 
as regards succession to hereditary offices.
Paternity and Legitimacy; Mother Married
Although marriage is not necessary for the legitimacy of 
an Ewe child, the rule of Ewe law was that any child of a 
married woman belonged to her husband as a legitimate child,^ 
Evidence of the husband’s biological paternity was excluded 
because it was an absolute presumption of law that the child 
was a legitimate issue of the mother’s husband. Therefore, in 
order to determine the paternity of a child, it was enough.to 
establish the subsistence of a valid customary lav/ marriage 
between the mother and her husband at the birth of the child; 
all other enquiries, such as would be appropriate in the case 
of an unmarried woman, were precluded. There v/as a marriage 
for this purpose if formal drinks in contemplation of marriage 
had been accepted by way of betrothal, even if the actual public 
celebration of the union had not occurred. There was also a 
valid subsisting marriage even if the couple were separated, 
provided that the marriage consideration or tanu had not been 
repaid to the husband to effect a formal dissolution of the 
marriage.
It was this rigid rule of the old Ewe law that was applied
1. The old Ewe rule is similar to the Tswana law where the 
child of a married woman, without further enquiry, belongs to 
the man on whose behalf the marriage consideration or 
was paid. See I. Schapera, A Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom
■1955, P.139.
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in Agbovi v, Adatsi,^ In this case, originating in Goviefe- 
Kov/u, the defendant-appellant had had sexual intercourse with 
a woman who was separated from her husband but whose marriage 
consideration or tanu had not been fully repaid to the estranged 
husband. As a result a child was born. The plaintiff-respondent, 
as the woman’s husband, contended that the child, was his son.be­
cause, although the customary law marriage had been dissolved, 
the marriage consideration or tanu and expenses were still out­
standing, The Woadje Native Tribunal decided in favour of the 
plaintiff and held that, so long as there had not been a full 
return of the marriage consideration, the marriage technically 
subsisted and, therefore, the plaintiff husband was the father 
of the child of his separated wife. The defendant paramour 
appealed to the Native Court of Appeal for Akpini State at 
Kpando, but the appeal was dismissed.^ In the determination 
of this case, the sole criterion was the subsistence of a mar­
riage between the plaintiff-respondent and his wife, although 
there was no suggestion of sexual intercourse between them, 
such as could have resulted in the birth of the child.
About a year before Agbovi v, Adatsi, however, another 
Native Tribunal, the Native Tribunal of Kpando, also under the
1, Agbovi v, Adatsi. Unreported, Native Court of Appeal for 
Akpini State, Kpando, 19kk, at p.3k0 of Civil Appeal Necord Book.
2, The information, however, is that the child nevertheless 
v/ent to the defendant-appellant, so that the Court’s assigning 
of such an artificial paternity remains only on paper.
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jurisdiction of the same Native Court of Appeal for Akpini 
State, had been faced with a converse situation. If the lav; 
is that the husband is the father of every child born of his 
wife, then the converse must also be true that, even if the 
husband is unwilling to accept it, the wife can hold him res­
ponsible, as father of any .child she bears while he is- away.
That is why the case of Ebenezer Kofi v. Cecilia Akosua.^ 
of Kpando Tsakpe, is interesting in this regard. In that case 
the defendant had been married to the plaintiff but, after the 
birth of five children, difficulties arose and the couple 
separated; but there was no formal dissolution of the marriage. 
On her own admission, the defendant wife, after the separation, 
left the town and became a prostitute elsewhere. As a result 
of promiscuous sexual relations with other men in the course 
of her prostitution, the defendant wife conceived a child whose 
father she did. not know. Apparently the plaintiff husband must 
have felt unhappy about this position. He eventually sued his 
wife claiming damages from her for asking him to accept the 
paternity of the baby then still in her womb, whereas they had 
been separated without any sexual relations for about sixteen 
months prior to the conception. In her evidence in defence, 
the defendant - wife denied ■ ever mentioning the plaintiff (her
1, Ebenezer Kofi v. Cecilia Akosua, Unreported, Native Tribunal 
of Kpando, Kpando, 7th April, 19k3, at p.151 of Civil Eecord 
Book.
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husband) as the father of the baby in her womb and said that,
oven though she could not name its father, yet the plaintiff
husband was definitely not the father. The Native Tribunal
accepted the evidence of the defendant wife that she had not
taxed her estranged husband with the paternity of her child 
\
and accordingly dismissed the plaintiff’s claim.' Said the- . 
Native Tribunal:
In the opinion of this Tribunal, the claim by the 
Plaintiff against the Defendant is dubious since there 
is no evidence in support of the Plaintiff’s statement 
that ... the Defendant did ask the Plaintiff to own 
the said conception ... Judgment is, therefore, 
entered against the Plaintiff. 1
The reasoning of the Native Tribunal seems quite clear. The 
action was dismissed because the allegation was not proved.
Unfortunately, Ebenezer Kofi v. Cecilia. Akosua was not 
taken on appeal to the Akpini Native Court of Appeal, By 
Implication the Native Tribunal of -Kpando in this -case rejects 
the proposition of law that the husband is always the father of 
his wife’s child, however and whenever conceived. If this 
proposition were not rejected by the Tribunal, then the hus­
band’s claim could simply have been dismissed on the ground 
that no claim would lie even if the defendant wife had named 
him as father of the child; for in that case the wife would have 
only been stating what was an absolute presumption of law.
1. Ibid.
In that; event, whether the wife did name her husband as father 
of the child or not would not seriously be in issue. This, 
however, was not the case here. The wife v/as at great pains 
to deny that she ever mentioned her husband as father of her 
child, and even went as far as to expressly exclude him as a
possible- father. The Tribunal itself emphasised that i t.......
rejected the plaintiff husband*s claim because he could not 
substantiate his allegation that he had been mentioned as 
father of the child, which leaves the impression that the hus­
band could have succeeded if he could prove that he had in fact 
been so mentioned. What we might ask is whether the plaintiff 
husband could have succeeded in his action if the defendant 
wife had maintained in court that the baby in her womb belonged 
to the plaintiff because the plaintiff was still legally her 
husband. Could the plaintiff husband have rejected paternity 
in spite of the technically subsisting customary law marriage? 
It seems that, from the tenor of the Native Tribunal’s judgment, 
the husband would have been allowed to reject the paternity. 
What we cannot directly infer from the judgment of the Native 
Tribunal is whether it would have upheld the claim of the 
husband, if the husband had claimed paternity of the child 
conceived by his 'wife In the course of prostitution and after 
sixteen months of separation without any sexual relations. It 
appears, however, that the Tribunal would have rejected such 
a claim.
I k k .
It seems that the decision in Ebenezer Kofi v, Cecilia 
Akosua is a reflection of modern changes in the Ewe lav; of 
paternity. The irrebuttable presumption of the old law was 
that, without any further enquiry being allowed into the facts, 
a husband was the father of any child of his wife. Accordingly, 
even where a wife v/as carried away into captivity during the 
Ashanti^Ewe war, children brought home by the liberated wife 
belonged to her husband who had been completely out of touch 
with her for many years.^ In the old rule, even if the paramour 
was openly cohabiting with the woman, the children legally be­
longed to the woman’s lawful husband if the marriage consider­
ation or tanu had not been repaid before the procreation of the 
children. The Ewe say fiafito bofo mole esi ot that is, ”a 
thief cannot own the products of a farm11, because the paramour 
has no right to another man’s wife and is in that sense a thief 
violating another person’s rights. This meant that the Ewe 
’’father” was not always the biological originator of his child’s 
conception. It was only a position of a legal relationship, 
which might not coincide with the biological facts. This was 
not peculiar to the Ewe. The dictum of Roman law was pater est 
quern nuptiae demonstrant; and it is said among the Arabs that 
’’children belong to the man' to 'whom the bed belongs” . Most
1, The Ashanti invasion of Eweland was in about 1868-69 and
it was successfully repulsed. Examples of descendants of such 
captured v/ives were given, but, for obvious reasons, without 
permission to publish them.
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patrilineal African peoples had rules of similar effect, even
if of different f o r m u l a t i o n E v e n  in the modern lav/, whether
of the Ev/e, the English or the Chinese, v/e cannot say that a
child’s "genitor” is always his ”pater” ,
Recent decisions and interviews with many people show
that■the old rule that a husband, simply because a husband, ■
is legally the father of his wife’s child, has been changed
among the Ewe. The issue of paternity is now decided on the
basis of physiological fatherhood as established from all the
available evidence, including, of course, the position of a
man as a husband. It was suggested in one or two areas that
2
it was the Germans who changed the lav/. Most people attribute 
the change to the British colonial authorities. In any event, 
in their mind, it was the ’’white man” who came to change the 
law. It seems'they are right to attribute the change to 
European rule; for ouch changes have been brought about by 
the colonial administration in Ghana and elsewhere.
An example of such a change arising from European rule 
is in the decision of a Nigerian case to which we may refer.
In the Nigerian (Efili) case of Sdet v, Essien,^ the facts w :
1. E.g. the Tswana and the Bantu generally where the payment 
of.bogadi.or lobola determines, paternity. ......................
2. Most of the area was part of the German colony of Togo 
until 191k.
3. Edet v, Essien. (1932) 11 N.L.E. 47.
are only slightly different from Agbovi v. Adatsi.^ In Edet 
v. Esslen. the defendant-appellant (Essien) was deserted by 
his wife but the marriage consideration had not been refunded 
before the wife went to live with another nan who v&s the 
plaintiff-respondent in this case, In the customary lav/ the 
woman remained a wife to the plaintiff for as long as the 
marriage consideration was not refunded. The defendant- 
appellant (Essien), therefore, sought to claim the two children 
procreated through the relations between his separated wife 
and the plaintiff-respondent (Edet) on the ground that, under 
Eiik law, he was entitled to any children born by the woman 
since she had not refunded the marriage consideration. The 
Calabar Provincial Court did not allow the claim because the 
native lav/ on the point was not proved to its satisfaction.
The claim was also rejected on an appeal to the Pivisional 
Court. In rejecting the appeal in the Divisional Court, Carey, 
J., said:
Assuming that the native lav/ and custom as alleged 
by the appellant had been definitely established, I am 
inclined to think it should properly have been over­
ruled in this case as being repugnant to natural justice, 
equity and good conscience having regard to the circum­
stances. 2
1.' Agbovi v, Adatsi. supra................
2. Edet v. Essien. (1932) H  N.L.P. V7, /48,
It seems that it is through decisions of this nature, applying 
the well-knov/n Mrepugnancy clause” , as well as executive and 
administrative action, that changes in Ewe lav; have resulted 
from European rule.
When the old Ewe lav; on paternity is stripped of its 
harshness .and.rigidity, excluding the absurd instances where 
there is a complete impossibility of sexual ingress, it is 
realised that the old Ewe rule is essentially the same as the 
present English lav; on the subject. It is, therefore, not easy 
to understand why the British colonial administration should 
have induced a change in the opposite direction.
The rule of English lav/, as stated in the Banbury Peerage 
Case, is that a child is presumed to be a legitimate child of 
its parents, if it was either conceived or born in lawful wed­
lock, unless it can be proved that sexual intercourse did not 
take place in such circumstances as could lead to the birth of 
the child.^ This was also stated by the Lord Chancellor in 
Head v. Head thus:
A child born of a married woman, whose husband is 
within the four seas, is always to be presumed to be 
legitimate, unless there is evidence of a satisfactory 
character that sexual intercourse did not take place 
at any time when, in the course of nature, the husband 
might have been the father of the child. 2
1. Banbury Peerage Case. (l3ll) 1 Sim. 8c St. 153] 57 E.B.62.
2. Head v. Head. (1823) 1 Sim. 8c St. 150; 37 E.H. 10^9.
This principle has been extended and is applied in England in 
a manner no less absurd than the extreme Ewe cases. Thus it 
has been said in the House of Lords that:
So strong is the legal presumption of legitimacy 
that in the case of a white woman having a mulatto 
child, although the husband is also white, and the 
supposed paramour black, the child is to be presumed
to be legitimate, if there was any opportunity for.........
intercourse. 1
One social reason for the presumption of legitimacy in English 
law must be to exclude impossible and embarrassing enquiries 
and to preserve the stability of the family and the sanctity of 
the institution of marriage. There is no reason why the same 
reasoning cannot apply to sustain the old Ewe rule, perhaps 
trimmed of its absurdities, even though the Ewe institution 
of marriage is polygamous. That the social implications of 
the Ewe rule have not been appreciated, with the result of a
drastic change in the law, has led in a spate of paternity
disputes, in which, to the embarrassment of families and the 
discredit of marriage as an■institution, enquiry into biological 
paternity has been over-emphasised. We may look at one or two 
paternity cases that have been before the Ewe native courts.
p
In Dansu v . Na-D.1 a . a case from Agbesia, the plaintiff- 
respondent was the husband of the defendant-appellant (Madam 
Na-Dja), to whom he was married, apparently under customary law,
1. Piers v. Piers. (1849) 13 Jur. 5&9*
2. Dansu v. Na-D.ja. Unreported, Native Court of Appeal for
Akpini State, Kpando, 15th March, 1944, at p.335 of Civil Appeal 
Record Book.
1*1-9 .
Both of them were living together whfeh a male child was born 
by the wife. The child was regarded as a legitimate child of 
the plaintiff-respondent (Kwami Dansu). W h e n  the child was 
about 15 years old, however, the defendant wife named a dif­
ferent man, one Kwasi Ablewu of Avene-Danyigba, as his father. 
The plaintiff husband sued his wife for naming another person­
as the child*s father. The trial Native Tribunal of Aveme' 
found that the plaintiff-respondent, who was the husband of 
the child’s mother, was the father and accordingly awarded him 
paternity. The wife appealed to the Native Court of Appeal for 
Akpini State at Kpando. At the hearing the Native Court of 
Appeal felt it pvas in doubt and so decided to call the boy 
himself to give fresh evidence. The disputed boy, in his 
evidence, stated that the information he believed from his 
mother (the defendant-appellant) was that the plaintiff- 
respondent was not his father and that one Kwasi Ablewu was 
his father. On the strength of this evidence, the Native Court 
of Appeal reversed the judgment of the trial Native Tribunal 
of Aveme and declared that the husband was not the father of 
the boy born by his wife while they were living together as 
man and wife.
Here we see-the case of a child born in wedlock-when his 
father and mother were cohabiting and yet the Native Court of 
Appeal declared that his father was not his-mother’s husband.
This goes beyond the rule in the English cases because there 
existed the opportunity for sexual intercourse which could have 
resulted in the birth of the child. It is an extreme case, 
though the rationale is to base legal paternity on physiological 
fatherhood, which by itself is good law. The difficulty here, 
of course,- was the enquiry into the biological origin of the 
child, a task which the Native Court of Appeal was not equipped 
to perform. In the event, it could do no better than rely on 
what amounts to no more than the mother’s evidence alone, for 
the boy could not corroborate his mother as he was only reproduc­
ing what his mother had told him. If the court had balanced the 
mother’s evidence against the rebuttable presumption of paternity 
in the husband, perhaps its decision might have been different.
In any case, the Court was also heavily swayed by the disputed 
child’s own statement rejecting his mother’s husband as his 
father.
Another case was decided by the Asogli Native Court lfB’T 
at Ho. It is Knatoy v . Hi ad z i ,^  both parties coming from 
Tanyigbe, In this case the plaintiff (Seth Kpatey) claimed to 
be the father of a girl named Akosua, then aged about 13. At 
the time the girl Akosua was born, her mother was married to 
one Tsetse Amevor and not to the plaintiff. She v;as, therefore,
1. Kpatey v. Hiadzl. Unreported, Asogli Native Court ”B”, 
Ho, 22nd September, 1939, at p.232 of Civil Necord Book.
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born in lav/ful wedlock, though the evidence did not show that 
she was conceived in that wedlock. It was Tsetse Amevor, the 
husband of Akosua1 s mother, who named, the child, performed the 
outdooring ceremony and other birth rites, and had been looking 
after the child and had been generally regarded all along as
the, father, of. Akosua............................. .................
The plaintiff1s case was that Akosua*s mother had been his 
lover and that their relations continued until they were 
terminated by the marriage of the woman to Tsetse Amevor. The 
plaintiff claimed that the defendant mother had conceived Akosua 
through sexual intercourse with him before she married Tsetse 
Amevor and that Amevor could, therefore, not be the father of 
the girl. The plaintiff deposed that he had even been ordered 
by arbitrators to pay some money and to provide two bottles of 
rum to the defendant’s father for putting the defendant in the , 
family way and that he had complied.
One witness, a member of the defendant's family, said:
We received the £2 and wine from the Plaintiff for 
having spoilt Defendant by conceiving her. Though we 
knew Plaintiff to be the conceiver /si c7 of Defendant, 
yet we gave her and the conception to Tsetse as this 
was our usual practice by then in our clan ... 1
The defendant, Akosua*s mother, said in her evidence that the
nlaintiff was not Akosua1s father. •
1. Ibid.
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The Native Court held that the plaintiff (Seth Kpatey) 
was the father of Akosua although-he did not name the child at 
birth or perform any other custom in respect of her, and in 
spite of Akosua’s own mother’s evidence to the contrary. In 
its judgment the trial Native Court said:
The first witness for the Plaintiff alleged that they 
were fully aware of Plaintiff’s conceiving of Defendant, 
but as it was and is a general practice for them of never 
permitting the conceivers /sic7 of their daughters to go 
with such conceptions hence they gave out Defendant with 
the conception to their brother Tsetse Amevor for marriage 
on the third day of arbitration ... Defendant's conten­
tion that Plaintiff's child is not with her for he never 
performed any delivery custom is vague; for in accor­
dance with Plaintiff’s witnesses it would never be possible 
for Plaintiff to approach Defendant's parents for such 
customary performances, as they alleged of receiving the 
conception from him /7ic7; as such this unperformed 
custom did not mean that the Plaintiff was never the 
conceivcr of Defendant /sic7 ... 1
'This is a case which is remarkable 
of law that may be deduced from it. V/e 
for the proposition that, even though a child may be born in 
wedlock, that fact alone cannot be held to raise an irrebuttable 
presumption that its father is the mother's husband. One reason - 
why the law presumes that birth in wedlock presupposes paternity 
in the husband is that the mother may have conceived in pre­
marital courtship with her intending husband; for it is very 
improbable that a man would enter into marriage with'a'woman 
having another person's baby in her womb. The Native Court was,.
for the propositions 
may take it as authority
1. Kpatey v. Iliadzi, supra, at p.232 of Civil Record Book,
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therefore, right in rejecting this presumption when the evidence 
was clear that the woman had taken seed from another man prior 
to the marriage. It was, however, a hard decision because, in • 
arriving at the conclusion that it did, the Native Court not 
only rejected the mother1s own evidence on paternity but also 
.excused the plaintiffVs non-performance- of customary rites- at 
the time of the birth of the child. In doing so, it also con­
tradicted the suggestion by Ollennu that f,to become recognised 
as the father of a child, a man must nerform the naminv7 -1- ^
ceremony11.1 The evidence of the mother and the failure to 
perform the customary £itfes at birth were properly treated, 
as they should be, as only part of the totality of the evidence, 
though entitled to great weight, and the issue was decided on 
the preponderance of the evidence as a whole. It is submitted 
that this was rightly decided.
p
Another paternity case is X and Y v. Z. In this case the 
defendant, Z, had approached X and told X that he was X fs father. 
Therefore X and his reputed father, Y, sued Z in damages for 
defamation.
1. N.A. Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession 
in Ghana, i960, p.206,
2. This is civil suit No. 59/58, 'unreported decision of the 
Gbi-Hohoe Native Court, Hohoe, delivered on 17th April, 1958, 
at p.1-18 of the Civil Record Book. The names of the parties 
are withheld.
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At the trial the defendant, Z, admitted making the statement 
to X, the first plaintiff, and maintained his contention that 
he was X fs father, for which reason he counterclaimed for a 
declaration of paternity in his favour. The defendant deposed- 
that he was in fact the biological father of the child X, be­
cause X was conceived as a -result of his ■ (defendant1s) sexual 
intercourse with the mother when he was a school boy. The 
defendant called evidence that he was dismissed from school in 
those days because of his relations with X*s mother at the 
material time, and he produced a youthful photograph of himself 
in an effort to establish physical resemblance between himself 
and the child X. The defendant admitted that he had never 
maintained either the mother or the child, who was then over 
21 years old.
The case for the Plaintiffs was that the 2nd plaintiff, Y, 
was the husband of 5, the mother of X, at the time X was born.
The 2nd plaintiff stated that X fs mother, S, had been customarily 
engaged to him some years earlier, and he had been performing 
the marriage customs over a period of time before the formal 
marriage. The marriage actually took place before the birth 
of the disputed child, so that at the time X was born both the 
2nd plaintiff and X fs mother were married and were cohabiting' 
as man and wife. The 2nd plaintiff asserted that he was the 
father. The defendants answer to this was that, regardless 
of the alleged engagement, he had put X 1s mother in the family
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way so that, at the time X !s mother went to live with the 2nd 
plaintiff as wife, she was already pregnant. The mother, S, 
gave evidence for the plaintiffs and stated that her child*s 
father was the 2nd plaintiff, Y; but the mother was described 
by the Court as an. untruthful witness.
In its judgment, the trial Native Court dismissed■the 
action by the disputed child, X, the 1st plaintiff therein, 
against the defendant. The ground on which the action by the 
disputed child, X, was dismissed was that, X*s own paternity 
being the substantive matter in issue, X was not competent to 
sue because he was not in existence at the time of the facts 
into which the Court was enquiring, so that everything' which he 
said was a hearsay.
As between the 2nd plaintiff, Y, who was X*s reputed father, 
and the defendant, Z, the Native Court entered judgment in 
favour of Y, the 2nd plaintiff, and awarded him the paternity
of the child X. The reasons given by the Court are, however,
interesting. It said:
According to the evidence before us, it seems that S 
took the seed from the Defendant, but the Defendant did 
not at all look after the conception .., The Defendant 
did not perform any outdooring ceremony at the time 1st
Plaintiff /i.e. X7 was born and had waited for about 22
years now when he comes to claim the 1st Plaintiff to 
be his son. It ‘was rather the 2nd Plaintiff /i.e. Y/ 
that performed the outdooring ceremony and had been 
looking after the child till now as his son, and S also 
told the Court that she took the seed from the 2nd 
Plaintiff, though Defendant’s picture (Exhibit *A!) 
appears to be 1st Plaintiff’s /i.e. X ’s7 This Court
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enters judgment for the 2nd Plaintiff and against 
the Defendant for paternity of the 1st Plaintiff 
/i.e. X7 *.. 1
This decision is difficult to reconcile with the Ewe lav; 
as to paternity. In the first place, the Native Court could 
have disposed of the case and decided in favour of the 2nd 
plaintiff by applying the.old Ewe rule that, as husband of X ’s 
mother, he was presumed in lav; to be X fs father. In that case 
no onus would lie on the 2nd plaintiff to establish his physio­
logical paternity, once the marriage was proved. Alternatively, 
the Native Court could treat the presumption that the husband 
is father of his wife’s child as a rebuttable presumption. In 
this latter case, the burden would be on the defendant to rebut 
the presumption by appropriate evidence to the effect that the 
plaintiff husband could not have been the child’s physiological 
father. Neither course was adopted, and the trial Native Court 
did not seem to have adverted its attention at all to the position 
of the 2nd plaintiff as a husband. We may take it, then, that 
the Native Court regarded the fact of marriage as irrelevant to 
the determination of the issue and. was applying the Ewe customary 
lav; in its modern form of deciding solely'on the criterion of 
biological fatherhood. If so, this would be in line with the 
general trend, of other decisions',..................................
1* X and Y v. Z « supra.
V/e cannot, however, say that the Native Court’s decision 
was based on the fact of biological paternity. On the contrary, 
the Native Court made a finding of fact on that issue but 
consciously decided that that was not legally conclusive. The 
Court said, ”According to the evidence before us, it seems that 
S took the seed from the Defendant”. Then it went on to say 
that the defendant’s picture appeared to be that of the disputed 
child. It was in the teeth of these findings that the Native 
Court nevertheless decided that in the circumstances the 
defendant could not be awarded paternity. If the Native Court 
was of the opinion that the defendant was the disputed child’s 
biological father, and even reinforced this with physical resem­
blance, why then did it enter judgment against the defendant?
The Native Court’s answer is that, although the defendant 
appeared to be the biological father, yet he lost the legal 
fatherhood because he neither performed the child’s outdooring 
ceremony nor maintained him, In so deciding, the Native Court 
was not relying on the strength of the plaintiff’s own case of 
physiological paternity, but only on the evidence of his per­
formance of customary rites at birth and maintenance there-after. 
V/e may, therefore, ask whether it is the Ewe lav; that a person 
can succeed in a claim of paternity by the mere facts of naming 
a child, performing its customary outdooring ceremony and 
maintaining it thereafter. It is submitted that that is not the 
law.' If paternity cannot be established on the facts of the case3
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assumption of parental responsibilities alone cannot confer it;
for that is only part of the totality of the evidence. There is
in Ewe law no rule of "legitimation per subsequent maintenance";
nor does there exist any "prescriptive right of paternity". That
is why in the Tanyigbe case of Kpatey v, Hiadzi.1 decided by the
Asogli Native Court "B" at Ho, it was decided that the biological
father was entitled to paternity,' notwithstanding that he did not
%
name the child nor perform its outdooring ceremony and had never 
maintained the child. That is also why, in an otherwise bad 
case, the Native Court of Appeal for Akpini State at Kpando, in 
Dansu v, Na-D.ja applied the correct principle, albeit with 
startling consequences, and awarded paternity to the biological 
father, although the child was conceived as well as born in wed­
lock and had been maintained for 15 years by the mother’s husband. 
It is submitted that the law laid down in Kpatey v, Hladzi and 
Bansu v, Na-D.ja is to be preferred, even if we do not fully 
agree with the application of the law to the facts in each case.
V/e may, therefore, sum up the position thus. Under the 
old Ewe law, there was an irrebuttable presumption of law that 
the husband of a married woman was the father of any child born 
by such a woman, and this was so even if there was no possibility 
of sexual access, to .the woman, This, however, has been changed..
1* Kpatey v. Hiadzi. supra.
2. Dansu v. Na-D.ja. supra.
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Therefore, under the current Ewe lav;, biological paternity is 
the sole criterion, so that paternity will be awarded to him who 
establishes physiological fatherhood: Ebenezer Kofi v. Cecilia
Akosua. Dansu v. Na-D.ja and Kpatey v. Hiadzi. Kelevant for the 
determination of biological paternity are such facts as marriage 
between a. claimant, and the child’s mother at. the time of. c.on-. - . 
ception or birth, the naming of the child and-performanco of the 
outdooring ceremony by the claimant, maintenance of the child 
by the claimant, and the mother's own testimony. Each of these, 
however, is only part of the evidence by which biological pater­
nity may bo established, so that neither of them is per se 
conclusive of the issue one way or the other. They each raise 
a presumption in favour of paternity, but in each case it is 
only a rebuttable presumption which can be displaced by such 
other evidence that may be forthcoming.
We may hero advert our attention briefly to the general 
question of why a man should want to claim the paternity of-a 
child. In one sense the rearing of children is no more than an 
onerous responsibility which some men are happy to shirk. For 
the Ewe, however, claiming one's child is a sacred duty. It 
has the sentimental reason of the satisfaction derived from 
having, as belonging to oneself, that which is priceless, The ■■ 
Ewe say ame wu ,ga or "a human being is more valuable than 
money". The sentimental attitude probably also has part of its
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origin in the traditional desire by members of a family or 
dzotinu to increase their number. The birth of a child was 
greeted with joy by the family because that made it easier for 
the unit to fulfil its obligations to its members in matters 
requiring mutual assistance, such as clearing of farm lands 
and building of houses*. Numbers also- increased-the general 
standing of the family in the community because that was indicativ 
of the potential contribution of the family to the general weal. 
Those feelings are retained even today. Hence, however reluc­
tant the Individual may be, his family would insist on claiming 
any child of which he is the father. The sentimental feeling
is also expressed in the reasoning that a child being of one's
"blood", should not be lost to another person or family. More 
practically, an Ewe man naturally wishes to ’be survived by his 
own children and descendants to perpetuate his memory. Similarly 
a man would like to have as his heirs his own children on whom 
his interests in property should devolve on his death. Another 
practical reason is that a man desires children who would serve 
him at home and assist him on his farm or in his trade or 
business, and who would maintain and care for him in his old age. 
The combination of these considerations may explain the vigour 
and determination with which paternity disputes are contested 
today among the Ewe. It is for these reasons that it is often
said that procreation is the chief aim of marriage among most
African peoples. Hence if the woman is barren it is considered
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that a primary objective of the marriage has not been realised. 
For a childless man feels that a major purpose of his life has 
been frustrated.
Paternity and Legitimacy: The Mother A Widow
It has been strongly urged by some authorities that a widow 
remains married to her husband's family even after the death of 
her real husband. Some writers have said this of other tribes 
of Ghana, but not of the Ewe specifically. As far as the Ewe 
are concerned, because the marriage does not subsist after the 
husband's death, a child of a widow, unless conceived before the 
death of the husband and as a result of sexual intercourse with 
the husband, belongs to its physiological father.
Field, for instance, says that if, after the death of her 
husband, Lis successor does not wish to marry the widow in Akirn- 
Kotoku, then the successor must divorce her in the appropriate 
manner that a husband would divorce his wife, and if the 'widow 
decides to go away she must return the marriage consideration.^ 
The applicability of this rule is extended by Ollennu who says 
that what Field says of Akim Kotoku "is in substance the same as
the law which obtains in all the different tribes throughout
■ O ..........................  . . . .  .......
Ghana". This will be taken up at the appropriate place in
discussing succession,^ V/e may explain here, however, that as
~  M.J. Field, Akim-Kotok'u. Crown Agents, London", 19587 pVll5.
2. IT.A.- Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession in
Ghana. 1966, p.226.
3. See tdd, {17 -725 Infra.
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a general rule male children succeed their father in Sue lav/, and 
none of such children is permitted to marry his own mother or 
any other wife of his deceased father. Although the Ewe recog­
nise a form of levirate which consists in finding a new husband 
for the widow within the family of her deceased husband, there 
is no legal, obligation on the family to find such a new husband 
for the widow, nor is the widow legally obliged to accept any 
person from her former husband's family. V/hatever may have been 
the Ewe law in the past, the law now is that there is no rule 
which retains the matrimonial bond even after the death of one 
spouse. Accordingly, in Ewe law, at any rate at present, a 
widow is practically in the position of a feme sole. She is, 
however, entitled to support and maintenance from her deceased 
husband1s successor or from other members of the family if she 
decides to remain single.
It follows that a widow in Eweland is free to marry anybody 
she pleases without having to refund the marriage consideration 
01 her deceased husband. As a corollary to this, a widow is 
free also to enter into sexual relations with any person of her 
own choice. Therefore, any child she bears, while still a widow 
and, therefore, a feme sole, v/ill have* its paternity determined 
by the normal rules applicable to the child of an unmarried 
woman. Such a child is not, and there is no presumption that 
it is, a member of the deceased husband's family, unless 
biological paternity can be traced to a member of that family.
Choice of Father by an Adult Child
Among the Ewe a child who is of age may decide not to 
recognise his reputed father any longer as father and may choose 
a new father. This he may do by renouncing his previous pater­
nity and physically moving away to reside with his new father 
or his family. Probably the child would normally do this only
on his mother's advice.
At what age a child may be regarded as being of age and
competent to take such a fundamental decision is not specified.
It seems that a child can take such a decision at any time that 
he possesses a sufficient degree of understanding to appreciate 
the consequences of such an action. There are instances when 
persons have changed their paternity before attaining 21 years; 
but others have done so at a much older age.
If the intended new father should reject paternity, the 
effect would be to bastardise the child in the sense of being 
fatherless, with all its legal consequences, unless the old 
father consents to take him back. Such a rejection is, however, 
rare in practice because there is always a prior consultation 
and agreement, so that the eventual public declaration of the 
new paternity is only a formal act and the presentation to the 
public of a fait accompli.
The acceptance of paternity by the new father consists in 
physically accepting the body of the child when he moves into 
the new paternal family. If the new father is of a different
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political unit, that is if of a different sub-division, division 
or chiefdom, the traditional drums are sounded to proclaim his 
acceptance into the new family. In all cases a sheep is 
slaughtered and prayers are said for the prosperity of the new 
child and to signify a change in paternity. This is usually 
followed by a general merry-making which may take several days.
It seems that a man who has been so rejected by his reputed 
child has no remedial action open to him now in Ewe law, whereby 
he can re-assert his position. The present Ewe law has no ‘ 
provision for preventing developments of this type. Therefore, 
even though the former father maty obtain a declaration of pater­
nity in his favour, there is no means by which the child can 
these days be compelled to return to him. It has been stated 
that the right of a child to choose his own father is a relatively 
recent innovation, It was stated that in the past, if the child 
was born in wedlock, he could not renounce his paternity, be­
cause he would be ordered to remain with his mothers husband 
as father. The position has now changed and, even if it is a 
rule of a comparatively recent origin, it has now crystallised 
into a rule of the Ewe customary law that a child may determine 
who is his father.
The information in the case of X and Y v. Z.'*' for instance, 
is that, although the Native Court awarded paternity to Y, the
1. X and Y v. Z. supra.
disputed child thereafter in his own judgment went to the 
defendant who had lost the case; but, after a while, he returned 
to the formerly reputed father and he was accepted back again.
As can be seen from the post-trial history of X and Y v. Z. the 
unfettered right of a child to choose his own father renders 
nugatory any award of paternity made by arbitrators or even a 
court of law. In X and Y v. Z. the defendant lost the action in 
court but won the child extra-judicially, whereas the 2nd 
plaintiff won the court case and lost the child. It was only 
at the child’s own wish that he again reversed the position.
The awareness of the Native Courts that a child could, in 
spite of a court’s award, choose his own father, seems to have 
influenced them in paternity suits. For example, in Dansu v. 
Na-D.ja^ the Native Court of Appeal for Akpini State at Kpando 
was in doubt on the evidence before it. It, therefore, decided 
to call for fresh evidence and invited the disputed child, then 
a boy aged about 15, to give evidence in the matter. The boy 
stated that the information he believed from his mother was that 
his mother's husband was not his father. In law this could not 
amount to a corroboration of his mother's evidence because it 
was only a repetition of what the mother had told her son. But 
the Native Court of Appeal could not have been unaware that, if 
it decided against the boy's expressed belief, the boy might
1. Dansu v. Na-Dja. supra.
still go to the man he believed to be his father, thus reducing 
the court's decision to an ineffective paper declaration. The 
Hative Court of Appeal, therefore, took a practical (even if not 
a legal) decision by concluding that this was a piece of cor­
roborative evidence which tilted the balance. It is submitted 
that this is perhaps the only explanation of the decision in 
that case when the Native Court of Appeal said:
Upon the facts as maintained on record from the boy 
himself who is now in his formative years, choosing his 
own father according to law, this Native Court-of Appeal 
sees no reason why judgment of the Aveme Tribunal should 
not be reversed. The appeal is, therefore, allowed ... 
Fatherhood of the said boy to be vested in the originator 
of the conception as contended by the Defendant-Appellant 
and corroborated by the boy in question ... 1
p
In the case of X and Y v. Z. however, it seems that the 
principle did not receive approval from the Court that an adult 
child could choose his own father. In that case the disputed 
child, X, had joined his reputed father as plaintiff in suing 
the defendant. Although the child's right to sue was not chal­
lenged by the defendant, the Gbi-Hohoe Native Court, Hohoe, on 
its own initiative, non-suited the plaintiff child on the ground 
that he had not been brought into existence at the time of the 
facts which had to be proved. This is an ingenious argument, 
insofar as everything that the disputed child himself could say.
1, Dansu v. NaD.ia. supra.
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on his paternity would only amount to hearsay evidence. 
Nevertheless the trial Native Court had ignored the current 
trend of the customary lav/ which recognises the right of the 
child to declare who is his father.
Other native courts have taken a contrary position to that 
decided in X and Y v. Z.1 The case of X and Y v. Z was decided 
by the Gbi-Hohoe Native Court sitting at Hohoe. Only about 22  
miles away, the Native Court of Appeal for Akpini State at
2Kpando had enunciated a different rule. In Agbosu v. Kuanor. 
a case from Gbefi, the plaintiff (Agbosu) sued the defendant 
in damages because the defendant had published concerning him 
that his father was not Kondogoloku Agbosu of Gbefi who had 
been recognised as his father. The defendant was alleged to 
have said that the plaintiff's real father was a different man 
from Leklebi. The plaintiff stated that the publication was 
defamatory of him because he was born in wedlock, his mother 
being married to his father under the customary lav/ at both 
the time of his conception and birth. The trial Native Court 
found for the plaintiff, and the defendant appealed to the 
Native Court of Appeal for Akpini State.
In his grounds of appeal, the defendant-appellant argued 
inter aliaT that "Plaintiff-Respondent should not have been the 
right man to sue him for the alleged defamatory words, rather
i- supra.
2. Agbosu v. Kuanor. Unreported, Native Court of Appeal for 
Akpini State, Kpando, k t h October, 19kk at p.358 of Civil Appeal 
Record Book.
his parents". The Native Court of Appeal rejected the argument 
and said:
In the opinion of this Native Court of Appeal, 
Plaintiff-Respondent is of ripe age and therefore 
knows of the origination of his conception and 
recognises Kondogoloku Agbosu of Gbefi as his 
legitimate father and not any Lekleki man or other 
.person as alleged by Defendant-Appellant. His 
action as instituted in the Tribunal below should 
hold good. 1
It seems that the Native Court of Appeal for Akpini State 
was quite consistent in its decisions which gave practical 
effect to the current customary law rule that a child can choose 
its own father. The decision in Agbosu v. Kuanor was an appli­
cation of the principle in Dansu v. Na-D.ia.2 also decided by 
the same Native Court of Appeal. While its consequences may 
in certain cases be unpleasant, the rule is now established.
It may be pointed out that Ewe law is not the only one 
that accords the right to an adult child to decide who is his 
father. This right is recognised in the laws of many countries 
of Europe and elsewhere. For instance, the Portuguese Civil 
Code provides that a child, on attainment of majority, can 
unilaterally decide who is his father.-^
1. Agbosu v. Kuanor. supra.
2. Kwami Dansu v. Na-D.ja. supra.
3. See Article 126 of the Codigo Civil Portugues (Portuguese 
Civil Code).
Persons Absorbed Into the Family
The discussion so far has mainly proceeded on the basic 
assumption that membership of the Ewe family is an irreversible 
incident of birth and of birth alone. The Ewe being a patri­
lineal community, this would mean that membership of the family 
is only conferred by blood descent exclusively through the male 
line. However, as v/e have seen, there are cases when a person 
becomes a member of a family by virtue of maternal connections 
only, v/hich are really the cases of the failure to accept or 
recognise paternity. Even in such a case, the membership of 
the family is an incident of birth, though an exception is made 
by allowing membership through the female line.
There are, however, other cases when a person is deemed 
to be a member of a family with which he has no blood connection 
whatsoever. Such persons are either slaves or descendants of 
slaves, naturalised persons, or foundlings. Because the member­
ship of the family by such persons cannot be traced to any blood 
relationship, such members are here described as absorbed 
persons; for the only legal basis of their membership is 
absorption into.the family. We may look at the categories of 
persons comprising this group.
The Slave: It does not appear that the position of the slave
or the descendant of a slave in Eweland is materially different
from that in the other tribes of Ghana. At present slaves and 
descendants of former slaves are regarded in the eyes of Ewe lav/ 
as full members of the families of the original slave masters.
In the past, a slave was a person who was bought by another 
person. As such, the slave belonged to his master and became a 
member, though an inferior one, of his master's family. In the 
uncommon cases when a woman bought a slave, such a slave did 
not acquire the status of a "child" of the female purchaser.
The slave was regarded as only an item of her self-acquired 
property. Accordingly, whether the woman was married or not, a 
slave bought by her belonged to her own patrilineal family; the 
slave would not be regarded as a child of her husband even ifs.
the female purchaser was married.
In the matrilineal Akan areas of Ghana, it would appear 
that there had been some uncertainty about the legal status of 
slaves and their descendants because of the emancipation of 
slaves in the past century. Eventually the trial Judge in 
Santeng v. Darkwa settled the controversy on the issue when he 
said:
I find it proved that the custom is that the child 
of a slave woman is considered for purposes of succession 
and otherwise to be a member of the father's family. 1
1. Sant eng v. Darkwa. (1%0) 6 W.A.C.A. 52, 3k*
This dictum was approved on appeal by the West African Court
of Appeal."*" Rattray, however, says that in Ashanti the children
of a slave woman, whether conceived in union with another slave
2
or a free man, belonged to the slave woman's master.
It does not appear that the issue had been in dispute 
among the Ewe. The Slaves' Emancipation Ordinance-^ has not 
altered the Ewe customary law in this respect. The Ewe position 
then remains that a former slave and his descendants in the 
male line are members of the patrilineal family of the person 
who bought the original slave. It is in this connection im­
material whether the original purchaser was a man, an unmarried 
woman or a married woman. A person who is a descendant of a 
slave through only his mother presents no problem because he 
legitimately belongs to his father's patrilineal family by 
birth.
Today it is illegal in Ewe customary law to refer openly 
to the slave ancestry of any person. To do so is a customary 
law offence for which, among other things, the offender will be 
ordered to pay a fine of a sheep and a big pot of palm wine.
In the eyes of the law and of society, former slaves and descen­
dants of slaves are full and legitimate members of the families
1. Ibid.
2. R.S. Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution. 1929, PP.38-39#
3. Cap. 108 of Laws of the Gold Coast, 1951. Ike Ordinance 
was originally passed in 1872.
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into which they have been absorbed through the unfortunate 
institution of slavery. As such members of the family, they 
incur all the responsibilities of membership of the family and 
are entitled to practically all the rights and privileges 
arising therefrom. Their right to occupy or use the family 
land and other family property is unquestionable.
Nevertheless, an almost unconcealed disability attaches
to the descendants of slaves even today as regards succession
to hereditary offices. The old rule was that a slave could
not become a chief, but his child could become one "because
he would not escape with the stool". Since hardly any slaves
are still alive today, one would have thought that by the
operation of this rule all descendants of slaves should now
*
be equally eligible for succession to stools and other traditional 
hereditary offices. Indeed this is the technical legal position. 
In practice, however, the disability exists, which bars and 
excludes descendants of slaves from succession to stools and 
other important hereditary offices. This can be done notwith­
standing the prohibition on the disclosure of a person's slave 
ancestry, because the Ewe process of election to a chiefly 
office is conducted in a secret deliberation, and no reasons 
are assigned for the choice or rejection of a candidate. So 
strict is-the insistence on the purity of the royal blood that, 
even among the patrilineal Ewe, a person with slave blood from 
only his maternal line is not considered desirable for the stool.
These considerations, however, are not disqualifications result­
ing in ineligibility. They are practical facts which eliminate 
otherwise acceptable candidates.
Even though the law confers a full status on former slaves 
and their descendants, their social standing is still quite low.
A slave background is still a social stigma and many persons* 
are, therefore, careful to conceal such origins.
Naturalised Persons: The Ewe seem to have had an ancient form
of absorbing strangers into the family. When the Ewe communities 
were still settling down as political units, it seems that 
strangers were readily absorbed either individually or en masse. 
Now, however, society is fairly stable, so that absolute inte­
gration of a total stranger into a foreign family is hardly 
possible today. The word "naturalisation" is, therefore, used 
only as a near-equivalent for today's process of absorption.
Today, a stranger may express his desire to be absorbed 
into the community among whom he has lived for a considerable 
time. He may thus be absorbed through incorporation into the 
family with which he had been connected during his sojourn. The 
Ewe rule is that every stranger or amedzro must have an afeto. 
that is a person who is to him in loco parentis. In all legal 
and official relations with him, such as when a claim is laid 
by or against him, it must be through his afeto; if the stranger 
commits any delict and runs away, the afeto is answerable. We 
might describe the afeto in this context as a "patron" or
"sponsor11 because he is officially responsible for the stranger 
during the latterfs sojourn in the community. Some interpret 
afeto as landlord; but he is strictly not a "landlord" because 
the stranger need not reside physically in the premises of the 
afeto or be his tenant at all. When eventually the amedzro or 
stranger decides to be absorbed into the community, it is into 
his afeto!s family that he will be absorbed.
The formal procedure is for the stranger seeking absorption 
to approach his patronising family with a sheep and some drinks 
manifesting his desire. The sheep is slaughtered and libation 
is poured, thereby seeking the consent of the departed members 
of the family for the incorporation of the new member. Unless 
this is done, along period of residence alone will not result 
in the absorption of the stranger.
Once the formalities have been satisfied, the stranger 
technically ceases to be a stranger. He acquires most of the 
rights and privileges of family membership and incurs all the 
liabilities. He may farm on the family land and attend family 
meetings, and the family will be responsible for him and his 
welfare and will perform his funeral on his death. But he cannot 
become a full member of the family on the same footing as a 
member by right of birth. He can never succeed to any hereditary 
office, and neither can his descendants. He is still referred 
to sometimes as amedzro or stranger, though he has technically 
ceased to be one. More often he is contemptuously referred to 
as amedzro zu afee. meaning "a stranger who has become a citizen".
A man who naturalises in this way commits only himself. His 
children may refuse to be incorporated into the new family, in 
which case they retain the membership of the father's original 
family. If, however, as is usually the case, the children elect 
to follow their father, no further formalities will be required
in their case. Children cannot follow their mother in being
absorbed into a new family because they do not belong to the 
motherfs original family.
Original relatives of a person who is so absorbed into a 
different family have no claim on his estate on intestacy. The 
effect of the naturalisation is to disinherit former relations, 
thereby creating the rights of succession in members of the 
absorbing new family.
Foundlings: Foundlings are not common in Eweland. In the rare 
cases that a child is found abandoned, the foundling is deemed 
to become .a member of the family of its finder. If the finder
is a man, it acquires a status of a son or daughter to him. If
it is found by an unmarried woman, it is regarded as a son or 
daughter of that woman's father and is absorbed into the finding 
woman's paternal family. If, however, the foundling is found by 
a married woman, it is regarded as her child and her husband 
becomes its father; should the husband decline to become its 
father, it will belong to the female finder's own paternal 
family.
It seems, therefore, that in Eweland also there will apply 
mutatis mutandis the dictum of Adumua-Bossman, J., in Poh v . 
Konamba when, speaking of a female foundling in a matrilineal 
community, he said:
Her finder or discoverer became her owner or mother 
into whose family she became absorbed, and from or through 
whom her family relationship had to be traced according 
to native customary lav/. 1
In the patrilineal Ewe society, the family will be traced through 
the male line of the finder, unless the finder is a married woman 
and her husband accepts the foundling as his own child.
It should not be forgotten, however, that a foundling, 
though absorbed into a family, suffers considerable social dis­
crimination. Such a person and his descendants cannot, for 
instance, become chiefs, though they are generally entitled to 
the use of family land and other family property.
Adoption: Adoption in the modern sense is unknown to Ewe law.
A couple or an individual may take over another person's child 
and maintain him for an unlimited period; but this cannot 
legally change the child's paternity or maternity. It cannot 
alter or even merely affect the child's membership of his 
family of origin.
1. Poh v. Konamba. (1957) 5 W.A.L.R. 7b, 80.
Incidents of Family Membership.
The family is not only a legal entity. It is also a 
kinship unit. Indeed we may say that the family started as 
a kinship unit before it acquired its legal personality. 
Therefore, as a kinship unit, it is also a social organisation 
which embraces persons of a certain common patrilineal des­
cent. Many of its functions, objectives and purposes can, 
therefore, be explained, or be better appreciated, within the 
context of its social organisation. We are here, however, 
concerned primarily with the legal incidents of membership of 
the family; but, law itself being an instrument for social 
organisation, we cannot divorce the legal incidents from the 
social implications.
The incidents of membership of the family are only briefly 
mentioned because some of them are discussed in the appropriate 
places in this work.
Insofar as the status of membership is concerned, sex 
and age are immaterial. Both male and female members are full 
members. The theory then is that a male member of the family 
has the same rights of user to, say, the family land as has a 
female member. Accordingly, the right of enjoyment of a woman 
cannot be denied on the ground of her sex alone. However, the 
practical position is that women enjoy a generally inferior
position in the exercise of the rights of membership, a ref­
lection of the female position in many traditional African 
social organisations. Therefore, as between a male and a female, 
all other things being equal, the male member of the family has 
precedence over the female. This can be seen in the use of 
land and other property generally. Similarly, the woman has a 
less effective say in the general decisions of the family, so 
that women are not even counted as principal members of the 
family.
Infants, because of infancy, do not normally exercise 
property rights; but they are nevertheless members of the 
family. There is no fixed age limit for infancy. Until the 
age of puberty a child is definitely an infant. After puberty 
he may quickly attain the status of an adult if his father is 
dead and he has no elder brothers living; otherwise it may be 
many years afterwards before he is regarded as an adult.
The departed souls, who are in fact the majority, though 
silenced by death, are always regarded as members of the family, 
especially as regards ancestral family property. Membership of 
the family by the departed souls may, however, be regarded as 
largely sentimental; but it has a restraining influence on the 
family, especially as regards the control, use and alienation 
of family property.
The marriage of a female member does not affect her member­
ship of the family. No change occurs in law because she does 
not through marriage become a member of her husband's family.
In practice, however, a married woman's role in the affairs of 
her family are greatly diminished on marriage. Marriage is 
viri-local, the married woman normally moving into her matrimonial 
home away from her own family. She would accompany her husband 
to his farm, so that she is unlikely to wish to till her own 
family land; but today women strive to obtain portions of the 
family land for the cultivation of permanent cash crops like 
cocoa and coffee. The physical separation of a married woman 
from her own kin means that she is not able to be involved in 
the day to day affairs of the unit.
Membership of the family is the basis of nationality.
Every person who claims to be a citizen of a chiefdom must 
derive such citizenship from the membership of a family. The 
family is the unit of which the saa or sub-division is composed; 
it is the sub-divisions which constitute the division or duta; 
and the divisions form the chiefdom or du. Family membership 
is thus the basis of political allegiance, determining to which 
chief the allegiance is due.
It is by right of membership that a person may attend the 
meetings of the family and participate in the formulation of its 
decisions. More appropriately we may say that this right is 
also in the nature of a duty. Sex, however, limits the role of 
wcmen in this respect because only men usually attend these 
meetings and take decisions. That is why women are not regarded 
as among the principal members of the family. Age is also a
relevant factor. Children and young adults are not entitled 
as of right to attend family meetings unless they are very open 
ones on general issues. ¥e can, however, say that every member 
of the family, including women and younger persons, has a legal 
right of representation, either personally or through an elder, 
in the councils of the family, whether in its deliberative, 
arbitral or advisory capacity* The right of personal particip­
ation and the effectiveness of one's role, therefore, increase 
with age and generation.
Where there is a hereditary office vested in the family, 
it is only by right of membership of that family that a person 
becomes eligible to be elected to that office. The most impor­
tant such offices are those of a chief in its various grades, 
the sub-divisional elder or saame'metsitsi and the head of 
family or dzotinu'metsitsi.
As the paramount title to practically all ancestral lands 
in the Northern Ewe-speaking area of Ghana is vested in the 
respective families, it is only by virtue of membership of the 
family that a person can have the inherent right of user of 
family lands. Indeed the right of user is inherent in and flows 
automatically from membership of the family. Its implications 
will, however, receive a more detailed treatment later,^
Hardly any item of self-acquired property devolves on the 
family as such on the death intestate of any of its members.
1. See pp. 307- 327 infra
When this does occur, the right of enjoyment of such family 
property is primarily conditional on membership of the family. 
Most of the personal articles of a deceased person are usually 
distributed in Eweland and, while it is the members of the 
deceased's patrilineal family that mainly benefit from the 
distribution, other relations or fometowo. on even the maternal 
side, are considered.
Membership of the family does not only confer rights and 
privileges. It also imposes obligations on members. Every 
member of the family is under a duty to defend and protect the 
ancestral property belonging to the family and such property,
In the Northern Ewe sense, consists mainly of land. Every 
member of the family must contribute all available resources 
to preserve the property belonging to his family and to redeem 
it if encumbered. Today such a duty generally means an 
obligation to make a financial contribution to the cost of 
litigation of title to the property or its redemption, when 
encumbered.
Traditionally every member of the family is his "brother's 
keeper". Therefore, personal obligations and liabilities 
incurred by a fellow member in his life-time are the concern 
of all other members of the family. Members are expected to 
defend and preserve the property belonging to each other, and 
to contribute to the relief of a member in his indebtedness. 
Members of a family are generally responsible for the torts
of any member, not within the principle of vicarious liability 
as such, but within the concept of a corporate obligation to 
assist every member out of his difficulties. For this reason 
any member of a defaulter's family could in the past be seized 
and held ransom for the satisfaction of any liability or 
obligation on the defaulter. It is because of this that 
delinquent members who were a perpetual liability on the family 
were in the olden days sold into slavery if they persisted in 
wrong-doing.
For the same reason of corporate responsibility, infant 
members are entitled to the support and protection of the whole 
family. Even when their parents are still alive, the family 
recognises its responsibilities towards the children. As soon 
as a child loses his father, the family appoints another "father" 
for him, who must be his father's brother or another close male 
member of the family. The child is thus never without a "father" 
This is carried so far that even adult members have* as fathers, 
persons who officially stand in place of "father" to them at all 
times.
In the case of a serious illness, physical incapacity or 
mental Infirmity, the family is generally responsible for the 
care, maintenance and treatment of its members. The respon­
sibilities are primarily assumed by closer relations, but the 
family is ultimately responsible.
Death brings to an end the active mundane membership of 
the family. At this final stage, the family as a whole is under 
an obligation to give the deceased a decent burial and perform 
his funeral rites in due form. The deceased then joins the 
majority of members of the family who are on the other side of 
this life.
Cutting the Family Tie
The Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana do not have any 
legal or customary process whereby a person's connections or 
ties with the family as such can be severed or his membership 
terminated, A fission of families is also an unknown legal 
phenomenon. Although it is possible that in the past sections 
of a family could have broken away, such a fission of families 
is not known to recent memory. Even in the olden days of Ewe 
migration it is more probable that whole families moved away 
than that they split apart. Today some members of the family 
may move away physically to settle elsewhere; but they remain 
for all purposes part of the single family. An example occurred 
in Gbi in the 1930's. A considerable number of members of the 
Amega Edze family of the Asedukluvi sub-division of Gbi-Kpeme 
in Gbi moved away to settle with the members of the Tsevi sub­
division who broke off to constitute themselves into a separate 
division of Gbi-Abansi. This physical separation has in no way 
affected or diminished the rights and obligations of the Gbi-
Abansi residents who are members of the Amega Edze family of 
Gbi-Kpeme. The physical separation means that the Abansi 
residents are not able to attend all family meetings. Every 
family property, however, remains intact and undivided and is 
equally enjoyed by the members of both the Gbi-Abansi and Gbi- 
Kpeme sections of the family. It is not a legal but only a 
physical separation.
A different account is given of the law among the Akan 
and the Ga. Among the Akan people there is a customary procedure 
whereby a person's ties v/ith the family may be severed. Sarbah 
describes the Fanti procedure which he calls "Cutting Ekar",1 
Danquah writes of the Akan generally and gives it the name
p
"Cutting Kahire". Although Sarbah records the suggestion that 
the custom among the Fanti had been abolished in Cape Coast by 
Governor MacLean, recent cases before the courts show that 
there has not been an effective abolition.^
Ollennu says that the process among the Ga people for
severing the family tie is known as "Tako Mlifoo", or cutting
U *5of the headkerchief. A recent Ga example was reported in 1956>
1. J.M. Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws. Clowes, London, 1904,
PP. 53-54.
2. J.B, Danquah, op.cit.. pp.193-196.
3. See, e.g. Amoabimaa v. Badu. (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 227 and
Fynn v. Kum. (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 289.
4. N.A. Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession
in Ghana. 1966, p. 104.
5. See Okaikor v, Opare. (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 275.
but neither in that case nor in Ollennu1s own work is the Ga 
procedure described. From the expression employed in Ga, how­
ever, the symbolic act of severance seems to be the partition 
of a headkerchief.
The account given by Sarbah certainly suggests that the 
cutting of ekar among the Fanti will only affect the relations 
between the individuals involved and not the family as such. 
Writing about cutting ekar the learned author said:
As soon as this ceremony is completed, the two persons 
have no more share or portion in the property of each 
other. Where a man is disowned, it affects him alone; 
but in the case of a woman, her issue is included, for 
the saying is, the children follow the mother's con­
dition. 1
Again the Ga linguist who gave evidence of the Ga custom in 
Qkaikor v . Opare said:
The persons who perform it sever their family 
connections and have nothing to do with each other's 
estate. They do not attend the funeral of each other. 2
These accounts suggest that both among the Fanti and the Ga, the
process affects only the persons directly involved and perhaps
their descendants as well. The impression given by Ollennu,
however, is that it may also imply the dissolution of the bond
which unites the individual and his family. A similar view is
expressed by. Danquah. There is no informatxon, however, as to
1. J.M. Sarbah, op.cit.. p.34.
2. Qkaikor v . Opare. (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 275, 277.
3# J.B. Danquah, op.cit.. p.195.
whether such a severance of family ties' among the Ga and the 
Akan leaves the person so cut off to become "family-less", a 
notion so foreign to African concepts. Similarly, it is not 
clear whether such a person retains his political allegiance 
to the chief, since political allegiance is through birth into 
a family within the political unit.
As has been stated earlier on, the Ewe have no customary 
process whereby a person's membership of the family as such can 
be terminecfel’ Such severance of ties with the family as a unit 
is unknown to the Ewe who, therefore, say vivo madzi gbe. mean­
ing that, however bad a child may be, he cannot be rejected or 
disowned. The principle being vivo madzi gbe. a member of the 
family, however bad he may be, once born into the family, 
remains a member of it. We may say, then, that the Ewe maxim 
of vivo madzi gbe means "once a member, always a member of the 
family". The membership of the family can never be ended and 
persists throughout life, except possibly in the case of 
naturalisation.
The only Ewe way of dealing with an incorrigible delinquent 
member of the family was to sell him into slavery. This was 
the means of relieving the family of responsibility for that 
member, not by the cutting of the family tie but by physical 
exclusion which rendered impossible the enforcement of the 
family rights, duties and obligations. The family tie itself, 
even in such a case, remained indissoluble throughout.
Accordingly, if the delinquent member by any means obtained 
his release from slavery and returned home, his rights which 
had only been in abeyance would be automatically revived. 
Slavery having been abolished, this way of disposing of a 
difficult member of the family has become both obsolete and 
impossible. It follows, therefore, that there is no way of 
cutting off a member from the Ewe family.
The Anlo Ewe had another method of dealing with delinquent 
persons. A delinquent person who proved impermeable to cor­
rection was given a secret trial and summarily executed at 
night. This was known as toko atolia or "the fifth landing 
stage". This procedure, again, did not cut off the family 
ties; it was a physical elimination of the individual member 
concerned. Toko atolia is also now a thing of the past.
The only procedure among the Northern Ewe-speaking people 
of Ghana for dissolving family relationships is on a personal 
basis. If two persons of the same family are involved in a 
serious feud which they consider impossible of being settled, 
they may decide to dissolve the family bonds which unite the 
two of them. This is done by repeating words manifesting the 
unequivocal decision of both parties to regard each other as 
no longer related in any way and to remain sworn adversaries. 
Accompanying these words must be the symbolic act of either 
tearing a piece of headkerchief or breaking a piece of roofing
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thatch, known as ebe. The symbolic violent tearing asunder of 
a headkerchief is by each party pulling one end of it, in such 
a manner that it breaks in two* This is known as dukume tsotso 
or f!the partition of the headkerchief”* The other symbolic act 
which may accompany the words is the breaking into two parts of 
a piece of roofing thatch held at opposite ends by the two 
opposing parties. This latter process is beme tsotso or ”the 
breaking of the roofing thatch11* Both of them have the same 
effect.
The dukume tsotso or ,fpartition of the headkerchief” seems 
to be similar to the Ga procedure of tako mlifoo because a 
headkerchief is rent asunder in both cases. According to 
Ollennu, however, the Ga ceremony cuts off a person’s connections 
with his family* Among the Ewe, both dukume tsotso and beme 
tsotso affect only the individuals concerned and them only* It 
means that each of them still remains a full member of the same 
family. It is only the estranged individual members who do not 
retain their personal blood relationship* The family as such 
is unaffected.
Persons who perform the ceremony of cutting off their 
relations in Eweland, through dukume tsotso or beme tsotso, may 
not treat each other as any longer related by consanguinity*
They may not talk to each other* One may not participate in or 
attend the burial or funeral of the other on his death. One 
may not inherit any item of property belonging to the other on 
that other's death*
The severance of relations does not legally affect the 
ascendants and descendants of the individuals who resort to it. 
However, since the occasion must have been an extremely serious 
one to call for such a drastic action, the relations between the 
ascendants and descendants of such "cut off" relations are not 
the best. Usually it disrupts the whole family organisation.
The ceremony of cutting off the personal relationship 
between members of a family, whether by dukume tsotso or by 
beme tsotso. is revocable. At any time before the death of 
either party the dispute may be settled and the relationship 
restored. In that case a sheep is slaughtered and libation is 
poured to the ancestors. The parties then recant their words 
and renounce their act of separation, which by a fiction is then 
ascribed to infantile ignorance. This is necessary because the 
majority of the members of the family are in the spirit world 
and they must be informed of the restoration of the personal 
blood relationship? between the individuals concerned. Once 
this is done, the separation is nullified and the parties again 
become relatives in the former manner.
Even at any time after the death of one party, the deed of 
separation may be revoked. Prayers by way of libation are said 
in that case to both the dead party and the other deceased 
members of the family, to restore the family ties between the 
parties. Usually this is done immediately on the death of one 
of the parties, so as to enable the surviving person to participat
in the burial and funeral ceremonies. As a rule among the 
Northern Ewe, before a dead person is buried, there is a public 
enquiry into the circumstances of his death, how he had been 
cared for by his family and his personal relations with the 
members of his family. It is a sort of an "inquest" and is 
known as ku volu dodro or ku kodzo dodo, literally "a court 
to ascertain facts relating to the death". It is attended by 
all the elders of the division or duta and even women and chil­
dren are usually present. It takes the form of a full scale 
trial of issues, the disclosure of facts being assured because 
of the fear of the spirit of the deceased. Penalties are 
imposed if any person is found guilty of unkindness or neglect. 
This is, therefore, an appropriate occasion to enquire into the 
circumstances which culminated in the severance of ties by 
dukume tsotso or beme tsotso. and a post-humous reconciliation 
may be effected. When the restoration of normal relations 
takes place after the death of one of the parties, the dead 
party is represented in the proceedings by another living 
relative.
Maternal Relations
The Northern Ewe are patrilineal, in the senses of both 
patri-descent and patri-succession. This means that a person 
belongs to his father's family and that the Ewe family is in
principle traced through the male line. The corollary is that 
a person does not belong to his mother's family, either for the 
determination of his citizenship and nationality or for the 
purposes of succession to hereditary office or rights in 
property.
The individual, however, also stands in a definite position 
of relationship to his maternal relations. The generality of 
the relations on the maternal side are also known as fometowo.
As the word fome means "the womb" or "the stomach", and 
fometowo properly means "persons from the same womb", they 
seem to be most apposite terms for relations of the maternal 
side; but the term fometowo includes relations of any remove 
on both the paternal and maternal sides. The other Ewe word 
for relations is novi. an elliptical form of nonyevi. which 
means literally "my mother's child". Although sometimes applied 
in a classificatory sense to be synonymous with fometo or 
relations generally, the word novi is properly used to refer 
to closer relations on either the paternal or the maternal 
side. Accordingly, one's mother's child (i.e. uterine brother 
or sister) is novi; a mother's brother's child and a mother's 
sister's child (i.e. maternal first cousins) are each known as 
novi; and a father's brother's child as well as a father's 
sister's child (i.e. paternal first cousins) are each novi; 
even a father's child born of another woman (i.e. a paternal 
half-brother) is also called novi. Each of these senses of the
use of the term novi can only be understood within the context, 
or explained upon enquiry, when the exact relationship can be 
broken down to tovi (i.e. paternal half-brother) or toga-todevi 
(i.e. paternal first cousin) and so on. It is significant that, 
although the Ewe are a patrilineal community, yet their 
relationships are expressed in a terminology constructed around 
the mother. This may be a pointer to the suggestion that, 
perhaps at some earlier stage in the evolution of their society, 
the Ewe might have been matrilineal.
The Ewe terminology for expressing relationships, by empha­
sising the mother as a central figure, also expresses the Ewe 
emphasis on maternal relations. When we say that the Ewe are 
patrilineal, it is no more than an expression of a legal 
relationship which becomes crucial only as regards citizenship 
and succession to rights in property and accession to hereditary 
offices, as well as certain other obligations. Outside this 
strict legal relationship, the Ewe thinks of his relations on 
both his paternal and maternal sides simply as fometowo or 
novinyewo. For, although a man and his maternal aunt's child 
may belong to different families for the purposes of citizenship 
and succession to property and hereditary offices, their personal 
relationship may be closer and more meaningful than that between 
either of them and his distant relations within his patrilineal 
family.
In terms of Ewe law, one does not belong to one's motherfs 
family and, therefore, maternal relationship per se does not 
confer any inherent right to enjoy or succeed to ancestral 
property or hereditary o f f i c e s T h a t  is why we have respect-
p
fully submitted that the decision in Nunekpeku v. Ametefe was 
wrongly decided, since it was based on the'erroneous assumption 
that by his maternal connections alone the defendant-appellant 
became a member of his mother's family and had a right or an 
interest in that family's ancestral land. .It is not unknown, 
however, that persons have benefited from their maternal relation­
ship. Sometimes land is donated to maternal relations as an 
out and out gift in consideration of the blood relationship.
Such a donee takes as a purchaser. On many occasions a man 
is allowed a user of the family land of his mother's family.
Such a permission may be expressly given; but, as a practical 
proposition, a maternal relation can, almost as a matter of
course, obtain such a permission even by a mere tacit acquies­
cence. A maternal relation in such occupation of the maternal 
family property does not enjoy the status of a purchaser or of 
a family member, irrespective of whether the permission was
granted tacitly or expressly; he is, as contended by the
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plaintiff-respondants in Numekpeku v. Ametefe. only a licensee
1. Agblevoe v. Dankradi. supra.
2. Nunekpeku v. Ametefe. (1961) G.L.R. 301.
3- Ibid.
of the maternal family. A man is usually welcome if he decides 
to reside with his maternal family and he may use their land and 
other property. But he has only a life interest therein which is 
subject to determination at any time by the maternal family and, 
unless permitted by the said maternal family, he cannot make any 
disposition of it either inter vivos or by testamentary dis­
position.
The individual relies heavily on his maternal family and 
actually looks up to them for support and protection on many 
occasions. The popular Ewe saying is amenyroewo dee vava le. 
meaning that na person eijoys a special position of prestige and 
power in the maternal family11. If a man feels that he is being 
unfairly treated by his paternal family, he calls on his maternal 
family for the assertion of his rights, and the maternal relations 
are recognised in the customary lav; as having the right to 
initiate proceedings towards this end. That is why the Ewe say 
that a child does not belong to its father alone.
A person's maternal connection is a real one. Thus, for 
example, when a woman is sought in marriage, one requirement of 
the formalities is that a large pot of palm wine must be presented 
to the mother's family. This is known as noha or "mother's 
drink". At some formal and ritual occasions, such as the 
purification of a stool, the relations traced through the female 
line have certain duties to perform and only they may enter the 
"holy of holies" to perform some of the sacred functions.
What it is sought to point out here is that a man has 
certain privileges in his maternal family. These, however, 
are only privileges not in the nature of legal rights, and 
they may be revoked by the maternal family for good reason.
Suggested Definition of The Family
Having endeavoured to analyse the nature and composition 
of the "family", we may now attempt a definition of the word in 
the context of Ewe law.
Anthropologists have offered a definition of the family as 
a social unit. Understandably the anthropologist's concern is 
generally different from that of the jurist, the former being 
concerned primarily with the social significance of the unit and 
the kinship organisation within which it exists. The anthro­
pologists recognise varieties of family. What the anthropolo­
gists call the "elementary family" or "simple family" consists 
of a man, his wife and children.^ This corresponds to the 
meaning in common, non-legal, English parlance. There is also 
the family consisting of the descendants traced through a known 
individual, which may not extend beyond a generation or two.
This is what is referred to as the "immediate" or "nuclear" 
family. The wider unit, which in Ghanaian legal usage is also 
called the family, is usually referred to by the anthropologists
1. See, e.g. Notes and Queries on Anthropology. Routledge and 
Kegan Paul Ltd., London, 1951, P#70.
as a "lineage11* For a lineage is defined as consisting of 
lineal descendants of a specified ancestor through a number of 
generations. ^* On this basis, however, the family or lineage as 
a unit is indeterminate and imprecise* This anthropological 
definition would include a large number of persons, not all of 
whom would be entitled to the beneficial enjoyment of the same 
ancestral property or succession to the same hereditary office* 
As a striking example, we have pointed out that normally all 
the members of the Ewe saa or sub-division are descended from 
a common ancestor in the male line* The members of a sub­
division, however, are not all members of the same family; on 
the contrary it is a number of families which constitute the 
sub-division* Similarly the members of the Akan "clan", such 
as the "Asona clan", are all persons who claim descent from a 
common ancestress in the female line; but they do not all 
constitute one family in the Ghanaian context* The line must, 
therefore, be drawn somewhere, especially to identify the 
family as a unit for the purpose of legal usage*
Those lawyers who have written about the "family" in
Ghanaian law have been mainly concerned with the matrilineal
<
family of the Akan* When Sarbah, for instance, wrote about the 
family, he was writing only in terms of the Fanti (and Akan) 
customary laws and he did not pretend to include other tribes*
1. Ibid* * pp.88-89*
In any case, at the time Sarbah wrote his monumental work, 
practically all the Northern Ewe-speaking people of the modern 
Ghana were outside the Gold Coast and in the German colony of 
Togo. He could not, therefore, have had them in mind. Hence 
Sarbah says, "A Fanti family consists of all persons lineally 
descended through females from a common ancestress."^ Not only 
is such a definition not very helpful, but obviously it cannot 
be intended to apply to the patrilineal Ewe.
The two recent legal writers who have offered definitions 
of the "family" for all Ghana are Ollennu and Bentsi-Enchill.
As regards Ollennu, with the greatest respect, we would question 
whether he really intended to define the family for all Ghana or 
primarily for only the Akan and other matrilineal communities. 
For it turned out that Ollennu did not define a patrilineal 
family of the Ewe type, but an Akan-type patrilineal family 
which is not a unit for the purposes of property holding or 
succession. Referring to the patrilineal family, he says:
This family, known to the Akans as 'Ntoro1, is based 
upon the common sacred germ or spirit which conceives 
the child and is the dominant influence which directs 
his or her course through life* It cannot be trans­
mitted through a woman: it therefore dies with each
female member of that family. According to custom each 
person should bear the ancestral name of his paternal 
family* A son joins his father*s army group (Asafo). 2
1. J.M. Sarbah, op* cit *. p.33.
2. N.A. Ollennu, The Law of Succession in Ghana. Presbyterian 
Book Depot Ltd., Accra, I960, p£*
This is nothing more than a description of the paternal family 
of a community which is matrilineal, In his later work, 
Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana. Ollennu merely re­
peated the "sacred germ11 or ntoro theory of the family."^ 
Similarly, in his Law of Testate and Intestate Succession in
Ghana, Ollennu again thought of the family only in terms of
2
the "sacred germ" or ntoro. It may be remarked that the only 
authority that Ollennu cited for the constitution of the patri­
lineal family is Rattray1s work, Ashanti. Rattray, however, 
was not writing on any patrilineal community but on the matri­
lineal Ashanti people] In the event, the learned Judge could 
not offer any other definition for the patrilineal family be­
yond saying, in each of his three works, that its basis is what 
is "known to the Akans as •ntoro1", and that it "consists of a 
unit of all people, male and female, all of whom are direct 
descendants in the male line from a male common ancestor". He 
even brings in the anthropological confusion by adding in his 
latest work that the family is traced to the remotest ancestor.-^ 
With the greatest respect, it is difficult to understand 
why Ollennu regards the ntoro or "sacred germ" theory as so 
vital and central to his definition of the family among patri­
lineal communities. The ntoro is a peculiar concept of the Akan
1. At pp. lifl-1^2.
2. At pp. 78-79.
3. NA Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession in 
Ghana. 1966, p.79.
tribes, and the Akan are not patrilineal communities. The Ewe 
and other patrilineal tribes do not share the concept of ntoro. 
Indeed the Ewe do not search for any such theory of a meta­
physical justification for the constitution of the patrilineal 
family. There is no reason why one cannot define the patri­
lineal family of patrilineal communities without employing a 
concept known only to the matrilineal communities. It is 
respectfully submitted that, by adopting the anthropologists 
ntoro theory and making it central to his definition, 011ennufs 
own definition of the family is not any more useful than that 
of the anthropologist for the purpose of legal analysis. By 
merely tracing the "sacred germ11 or ntoro to a common male 
ancestor "however remote that ancestor may be",^ though we 
might not get as far as Adam, the expanse of the unit would 
make the definition devoid of any legal significance.
The other definition of the Ghanaian family, designed to 
take account of the patrilineal societies as well, has come from 
Bentsi-Enchill. He says:
The family is the group of persons, lineally descended 
from a common ancestor exclusively through males (in com­
munities called patrilineal for this reason), or exclusively 
through females starting from the mother of such' ancestor 
(in communities called matrilineal for this reason), and 
within which group succession to office and to property is 
based on this relationship. 2
1. N.A.Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession 
in Ghana. 1966, p.79.
2. K. Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit.. p.25.
It is submitted that Bentsi-Enchill1s definition is to be 
preferred. Not only does it divest itself of the legally 
irrelevant anthropological concept of ntoro. but it does empha­
sise what is legally essential, that the family, apart from the 
descent line, can only be identified by reference to the legal 
relationship of the right to succeed to certain offices and 
property. Expunging that part of the definition referring to 
the matrilineal communities, Bentsi-Enchill1s definition of the 
family in a patrilineal community is:
... the group of persons lineally descended from a 
common ancestor exclusively through males ... and 
within which group succession to office and property 
is based on this relationship.
Subject to the comments hereunder, it is suggested that this 
definition is applicable to the Ewe.
One point which should be noted in the definition of the 
Ewe family is that biological descent is not always certain and 
may only be a presumption of law. This problem does not face 
the matrilineal communities in the same form. Among the Akan 
and other matrilineal communities, the fact of lineal descent 
by blood is easily demonstrable, because it is scarcely ever in 
doubt as to which womb bore the child. In the matrilineal com­
munity, therefore, the biological fact normally coincides with 
the legal. The extension of the criterion of pure lineal blood 
descent to the patrilineal community is naturally fraught with
1. Excepting slaves, foundlings and naturalised persons and 
their descendants.
difficulty. In his defence of the matrilineal system of the 
Akan, Danquah observes that:
Under a system of polygamy with its attendant 
easy means of divorce, it is possible for the paternity 
of a child to remain doubtful, perhaps problematical, 
never so its maternity. A child is easily identifiable 
with its mother, not so with the father. Hence, the 
Akan institution, following natural law with a slight 
superimposed social convention, adopts the female line 
of descent. 1
There are times when doubts and disputes ar-ise as to paternity 
among the Ewe. The result of such doubts and disputes is that 
sometimes persons who are not necessarily of the biological 
line of descent through the male line are considered as legally 
belonging to the family. These are usually persons whose bio­
logical paternity is unknown or unacknowledged, and they become 
members of their mothers' families. The number of persons 
absorbed into their mothers' families because of the failure 
to establish paternity is admittedly very small; but it is a 
process which goes on even today and is significant enough for 
us to take account of it in our definition of the family.
Others sometimes absorbed are those whose fathers come from 
matrilineal communities and who are, therefore, not accepted 
into their fathers' families. It is suggested, therefore, that 
in the definition of the Ewe family we should not limit our­
selves to only persons "lineally descended from a common 
ancestor". Descent here should be understood in its legal
1. J.B. Danquah, op.cit.. p.l8l.
sense of being "legally recognised as descended from" or 
"deemed in law to be descended from". In the Ewe community, 
therefore, biological descent in the male line is a vital fac­
tor in the membership of the family, but it is not the only 
factor. We have not specifically mentioned slaves and .their 
descendants because of the abolition of slavery; and foundlings 
and absorbed strangers are extremely rare, rare enough to be 
discounted.
It is also respectfully submitted that the legal referent 
of Bentsi-Enchill1s definition is somewhat narrow inasmuch as 
it excludes certain other legal consequences of the membership 
of a family. It does not state that membership of the fanHy 
is the basis of citizenship in the traditional state. Further­
more, membership of the family also imposes a duty to defend 
and protect the ancestral property. Members of the same family 
are responsible for the security and welfare of each other, so 
that in the olden days a member of the family could be seized 
for another member's debt or other liability, and one could be 
sold into slavery or be pawned to satisfy a debt incurred by 
another member of the family. The family as a whole also has 
an obligation to bury any of its deceased members and to give 
him a proper funeral. °These and other incidents of family 
membership have no direct reference to "succession to office 
and property".
It is proposed, in the light of the foregoing, to offer 
a suggested definition of the Ewe family as that unit of per­
sons, both male and female, who, in the contemplation of the 
law, are lineally descended from a common male ancestor, 
generally but not exclusively through males, and which group 
is identifiable as a legal entity by the conferment and 
imposition thereon of certain rights, privileges and obli­
gations, including the determination of citizenship and 
political allegiance and succession to rights in property and 
hereditary offices exclusively belonging to or vested in the 
unit. Where the descent is not directly through a male member 
by birth, it must be referable to a person, usually a mother, 
who is of such a male line of descent by birth. This is the 
unit which is known among the Northern Ewe-speaking people of 
Ghana as dzotinu. togbevime or avadzidzi. It may well be that 
the definition attempted above will be applicable to all Ewe 
and to some other patrilineal communities of Ghana.
The definition attempted above identifies the family as 
a unit which has a legal personality in Ewe law. It is a 
juristic person of the indigenous law and as such is clothed 
with certain indicia of corporateness.'1' It has a name, such
1. These are based on A.N. Allott, Legal Personality In 
African Law, in M. Gluckman (ed.) Ideas ana Procedures m  
African Law. O.U.P., London, 1969, pp.182-189.
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as Amega Edzeviwo, Katsrikuviwo, Adomviwo or Kadrakeviwo, which 
refers to the legal entity as distinct from its constituent 
members. The Ewe family by our definition has a definable, if 
not defined, membership. Although no membership list is nor­
mally maintained, every individual knows to which family he 
belongs and members are identified or identifiable generally 
by tracing their descent unilineally through the male line.
There is, therefore, never a doubt as to whether an individual 
is a member of a particular family, once his paternity has 
been determined. Membership of the family is also demonstrable 
by the common acknowledgment of the dzotinu'metsitsi as head of 
the family and by the right and obligation of participation or 
representation in the meetings of the family, enjoyment of 
property belonging to the unit and contribution to the funeral 
expenses of deceased members. The unit has a definite structure 
and government, in the sense that it has a governing body con­
sisting of the principal elders representing every section of 
the family. There is usually no symbol of identity (such as a 
family stool or family fetish among the Akan); but the members 
of a family manifest their group solidarity by acting together 
in a concerted fashion as one entity at birth, funerals and 
other important occasions. Certain rights and duties are 
attributable to the entity, among which we may mention the 
right to hold property, especially land, and the exclusive 
right to select some of its members to fill certain hereditary
20if.
offices. As a legal person the family can institute and defend 
legal actions in its corporate capacity through authorised 
members. Finally it has permanency in the sense that it has 
perpetual existence. Although Allott considers that "permanency" 
is too strong a word to use here because of the possibility of 
extinction,^ the possibility of such an eventuality in Ewe cir­
cumstances is so remote that it can be discounted. The Ewe 
family or dzotinu consists of such a large number of members 
that its extinction is hardly conceivable. Empirically it is 
not known that any dzotinu has ever disappeared or disintegrated. 
Therefore, not only is the Ewe family or dzotinu not transient 
but it is permanent in the sense that it endures ad infinitum, 
inasmuch as we can say that of any human institution. The other 
aspect is that a family as understood among the Northern Ewe 
cannot be created today. All the families have existed from 
time immemorial and new ones cannot be created today by a 
fission or fusion of families. The number of families in any 
community is, therefore, fixed and unalterable.
1. Ibid.f pp. 188-189.
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CHAPTER IV 
THE HEAD OF FAMILY
Who is Head of Family
The determination of who may be designated as "head of
family" largely depends on our conception of the "family" in
the context of Ghanaian legal usage. If the lav/ is that "each
man in a patrilineal family area starts a family and each woman
1in a matrilineal family area starts a family", then there must 
be as many heads of families as there are men with children in 
Eweland. We have, however, suggested that this is not the law 
of the Northern Ewe and that among them the family is considered 
as consisting of persons generally descended through males from 
a common male ancestor and who constitute a legal unit for the 
purposes of certain legal relationships, such as succession to 
rights in property and hereditary offices. This unit we iden­
tified in the Ewe as dzotinu. for which some areas also use 
other terms like avadzidzi and togbevime.
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Lav/ in Ghana.
1962, p.151. Also Serv/ah v. Kesse. Unreported, Land Court, Accra, 
10th April, 1959.
This being our view, it is further suggested that there 
does not exist in Northern Ev/e law anything like a head of a 
nuclear family or head of an immediate family. There are no
terms in the Northern Ewe language by which these are known. A
position of leadership or being a primus inter pares is recog­
nisable among the children or grandchildren of any man, but 
such a leader is not regarded as a head of family. The only 
person recognised among the Northern Ewe as Mhead of family” is 
the man who heads the family or dzotinu. In the Northern Ewe law, 
therefore, "head of family11 means precisely "head of the dzotinu11. 
and only that. Since every family or dzotinu must have one head 
and one only, it foliov/s that the number of heads of families in 
the Northern Ewe community corresponds to the number of families 
or dzotinuwo.
The "head of family" or "head of the dzotinu" is known in
Ewe as dzotinu be ametsitsi or dzotinu wo ametsitsi.^  This is
contracted to dzotinu1 metsitsi. The correct English rendering
is "the elder of the dzotinu" or "the elder of the family". In
normal speech the dzotinu1metsitsi or "head of family" is also
sometimes referred to simply as ametsitsi. which means "the
elder". The ametsitsi as "head of family" or dzotinu1metsitsi.
however, should not be confused with the "sub-divisional elder"
2
or saamefmetsitsi who is better known as ametsitsi.
T~. These "are the dialect forms of the Northern Ewe of Ghana. Tn 
the literary or "standard" Ewe this would be dzotinu fe ametsitsi.
2. On the position of the "sub-divisional elder" or saame*metsitsi 
see pp.68-69 supra.
Succession to the Head of Family
Among the Northern Ewe of Ghana, as a general rule, the 
head of family or dzotinu*metsitsi is not elected. Succession 
to the office is automatic on the principle of. seniority, the 
oldest male member of the senior generation becoming head of 
the family without a choice or an election.
The doctrine of the Ghana courts, however, is that there 
is no right of automatic succession to the office of head of 
family. The courts have always held that the head of family 
must be elected or appointed at a family meeting specifically 
convened for that purpose.
In Hervie v. Tamakloe.^  the plaintiff sued as head of 
family, claiming certain properties from the defendants. The 
defendants denied that the plaintiff was head of the family or, 
indeed, that he even belonged to the family in the male line,. 
The plaintiff could not satisfactorily establish his membership 
of the male line of the family, neither was his appointment as 
head of family proved to the satisfaction of the Court. For 
these reasons the plaintiff*s action was rightly dismissed. 
However, the learned Judge, Ollennu, J., went on to state a 
sweeping proposition of the lav; which was not necessary for the 
determination of the issues before him. He said:
1. (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 3kZ.
By native custom a person does not automatically 
become head of family as of right. He must either be 
appointed - elected - by the principal elders of the 
family when the post becomes vacant by any means, or 
he must be acclaimed and acknowledged as such by the 
said principal members of the family, for example by 
the principal members supporting acts he performs as 
head. In the appointment of the head the family is 
not tied down to choose any particular person; they
are entitled to appoint any eligible person in the
family; thus in the non-Akan areas, such as Bator, 
where the family consists principally of descendants 
in the male line, the family can, if in their opinion 
there is no suitable candidate among the descendants 
in the direct male line, appoint a descendant in the 
female line; the principle is the same as that ap­
plicable to the appointment of a successor to a 
deceased person. 1
In saying that the principle is the same for both a successor to 
a head of family and the successor to the rights in property of 
an individual deceased person, the learned Judge referred to the 
decision of the West African Court of Appeal in Makata v. Ahorli.
In Makata v. Ahorli the West African Court of Appeal held that, if
the family so desired, a distant relative could be chosen to suc­
ceed to the rights in the self-acquired property of a deceased 
3
members In that case a nephew, by a special dispensation, was 
chosen by the family to succeed to the estate of his maternal 
uncle because of the services he had rendered to the deceased in 
his lifetime. Such succession to property, however, does not 
ipso facto constitute the successor into a head of family.
1. Hervie v, Tamakloe. (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 342, 344.
2. Makata v. Ahorli. *1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 169. Just before his 
elevation to the Bench^ Ollennu had been Counsel in Makata v. 
Ahorli.
3. This itself is a doubtful proposition if taken as a general 
statement of the law. An analysis of the effect and applicability 
of this proposition in Makata v. Ahorli is attempted in pp. 660-
662 infra.
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Obviously this confusion of the two positions was present in the
mind of Ollennu, J., when he decided Hervie v. Tamakloe. for he
elaborated this by saying elsewhere that
The person who is appointed successor to a deceased
in the family is, by virtue of his said office, the head
of the immediate or branch family originating with the 
particular deceased person, his father or mother. 1
The reasoning here can only be explained by a failure to
appreciate that the successors to the property rights of a
deceased are not necessarily the head of family. Among the Ewe
the successors to the rights in the self-acquired property of a
deceased person (usually there are more than one successor) are
different from the positional successor. The positional successor
may succeed the deceased as head of family, if he was one, or as
father to his children; but a positional succession does not
carry with it any property rights. The converse is also true
that succession to rights in self-acquired property does not
2
necessarily imply positional succession.
In another case, this time from the Ga area, coming before 
the same Judge, the defendants challenged the authority of the 
plaintiff who had sued as head of family to recover possession 
of certain deeds from them. The previous head having unexpectedly 
resigned, the plaintiff claimed that he was there and then elected 
head of the family by the principal members then present.
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana.
1962, p.151.
2. The distinction between these two types of successor is 
elaborated upon in pp.595 -601 infra.
Ollennu, J,, rejected the purported election of the plaintiff 
as head of the family and said:
. According to native custom the head of family is 
appointed at a meeting of all the accredited elders 
of the family summoned for that purpose. The meeting 
at which an appointment is to be made should be con­
vened for that purpose and notice of it should be 
given to all members of the family entitled, by custom, 
to participate in the appointment. If then some elders 
stay away from the meeting, those who do attend can 
make an appointment in the absence of the former.,Where 
notice given to the members of the family shows that 
some particular business is to be transacted at a 
meeting, for example the settlement of disputes, and 
a head is appointed at that particular meeting, that 
appointment of a head is null and void, prior notice 
of the appointment not having been given to all con­
cerned. 1
Unfortunately the learned Judge does not say what would constitute 
adequate notice in the circumstances. My informants, who were 
elders in the Northern Ewe area, only reacted with amusement to 
this proposition when told that this was the lav/. In this area 
the affairs of the family are not ordered in such a formal 
manner; although notice is given to all elders and the principle 
of representativity is always observed, formal agenda are not 
issued for family meetings as though they were company board 
meetings.
Be that as it may, basing himself on the above cases 
decided by himself, Ollennu has stated in his book that
No one has an inherent right to be appointed the head 
of his family. The appointment is made by the family at 
a family meeting. 2
IT Larte.y v. MensahT (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 410, 411-412.
2, N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana. 
1962, p.146.
Similarly Bentsi-Enchill also says:
The head /i.e. head of family7 is normally confirmed 
or elected by the principal members upon the death and 
at the funeral of the previous head, or upon the dis­
missal by such principal members, or upon the abdication 
of the previous head, 1
Both Ollennu and Bentsi-Enchill admittedly rely on Sarbah's 
2
statement of lav/, v/hich was intended for the matrilineal Fanti 
and other Akan areas.
Realising the difficulty in insisting on the formal election 
of the head of family, Ollennu admits that at times the head of-; 
family is chosen by mere acclamation or acknowledgment. The same 
admission'is implied in Bentsi-Enchill1s statement that the head 
may be "confirmed" in his office by the principal elders. The 
view of the authorities, hov/ever, is that such occasions are only 
exceptions to the rule that the head of family must be formally 
elected.
Although the court doctrine is that the head of family must 
be formally elected, it is respectfully submitted that this is 
not generally applicable to the Northern Ewe. Among the Northern 
Ewe-speaking people of Ghana, there is an automatic right of 
succession to the office of head of family according to a pre­
determined formula. The rule is that the oldest male member of 
the family automatically becomes head of the family in the case 
of a vacancy, and there is no need for a formal election or
TT K, Bentsi-Enchill. Ghana Land Law. Sweet & Maxwell. London, 
1964, P.26.
2. J.M. Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws. Clowes, London, 1904, P.33.
acclamation. Because of the formula for automatic succession, 
there is always also a recognised deputy who immediately assumes 
the responsibilities of head of family automatically on the 
occurrence of the vacancy.
The Ewe term for the office of head of family makes clear 
the age principle involved. The expression dzotinufmetsitsi. 
which we translate as "head of family!^ actually means "the elder 
of the family". It does not mean "head" or "leader" but "the 
elder" of the family. He is in fact meant to be the elder, and 
on this principle succession is automatic. The basis on which 
the "elder" automatically succeeds is seniority, meaning 
seniority in terms of both generation and age in that order of 
importance. Thus the office runs on the basis of age through 
the oldest generation before it devolves on the next. The 
reason is that, although a person of a younger generation may in 
fact be older in age, yet in the classificatory sense he is a 
child of even a younger person belonging to an earlier generation.
It may well be that the principle of automatic succession 
as head of family is applicable to all Ewe. Nukunya, himself an 
Ewe, writing of the Anlo Ewe, says:
The lineage head is usually its oldest surviving member 
both in terms of generation and age. Where age and gener­
ation conflict, the latter takes precedence, for the office 
runs through each generation completely before descending 
to the next. 1
1. G.K. Nukunya, op.cit.. p.41.
It must be assumed that by the "oldest surviving member" Nukunya
means the oldest male member because Ewe women may not become
heads of families. And "lineage head" is the term by which
anthropologists sometimes refer to the head of family.
Before Nukunya, Ward had said of the Ev/e that
It seems clear enough that it is usually the most 
senior man in any lineage who is its head.. Within the 
lineage, succession runs through each generation com­
pletely before descending to the next, 1
Similarly Manoukian also says of the Ev/e:
The lineage head is usually its most senior man and 
apparently succeeds automatically. Succession runs 
through each generation completely before descending 
to the next. In the case of the absence or incapacity 
of the titular head his duties are undertaken by the 
next most senior (classificatory) brother. 2
3
Both Ward and Manoukian relied on Spieth and Westerman. It is 
submitted that these observations are correct and that, as a 
general rule, among the Ewe, succession.to the office of head 
of family is automatic.
Recent interviews have confirmed that the principle of 
automatic succession to the office of head of family is the 
general rule among the Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana.
This is the information from Gbi, Aveme, Kpando, Peki, Abutia, 
Taviefe, Kpedze, Matse, Awudome, Ho and most other places, where 
many chiefs arid elders were interviewed,
T. B.E. Ward. The Social Organisation of the Ewe-speaking People. 
Unpublished M.A. thesis, University of London, 1949, P.81.
2. M. Manoukian, op.cit.. p.23.
3. P. Westermann, Die Glidyi-Ewe in Togo. Berlin, 1935, P.135.
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It is only in Anfoega that the information was given that 
the family normally meets to select its head when a vacancy 
occurs. According to the Anfoega informants, in Anfoega there 
is no right of automatic succession and the head of family is 
chosen primarily on the basis of the personal qualities of 
leadership and administrative ability. Even here, however, it 
is pointed out that age is an important factor, though not solely 
decisive, and it is conceded that statistically it is the oldest 
male members of the families who become their heads; but it is 
emphasised that this empirical generalisation has not crystallised 
into a rule of customary law in Anfoega.
It seems that the position in Anfoega can be reconciled with 
that of the other areas, when we consider the qualification on 
the right of automatic succession. Although the general rule is 
that the oldest male member of the family automatically becomes 
its head, the principal members of the family have the right and 
authority to by-pass the oldest member for good reason. If, for 
instance, the oldest male member of the family is a chief or 
holds some other important office, he will be Required to waive 
his right of succession to the position of head of family and 
the next in seniority will succeed. On the other hand, if the 
oldest male member of the family is obviously not a man of the 
right calibre, either because he is demonstrably unreliable or 
is of an exceptionally bad character, he may not be allowed to 
succeed. In such a case the reason for rejecting the otherwise 
entitled elder must be very compelling; such instances are,
therefore, very rare. It seems that it is the rare exercise of 
the family1s power to reject the entitled successor which is 
regarded in Anfoega as an election. It should be further explained 
that in any case where the oldest man is by-passed, the next in 
seniority in age succeeds without a competitive election. It is 
not correct, as Ollennu, J., states in Hervie v. Tamakloe. that 
"the family is not tied down to choose any particular person" 
and that even descendants in the female line can head the family. 
That would make meaningless the patrilineal character of the Ev/e 
community. If the family were so unfettered in its choice, we 
would have many examples of non-members of the family who are 
heads of families. No such example, however, exists anywhere 
among the Northern Ewe. It is submitted, therefore, that the 
Ewe family is not unfettered in its choice of a head and that 
the principle of seniority applies.
The important principle which must be noted is that the 
right of succession to head of family is automatic, being deter­
mined by generation and age. The cases in which this formula 
is not observed1are rare exceptions which prove the general rule. 
The reasons for departing from the normal rule must be excep­
tionally strong, evidently compelling and notoriously incontro­
vertible. Hence, among the Ewe, unless it is to reject an 
otherwise entitled successor to the office, no formal meeting
1. Hervie v. Tamakloe. (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 342, 344.
is held for the purpose of considering succession to a head of 
family. Such instances are very rare and their rarity is indic­
ative of the improbability of possible disqualifications for the 
office. If the entitled person for the position of head'of 
family is already the holder of another important office, such 
as a chief, it is more accurate to say that he waives the right 
to succeed rather than that he is thereby disqualified. Mental 
infirmity is certainly a disqualification, so that an insane man 
or an imbecile cannot hold the office; but mere lack of intel­
ligence is not a sufficient disqualification. Although a super­
vening physical infirmity may not be a good cause for deposition 
from the office, yet a serious physical incapacity which rules 
out participation in the deliberations of the family may bar a 
person from becoming the head of family. This may be the case, 
for instance, if the prospective successor to the office is bed­
ridden with permanent paralysis or other serious disease or is 
suffering from a traditionally abominable disease like leprosy. 
There is no requirement as to the general physical condition of 
the office holder, such as that he must be a whole man with no 
part of his body blemished or missing. Circumcision is a general 
rule among the Ewe; but an uncircumcised man is not under any 
disability for the office of head of family, A slave origin is 
not a legal disqualification; similarly foundlings, naturalised 
persons and "fatherless" persons absorbed into the family and
their descendants are fully eligible for the office. Because 
it is not elective, unpopularity among members or the elders of 
the family cannot prevent accession to the office of head of 
family, although in actual fact such unpopularity may mean that 
the head is an ineffective leader. Exceptional bad character 
and a bad reputation in dealings with the family, such as a ten­
dency to dissipate family property, is a theoretical disqualifi­
cation; but this is in practice difficult to establish against 
individuals. Bad character in other respects, such as the pro­
pensity to commit adultery, selfishness, unkindness, indebtedness 
or malevolent practice of sorcery is not a disqualification.
Perhaps it is in the succession to the office of head of 
family that we see an example of the relationship between law 
and economics even in the traditional society. In the Akan areas 
where the head of family normally manages property of considerable 
value, it seems that the head is elected at a meeting specially 
convened for that purpose and is apparently easily removable.
In contrast, among the’Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana 
where, as will be hereafter explained, there is hardly any other 
family property apart from land, the head of -family succeeds 
automatically by the right of seniority in generation and age 
and is irremovable.
This pattern is observable in some other African communities. 
In many African communities, notably the Bantu, the basic unit 
for the purposes of property is the household consisting of a man,
his wives and their children and descendants. In this unit the 
man, by virtue of his position as husband and father, is auto­
matically the head. The Zulu kraal head, for example, automatic­
ally becomes head of the kraal because he is its founder. In the 
Bantu communities, however, family property in. the Ghanaian 
sense is not common because individuals rather than families 
succeed to property. The head of the Bantu household controls 
the property of the household; but succession to interests in 
property, including land, is on individual basis, though suc­
cession to the entire estate on the principle of filioprimogen- 
iture tends to keep the property intact. Among the Tswana, for 
example, there is individual succession to interests in property, 
whether land or cattle, the property being shared per matres.
The head of the family-group"^ among the Tswana, known as mogolwane.
succeeds automatically to the office on the basis of seniority in 
2
age. It may be argued that among the Tswana the head of the 
household is automatically the husband of the wives of the house­
hold, although the household has property in the nature of land
and cattle. It would be more accurate, however, to say that the 
household property, such as household land, is property of the
founder of the household and that his children and their descen­
dants are entitled to succeed to his interest in such property, 
usually on a per matres basis. The same may be said of the
1. The Tswana "family-group" consists of households and resembles 
the so-called "wider family" in Ghana.
2. I. Schapera, A Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom. International 
African Institute, London, 1955, P*89V
3. Ibid., p.218.
1 2  ^ 
Gusii of Kenya and the Arusha of Tanzania, Among the Sukir
of Congo-Kinshasa also, just like the Ewe, the main type of 
family property is land because other items of property are 
distributed among the heirs. Although, unlike the Ewe, the 
Suku are a matrilineal community, the head of the matrilineage 
is automatically its oldest member. In West Africa also, we 
find a similar arrangement of automatic succession to head of 
family among the Yoruba^ of Nigeria. Among the Yoruba, where 
land is the main type of family property, a man's interest in 
his self-acquired property is inheritable by his children.
Here again there is an automatic right of succession to the 
position of head of family on the principle of seniority in 
age. Although these examples may not be enough to justify a 
generalisation for Africa, they indicate that automatic suc­
cession as head of family is often associated with the absence 
of substantial family property.
Powers and Functions of the Head of Family
The head of family or dzotinu 'metsitsi is not a chief and 
he does not, therefore, occupy any ancestral stool. In this 
respect,, the position in the Northern Ewe area of Ghana is.
again different from that in other communities such as the Akan,
TT R.F. Gray and R.H. Gulliver. The Family Estate in Africa, 
Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 196*4-, pp,6b-67.
2, Ibid,. pp.210-211.
3. Ibid., pp. 89, 91-95.
*f. G.B.A. Coker, Family Property Among the Yorubas. Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1966, pp.169-170, Also P.C. Lloyd, Yoruba Land 
Law. O.U.P., London, 1962, p.83.
where there are family stools. The Northern Ewe of Ghana have 
no family stools properly so called. Wherever a stool in this 
area belongs to a particular family, it is a political office 
which constitutes that family into a ruling house over the chief- 
dom, the division or sub-division. There are no private stools 
for family purposes only. Therefore, there is no formal instal­
lation ceremony or formal presentation of the head of family on 
his assumption of office.^ Indeed the general rule among the 
Northern Ev/e is that a stool occupant or the incumbent of any 
other important hereditary office must waive his right of suc­
cession in favour of the next senior man as head of the family.
The Ewe head of family is primarily a kinship head. He is, 
therefore, not a political functionary, except insofar as the 
family exists v/ithin the framework of a political organisation 
and except that by virtue of his office he may become a councillor 
of a chief. He is the direct successor in office of the great­
grandfather v/ho founded the family and is, therefore,, entitled . 
to the respect due to that great ancestor. For that reason, the 
head of family is a ”father” to all members of the family. Hence, 
even if there is a chief in the family, the chief submits to the 
authority of the head of the family in matters pertaining 
exclusively to the family. The main functions of the head of
1. Cf. the Akan head of family who is formally installed and 
presented. See e.g. K.A. Busia, The Position of the Chief in 
the Modern Political System of Ashanti. O.U.P., London, 1951, 
pp. 7-&.
family in this respect are to ensure the welfare of all the 
members of the family and to foster the kinship solidarity of 
the unit.
As such kinship head, the head of family performs a ritual 
role. As successor to the founder of the family, he stands 
between the living and the dead. It is part of his duty, there­
fore, to communicate with the ancestors or togbewo on behalf of 
the living members of the family. Such communication takes the 
form of prayers by way of libation. At any time that any impor­
tant decision is taken by the family, including the acquisition 
or alienation of any family property and the settlement of dis­
putes, the head of family communicates the same to the ancestors 
through the pouring of libation, whereby he invokes their 
favourable intervention and approval. There is a similar duty 
on the head of family to communicate with the ancestors at the 
birth, marriage, death and funeral of members of the family.
At any family gathering where drinks or aha are served, the 
head of family is first given a portion with which he prays, 
pouring part on the ground to be enjoyed by the ancestors and 
invoking their blessing. The head of family, hov/ever, is not a 
priest of any family god.^ Family gods are indeed scarcely 
found among the Northern Ewe,
1. Cf, M.J. Field, Social Organization of the Ga People.
19*+0, at p.2 where it is stated that the Ga head of family 
is the priest of the family god.
The head of family has general responsibility for the 
conduct and behaviour of members of the family. He must repri-
I
mand and discipline all members. So strong was this responsibility 
that in the past the head of family was answerable for the delicts 
of members of his family. Even today claims in customary law by 
customary procedure are laid against individuals through their 
heads of families.
Family meetings are normally convened by the head of family 
who personally presides over them. In his absence it is the 
responsibility of the deputy head, who is the man next in 
seniority by age and generation. A family meeting may be con­
vened by the head of family on his own initiative or at the 
request of a reasonable number of the principal members of the 
family. A family meeting may be for an unlimited variety of 
purposes. It may be to discuss general issues and plan the 
welfare of the family, to admonish recalcitrant members or 
settle disputes between members. On other occasions it may be 
connected with the funerals of deceased members or relations 
of the family; at other times it may be to consider the 
acquisition of some new family property or to authorise the 
alienation of title to property vested in the family. The 
family may meet to consider proposed marriages or dissolution 
of marriages effecting some of its members.
On the death of any member of the family, the head of the 
family formally announces the death by sending messengers
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personally to other heads of families in the division, and to 
other persons outside the division who are related to the family 
or the deceased. This is known as kutsitsi or "announcement of 
death". As information on the death of a familyfs relation is 
first conveyed to the head of the family, it-is his duty to 
communicate the sad news to the members of his family. It is 
also the responsibility of the head of family to ensure that a 
deceased member is given a proper burial, followed by appropriate 
funeral rites. The expenses involved, however, are borne by the 
whole family, usually through direct contribution. Such con­
tributions are assessed on per capita basis on all male adult 
members, and sometimes also on adult female members, of the 
family, the senior in age paying a little more than the junior; 
but proximity in relationship to the deceased may be an element 
in increasing the contribution by some individuals. The head 
of family, however, does not succeed to the interest in the 
self-acquired property of deceased members. Neither is he in 
charge of interim administration of the estate of deceased mem­
bers on intestacy. In each case an individual is appointed for 
the purpose.
The head of family represents the legal personality of the 
family; for only he can legally bind the family. This, however, 
is only in a limited sense. The head of family can bind the 
family only if authorised in that behalf. He is, therefore, the 
official through whom the family as a corporate entity can legally
give effect to its will. Accordingly the head of family, for 
example, can and is the proper person to bind the family when 
duly authorised by the family to acquire, affect or alienate 
title to any family property. The usual language in which this 
is expressed is that the head of family may convey or alienate 
the title to family property "with the consent and concurrence" 
of the principal members of the family. This is strictly mis­
leading as it creates the impression that the head of the family 
can enter into the transaction and thereafter obtain the approval 
of the family in order to perfect title. The family title vests 
in the family and not in its head. It is, therefore, only the 
family which can alienate its own title. The role of the head 
of family is only to give effect to the will of the family. Thus, 
although the head of family is indispensable to any valid 
alienation of title to family property,^* he can only act on the 
authorisation of the family. What the head of family requires 
in any alienation of family title, or to bind the family in 
other respects, is not the "consent and concurrence of the 
principal members of the family" but the authority of the family. 
The authority of the family in this context is usually given by 
a decision by consensus of the principal members of the family; 
but at times the authority may be obtained even by informal con­
sultations with the principal members of the family. If a .
1. Allote.y v, Abrahams. (1957) 3 W.A.L.H. 280; Mensah v, Ghana 
Commercial Bank"! (1959) 3 W.A.L.R. 123.
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consensus cannot be obtained, there is no authority; for a bare 
majority consent is not enough*
In the old law when writing was unknown and society was 
less complex, all the principal elders of the family were present 
and, under the leadership of the head of the family, took part 
in the negotiations resulting in the acquisition or alienation 
of any family property or other important transaction* This 
was a transaction in which the head of the family and the prin­
cipal members jointly participated on behalf of the family.
Such a transaction was not merely entered into by the head of 
the family with the consent and concurrence of the principal 
members of the family, but by the head of the family and his 
principal elders acting together on behalf of the family. The 
authorisation by the family was? therefore, easily demonstrable 
.to the other party.
Today the problem is created by writing which makes it 
comparatively easy for individuals, purporting to act on behalf 
of the family, to attempt to bind the family. The modern 
expedient, therefore, is that the head of family must himself 
be a party to any transaction which binds the family, while the 
validity of his action is attested by some principal elders 
expressing their endorsement as evidence of having obtained the 
authority of the family,^ The principle, however, it is submitted,
1. Allote.y v* Abrahams* (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 280.
remains the same. The head of family alone,. though purporting 
to represent the family, cannot bind the family unless authorized 
in that behalf by the family. To say that the head of family 
represents the family, therefore, essentially only means that 
the will of the family as a corporate personality in lav; is 
expressed through the head of the family.
The head of family is the proper person to sue and be sued 
in respect of any family property. He binds the family, there­
fore, by the outcome of the litigation which constitutes a res 
.judicata as against the family. Even under the old Ewe law this 
was the rule. There seems to be here an implied authority given 
to the head of the family to litigate the family title because 
of the general obligation on the holder of the office to defend 
and preserve every item of family property. On occasions, how­
ever, express authority may be given by a meeting of the principal 
elders of the family. Whether such express authority is given or 
not, any litigation by the head of the family in his capacity 
as such head is a family litigation. Not only is the family 
bound by the result but it is submitted that the family as such 
is liable in costs arising from such litigation. It is further 
submitted, therefore, that the head of family is not personally 
liable and execution cannot be levied against him personally in 
respect of the award or costs in such proceedings undertaken on
behalf of the family,"*" It is not, however, necessary that the 
head of family should personally be a party to the proceedings 
on behalf of his family. The family itself or the head of family 
may delegate any member of the family to appear on behalf of the 
head and the family. This was quite common in litigation under 
the old law in the chief’s tribunals and it has been retained. 
Particularly in cases of land litigation, the Ewe practice is to 
authorise the individual person in actual occupation of the dis­
puted land to prosecute or defend the suit in the name of the 
family. For such an individual is more likely to 1-mow better 
the boundaries and facts associated with the land in dispute. 
Furthermore, as stated by the Court of Appeal, per van Lare, Ag. 
C.J., in Kwan v. Nyienl. if the head of the family is unable 
or unwilling to defend or assert the rights of'the family, any 
other member of the family may in such exceptional circumstances 
be authorised to prosecute or defend the action on behalf of the 
family.
The practical and most effective role of the Ewe head of 
family with respect to property is that he is the chief adminis­
trator of the family property. We must here hasten to explain, 
however, that as a rule practically the only property which is
1. This is the view urged also by Ollennu in his The Law of 
Testate and Intestate Succession in Ghana. 1966, p.215# 1
However, the West African Court of Appeal had taken a contrary 
decision in Hammond v. U.A.C. (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 60, holding 
the head of family liable personally for the costs.
2. (1939) G.L.R. 67-
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family property and is administered as such by the head of 
family among the Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana is the 
ancestral family land. The principle constantly enunciated in 
the Akan cases that the self-acquired property of an intestate 
automatically becomes family property on his death is inapplic­
able in Northern Eweland. . All the. heads of families interviewed 
were both unanimous and emphatic that there is no other family 
property apart from the ancestral land; for, as regards self­
acquired property, the Ewe rules provide for succession as of 
right by children and other near relatives in order of precedence 
in a manner similar to the entitlement of next-of-kin. Accord­
ingly, the only property in the hands of the head of family is 
the ancestral land. This however, does not preclude the 
acquiation today of new family property. In that case such 
property, like the ancestral family property, comes under the 
administration-and management of the head of the family.
With this explanation on the extent of family property in 
the Northern Ewe area, it is also necessary to draw the dis­
tinction between positional succession and succession to an 
interest; . in property in Ewe law. The suggestion by Ollennu,
based on the Ghanaian authorities, is that
The person who is appointed successor to a deceased in 
the family is, by virtue of his said office, the head of 
the immediate or branch family originating with the par­
ticular deceased person, his father or mother, 1
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Lav/ in Ghana, 
1962, p.151-
It is submitted, with great respect, that this is not good Ewe 
law. In the first place, as already explained, the Northern Ewe 
of Ghana do not have so-called immediate families as recognised 
units. Secondly, and perhaps more important, succession to 
interests in property does not necessarily imply the assumption 
of the administrative and executive position of leadership of 
the family in all other matters. Similarly the person who be­
comes head of family succeeds to only the office. He does not 
acquire any interest in the property of his predecessor by 
virtue of such succession. The successor to property rights, 
who enters into the beneficial enjoyment of an intestate memberfs 
estate, does not thereby become head of any family originating 
from that intestate. Since Ewe law generally provides for plural 
succession by a group or class of heirs, such as the children who 
jointly succeed their deceased father, it would lead to an absurd 
result if one strictly applied such a purported rule, so that 
the co-heirs became joint heads of the family.
As the head of family among the Northern Ewe-speaking 
people of Ghana does not normally administer any substantial 
property apart from the ancestral lands, his self-acquired 
property does not in any circumstances merge into family property. 
Therefore, the rule in Antu v, Buedu'*' that, in order to avoid - 
his self-acquired property merging with family property, on
1. Antu v, Buedu. (1926-29) F.C. Lflh.
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succeeding to the office of chief the incumbent must declare 
his self-acquired property, a rule which has been extended to 
the head of family, is not Ewe law. For the Ewe head of family 
succeeds to responsibilities rather than property.
We may conclude this section by adding that, in the dis­
charge of his functions, the head of family is assisted by the 
elders who are the principal members of the family. In practice 
the decisions and acts of the head of family are those approved 
by the principal members. There is no voting, nor are decisions 
taken on the principle of a majority. The head of family has 
no ncasting vote”: but his opinion carries great weight.
Decisions, however, are talien by a consensus of opinion. If 
there is such a serious disagreement that a consensus cannot be 
obtained, the proposal is deemed to be lost and is dropped.
There is hardly any personal benefit derived from the 
position of head of family, except the satisfaction of adminis­
tering an ancestral trust. There is no official residence and 
the head of family lives in his .own house. He may sell timber 
and palm trees naturally growing on the family land but proceeds 
from these are insignificant and, in any case, are usually 
shared with the principal members of the family. The only 
other benefit is that the head of family is entitled to a 
larger portion of meat or drinks shared by the family.
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Accountability of the Head of Family
The general rule of Ewe law is that the head of family is 
accountable for family property under his management and adminis­
tration, He accounts to the family of which he is the head, and 
this means the principal elders of the family as representing the
entire membership. As the head of family is not the only bene­
ficiary of the family property, he cannot apply any such property
to his own use only. The only means of ensuring that the family
property is for the general benefit of all the members is by 
holding the head of family to be accountable.
There has always been a reluctance to sue one’s head of 
family. However, even in the old law, if the head of family 
declined to account for family property under his control, or 
if his accounting was unsatisfactory, members of the family could 
enforce the obligation to account by instituting proceedings in 
the tribunal of the sub-divisional chief (i.e. saamefia) or the 
divisional chief (i.e. fia). Such matters could also be enquired 
into by another head of family or any other respectable member of 
the community, if formal judicial proceedings were not contem­
plated, On the other hand, if the accounting dispute was serious 
enough, the matter was cognisable by the tribunal of the head 
chief or Fiaga. either on appeal from lower tribunals or as a 
tribunal of first instance. The tribunals under the traditional 
state system having been superseded by the statutory courts, one 
would have expected that the latter would generally perform the
former's function in this respect. Thus one would expect as a 
logical development that, in appropriate cases, the present 
courts would compel the head of family to render such accounts 
as are reasonable in the particular circumstances of each case.
The principle applied by the Courts of Ghana, however, is 
that the head of a family, while such a head, is not accountable 
for family property in his hands. Ollennu says that, because 
of the customary law principle that only the head of family can 
sue and be sued in respect of family property, "neither the 
occupant of the stool nor head of the family can be sued for 
account either of stool or family funds” for such an action 
will be ”an action by the stool against the stool, or by the
p
family against the family, which is absurd” . This, it is 
submitted, is a statement of the judicial customary law which 
does not represent Ewe law.
The courts of Ghana had adopted the principle of non­
accountability of the head of family from Sarbah who was writing 
on the Fanti and the Akan of Ghana. As is the tendency in 
Ghana, this proposition on the Akan has been extended almost as 
a matter of course to all other tribes of the country. In 
stating that among the Fanti the head of family is not account­
able, Sarbah wrote:....................................
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana.
1962, p.137.
2. Ibid.. p.138.
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If the family, therefore, find the head of the family 
misappropriating the family possessions and squander­
ing them the only remedy is to remove him and appoint 
another instead. 1
This statement by Sarbah was adopted almost without question
p
by the Full Court in Pappoe v. Kweku and that court held that 
the sole surviving brother of an intestate could not, therefore, 
enquire into accounts with the head of the family in respect of 
his deceased brother's estate. Since then it has been applied 
in other cases and, when "the head of a branch family" sought 
accounts from the head of the family in F.ynn v, Gardiner.^ the 
V/est African Court of Appeal said:
It is a well settled principle of native law and 
custom that junior members of a family cannot call 
upon a head of family for an account. Their remedy 
is -to depose him and appoint another in his stead, A
In F.ynn v. Koonh, Adumua-Bossman, J., considered the principle 
so well established that he said it was "common learning". This 
is, therefore, the principle which the Ghana courts have 
generally applied.
However, realising the danger in granting absolute immunity 
to the head of family from accounting, Ollennu says that (apparent­
ly apart from Sarbah's "only remedy" of deposition) there is 
nevertheless some other remedy in the case of mismanagement.
Thus he says:
1. J.M. Sarbah, op.cit.. p.90, Emphasis supplied.
2. Pappoe v. Kweku. ("l92k) F.C, 1923-25, p.158.
3. (1953) Ik W.A.C.A. 260.
k. F.ynn v, Gardiner. (1953) 1^ W.A.C.A. 260, 26l,
5. F.ynn v, Koom, Unreported, Land Suit No, 4/1959, Land Court,
Cape Coast, 20th February, 1§60.
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The remedy of the stool or the family is firstly to 
remove the said occupant of the stool or the said head 
of the family from office. The moment he is deposed, 
he is no longer the lawful representative of the stool 
or the family and he becomes liable to hand over and 
account to his successor or the person or persons 
entitled by customary law to have custody and control 
of the stool property. The new occupant or the new 
head of the family or any individual or group of in­
dividuals authorised in that behalf by customary law, 
can then call upon him to hand over and to make full 
and proper account of all stool or family funds and 
other property which came into his possession during 
his term of office. In short, therefore, while the 
occupant of the stool or head of family cannot be sued 
for accounts, because that is tantamount to a claim by 
the stool against itself or by the family against it­
self, the ex-occupant of the stool or an ex-head of 
the family may be sued for accounts. 1
The learned author evidently was adopting the proposition by
p
Yates, Ag.C.J., in the unreported case of Botchway v. Solomon 
referred to by Adumua-Bossman, J., in Fynn v. Koom,^ also un­
reported, that it is only after his removal that an action can 
be maintained against the former head of a family for an account. 
The implication, then, is that, after his deposition, the said 
head of family becomes fully accountable in respect of the v/hole 
period of his tenure of office.
Taking first the rider that the former head of family, once 
deposed, becomes fully accountable for the whole of his steward­
ship, it is difficult to understand the rationale of the rule of 
unaccountability while in office. It would certainly be better
Yl N.A. Ollennu. Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana"
1962, p.139.
2. Botchway v. Solomon. Unreported, Divisional Court, Accra,
Suit No. 6^/1935* 7th December, 1935; referred to in Vanderpuye 
v.' Botchway. (1951) 13 W.A.C.A, l6*t.
3. F.ynn v. Koom. supra.
L i
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to make the head of family accountable even while in office, 
since this would be a more practical and more effective corrective 
measure short of removal from office. The present rule confers 
only an illusory immunity from accounting, there being full 
accountability when deposed.
. . The basic question, however, is the implication of Sarbah!s 
statement and the manner in which it has been applied by the 
courts. Sarbah says that, if the family 11 find" that there is a 
misappropriation, the only remedy lies in the removal of the head 
of family. It is respectfully submitted that Sarbah1s own state­
ment implies that the head of family is accountable; for the 
family cannot "find" that there has been a misappropriation 
except after an accounting. Accounting is thus implicit in the 
exercise to "find" whether there has been a misappropriation of 
the family property. That is why Sarbaii did not say that the 
head is deposed merely when the family suspect that there has 
been a misappropriation, but only when they "find" that there 
has been one, Accordingly, it is submitted that, even if we rely 
on Sarbah as correctly stating the law, his statement is an 
implicit acceptance of the principle of accountability of the 
head of family. In that case there has been a misinterpretation 
of Sarbah1s statement.
If we so interpret Sarbah*s statement, then we can say that,
in spite of what Sarbah says, the head of family is accountable.
amounts
That the head of family cannot be sued in the courts, therefore,/
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to no more than a doctrine of procedural immunity evolved by the 
statutory courts, which does not affect his substantive liability 
to render accounts. Such cases of procedural immunity are, of 
course, not unknown to the lav;. Thus a diplomat accredited to 
a foreign country is not amenable to the jurisdiction of the 
process of the courts of the receiving country even in respect 
of torts committed by him in his personal capacity; but such 
immunity does not affect the substantive liability of the tort­
feasor and. an action may be succesEfully maintained against him 
if he is subsequently found within the jurisdiction after he has 
been divested of his- diplomatic status.^
p
The case of Abude v. Onano is often cited in support of non­
accountability of the head of family, because of the dictum of 
Korsah, J,, as he then was, that
It is an accepted principle of native customary law 
that neither a chief nor the head of family can be sued 
for account either of state or family funds. 3
This dictum, however, must be read in conjunction with another
statement of the learned Judge later in the course of the same
judgment. For he said:
There is evidence on record which proves that whenever 
a member of the Council is of the opinion that either the 
chief and/or some of his'elders have misappropriated State 
funds, the proper.course is to bring the matter before the 
local Council or the Ga State Council which alone has juris­
diction to enquire into such matters, 4
17 Dickinson v, Del Solar, (1930) 1 K .B . 376, 380; Zoernsch v. 
V/aldock. (196k) 2 All E.R. 256, 265, 266.
2. Abude v. Onano. (1946) 12 .V/.A.C.A, 102.
3. Abude v. Onano. (1946) 12 V/.A.C.A. 102, 104.
4. Abude v. Onano. (1946) 12 V/.A.C.A. 102, 104. Emphasis
supplied.
The Court thus declined to entertain the suit for lack of juris­
diction because the remedy lay in obtaining relief through the 
customary arbitral process. The case of Abude v. Onano was one 
in which some elders of the stool sued the chief for an account. 
If we extend the implication of this ca.se to family property, as 
the Courts are wont to do, it is obvious that members of the 
family may have recourse to the customary judicial process (now 
known as customary arbitral proceedings) to compel the head of 
family to render accounts. Indeed this is what happens. Instead 
of deposing him, the head of family is always liable to be 
summoned to an "arbitration11 to enquire into accounts when there 
is a suspicion of improper handling of family property. Trans­
lated into Its proper legal term, before the advent of European 
rule and the constitution of the statutory courts for the land, 
what is now "arbitration11 was the only recognised form of legal 
proceeding known to the customary law. Therefore, in the eyes 
of the customary law, a head of family is accountable. It is 
only the statutory courts which have declined to extend their 
jurisdiction to cases of this nature. In the view of Ewe law the 
head of family is accountable and the chief1s tribunal will 
enforce such an obligation even today.
In any case, reading the quotation in its proper context, 
it seems that Sarbah'was only emphasising the extent to which 
the head of family can bind his family, thus precluding the 
right of the family to re-call any family property alienated by
the head. Sarbah seems to be here concerned primarily with the 
question of alienation rather than the question of removability 
of the head of family from office. It is, therefore, a mis­
placement of emphasis on the part of the courts which have regarded 
as categorical the incidental reference by Sarbah to the question 
of removability of the head of family. When Sarbah made his 
statement he had been discussing the capacity to alienate title 
to family property. His argument, then, seems to be that once 
the formal alienation has been effected by the head of family, 
the transaction cannot be impugned even if effected irresponsibly 
and if the general membership of the family is in disagreement. 
Certainly such irresponsible dissipation of family property 
could be motivated by the desire of the head and some of the 
principal elders of the family to benefit themselves. This is 
where Sarbahfs concern for the misappropriation of family property 
arises. Ultimately, however, It is a,question of the extent to 
which the family can be bound by its head and Sarbah1s submission , 
is that this is absolute. Hence he suggests that the only remedy 
open to the family whose headacts in such irresponsible manner is 
to replace him; for his alienation of family property cannot be 
impugned. Sarbah himself, however, is to blame for the brevity 
with which he disposed of this important Issue.
The above analysis may be attacked on the ground that 
Sarbah has also stated that junior members of the family cannot
i
go into accounts with the head of the family.*** This, however, is .
1. J.M. Sarbah, op.cit., p.90.
not inconsistent with the principle of accountability. For, to 
say that a head of family is accountable is not to concede that 
even the smallest child can at any time sue in court for 
accounts, thus allowing for a multiplicity of suits which may 
paralyse or disrupt the normal functioning of the family as a 
unit. If so understood, Sarbah1s statement'would imply that, 
while the head of family is accountable, an action for accounts 
may only be maintained by those who, because of their position 
within the family, are entitled to demand such accounts. This 
is in accordance with Ewe law which, like any other system of 
law, has its own procedure for regulating such matters. Among 
the Ewe a relatively junior person in the family cannot by him­
self alone demand accounts of family property generally. He can 
only do so through one of the elders, unless there is such a 
strong body of opinion among a large section of the junior mem­
bers that they cannot be ignored by the principal elders. This, 
however, is not the sense in which the courts have understood 
Sarbah. The courts have acted on the general supposition that 
all other members of the family, including the principal elders, 
are "junior members" in relation to the head of the family and, 
therefore, cannot enquire into accounts with the head. That 
explains why, as we have seen in Pappo e v . Hweku.^ the full 
Court held that a sole surviving brother of an intestate could
1. (1923-25) F.Ct. 158.
240.
not enquire into accounts with the head of the family even as 
regards the estate of his deceased brother. If the result in 
Pappoe v. Kweku was intended by Sarbah, then we must dissent 
from his opinion because it does not conform to Ewe lav;. In 
that case Sarbah's opinion must be confined to the Fanti and 
Akan, of whom he was 'writing; for it is submitted that, if 
Pappoe v. Kweku were an Ewe case, the right of the sole sur­
viving brother, as heir to the deceased, to enquire into accounts 
relating to his late brotherfs estate could not have been denied. 
Not only is this submission supported by information from field 
research, but it is also the basis of the decision of the West 
African Court of Appeal in the unreported Ewe case of Tamakloey. 
Attipoe,*“ In that case the children of the deceased, as heirs 
In Ewe law, sought accounts from the head of family when their 
fatherfs estate was eventually handed over to them by the head 
of the family. The West African Court of Appeal, per Coussey,
J., said:
I can see no difference in principle in their 
liability.to account both in English law and by the 
customary law, once it is appreciated that the 1st 
and 2nd Defendants have no beneficial interest in 
the estate of the deceased, and that their function, 
as Heads of the larger family is advisory and pro­
tective, 2
1. Tamakloe v, Attipoe. Unreported, Civil Appeal No. 38/1952, 
West African Court of Appeal, 22nd June, 1955.
2. Ibid, Quoted in Ennin v. Prah. (1959) G.L.R. 44, 48.
In this instance the head of familyfs liability to account is 
thus recognised in a manner contrary to the decision in Pappoe 
v. Kweku. It is submitted that, as far as Ewe law is concerned, 
Tamakloe v. Attipoe was correctly decided. It is further sub- 
mitted that, on the same principle, the head of family being 
only the administrator of family property'without any personal 
beneficial interest beyond that conferred on him by membership 
of the family, is in Ewe lav; accountable for family property 
under his control and management.
The lav; of non-accountability of the head of family, which 
we have been discussing, was formulated on the strength of cases 
from the Akan and Ga areas of Ghana where there are usually 
substantial properties in the hands of the head of family. Among 
the Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana, however, the question 
of accountability does not seem to be of the same degree of im­
portance. Apart from the ancestral land under his administration, 
the head.of family in Northern Eweland has hardly any other 
family property in his hands. His only beneficial enjoyment of 
such property is that it is only the head of family who may sell 
timber (like odum trees) and palm trees naturally growing on the 
ancestral land. Moneys realised from such occasional sales of 
timber and palm trees are so insignificant that they cannot 
justify a demand for the removal of the head of family just In 
order to be able to go into accounts with him.
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The only substantial sums of money which may come into the 
hands of the head of the family today in Northern Eweland are 
moneys realised from the sale or lease of the family lands.
Such transactions, however, take place validly only with the 
authorisation of the family, as expressed by the consent and 
concurrence of the principal members of the family, and the 
figures are openly known. Furthermore, the regrettable practice 
in this area is to share the proceeds among the principal mem­
bers of the family as each transaction Is concluded. The result 
is that, as a rule, there are no family funds in the hands of 
the head of the family for which ho may be subsequently requested 
to account. His accountability ends with the supervision of the 
distribution of the moneys among the principal members, in the 
proportions decided by the family. Until then, however, he is 
fully accountable for the moneys received by him on behalf of 
the family.
.Family money may also come into the hands of the Eve head 
of family when there are contributions by members of the family 
to meet the cost of litigation in defence of family property, 
the expenses in connection'with the funerals of the deceased 
members and relations of the family, or any other purpose agreed 
by the family. In all these cases there is a strict account­
ability though the sums involved may not be enough to justify 
the deposition of a head of family who is guilty of mismanage­
ment , He may only be rebuked and the moneys lost refunded, if 
possible, or written off.
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Within the context of the explanation given above, it is 
agreed in all areas that among the Northern Ewe-speaking people 
of Ghana the head of family is accountable for family property 
coming under his administration. It was only in the Aveme area 
that it was suggested by some informants that the head of family 
was not.accountable. Upon further enquiry, however, it appeared 
that the only reason for this view was that he scarcely controlled 
sufficient property (apart from land), so that his accountability 
was not a serious issue. In any case, in an interview with 
Togbe Gazari IV, Fiaga of Aveme, the Fiaga and his elders 
corrected the view and stated that the head of family was 
accountable in Aveme.
It is submitted, thereforo, that among the Northern Ewe- 
speaking people of Ghana, the head of family is accountable for 
his administration of any family property that is entrusted to 
him,"*' There is, of course, a natural reluctance to sue the head 
of a family because his disgrace is as much that of the family 
and his liability is a liability of the family, and because such 
litigation within the family destroys the solidarity of the 
unit. It is, however, only a case of self-restraint and not 
immunity of the head of the family from accounting.
1. This is known among other African societies as well. For 
instance, in the Nigerian case of Kosoko v, Kosoko. (1937)
13 N.L.K. 131, it was held that the head of family is liable 
to account to other members of the family.
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As the law now stands, however, even an action from the
Northern Ewe area to compel the head of a family to render
/
accounts may not be entertained by the 'Ghana courts. This can­
not be explained on the basis that there is no liability to 
account, but because of the procedural immunity granted to the 
head of family by the courts. It leads to an absurdity among 
the Northern Ewe because, while members of the family may often 
seek accounts, they are rarely prepared to apply the extreme 
sanction of deposing even a guilty head of family; for, granting 
that there is a misappropriation or mismanagement, the cum of 
money or value of property involved in this area is hardly large 
enough to call for the dismissal of the head of family. Further­
more, the application of the judicial customary lav/ principle of 
non-accountability may lead to serious difficulties because in 
most Ewe chiefdoms it is not accepted that a head of family can 
be removed from office. It means that in most Ewe chiefdoms no 
accounts can be required of the head because he cannot be 
deposed in order to divest him of his judicial immunity.
The rule that in Ghana the head of family cannot be held
. been
accountable until he has/deposed is in any case, an absurd one 
which needs to be changed. It denies members of the family the 
right'to go into accounts with their head and yet retain him in 
his office notwithstanding any irregularities. It engenders 
instability in the family since any suspicion of mismanagement 
can only be investigated after first deposing the suspected head
of family. Furthermore, it is a strange rule that requires a 
suspected or accused head to be first removed from office before 
he can be compelled to account; for removal from office can 
only be a sanction for mismanagement or misconduct. What, then, 
is the position when a head of family, after having been deposed, 
is eventually exonerated when' he comes to render accounts?
Perhaps the answer is that he will be re-instated. Such a 
situation can hardly be in the interest of the family.
It seems that the rule of non-accountability of the head 
of family was based on the other rule that only the head of
i
family may sue or be cued in respect of family property. That 
is why Ollennu argues that an action by members of the family 
against the head of family is tantamount to the absurdity of an 
action by the family against itself. Such an ingenious argument 
is, however, only a legal nicety which has been allowed to stand 
in the way of the solution of a practical problem. It is not a 
contrivance of native jurisprudence but an imposition from the 
statutory courts. The argument is sound only if we concede that 
any person taking an action in respect of any item of family 
property must necessarily sue as representing the family. In 
that case there would indeed be the technical absurdity of an 
action by the family against itself, since the head of the 
family, as such head, also represents the family. This, however,
1. See, e.g. Mahmudu v. Zenuah. (1934) 2 W.A.C.A. 172, 175; 
and Koran v, Dokyi. (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 78, 80.
is only a procedural problem which does not affect the sub­
stantive question of liability to account. In any case it is 
suggested that a possible solution is to permit any responsible 
member of the family to sue in his own name, though as such 
member, for accounts. In that case it would not be an action 
by the family but by a member of the family, so that the 
individual should be personally liable for any costs occasioned 
by the action. An analogy may be found in members of a club or 
society suing in their own names to obtain a relief against the 
officers of their club or society. Such an individual suing in 
his own name should be granted a locus standi inherent in his 
membership of the family. This indeed is the basis on which 
the tribunals of the indigenous law grant a hearing to a member 
cf the family who seeks to enquire into accounts with the head 
of the family. As regards the head of family who is sued for 
accounts, the courts could get round the difficulty created by 
his position as the legal representative of the family by, as it 
were, "piercing the veil of incorporation", thus treating him 
for the purpose of that action alone as a private individual 
whose acts are being called In question. This does not seem to 
bo unreasonable because, if indeed he is eventually found to 
have defaulted in his duties, it means that the family has a 
remedy against him. In that case he is not entitled to hide 
behind the family to defraud the family, or to prevent the 
family from obtaining its relief against him. If, on the other
hand, the head of family is exonerated, he should be entitled to 
recover his full costs personally against the person who instituted 
the action. In either event, therefore, the head of family is 
not at a disadvantage, except that his misconduct may be exposed 
and such exposure is to the benefit of the family.
In any case, there has been a definite derogation from the 
rigidity of the rule that only the head of family can sue in 
respect of family property. For, as stated in Kwan v. Nyieni.1 
in exceptional cases when family property is in danger but the 
head and the principal members of the family are likely to com­
promise the interests of the family, the courts will entertain 
an action by any member of the family properly authorised in 
that behalf or "upon proof of necessity". It is suggested that 
by extending the basis of the proposition in Kwan v . Nyienifit 
should be possible for genuinely Interested members of the
family (such as the sole surviving brother of the intestate in
2Pappoe v. Kweku.) to compel accounts.from the head of the family 
if; as the proviso in Kwan v. Nyieni states, "the Court is 
satisfied that the action is instituted in order to preserve 
the family character of the property". This is not to release 
the flood gates for a spate of frivolous or vexatious actions 
by discontented Individuals calculated to paralyse the adminis-
1. (1959) G.L.P. 67.
2. Pappoe v, Kweku. (1923-25) F.C.158.
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tration of affairs by the head of the family. This danger 
can in part be avoided by setting conditions on the institution 
and prosecution of such actions, such as that a prima facie 
case of mismanagement or irregularity must be disclosed in 
lemine, that a relatively substantial portion of the family 
property must be in danger, and'that the interests of the 
family must be demonstrably at stake. Furthermore, "account­
ing" in this context must be given a meaning limited by the 
peculiar circumstances of each family without necessarily im­
porting the meticulous fervor of a professional accountant.
In most families no books are kept relating to the adminis­
tration of family property in the sense in which it is under­
stood in a business or commercial enterprise. In most cases, 
therefore, the liability of the head of family to account may 
amount to no more than a general statement of incomes, expen­
diture and other disbursements of the family, sufficient to 
show whether there has been a misappropriation.
Removability of the Head of Family
The Ewe lav; in the majority of the chiefdoms is that a 
head of family is irremovable. He holds his office for life, 
and, though he may probably resign, he cannot be deposed for any 
cause whatever. In some chiefdoms, however, the lav; is that a 
head of family may be removed from office in cases of very grave 
misconduct.
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The judicial customary lav; in Ghana is that a head of 
family is removable from office by the family.
The late Sarbah wrote thus:
Where the /head of family/ suffers from mental incapacity, 
or enters upon a course of conduct which unchecked may 
end in the ruin of the family, or persistently disregards 
the interests of the family, he can be removed by a 
majority of the other members of the family, and a new 
person substituted for him. 1
This statement concerning the Fanti head of family has been 
generally treated as a rule applicable to all the people of 
Ghana. Hence, Ollennu was able to state the general proposition 
that:
The head of family holds his office subject to good 
behaviour; he continues in office so long as he enjoys 
the confidence of the majority of the principal elders 
of the family, or so long as he does not suffer any 
disabilities. 2
He gives several reasons for which a head of family may be
removed from office, such as failure to perform his duties
properly, mismanagement of family property, selfish practices,
disrespect for the family, failing to account to the family for
funds of the family, conduct likely to disgrace the family and
physical or mental incapacity. Significantly, Ollennu does not
say that a head of family may be removed only to be able to go
into accounts with him. He says that the head of family is
removable through the same procedure that he was appointed,
1. J.M. Sarbah, op.cit., p.35.
2. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana, 
1962, pp.162-3.
that is, by a formal meeting of the family. Bentsi-Enchill 
also says of the head of family that: '
He is elected to his office, holds it during good
behaviour, and is removable for misconduct. 1
Apart from these opinions, there is not much authority for 
the proposition that a head of family is removable from office.
p
Although in the Ga case of Y/elbeck v. Captan it was mentioned 
that a co-defendant had been removed from office as head of 
family "for reasons involving finance and alleged squandering 
of moneys", the question of removability was not the point in 
issue in that case. The real issue was the question of the 
validity of the appointment of a head of family at a meeting 
from which some principal elders had absented themselves. That 
case is, therefore, no authority for the proposition that the 
head of family is removable from office.
In any case, if, as has been contended for the other tribes 
of Ghana, the office of head of family is elective, then it is 
only logical that he should be removable at the instance of the 
body that elected him. For, to that extent, the ■ -r ^position of 
head of family is hardly distinguishable from any-other political 
office, such as that of a chief who can be removed for various 
reasons.
Among the Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana, as we 
have pointed out, the office of head of family is not elective,
1. K. Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit.. p.187.
2. Welbeck v. Captan. (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 47, 48.
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there being the right of automatic succession. There is, however,
no uniform Ewe rule on the issue of the removability of the head
of family from office.
The rule stated in the majority of the Ewe areas is that
the head of family is not removable from office, though he may
be rebuked in cases of misconduct.1, This is also the rule stated 
2 3
by V/estermann and Ward. The areas where the principle of the 
irremovability of the head of family applies include Gbi, Averne, 
Kpando, Abutia, Akome, Matse and Ho, If, in these areas, a head 
of family persists in wilful misconduct, the sanction applied to 
him is that of non-cooperation. He quickly ceases to command the 
respect and obedience due to his office and person and, if the 
misconduct involves an element of mismanagement, family property 
is no longer entrusted to his care. He no longer enjoys the 
support of the family and the members turn more and more to the 
natural deputy who is the next senior elder of the family. It 
should be noted, however, that the head of family in this part 
of the country has little scope for serious misconduct in office 
because, apart from land, he does not control much that is in 
the nature of family property. Where a head of family is not 
very reliable in financial dealings with little sums that'pass 
through his hands, the expedient is that responsibility for such ■
matters is transferred to other elders without deposing the head
T! Among the Yoruba, where also succession to the office is 
automatic on the principle of seniority, the head of family is not 
removable. See P.C, Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law. O.U.P., London, 1962,
p. 83.
2. D. Westermann, Pie Glidyi-Ewe in Togo. 1935, P.135.
3. B.E. Ward, op.cit.. p.82,
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from his office. Deposition of a head of family is considered 
in this area as a calamitous event or busu n.ya. The procedure, 
therefore, is to settle matters at family meetings without 
deposing the head of the family, lest the wrath of the ancestors 
is incurred.
In-Taviefe it is stated that theoretically the head of 
family is removable from office; but the circumstances must be 
patently very grave and such drastic action irresistible. It 
is stated by the Head Chief and his elders, however, that there 
is no case in living memory in the Taviefe area when the head of 
a family had been deposed.
In Anfoega, where it is contended that the head of family 
is elected, it is stated as a logical corollary that he is re­
movable for serious misconduct. But no example of such a removal 
can be referred to even in this area.
In Peki and Kpedze, where the rule of automatic succession 
is held to apply, it is nevertheless stated that the head of 
family may be removed from office if he is guilty of a serious 
misconduct. Here again, an example is wanting of a recourse to 
such a drastic action.
The only place where the principle of the removability of 
the head of family is supported with an example is'Awudome. The 
Fiaga of Awudome, Togbe Addai Kwasi X and his elders stated in 
an interview that in the Awudome area a head of family who was 
found guilty of a serious misconduct or mismanagement could be
removed from office by his family. They supported their 
proposition of the law with reference to an example of a "recent" 
removal from office of a head of family in the Anyirawase 
division of Awudome, Unfortunately, however, they declined to 
supply the name of the deposed head of family, and neither would 
they name the family concerned.
In the Northern Ewe areas where the principle of remov­
ability is accepted, it is not inconsistent with the principle 
of the right of automatic succession. For, on the deposition 
of a head of family, the next in seniority by generation and 
age succeeds automatically.
Although it is only in a minority of the areas that it has 
been stated that a head of family is removable from office, the 
principle of removability is a sound one. The head of family,
'.vhether elected or succeeding automatically, is answerable to 
the family. That being so, there is no reason why he should 
not be removable by the family for gross misconduct, dishonesty 
cr misappropriation of family property, mismanagement and even 
incompetence. It is to be hoped that in course of time the 
principle of removability will be accepted in all areas.
Even in the Northern Ewe areas where it is the rule that 
a head of family is removable from office, it is not the prin­
ciple, as suggested by Ollennu, that he holds his office "subject 
to good behaviour'1 or "so long as he does not suffer any
disabilities". Nor is Bentsi-Enchill wholly correct when he 
states briefly and simply that a head of family holds office 
"during good behaviour and is removable for misconduct". The 
principle among the Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana is 
that the head of family holds his office for life, with only the 
proviso that in a few areas he may be removed in special cases 
of very grave misconduct. It means that, even in areas where a 
head of family may be removed from office, he cannot be removed 
for mere absence of "good behaviour" or merely for the reason 
that he no longer "enjoys the confidence of the majority of the 
principal elders of the family". It must be' clearly more than 
that. The conduct complained of must manifest a systematic and 
persistent but highly reprehensible course of conduct referable 
to his office as hstad of family. Accordingly, an occasional 
failure to perform his duties properly, a simple mismanagement 
or even misappropriation of family funds, cannot be a sufficient 
ground for his removal from office, unless it is in the serious 
circumstances of a deliberate and systematic dissipation of 
family property or the compromising of the interests of the 
family in a manner clearly inconsistent with the position of 
a head of family. To justify the removal of a head from office, 
the gravity of the dereliction of duty or mismanagement of family 
property must be beyond doubt, ' An example may be when a head of 
family supports an adverse title against his own family with
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respect to a substantial portion of the family property, either 
out of selfishness or other relationship with the adverse claimant. 
If he merely refuses to litigate the family's title to property, 
another elder may be authorised to do so without removing the 
head, unless more can be read into the refusal. Failure to 
repair a family house is too trivial, and so is the mere refusal 
or inability to summon a family meeting when requested by some 
members of the family. Conviction of criminal offence is no 
ground for deposing a head of family. Because of the gravity 
and consequential rarity of the circumstances which can justify 
the removal of a head of family from office, it is difficult to 
find examples of such removal among the Northern Ewe. It may 
v/ell be that, because of the rarity of the exercise of that 
power, in most of the Ewe areas the family's power to remove its 
head had fallen into desuetitude, and this may explain why it 
is assumed in those areas that the head of family cannot be 
removed from office.
In all areas of Northern Eweland, it is stated that a head 
of family cannot be removed from office on the simple ground 
that he no longer "enjoys the confidence of the majority of the 
principal elders of the family". Where he is removable, it must 
be on the ground of a stated misconduct of sufficient serious­
ness, and not mere lack of confidence in him. Furthermore, it is 
not Ewe law that a "majority of the principal elders of the 
family" can remove a head of family from office. Where he is
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removable, it must be with an almost unanimous consent of the 
principal members of the family because it is a most drastic 
step. Unless this near-unanimity can be obtained the attempt 
to remove a head of family from office fails.
In no part of the Northern Ewe-speaking area of Ghana 
is mental or physical incapacity a ground for removing a head 
of family from office. If the head of family becomes insane, 
there is still no formal act of removal, but the next in 
seniority automatically assumes the position of head of family.
If the insane head of family subsequently regains sanity, he 
automatically resumes his office without formality, just as if 
he had been absent from the locality.
As regards physical infirmity, it is never a ground for 
removing a head of family from office. Even though he may be 
blind, deaf or bed-ridden, he remains head of the family. 
Accordingly, although another elder, usually the next in 
seniority, deputises for.him, all formal acts are still done 
in the name of the infirm head of the family and, unless it is 
inconvenient to do so, all family meetings are still held in 
his house. The Ewe attitude to illness is dictated by sympathy 
and understanding, and it would be deemed both cruel and incon­
siderate on the part of any member of the family to suggest the 
removal of a head of family from office on the ground of illness.
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CHAPTER V
THE MATURE OF LAND TITLES
The Ewe Conception of Land
In Ewe law, land or an.yigba means the soil itself, as well 
as the sub-soil and anything under the soil, such as minerals.
It does not include things on or attached to the soil, such as
trees, houses or other permanent fixtures. There is thus a 
distinction between interests in the land itself or anvigba and 
interests in things on or attached to the land.
Writing on the customary land law of Ghana in general,
Ollennu says:
The t erm land as understood in customary lav; has a wide 
application. It includes the land itself, i.e. the 
surface soil; it includes things on the soil which are 
enjoyed with it as being part of the land by nature, 
e.g. rivers, streams, lakes, lagoons, creeks, growing 
trees like palm trees and dawadawa trees, or as being 
artificially fixed to it like houses, buildings and 
structures whatsoever; it also includes any estate, 
interest or right in, to or over the land or over any 
of the other things which land denotes, e.g. the right 
to collect snails, herbs or to hunt on land. 1
With respect, this sounds rather like a definition of "land” in
English law. Furthermore, it would appear from the subsequent
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Lav; in Ghana. 
1962, p.l.
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passages in that work that the learned Judge was not primarily
concerned with the customary lav; conception of land as such.'*'
His primary purpose seemed to be to spell out the guidelines for
determining whether a suit was a "land suit" rather than a
personal suit or a succession suit. This distinction was at one
time vital to the jurisdiction of the courts, . especially between
April, 19k5 and July, I960. For, under the Courts (Amendment)
2Ordinance, 19kk, there was created a Land Court which had 
exclusive jurisdiction in land suits. Since I960, however, this 
distinction for the purposes of jurisdiction has been swept away 
because under the Courts Act, 1960,^ and later the Courts Decree, 
1966,^ there is now only one High Court vested with jurisdiction 
in all matters, the former Land Court having been abolished. Not 
unlikely, the old legal distinction was still present to the mind 
of Ollennu. In any case, his definition cannot be regarded as an 
exposition of either the indigenous law or even the present sub­
stantive lav; of the land.
In what he called a retrospective view of the Ashanti law 
of land tenure and alienation, Rattray wrote thus:
The words flandf, 1 earth1, ’soil1 could hardly in them­
selves conjure up anything else but something which v/as 
personified in the Earth goddess whom all men worshipped.
Land was seldom or never visualised as the soil of 
which it was composed; it' was regarded as an area of the 
world’s surface, over which mankind might roam for food ...
1. Ibid., pp. 1-3.
2. No. 23 of 19kk.
3. C.A.9.
k. N.L.C. Decree No. 8k of 1966.
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and if the actual soil or earth were thought of at 
all, it was in association with a deity with whom it 
was personified or to.whom it belonged, 1
In Rattray!s view, it was from this stage that there later
developed a transition into the possession of tribal, then
family and individual, ,fusufruct,! of land. V/hatever may be
the comment on‘this historical conspectus of Ashanti land law,
Rattray stated thereafter the significant proposition that crops,
trees and even houses were not, in Ashanti lav/, regarded as in-
p
separable from the soil." This has now been stated by Allott
in clearer terms thus:
The Ashanti conception of land extends only to the soil 
itself, and things in land (e.g. minerals) or on the 
land (planted trees, houses) would not fall within the 
definition of land (asase) and might be separately dealt 
with in law. 3
Subject to some qualification, this is also the Ewe law.
In Ewe law, land or anyigba consists of the soil itself as 
well as the sub-soil and anything thereunder. Since the Ewe have 
no means of analysing the contents of the bowels of the earth, 
they regard land as including minerals and other things embedded 
in the soil. The absolute or paramount interest in land, there­
fore, extends not only to the sub-soil but also ad inferos. The 
holder of the paramount interest in the land is thus also entitled 
to any.minerals or objects discovered under the soil. The Ewe
1. E.S. Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution. Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1929, pp,3^5-3A6.
2. Ibid,, p.3A0.
3. A.N. Allott, The Ashanti Law of Property, Stuttgart, 1966, 
P.lif3;
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conception of land is consequently more extensive than that of 
the Ashanti as stated by both Allott and Rattray, inasmuch as 
"land" among the Ewe includes minerals and other things in the 
soil.
Like the Ashanti law, trees growing naturally on the land
and even those planted by the industry of man are not regarded
as part of the land in Ewe law, though title to them vests in
the holder of the paramount title to the land on v/hich they grow.
Ilence timber like odurn and mahogany, as well as palm trees,
belong to the family holding the absolute or paramount interest
in the land on v/hich they grow and can only be validly sold by
the head of that family. Things artificially fixed to the soil,
even if of the nature of a permanent fixture, are not regarded
as land. Accordingly, houses, buildings and other structures
on the soil are not regarded as part of the land. Conceptually,
such fixtures-and structures are regarded as different from land
in Ewe law. As Pogucki puts it,
Rights in buildings (houses, compounds) are of a special 
nature, as are rights in trees of economic value. They 
may be, and normally are, separated from the right to 
the land on which the buildings or trees stand or grow, 1
The Religious Significance of Land
Generally the earth, the soil or land is not regarded as
a fetish or a ngodu among the Ewe. Though it is conceived of
T9 R.J.H.~ Pogucki. Land Tenure in Ghana, Lands Department,
Accra, 1957, Vol. 6, p.S.
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as a principle, it is not a fetish or tro and has no worshippers. 
It, however, has certain observances which must be obeyed in 
order to ensure fertility and progress and to avoid personal 
illnecs.
On the religious importance of land, Rattray says that in
Ashanti the earth is regarded as a goddess and is known- as Asase ■ 
„ 1
laa, whose rest day is Thursday, Commenting on this, Busia 
says:
The Ashanti believed that the Earth had a power or spirit 
of its own which could be helpful if propitiated or harmful 
if neglected. The power in the Earth was conceived as a 
female principle, Asase Yaa (Earth) whose natal day is 
Thursday. 2
Ho continues to explain that the earth is, however, not a goddess. 
Says Busia:
Rattray, translated Asase Yaa as Thursday, Earth Goddess*, 
and spoke of the 1 Cult of the Earth Deity1, This was not 
a very accurate rendering of the Ashanti conception. The 
Earth has no priests or priestesses, nor do the Ashanti 
consult her for divination in case of illness or need as 
they do other gods (abosom) ... The Ashanti say ... the 
Earth is not a goddess, she does not divine. The con­
ception is rather that of a power or principle possessed 
by the Earth, 3
The view of Busia is not far from the religious significance 
of land among the Northern Ewe generally. The only area in 
Northern Eweland where an Earth fetish or tro is known to exist 
is Awudome, This tro is' known as Zodzi, meaning "that on which
1. R.S. Rattray, Ashanti, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1923, p.215; 
and Ashanti Law and Constitution. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1929,
PP.3^ -3^ 3.
2. K.A. Busia, The Position of the Chief in the Modern Political 
Si s t ern of Ashan t , 0,U,P., ■ London, 1951, P * AO,
3. K.A. Busia, Ibid,
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we walk". Its shrine and priest are at Awudome-Avenui, but it 
is a tro or fetish for the whole of the chiefdorn of Awudome,
The Earth fetish, zodzi. of Awudome, however, is an excep- 
tional case. The Northern Ewe of Ghana generally have no Earth 
God or Earth Goddess, Neither is the earth or the land regarded 
as a fetish or tro.. Therefore,.with the. sole, exception of the ■ ■ 
Awudome case, there are no priests or priestesses ministering 
unto the earth or the land anywhere. Nevertheless, land in the 
abstract is conceived of as a potent principle of some spiritual 
force. It has decreed certain taboos and avoidances, failure to 
observe which is visited with a sanction in the form of an incur­
able disease leading to inevitable death. To swear, for instance, 
by the earth or to strike or even touch the soil with the palm or 
a finger or swallow a bit of the soil, Is a mode of proof of one’s 
truthfulness; for to foreswear in this manner is believed to mean 
a certain death to him who utters the falsehood. In case of such 
false swearing or violation of the earth*s taboo, the offence may 
be purged by propitiating the earth with appropriate sacrifices 
involving a sheep, a goat or a fowl with drinks. This, however, 
is done not by a priest but by the linguist, or tsiami of the 
local divisional chief or fia, together with the elders. Such 
spiritual transgressions are also- legal offences because it is ■ • 
believed that such misconduct angers the earth so that rain does 
not fall and crops do not prosper.
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The earth, as a principle, is considered as capable of 
being disposed through offerings and sacrifices to bestow its 
blessings in the form of increased fertility. Hence in the case 
of prolonged drought or bad harvests, sacrifices are made to the 
earth, the rain-makers being usually called in aid, to ensure a 
good harvest. For this reason also, at the annual harvest of the 
first crops, special rituals and celebrations are held to thank 
the earth, the deities and the ancestral spirits for their bounty 
and to pray for future prosperity. This is the origin of the 
annual yam festivals or te dudu and other such celebrations in 
many parts of the Ewe area.
In Sweland each area of the earth1s surface is parcelled 
out in identifiable lands with separate and distinct names. Thus 
in Alavanjp, for example, a part-of the land is called Abriwanko; 
in V/li we have Huveme; in Have we have I-Iefu; in Ho we have 
Ahorlor; and in Gbi we hear of names like Tonglo, Klokpo,
Abudome, Deblanyi and Desiamadove, Primarily, these are names 
for purposes of geographical identification; but they have also 
been clothed with the personality of spiritual entities. In other 
words, each of these areas is a local manifestation of the power 
or spirit of the. earth and is, in its own right, entitled to 
certain avoidances and sacrifice's. None of them, however, has 
a priest or priestess of its own.
If there is a defilement of the land, it is the particular 
area involved that is purified to propitiate the spirits. Such
a defilement may result from a'human being dying in the area 
(for a person must die in the habitable town or village and not 
in the bush), a woman visiting the area while "unclean” because 
she is in her menstrual period, or in having sexual intercourse 
011 the bare ground in the farm or bush. Such acts are sins and 
the iniquity must be washed away with the sacrifice-of a goat, 
a sheep or a fowl, otherwise, not only will the guilty be punished 
with illness and ultimate death, but the area will withhold its 
rainfall and crops will not flourish. Thus if in Gbi the area 
of Tonglo is defiled it is believed that rain may not fall in 
that area and crops will wither or be destroyed there, while 
rainfall and fertility in another area like Klokpo may be unaf­
fected. Therefore, when there is a scarcity of rainfall in a 
particular 'area, that area is supposed to be visiting its wrath 
on the farmers because of undetected transgressions. Fertility 
rites are, therefore, performed in such an area, usually with 
the sacrifice of a goat (not a sheep) to appease the anger of 
the land. This is known as ave dada. Because of the effect on 
all the inhabitants, such defilements are not regarded merely 
as belonging to the realm of spiritualism but are treated as 
public wrongs which are punishable by exacting the penalty con­
sisting of the articles necessary for the appeasement of the 
spirits,
Throughout the Northern Ewe aree^  each chiefdom has a day 
set aside when no work may be done on the soil. That is the day 
of rest for the earth, when it must not be disturbed. It is not
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regarded as a natal day, but a day which the ancestors and the 
spirits have signified as a sacred day when all must abstain 
from manual work. Perhaps on analysis today we may say that the 
ancestors decreed such abstention from work to ensure that, in 
a farming community, everybody had a mandatory rest day each 
week. Howeverlike many others, its observance is ensured by 
the imposition of a spiritual sanction. Violation of the rule 
of abstention from work on the rest day was also a public wrong 
because it v;as regarded as an act which displeased the spirits. 
Today, however, observance of the day of rest is not enforced 
with the same rigidity.
The days set aside for general rest vary from one chiefdorn 
to another. In Gbi and Peki, with the traditional seven-day 
week, the sacred day of rest is Thursday or Afenoogbe. the same 
as for the Ashanti; but in Abutia and Awudome, where also the 
seven-day week is observed, the day of rest is every Wednesday,
In places where the week has a four or five day cycle constructed
around the traditional market day, the day after.the market day 
or Asiarnigbe is usually the day of rest.
Apart from the general day of rest in the chiefdom, there
is.also a special day of rest for each farming area, when no
manual work may be undertaken in that area only. In Gbi, for
instance, the special day of rest for the area known as
Danyimegbe is Friday and that for Manamegbe is Wednesday, To
1, Alsc known as Yawodagbe.
violate this is a spiritual as well as a public offence for 
v/hich there must be an atonement by the sacrifice of a goat, 
lest the fertility of the land be impaired. In effect, therefore, 
there are two days of rest each week, one general and the other 
for the particular area. The general one is obligatory throughout 
the chiefdom; but that of the specific farming area does not 
mean a mandatory rest because the farmer may go to another farm 
in a different farming area.
Modes of Acquisition of Land
The methods by which lands were acquired may afford an 
explanation for the interests which stools and families have 
in land among the Northern Ewe of Ghana. In particular they 
explain why, as we shall submit later, the paramount interest 
in practically all lands is held by the respective families in 
this part of the country.
Those who have dealt with the subject of acquisition of 
land in Ghana have discussed the issue on the basis that the 
interests in. lands are held by the families from one stool or 
another. The view of Sarbah is that land could become a property 
of the stool or the community by the appropriation of an owner­
less or vacant land, through conquest followed by settlement on 
the lands of the vanquished, or through alienation such as a 
sale or a gift.."^  He also suggests that the paramount title to
1, J.M. Sarbah, Fanti Customary Laws. Clowes, London, 190k, 
pp.k7-k8.
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some lands could be acquired through the natural process of
accession, such as lands reclaimed from the sea or a river by
the recession or drying up of the waters. This last process
must be of a comparatively rare and insignificant occurrence
even among the coastal tribes and is hardly relevant to the
modes of land■acquisition'of a ■non-coastal'community like the' ' '
Northern Ewe of Ghana. Acquisition through accretion or accession
will, therefore, not be discussed further.
The picture given by Casely Hayford is that
In the early stages of the Native State System, upon the 
acquisition of lands by conquest or settlement by members 
of a given community, the lands so acquired or settled 
upon would be apportioned among those worthy of them in 
the order of merit. 1
This apportionment of land, according to Casely Hayford, was done
by the supreme ruler, the head chief.
Danquah gives a more vivid picture of the traditional
process of land acquisition among the Alcan of Ghana. He writes:
Stool property, with particular reference to land, is 
, acquired in one of many ways. A warlike tribe invades 
a country under a supreme commander, or war lord with 
' commanders and captains and their respective people and 
retainers. The country is over-run; the invaded tribes 
are enslaved, massacred or driven away from their own 
country by force of arms. The invaders occupy the 
devastated and evacuated tov/ns, and after setting up 
defences against attacks by the conquered tribes or any 
others, they portion out the conquered territories among 
themselves and destroy the institutions which they find 
in the country and substitute their own. The supreme 
commander, almost always the prince of the tribe, be­
comes ex-officio supreme lord of the whole land. Every
1. Casely Hayford, Gold Coast Native Institutions. Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1903, P.A-5*
commander, captain or head of tribe retains such land 
as falls to his lot in the general apportionment, and 
the land thus retained is held by him in virtue of his 
allegiance to the supreme lord of the tribe and of his 
headship of his own tribe or family.section. This was 
one way of acquiring stool land in historic times. 1
Other modes of acquisition described by Danquah include the
confiscation of land to the stool, a long and uninterrupted
occupation by or on behalf of the stool and an acknowledgment
of a superior stool's paramount title. He also states that
stool land may be acquired by gift or purchase, the latter
being described by him as a comparatively modern form of
acquisition.
In Ohimen v. Adjei, Ollennu, J., as he then was, stated the
modes of acquisition of lands by stools thus:
There are four principal methods by which a stool acquires 
land. They are: conquest and settlement thereon and cul­
tivation by subjects of the stool; discovery, by hunters 
or pioneers of the stool, of unoccupied land and subsequent 
settlement thereon and use thereof by the stool and"its 
subjects; gift to the stool; purchase by the stool. 2
In addition to gift and purchase, the two principal methods of 
acquisition outlined by the learned Judge in essence consist in 
settlement on the land by the subjects of the stool.
The picturesque account■given by Danquah cannot be regarded 
as descriptive of the Ewe process of land acquisition. In par­
ticular the idea of original land apportionment, which comes 
from both Casely Hayford and Danquah, was not a feature of land
1. J.B. Danquah, Akan Laws and Customs. Eoutledge, London, 1928, 
p .199 *
2. Ohimen v.'Ad.jei. (1957) 2 V/.A.L.R. 275, 279.
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acquisition among the Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana*
The Akan account, which comes from these learned authors, is 
based on the fundamental notion that the chief, as supreme 
ruler, apportioned lands to his subjects of various degrees of 
importance and status, who thereupon settled on them. The lands 
are thus held of the stool even today. The Northern Ewe chiefs, 
however, have never assumed such a role in land administration, 
with the result that the paramount interest in practically all 
lands in Northern Eweland is held by the families in their own 
right and not as grants from stools.
In Eweland, as among the Akan, the basis of land acquisition 
in the'ancient times was settlement; the difference is that the 
Ewe settlement was not by virtue of apportionment by the political 
authority. Land became available for settlement either because 
of war, because of the discovery of unoccupied land or because of 
cession of territory by way of a gift. Once the lands became 
available, acquisition 011 behalf of the family was simply through 
occupation and use by the individual members of the families.
In some cases a more powerful community defeated another 
in war and settled on its lands. The area thus abandoned by the 
defeated people became available for settlement by the victors*
The people of Awudome, for instance, claim that they obtained 
their present lands by defeating and driving away the people of
4
Akpafu and Lolobi who were formerly in occupation. This is an 
instance of open warfare resulting in the overrunning of enemy 
territory.
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Even without open warfare, sometimes a community was driven 
away by a hostile but more powerful neighbour. An example is 
that of the people of Gbi who have ,settled on certain portions 
of lands formerly occupied by the people of Likpe. There is 
no tradition of any open war between Gbi and Likpe. The 
tradition, however,. i s .that the Likpe people were driven away 
to their present places by the people of Gbi through pressure 
in the form of persistent raids on them. There were intermittent 
but effective attacks by the people of Gbi on the Likpe people. 
Rather than risk an open war against a superior force, the Likpe 
people decided to migrate further east to avoid hostilities.
Thus it has been suggested that an area, in Gbi now normally known 
as "Bla-to" was originally "Bala-to" which means the "Bala moun­
tain", Bala being one of the divisions of Likpe, Cooking 
utensils and other relics evidencing a previous human occupation, 
all attributable to the people of Likpe, were also shown to me 
in the Todzi farming area of Gbi-Kpeme in Gbi near the present 
boundary with Likpe.
The more peaceful instance was when a community came upon 
occupied tracts of land. Such a pacific mode of acquisition was 
no more than the appropriation of a res nullius. The tradition 
is that most of' the Ewe communities settled in their present 
abodes in this way. Even though the Gbi people, for instance, 
had to drive away the Likpe, yet Gbi had found the bulk of the 
lands, including the vital river Dayi, unoccupied. It was,
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therefore, out of expansionist ambitions that surrounding com­
munities with potentially competing claims were driven off in 
hostile operations.
Communities sometimes settled on land ceded to them by way 
of express grant, or tacit consent, of other friendly communities 
■in prior occupation, ■ This was normally the case'where a community 
already settled in the locality considered that it could not 
occupy and did not need all the contiguous lands. A community 
still in transit was thus allowed to settle in such lands as 
friendly neighbours. A ca.se in point is the Poki-Awudome-Abutia 
area lands, particularly interesting because of the conflicting 
claims of prior settlement. The people of Awudome claim that 
they had arrived there first and had driven away the Akpafu and 
Lolobi communities after defeating them in a war, but later 
allowed the Peki people to settle on parts of the lands as a 
manifestation of a friendly disposition. The contrary contention 
of Peki is that the people of Peki and Abutia had settled in the 
area long before the arrival of the Awudome people whom they 
permitted to settle "between them", for v/hich reason the Awudome 
people got their present name v/hich is a corruption of Wo dome or 
"between them". This is one of the arguments of Peki in claiming 
suzerainty over Awudome, which Awudome vehemently rejects. As to 
which of these conflicting stories should be believed, we must 
await a fuller historical research. The making of these claims 
and counterclaims in this and other areas is mentioned only as
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evidence to show that such permissive occupation, maturing into 
an absolute and indefeasible title, was an accepted feature of 
land acquisition in the early times among the Ewe.
If settlement was by conquest with a resulting confiscation 
of the lands of the vanquished, the territorial limits of the 
lands were those of the former occupants., ..That area then became 
the expanse of land that came under the territorial jurisdiction 
of the head chief or Fiaga of the victorious invading community. 
If it was a permissive occupation, that is, settlement on land 
ceded or granted by another friendly community, the boundaries 
would be generally known and the area so delimited was the area 
of authority of the new chiefdorn. The position, however, was 
different where the community settled on an unoccupied land or 
a res nulllus. In that case the land area Immediately In the 
effective occupation of the settling community formed the nucleus 
of the territory under the authority of the head chief or Fiaga. 
In the course of time, however, the subjects extended their 
areas of occupation by farming and hunting. As the subjects so 
extended the area, the territorial jurisdiction of the head chief 
was also extended pro tanto. Such extension became an Intermin­
able process in all directions until other communities were 
encountered, whereupon the respective boundaries were settled 
by mutual agreement or tacit understanding.
The position of the Fiaga or head chief has been mentioned, 
as regards the acquisition of land, with respect to only his
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jurisdictional authority. This is deliberate because it is 
fundamental to the understanding of the land law among the 
Northorn Ewe-speaking people of Ghana. The stool as such, 
represented by the chief, has only jurisdictional authority 
over the land. The jurisdiction is both political, legislative 
and judicial. It means in the political .sense that the ter­
ritory over which he has jurisdiction is the area that may'be 
designated as a chiefdom. In that sense also it means that all 
inhabitants, including subordinate chiefs, on those lands owe 
him political allegiance and are entitled to his protection. In 
the legal and judicial sense it means that it is the land area 
over which the laws and orders promulgated by the chief have 
effect and validity. If any transgressions are committed on any 
part of these lands, they are punishable only by or under the 
authority of the head chief exercising jurisdiction over the 
area. The authority of the Fiaga, however, is exercised in each 
of the divisions of the chiefdom by the respective divisional 
chiefs or fiawo,
The jurisdictional authority of the stool entails no 
element of a proprietary interest in the lands under its authority. 
The paramount interest in the lands is held by the families in 
occupation. Whether the lands were acquired through conquest 
or by settlement on unoccupied lands, or even through gift, the 
stool did not acquire any proprietary rights or interests in 
them. Therefore, it was not the pattern among the Northern Ewe
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of Ghana that the head chief or the head stool held the paramount 
interest in all the lands; nor was it the case that "the lands 
so acquired or settled upon would be apportioned among those 
worthy of them in order of merit",'1' by the chief. The families 
did not hold the interests in their lands of the stool as the 
English lords did of William the Conqueror after the Norman 
Conquest of 1066. Nor did they hold their lands "in virtue of 
/their7 allegiance to the supreme lord of the tribe" as Da.nquah 
tells us of the Akan,
Once the land became available for settlement the Ewe 
families went into direct occupation. Each family automatically 
acquired the absolute or paramount interest in such portions of 
the land as it could reduce into^its effective occupation. Such 
family title was absolute and paramount in itself, it was not 
derivative from the stool and was a proprietary title of the 
family in its own right. The areas of land farmed by the members 
of a family became family lands; similarly, the areas exclusively 
retained by the members of a family for hunting animals became 
family lands. The most usual methods of acquiring family interest 
in unappropriated lands, therefore, were through farming and 
hunting. It should be explained, however, that the origin of the 
Ewe family lands was not by a right of succession in the family.
1. Cf. Casely Hayford, op. cit. . p. h-5.
2. Cf, J.B. Danquah, op.cit.. p.199.
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It was the accepted rule that individuals could not hold the 
paramount or absolute interest in land. Only the family as such 
had the capacity to hold such an interest. Therefore, any land 
acquired by a member of the family was acquired for the whole 
family and the family only. For this reason no boundary marks 
or trees were set or planted as between .the holdings of. two . . . 
members of the same family, for the totality of their joint 
acquisitions belonged not to themselves alone but to"their 
family. The phenomenon of only the family holding the absolute 
interest in land may also be understood against the background 
of the fact that in many cases the joint endeavours of several 
or many members of the family were necessary for clearing and 
penetrating into the thick tropical forests.
Y/ithin the territorial limits of the chiefdom a family could 
continue extending its lands until it met another family. This 
became the boundary between different families within the same 
chiefdom and was identified with suitable boundary marks, It is 
said that hunters were very good at grabbing lands by identifying 
the areas roamed by them with stones, trees, mounds with grass 
planted on them, and natural physical features. Families with 
enterprising hunters, therefore, had more lands and consequently 
hunters were highly esteemed.. That is why -Westermann records- • 
the following Information on the Gbi (Hohoe) dynasty:
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As in those days a hunter was more highly esteemed .-than 
a chief, Kadrake v/as given the cognomen fBig Hunter1 and' 
v/as left in possession of the hunting drum. The chief*s 
stool he left to his younger brother, Adorn. The office 
of a chief was little respected in those days, and the 
chiefs kept their stools somewhere in or behind the 
house, 1
For this reason, today in Northern Eweland, many of the stool 
families have■less la.nds tha/n the other' families whose ancestors 
were hunters.
If the extension of family lands continued until it touched 
on a boundary with a family belonging to another chiefdom, the 
boundary so formed became the inter-state boundary between the 
respective chiefdoms. The maintenance of that boundary, there­
fore, became also a matter of interest to the head chiefs con- 
- cerned because it automatically defined the territorial limits 
of their respective jurisdictions.
The acquisition of land through purchase by the whole 
community has been suggested as a mode of land acquisition in 
. the early,times. There,is, however, no evidence of such 
acquisition of land by an Ewe chiefdom through purchase from 
another chiefdom. No instance of this could be found anywhere 
in Northern Eweland, though it is known that individual families 
did purchase lands. It is suggested, therefore, that this 
method of land acquisition was not employed by the Ewe, although 
there later developed in many areas the notion of alienation of 
land by families.
T~, D. Y/estermann. Afrikaner Er~zahlen Ihr Leben. Essen. 19h2, 
pp.299-260. Freely translated from the German.
The same may be said of gifts of lands to communities.
There is not enough evidence of any Ewe chiefdom having made a 
gift of its lands to another chiefdom, if we understand a gift 
in the sense of transferring the rights and title previously 
held in property. As the stool as such did not have any prop- 
ritary interest in the-lands, it could not make a gift of any 
portion of them to another stool; for the lands were family 
lands, though subject to the jurisdiction of the stool. The 
common law principle of nemo dat quod non habot was also a 
principle of Ewe law. The apparent instances of gifts were 
no more than permitting a new chiefdom to settle on unapprop­
riated contiguous lands which would otherwise be appropriated- 
in the course of time by the families in the community granting 
such a permission, This was not strictly a gift. But even 
such permissive occupation, though now ripened into absolute 
title, is strenuously denied by every community, sometimes only 
out of national pride. We have, for instance, the conflicting 
claims of Peki and Awudome as to which community permitted the 
other to settle on their present lands. The only admitted cases 
of such gifts are the alleged gifts of the Afram plains lands 
to communities like Aveme and V/usuta by the Kumawu of Ashanti, 
These lands, therefore, stand in a different'category, even as 
regards the rest of the Aveme and V/usuta lands. In any case the 
alleged gifts are challenged by the Kwahu of the Eastern Region 
of Ghana who deny that they were ever made.
Today the normal way of establishing inter-chiefclom boun­
daries is by proof that the paramount title to the disputed 
portion of land is held by a family belonging to the particular 
chiefdom. Once it is proved that title to the disputed portion 
of land is held by a family of the chiefdom, not as an isolated 
parcel of land but as part of the general holdings of the families 
of the chiefdom, that constitutes a strong prima facie evidence 
of the physical extent of the territorial area of the chiefdom.
It is thus the extent of the territorial jurisdiction of the 
head chief or Fiaga.
This, however, was not always the case in ancient times.
In the early times the inter-chiefdorn boundaries were sometimes 
demarcated, as marking the points beyond which families could not 
extend their lands. At that stage of the demarcation, all the 
lands contained within the physical boundaries of the chiefdom 
need not have been occupied or appropriated by families. It was 
only a political boundary,and citizens might not have appropriated 
lands up to the inter-chiefdom boundary; but after settling the 
boundary the families farmed and acquired lands up to that point. 
Until appropriated, the land within the boundary was said to 
"belong" to the chief or en.ye fia to. The meaning of en.ye fia to 
in Ewe, however, was not that It was stool land; for the stool 
did not have any proprietary interest in such lands. Its true 
import was that it was unappropriated land within -the territorial 
boundary of the stool and could thus be appropriated by families
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owing allegiance to the stool. In some areas it was suggested 
that the boundary was settled on an arbitrary principle, the 
more powerful chiefdom pushing its boundary as far as it could 
conscionably do. Others suggested that the boundary v/as settled 
only after a period of settlement in the locality, so that the 
boundary, v/as fixed at the spot up to -which, by mutual tacit 
agreement, each community stopped when clearing the public foot­
path or road connecting the tv/o chiefdoms. This point v/as known 
as motasefe. that is, "where the clearing of the footpath 
stops". The boundary itself was known as knefe or "where we 
meet". In Peki, however, it was stated that the motasefe v/as 
not necessarily the kpefe or intcr-chiefdorn boundary; for any 
suitable spot could be agreed as the boundary or kpefe. The 
proof of inter-chiefdom boundaries, therefore, is today, a matter 
of evidence, of which the fact of long possession by subjects is 
almost conclusive.
The nature of land acquisition among the Ewe makes possible 
the existence of vacant lands to which the paramount title does 
not vest in any individual or family. There are, however, no 
lands over which one chief or another does not exercise juris­
dictional authority. Thus, in Eweland, the dictum that there is 
no land without an "owner" is inapplicable unless by that we 
mean that there is no land which is not under the jurisdiction 
of a chief. As the determination of the territorial boundaries 
of the chiefdoms did not imply any proprietary interest of the 
stools in the lands, there are at times pockets of lands which
are not beneficially "owned11 by any family or stool, Informants 
were reluctant to specify such lands because of possible liti­
gation. Such "ownerless" parcels of land as were mentioned have, 
therefore, either been flooded or have been declared "forest 
reserves" by the central government. One example is the TKodzofe 
lands" of Gbi-Kpeme in Gbi, on the boundary between Gbi and Likpe. 
These lands were known as Gbi lands, inasmuch as they were within 
the boundaries of Ghi, but title to them was vested in nobody 
until 1929 when Togbe Adzirna, then chief of Gbi-Kpeme, urged 
the subjects of Gbi-Kpeme to go into occupation. Every subject 
acquired the absolute title to as much land as he could clear, 
because by that time there had occurred a change in the law which 
permitted the individual to personally hold and acquire the 
absolute interest in land. These lands now consist mainly of 
individual cocoa farms and neither the Gbi-Kpeme stool nor the 
head stool has any proprietary interest in them. Thus the dis­
tinguishing feature of these lands and the evidence of their ; 
recent occupation is that they are not ancestral family lands. 
Another example from Gbi is the "Abudorne lands", near the 
boundary between Gbi and Alavanyo. Although the Abudome lands 
were admittedly Gbi lands, no family, individual person or 
stool held the absolute interest in them in Gbi, It was only 
fairly recently that the lands were divided among the then seven 
divisions of Gbi, each division thereafter sharing it among its
component sub-divisions. Those individuals who so desired 
made farms there, on the portions of land allotted to their 
divisions and sub-divisions; but the Abudome lands have now 
been declared a "forest reserve" in which farming activity ha 
been prohibited by statute. In Aveme-Dra in Aveme, the land 
known as "Dra-to" is part of the division.of Aveme-Dra; but 
the absolute title to it is not vested in any family, nor is 
it vested in the chief or stool as stool land. This "owner­
less" land, however, has also now been declared a "forest 
reserve" in which farming is no longer permitted. In Kpando, 
the lands lying between Kpando and the Kwahu of the Eastern 
Degion of Ghana and known as "Kpatoe lands" belong to no 
family and are not stool property. These lands which lie 
beyond the Volta Diver are nevertheless under the jurisdic­
tion of the Eiaga of Kpando, albeit "ownerless" in the 
proprietary sense. The Kpatoe lands have now been flooded 
by the rising waters of the Volta Dam as a result of the 
Volta Diver Project, From these examples we may suggest 
that unowned lands exist, though such lands are under the 
jurisdictional authority of the chiefs within whose territ­
orial boundaries they lie. ...........
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The Paramount Interest in Land
We may preface this discussion with the oft-quoted words 
of Rayner, C.J., that
The notion of individual ownership is quite foreign 
to native ideas* Land belongs to the community, the 
village or. the family, never to the individual. 1
In general this also expresses the traditional view of Ewe land 
law. The acquisition or holding of the paramount or absolute 
interest in land by an individual was unknown to the Northern 
Ewe. The paramount or absolute interest in land could be vested 
only in the families or dzotinuwo as legal entities. The holder 
of the paramount title in land is known as anyigbato or !lland 
owner”. Although the Ewe stools have always enjoyed jurisdic­
tional authority, apart from the specific cases of small stool 
lands, the paramount or absolute title to lands has been vested 
in the several families and not in the stools. Hence the stool 
or the chief is not necessarily the anyigbato.
The idea has not been generally accepted that in some 
parts of Ghana, in any case among the Northern Ewe of Ghana, 
absolute or paramount title to lands is vested in the families. 
Perhaps because the dictum of Rayner, C.J., first received 
application in the Ghana courts in cases involving the Akan and
1. Rayner, C.J., in a Report on West African Land Tenure.
Quoted with approval by Lord Haldane in Amodu Tijani v. Secretary 
to the Government Southern Nigeria (1921) 2 A.C.399,
Ga, it has been assumed that the absolute title to land can 
only be vested in the stool which symbolises the sovereignty 
of the entire political community. It seems to have been for­
gotten that Rayner did not say that land belonged only to the
community but that it could also belong to the family. Thus 
Ollennu, in what he describes as the basic principles of Ghana 
land law, apart from tenancies, licences and pledges which are 
essentially forms of alienation, states three types of title 
to land.'*' They are the paramount or absolute title, the sub- 
paramount title, and the determinable or usufructuary title, 
all of which are constructed around the hierarchy of political
authority in the traditional state.
The nature of titles to land, as given by Ollennu, though 
purporting to be a generalisation for all Ghana, is a typical 
Akan pattern. In Ollennu*s classification the paramount title, 
also known as the absolute title or the allodial title, is vested 
in the head stool. He explains that, as the stool is the em­
bodiment of the collective authority of all the members of the 
community, the stool holds the paramount or absolute title to 
all the lands of the village, town or tribe. He thus equates 
political authority with proprietary interest in land. In 
conformity with this scheme of land titles, Ollennu also
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana. 
1962, p.k.
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identifies a lesser title which he describes as the sub- 
paramount title. The sub-paramount title, according to him, 
resides in the stool immediately subordinate to the head stool 
in political importance. The quantum of interest in land is 
thus commensurate with political authority. No doubt it is such 
identification of land titles in terms of political authority 
that misled writers like Rattray to describe the Ashanti land 
tenure in terms of feudalism, a view which has now been rejected 
by anthropologists and lawyers alike. Nevertheless it seems to 
be a generally accepted view that among the Akan, notably the 
Ashanti, paramount title to all the lands is vested in the head 
chief,^ of whom the lesser chiefs in turn hold lesser titles in 
a manner corresponding to their positions in the hierarchy of 
political authority. If we are to press the scheme to its 
logical interpretation, it means that these must be still lesser 
titles than even the sub-paramount title before we come to the 
family and the individual. If we take a normal Ewe chiefdom, 
the acceptance of such a scheme of land titles would mean that 
the absolute or paramount title would be vested in the Fiaga or 
head chief, while the divisional chief or fia logically would 
have the sub-paramount title. The sub-divisional chief or 
saamefia, then, must have something like a 11 sub-sub-paramount11
1. Though this is not true of all Akan. This contention was, 
for instance, rejected in the case of Akim Abuakwa: Asamankese
Arbitration Award. (1926-29) D.Ct. 220.
title, with a further reduplication of the prefix f,subl! for as 
far as there are still lesser chiefs before we come to the 
families.
In Ollennufs classification, it is only after the titles of 
the stools that we may come to the ndeterminable estate11 or the 
"possessory” or "usufructuary" titles of the family.^ There 
seems to be some confusion in the learned Judge*s description 
of this type of "ownership". He says that "the determinable or 
usufructuary title is the right of the individual subject of the 
stool or member of the family to the enjoyment" of the land, the 
paramount title to which is held by the head stool. Before that 
he had also said of the "determinable" or "usufructuary" title 
that "it is also one which a family usually holds in general 
stool, skin or communal land". While trying to distinguish them 
the learned Judge nevertheless seems to treat the individual*s 
interest and that of the family as the same thing. Conceptually, 
however, one must be higher than the other.
There is, however, ample support for Ollennu*s view when we 
consider land holding among such communities as the Ashanti, some 
areas of Akim Abuakwa and the Ga, Rattray had recorded a 
similar view of Ashanti lands. And of the Akan generally 
Danquah has said:
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana,
1962, pp. if-11.
The stool occupier is in common parlance, or by courtesy, 
referred to as the owner of the land; but he is so only 
in so far as he occupies the Stool and represents the 
sovereignty of the people, giving due respect to the 
sacredness of the Stool. If we were pressed for an an­
swer to the fundamental question as to ultimate owner­
ship of stool property, we should readily say the thing 
called 'Stool1, whose supremacy is acknowledged by mem­
bers of the family, section of the tribe or subjects of 
the State, and to which they are bound by their own 
traditions and laws to serve and respect, is the ultimate 
and absolute owner. 1
The view of Danquah is based on the necessary assumption that the
particular lands are stool property. This is understandable
because Danquah was writing on the Akan, particularly the Akim
Abuakwa, whose lands are mainly stool lands. This view, however,
was rejected as regards the Asamenkese lands in Akim Abuakwa.^
Even as regards the Akan communities, there is no unanimity
that all land is stool land. That is why at the beginning of
the century Deane, C.J., was able to say that "The presumption
with regard to land in this country is that it is family land".^
More significant is what Casely Hayford has said about title to
land among the Fanti, an Akan community. Said Casely Hayford:
The King, qua King, does not own all the lands of the 
state. The limits of his proprietary rights are strictly 
defined.
There are first of all lands which are the ancestral 
property of the King. These he can deal with as he 
pleases, but with the sanction of the members of his 
family.
Secondly, there are lands attached to the stool 
which the King can deal with only with the consent 
of the councillors.
1. J.B. Danquah, op,cit.. p.200,
2. Asamankese Arbitration Award. (1926-29) D.Ct. 220.
3. United Products v. Afari. (T929-1931) D.Ct. 12.
Thirdly, there are the general lands of the state 
over which the King exercises paramountcy. It is a 
sort of sovereign oversight which does not carry with 
it the ownership of any particular land. It is not 
even ownership in a general way in respect of which, 
per se, the King can have a locus standi in a court 
of law. 1
The Paramount Chief or Omanhene was known in Casely Hayford*s 
days as "King",
Casely Hayford*s account is meant to indicate that at 
least among the Fanti it is not the lav/ that all lands belong 
to the Stool, of whom the families hold their allocations. 
Casely Hayford, however, seems to have been ignored completely 
in favour of Sarbah and authorities like Ollennu have assumed 
that all lands in Ghana are stool lands.
Apart from Ollennu, the other writer on this point is 
Bentsi-Enchill; for others have dealt with only specified 
communities. There is little doubt that Bentsi-Enchill con­
ducted a more serious study than Ollennu into the question of 
paramount titles to lands in Ghana. He, like Ollennu, recog­
nises that among many communities, notably among the Akan and 
the Ga, the paramount title to land is vested in the stools. 
However, while Ollennu treats the Akan and Ga experience as 
applicable to all Ghana, Bentsi-Enchill rightly points out 
that differences exist in other parts of the country. After 
considering the stool interest in land among the Akim Abuakwa
1. Casely Hayford, op.cit.. pp.£^ -1*5.
and the Ashanti, Bentsi-Enchill states that:
In most other states of Ghana, there is no basic notion 
of what has been called 1 state ownership1 above: the 
principal owners of land - absolute or allodial owners 
thereof - are clans or extended families, or village 
communities ... To be sure, these clans, or extended 
families, or village communities, are members of a 
particular state, owe allegiance to its governing 
authority of the state and are subject to the juris­
diction, And jurisdiction is exercised in ways which 
have profound effects on title ... As a result, the 
distinction between the obligations of allegiance and 
proprietary rights can become blurred. Nevertheless 
the titles of such families to their land are regarded 
as independent and allodial. 1
The same view has also been expressed by Pogucki, formerly of
the Lands Department of Ghana, who after examining stool
interests in land in other parts of Ghana, said:
The fact that certain principles or notions are known 
need not necessarily mean that they must be applicable 
in the whole of the country. For instance the notion 
of stool lands appears to be confined mainly to areas 
inhabited by peoples belonging to the Akan group; 
there is no stool-land in the Northern Region nor e.g., 
among the Ewe and Adangbe*,,, 2
It is respectfully submitted that both Bentsi-Enchill and 
Pogucki are right. Among the Northern Ewe-speaking people of 
Ghana the rule is that the paramount or absolute title to land 
is vested in the families. The Ewe family does not hold its 
interest in land from any stool. The family's original title 
to its lands is paramount or absolute in its own right, which
1. K. Bentsi-Enchill, Ghana Land Law. Sweet & Maxwell, London,
196£f, p.16.
2. R.J.H. Pogucki, Land Tenure in Ghana. Lands Department, 
Accra, 1957, Vol. 6, Preface, p.iii.
is unaffected by the political sovereignty of the stool. The 
Ewe stool, while clothed with jurisdictional authority over the 
whole territory, has no proprietary rights or interests in the 
lands generally. As far as can be ascertained, this rule admits 
of no exception among the Northern Ewe.
This scheme of land titles among the Ewe has its own 
implications. It means first and foremost that in this part of 
Eweland, the concept of land holding is divorced from the notion 
of political allegiance to the stool. The authority of the 
chief is not all pervasive as among other communities. In 
England, after the Norman Conquest, William the Conqueror de­
clared all the lands of the realm to be vested in the Crown, so 
that all lands were thereafter held either mediately or immediately 
of the Crown. For that reason the theory of English land law is 
that the highest interest which an individual or body of persons 
can have in land is the fee simple absolute. Only the English 
Crown possesses the allodial title. This indeed is the basis 
of the English law doctrines of tenures and estates, the tenure 
indicating the quantum of interest held in the land while the 
estate explains the duration of the interest so granted. Strictly 
therefore, it is somewhat misleading to speak of "land tenure" 
among the Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana. There is no 
question of a "tenure" because the family does not hold its land 
in tenure from the holder of any superior title. The family's 
title to its lands is absolute in its own right, not by virtue 
of but in spite of the political allegiance to the stool. The
title of the family is in perpetuity as an invariable incident 
of Ewe law of land acquisition and, therefore, the concept of 
a tenure is strictly inapplicable. Similarly, the quantum of 
interest vested in the family in Eweland is the highest known 
to the law, the paramount title. It is the highest interest and 
not a lesser carved out of any higher one. While in legal theory 
it is similar to the theoretical allodial title of the English 
Crown in the lands of England, the paramount title of the Ewe 
family is a real one expressed in the power of proprietary con­
trol and the right of physical occupation or user by members of 
the family or persons claiming through the family. Therefore, 
in the same sense that we cannot speak of the Crown's tenure of 
English lands because its interest is unlimited in both duration 
and quantum, we cannot correctly speak of land tenure as regards 
the paramount titles of families to their lands among the 
Northern Ewe, because the interest of each family is unlimited 
in point of time and is without limit in its quantum. Hence, 
as regards family titles to land, we would prefer expressions 
like "land titles" and "land holding" rather than "land tenure". 
Land tenure can perhaps only properly refer to titles created 
in individual strangers who have taken lands from families in 
a transaction not transferring the paramount title, such as a 
lease of different kinds. However, it is also true that even in 
England the expression "land tenure" has undergone a change from 
its original meaning and today it more properly refers to the
nature of interests in land. With this meaning it can equally 
be applied to interests in land under Ewe law. This analysis 
of the original meaning of the expression has, therefore, been 
attempted primarily in order to emphasise the paramount nature 
of family titles to Ewe family lands.
The Ewe scheme of land titles defies being contained within 
the classification of the types of interests in land that Ollennu 
has suggested. The classification suggested by Ollennu places 
the paramount titles to the lands in the head stool, with the 
lesser stools possessing the sub-paramount title. The family's 
title, he, therefore, describes as the "determinable estate" or 
"possessory" or "usufructuary" title. The learned Judge, with 
the greatest respect, cannot be right if his classification is 
to be applied throughout the country, because political authority 
in the traditional Ewe society has no corresponding quantum of 
proprietary interests in the lands under the jurisdiction of 
the stool. Accordingly the head stool in Eweland has no 
derivative paramount title, and a fortiori the sub-stools have 
no sub-paramount title, in the lands. As for Ollennu's des­
cription of the family's title to its lands as a "determinable 
estate", nothing could be further from the truth when it is 
applied to the Northern Ewe. As already explained, we cannot 
strictly describe the title to lands held by the Ewe family in 
terms of the English law doctrine of estates because the Ewe
family's interest in land is of unlimited quantum. More 
important, the interest of the Ewe family in its lands is any­
thing hut "determinable11. It is not "determinable" because the 
title is absolute and paramount and exists in perpetuity unless 
alienated; for it is not an interest which is subject to ter­
mination by the holder of any superior title. Although the Ewe 
family is normally in possession of its lands through the members 
of the family, the interest of the family is not merely a 
"possessory title" because its possession is only an incident 
of the paramount title. To describe it as a "usufructuary title" 
is equally wrong. The "usufruct", even in Roman law from which 
the concept is borrowed, only implies a right of user and enjoy­
ment of the fruits of the property belonging to another person 
without thereby causing a destruction of that property or sub­
stantially altering its nature. Since, as we suggest, the Ewe 
family has a paramount title in its own right, its title cannot 
be described as usufructuary. And, because of the absolute 
nature of the family title, it is not a basis of any derivative 
title in the stool.
Once it is appreciated that, unlike the Ashanti and other 
Akan communities, government in the traditional Ewe society is 
not lirloed with interests in land, the position of the stools 
as regards lands will become clearer. The jurisdiction of the 
Ewe head chief as paramount ruler is acknowledged. This authority 
he norirally exercises through lesser chiefs. However, neither the
head chief nor any sub-chief under him has any proprietary 
interest in the lands. Where a stool, whether a head stool or 
a sub-stool, has title to any lands it holds it directly and 
its title is not derivative from a higher or a lower stool or 
from any family. In such cases of a stool holding an interest 
in land, which are indeed rare and hardly significant, the title 
of the Ewe stool is as paramount or absolute as that vested in 
each family in its own lands and no more. No stool has any 
proprietary interest in any Qf the lands, title to which is 
vested in families which serve it, for the family titles are 
paramount in themselves. The chiefs accept this as the correct 
legal and practical position and, in the interviews with them, 
no Fiaga or head chief, indeed no chief, in the Northern Ewe 
area pretended to lay claim in the proprietary sense to title 
to the family lands under his jurisdiction. Similarly all the 
heads of families were unanimous in emphasising that absolute 
title to their lands was vested in their families in their own 
right without any stool interest therein. This, it is respect­
fully submitted, is the law of the Northern Ewe-speaking people 
of Ghana,
What, then, is the nature of the paramount title to land in 
Ewe law? The answer partly depends on whether the paramount 
title is vested in a family, a stool or an individual person; 
but in all cases the issues raised are those of benefit auid
control. As the normal case is that the paramount title to 
land is held by a family, we may first consider the nature of 
the paramount title held by a family. The nature of the bene­
ficial interest of the family is limited because the family is 
but an artificial person and also because the notion of family 
property other than land is little developed among the Ewe.
Thus the family, as the holder of the paramount title, has the 
right to occupy any part of its own lands, such as for the 
cultivation of a family farm or the building of a family housej 
but this type of beneficial user is rare among the Northern Ewe 
because the creation of family property as such is hardly ever 
undertaken. Furthermore, the right of the family to appropriate 
or develop part of its lands can only be exercised over such 
part of its lands as are unoccupied by members of the family.
For the interest of the individual members of the family is a 
qualification on the paramount title of the family, such that a 
member of the family occupying family land by an inherent right 
of occupation cannot be dispossessed by the family. The benefit 
to the family (because it is responsible for the welfare of its 
members), is, therefore, that only members -of the family have 
an inherent right of occupation and use of family land. Occu­
pation of the family land by the members of the family is 
consequently regarded as occupation by the family. As there
r
are today scarcely any family lands unoccupied by members of 
the family, we may say that the benefit to the family, derived 
from its paramount title to land, is that it provides for members
of the family the lands which they may occupy and use as
individuals. Apart from these the other beneficial interest
of the family is that any naturally growing trees, like odum and
mahogany, and naturally growing palm trees belong to the family.
Thus only the family, through the head of family, may sell such
timber. Similarly only the head of family may on behalf of the
family fell or sell palm trees growing naturally on the family
land or permit such felling or selling. Minerals and treasure
#
trove discovered in or on the family land, as well as the soil 
and sub-soil and any stones, pebbles or objects in or on the 
soil belong beneficially to the family, and only the family may 
sell or otherwise dispose of any interest in them or consent to 
their exploitation.
The paramount title of the family in its land also implies 
the power of control. Control here is of two types: one over
members of the family and the other over non-members. As regards 
non-members of the family the power of control means that the 
family can exclude from the land all those who are not its 
members, while also reserving the right to permit any such stran­
gers the use of its lands on such terms as it may determine.
The power of control over members of the family in the use of 
family land is very general and supervisory. The family cannot 
deny a member the general right to use family land, nor can it 
terminate the occupation of a member already in occupation of a 
portion of the family land. The right and function of the family
by way of control, therefore, is to determine the competing 
claims of its individual members to the use of available por­
tions of family land. This is one of the reasons why the per­
mission of the head of the family must be obtained before going 
into occupation of an unoccupied family land. For, although 
the general right to occupy land cannot be denied and although 
individuals are not rationed in their use of family land, the 
permission to occupy a specific portion may be withheld if the 
family wishes to utilise the site for some purpose or if another 
person has already been permitted to go into occupation, and a 
limit may be imposed on the size of individual occupation or 
cultivation if the needs of other members of the family so 
require. Finally, the power of control means that only the 
family can alienate title to the land. This is important 
because in Ewe law the sale or outright gift of land has the 
effect of conveying only the paramount title and an individual 
in occupation of family land cannot alienate his own inherent 
interest to a stranger nor alienate his family's paramount title.
The paramount title of the stool in stool lands is similar 
to that of the family in family lands, both the stool and the 
family being corporate personalities of the indigenous law. Like 
the family the stool is entitled to any trees, including palm 
trees, growing naturally on the land and also to any minerals 
or treasure trove found in or on the stool land. Similarly the 
stool has the absolute interest in the soil and sub-soil and in
the stones, pebbles and other objects in it. The contrast with 
the family land, however, is that in actual use and control all 
the subjects of the stool as well as strangers are excluded from 
the stool land, unless expressly permitted by the stool to occupy 
or use it for a definite time. It is the exclusive reservation 
to the stool that marks out the Ewe-type stool land from the 
general lands. Hence stool land can be used only for the pur­
poses of the stool or for the benefit of the stool. Once title 
thereto is transferred to an individual or a family, it ceases 
to be stool land. It follows that only the stool can alienate 
the paramount title to the stool land or grant any lesser 
interests therein.
The individual could not in the past acquire the paramount 
title to land; but this is possible today. An individual who 
acquires the paramount title to land from a stool or a family 
acquires all the concomitant rights of benefit and control. He 
may exclude everybody else from the land. Unlike an artificial 
person such as the stool and the family, an individual person 
holding the paramount title to land may go into personal occu­
pation and use the property for any purpose permitted by law.
The individual title holder is entitled to all the trees, 
minerals, stones, pebbles and any other objects in or under the
rtft.
soil, as well as the soil and sub-soil. He also has the right 
and power of alienation.
Land Boundaries
Boundaries are an absolute necessity in defining interests 
in land; for without boundaries it is idle to speak of title to 
land. Boundaries are perhaps an even more crucial issue when, as 
in the case of the Northern Ewe of Ghana, we are dealing with 
thick tropical forests which are hardly penetrable until con­
siderable time and effort have been expended in cutting paths 
through. Added to this are the facts that one has to deal with 
an illiterate population among whom geometrical surveying was 
unknown, cadastral plans had never been heard of and any talk 
of the registration of land titles was meaningless. In spite of 
these handicaps, the ingenuity of the forefathers had devised 
various means for the identification of boundaries marking out 
the portions of land held by the families.
It seems that in the very early times all kinds of natural 
physical features served as identification marks for land boun­
daries. In the event of inability to find a suitable land mark, 
concessions were made so that, even with the loss of some land 
on one side, the boundary might coincide with some unchangeable 
natural features such as a river-bed or a hill. Gradually people 
began to resort to the intentional planting of trees as boundary 
marks, when it was discovered that certain trees were very 
difficult to destroy. Today a combination of all these is used 
in the identification of boundaries to family lands.
Natural physical features are still very important boundary 
marks today. The reason is that they are by nature very dif­
ficult, if not impossible, to falsify. Such physical features 
include hills and other conspicuous elevations of the ground, 
because it is impossible to obliterate the boundary by levelling 
a hill with the ground. Large ant-hills and mounds are, there­
fore, also often accepted as boundary marks. In the same way 
large rocks forming distinct marks on the land are constituted 
into boundary marks which cannot be changed. Similarly, any 
large depression in the earth may serve as a boundary because it 
forms a permanent mark on the land. A river-bed, though some­
times dry, is also a very usual form of boundary mark. Large 
rivers, streams and rivulets and ponds are always convenient 
boundary marks because of manfs inability to alter their course 
without detection. Presumably, if the river alters its course
imperceptibly over the years, it may result in an unnoticed
\
change in the boundary in favour of one party; but, if it is a 
sudden change, the former bed of the river, though now dry, will 
continue to be accepted as the land boundary. It does not 
appear that the Ewe law confers any special property in a boun­
dary river on any of the riparian land holders; such a river 
seems to be regarded as a "no man's land” separating the two 
properties.
Sometimes, and indeed quite as often as convenient, large 
trees naturally growing on the soil are regarded as boundary 
marks. The two types of trees usually serving this purpose are
the vuti and the lokoti. In the first place they are not very 
common trees and few of them are likely to be found close 
together. Secondly, they are large trees towering over other 
trees in both height and size. Furthermore, they are known to 
enjoy long life, being able to stand drought, strong v/inds and 
the elements. Neither of these trees can be uprooted without 
leaving permanent evidence of a large hole in the earth and 
the bulk of its trunk sprawling on the ground and destroying 
other trees and undergrowth with it. Thus by sheer size the 
vuti and lokoti are convenient bounclary marks. When a large 
tree is accepted as a boundary, it is usually disfigured in one 
form or another, either by removing some of its bark or making 
some deep cuts into the tree trunk, to identify it as represent­
ing a boundary mark. Occasionally trees like odum and mahogany 
are also used as boundary marks; but, because of their commercial 
value, other substitutes are preferred.
Since land boundaries cannot always be made to coincide 
with natural physical features" or fall in line with wild growing 
trees, special trees are planted as boundary marks whenever 
necessary. Such trees may be planted to supplement the natural 
features or wild trees, in order to cover all corners of the 
land. Often they are planted as the only boundary markers. The 
tree specially accepted throughout all Northern Eweland as
1
boundary markers is known as kppti. In some areas the same 
tree is known as anya or anyra. The name kpoti in the Ewe in 
fact means "boundary tree". The only other tree which may serve 
the same purpose is womia. also known as dameti or damti. The 
ancestral Ewe botanists had discovered that these two trees 
hardly ever die out and are exceptionally difficult to destroy. 
The kpoti and womia have the unusual property of germinating and 
growing almost wherever planted, even on very infertile soil and 
in the severest drought. They cannot be successfully destroyed 
either by cutting them off or burning them with fire; for the 
roots will germinate again. The only way to completely exter­
minate them is to dig deep into the earth to remove even the 
smallest pieces of roots; but this exercise would leave a huge 
hole in the soil and a mess around the spot even if carried out 
successfully and clandestinely. The kpoti and womia take over 
15 years to grow into sizeable trees. It is, therefore, imprac­
ticable to falsify the boundary by planting new ones merely in 
contemplation of a dispute. These are some of the reasons why 
these two trees are accepted throughout the Northern Ewe- 
speaking area as special trees to serve as boundary markers. 
Because of the convenience and usefulness of these trees, land 
boundaries are not marked by fences or paths among the Northern 
Ewe.
1. Dracaena arborea. The kpoti in Anlo dialect, however, 
is jatropha curcas.
Boundary marks are not, and must not, be fixed in secret 
or merely by agreement between the parties. The planting of 
boundary trees or kpoti dodo is always a public ceremony and 
the attendant publicity is an additional guarantee against 
future denial or repudiation of the boundary so fixed. In the 
first place, apart from the parties themselves, other families 
holding title to lands in the vicinity or near the intended 
boundary must be notified to attend. Such third parties must 
be present to protest if the projected boundary would compromise 
their own interests; and they are vital independent witnesses 
in any future dispute. Where it is a boundary between families 
in the same sub-division, the sub-divisional elder, assisted 
by all heads of families and the principal elders in the sub­
division, must preside over the ceremony. If the families are 
from different sub-divisions of the same division, a neutral 
sub-divisional elder is invited to preside. If different 
divisions are involved in the same chiefdom the divisional 
chiefs or their representatives jointly preside. If the 
opposing families are from different chiefdoms, in which case 
the boundary would be the inter-chiefdom boundary, the 
divisional chiefs concerned in each of the chiefdoms may 
preside; but, if they are unable to settle the boundary, the 
head chiefs would directly meet over it, they in turn inviting 
another head chief as an arbiter if they disagree. Relatives, 
including maternal relations, may be invited from anywhere as
independent witnesses. In addition any citizen who chooses may 
be present at the site. The boundaries must be agreed and 
marked in the presence of all these witnesses.
The actual ceremony of planting the boundary tree requires 
that representatives from each side must jointly physically 
place the boundary tree in its hole, thus dramatising the 
agreement of both sides that the spot is the boundary between 
them. In Gbi the account of the ceremony is that the holes 
for the planting of the boundary trees may be dug by any person 
from among those present. Then a representative from each side 
should jointly hold the plant at the same time and together 
place it in its hole. Both representatives should then add 
soil to the stem of the new tree at the. same time to fix it 
firmly in the soil, each party adding and pressing the soil 
from the opposite side of his boundary. In Gbi every one of 
the boundary trees should be jointly planted in this way. In 
Matse it is stated that the digging of the first hole should 
be a joint endeavour of the representatives of both sides taking 
their turn, and both representatives should jointly place the 
first tree in the soil and add the soil together at the same 
time as in Gbi. In Matse, however, once the first of the 
boundary trees is planted with such formality, the remaining 
trees may be planted by other people attending the ceremony.
In all places, before the commencement of planting the boundary 
trees, libation is poured and prayers are offered to the
ancestral spirits invoking their intervention to visit death 
upon any person who would falsify or deny the boundary as 
determined. For many people, therefore, maintenance of the 
true boundaries is enjoined by the fear of a supernatural 
sanction rather than the necessity to obey the laws of this 
world..........................................................
Parties to the determination of boundaries, that is members 
of the families concerned, are not allowed at the site with 
cutlasses, guns or other lethal weapons, lest they be tempted 
to settle any disagreement by recourse to physical violence. 
Cutlasses and guns are removed from all parties before going 
to the actual site and deposited elsewhere in the bush till 
after the inspection of the land. Only independent persons 
selected by the chief or the arbitrators hold cutlasses for 
cutting the paths as boundary lines through the bush. That is 
why the holes for planting the boundary trees in Gbi and other 
places are dug by non-members of the families concerned. In 
Matse it means that, agreement having been secured on the 
boundaries and peace ensured, implements may be borrowed from 
others present there for digging the first hole.
The procedure outlined above is the same whether it is a 
boundary dispute which is being settled or whether it is a 
sale of land. A boundary dispute requires somebody to preside 
and an award is made after inspecting the disputed land. In 
the case of the sale of land, however, no presiding official
is needed; but the fixing of the boundaries is done in exactly
the same way if it is a forest land in the bush. In the case
of town lands the modern expedient of concrete pillars buried
in the soil is the normal method today.
Even today the existence of boundary marks is very vital to
disputes as to title to land. One even gets the impression that
the former Native Courts had been placing too much importance on
the existence of boundary marks. Almost all land cases that
have been before the Native Courts in this area were decided
simply as questions of fact because one party was able to adduce
more convincing" y evidence of his boundary marks. Most of the
judgments, even where questions of law such as proof of title
had been raised, are framed along the following lines:
The statement as given by both Plaintiff and Defendant, 
although traditional they are, evidences of more witnesses 
on either side should have been heard in confirmation /^ sic7* 
However, this Tribunal is convinced to have the belief that 
the land in dispute is owned by the Plaintiff who during 
the inspection of the portion in dispute did satisfactorily 
show the boundaries at the four corners, i.e. north, south, 
east and west, together with the boundary definitions or 
marks, namely womia trees, whereas on the contrary Defendant 
could not do so than pointing out a set of womia trees only 
on the west despite his statement on record showing the 
various boundaries and their marks ... Judgment is therefore 
entered in favour of Plaintiff and against Defendant with 
costs ... 1
The insistence on boundary marks, however, is not unreasonable, 
especially as it is difficult to think of an alternative method
of proving title. Boundary marks, as we have explained, are
T l Tendeh v. Degbad.jor. Unreported, Native Tribunal of Kpando, 
January 1 9 kk t pp.321-322 of Civil Record Book.
305.
difficult to falsify. It is difficult to destroy the planted
trees and plant new ones in their stead, and physical features
are equally difficult to obliterate. Furthermore, falsification
is difficult because all the marks taken together must form a
coherent pattern.
At times litigants, like drowning men clutching at any .
straw, try to rely on other trees as boundary markers. Because
of the facility with which such allegations can be made in an
area with a thick tropical vegetation containing many large
trees, tribunals are usually insistent on the specially accepted
kinds of trees as boundary markers. In the case of X v , L.K.
1
Agbesi, a case from Gbi-Kledzo in Gbi, the defendant based
his claim of title to land on a boundary marked by a kind of
tree known as the an.yi tree. From the spelling the name anyi
may phonetically be confused with the acceptable anya tree, but
the two kinds of trees are very unlike each other. The anya or
kpoti is one of the recognised boundary trees. Although the
anyi is bigger, it does not serve as a boundary tree. The
Atando Native Court, sitting at Hohoe, therefore, rejected the
defendants contention and stated thus:
According to our Gbi native customs, 'anya1 trees are 
always planted as boundary marks between lands. Defendant's 
witness by name Togbe Deh, Kledzo Chief, in answer to 
Plaintiff's third question stated that it was said in that 
arbitration that this 'anyi' tree was planted in place of 
a certain ant-hill that was the boundary mark between the
1. X v. L.K. Agbesi. Unreported, Suit No, 35/A-9, Atando Native 
Court, Hohoe, 20th December, 1951, p.kOO of Civil Record Book. 
Name of Plaintiff illegible.
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three people. fAnyif trees are not planted in Gbi as 
boundary marks but fanyaf trees, hence Defendant and 
Paul Yawo went and planted !anyaf tree in place of this 
'anyi1 tree. Why should 'anya1 tree not be planted in 
place of this ant-hill but rather 'anyi* tree? We don't 
believe that this 'anyi' tree is really a boundary mark ...1
The insistence on special trees as boundary markers is just­
ifiable, otherwise boundaries would be unidentifiable in a land 
with many large trees.
One other rule which is vital to the determination of inter­
family boundaries is that the kpoti. otherwise known, as anya. and 
the womia are exclusively reserved for marking inter-family boun- 
aries only. The anya or womia may not be used to demarcate boun­
daries between members of the same family. Internal boundaries 
between members of the same family are usually not marked. If 
they should for any reason be marked, such internal boundaries are 
indicated with a row of pineapple plants. In this connection it 
may be explained that there were indigenous pineapples before the 
introduction of the imported species which are now more in common 
use. Either species of pineapple plants is acceptable. For in­
ternal boundaries also another tree known as trekpo may be used. 
This leaves kpoti or anya and womia 'or dameti for inter-family 
boundaries. Accordingly, in case of doubt, the anya or kpoti 
and womia or dameti will be accepted as marking an inter-family 
rather than an internal boundary. Similarly pineapple plants 
and trekpo trees indicate only internal boundaries between mem­
bers of the same family and cannot be held out as inter-family 
boundary marks.
1. X v. L.K. Agbesi. supra.
The Individual's Interest in Family Land
An important issue which has engaged the attention of 
Ghanaian lawyers is the nature of the interest of an individual 
in family land. Among the Northern Ewe of Ghana we may describe 
the individual's interest in family land as a dependent interest 
inherent in membership of the family which holds the paramount 
title to the land. It is a dependent interest because it is 
incapable of separate existence by itself, except as a burden 
on the family's paramount title. In the view of the old and 
orthodox Ewe law this was the highest interest which an individual 
person could hold in land; for only a family or a stool could 
hold the paramount title to land. Hence, although he has been 
criticised by several authorities and although he was not 
speaking of the Ewe specifically, we would agree with Rayner,
C.J., in his statement to the committee on West African Land 
Tenure that in the old Ewe law "the notion of individual owner­
ship /of land/ is quite foreign to native ideas".^ We would 
also adopt the words of Deane, C.J., that even today, among the
Northern Ewe, "the presumption with regard to land ... is that
2it is family land", though this presumption is now rebuttable.
The position has now changed and today the individual person 
has the legal capacity to acquire the paramount title to land
1. Quoted by Lord Haldane in Amodu Ti.jani v. Secretary to 
Government of Southern Nigeria. (1921) A.C. 399. kOl+.
United Products v. Afa.ri« (1919-1931) D.Ct. 12.
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in his own right. However, insofar as family lands are con­
cerned, the individual’s interest is still a dependent interest 
which is subordinate to the paramount title of his family.
The primary interest which an individual has in the land 
of his family is that he has an inherent right to occupy and 
use such land, provided that.it is not already occupied. Once 
in occupation of a particular portion of the family land, he 
can remain in such occupation for life because the interest is 
indeterminable and cannot be determined even by the family. On 
the other hand the individual cannot in Ewe law alienate his 
interest in family land to a person who is not a member of the 
family, whether inter vivos or by testamentary disposition. He 
may transfer his interest inter vivos to any other member of the 
family, and it is transmissible to his heirs upon his death; but 
he cannot transfer it by testamentary disposition to even members 
of the family.
Ollennu has criticised the statement by Rayner, C.J., that 
individual ’’ownership11 of land is a notion which is foreign to 
native ideas. Ollennu!s main ground for rejecting the statement 
as incorrect is apparently the modern practice of alienation of 
land by sale to individual purchasers. Apparently Ollennu was 
also thinking of only stool lands of the communities which have 
stool lands. In the Ewe context, the statements of Rayner and 
Deane, C. J\J., must both be understood to mean that the para­
mount title to land by virtue of original acquisition of land
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was always vested in the family. Among the Ewe, this is not 
because the individual, as Ollennu suggests, "is himself a 
property of the family" or because on his death intestate the 
land becomes family property. The traditional Ewe notion from 
the earliest times was that because land was a special type of 
property, the individual was incapable of holding the paramount * 
title to it. Therefore, any person who acquired unoccupied land 
in the olden days did so on the understanding that it was 
acquired for his family as a whole. This is the basis of the 
origin of family titles to lands, since it precluded individuals 
from laying personal claims to the paramount title to lands 
acquired by them. Changes have taken place and today the para­
mount interest in land can be purchased as individual private 
property like any other commodity; but it is still true that 
the roots of title to each of these lands must be traced to a 
family or a stool. In that sense, therefore, it is still the 
presumption, though rebuttable, that land among the Northern Ewe 
is family land.
In any case, considering family land even today, what is 
the interest of the individual in the land of his family?
Ollennufs answer is that the highest estate or title which a 
subject or individual person can hold in stool land or family 
land is the "determinable" or "usufructuary" estate.^* He,
1. N.A. Ollennu. Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana. 
1962, pp. 9-11, 5A--S0T
however, somewhat confuses the discussion here by his choice 
of terminology because he also describes the title of the 
family as a determinable estate and says that both are qualif­
ications on the "allodial11 title. The explanation seems to be 
that, in Ollennu1s view, the family acquires no interest in land 
except by intestate succession to the interest of one or other 
of its deceased members. And since the member, on a grant from 
the stool, had only a determinable estate, that interest is the 
highest estate to which the family itself can succeed. Hence, 
both the individual’s interest and that of the family are des­
cribed by Ollennu as determinable estates. The basis of 
Ollennu’s analysis is that the land held by the family and the 
individual must be stool land. An individual’s interest in 
Ollennu’s scheme is, however, of two kinds. In one case it is 
a right of occupation of unoccupied stool land by either express 
or implicit grant. He says of this type that it is both 
inheritable and alienable inter vivos or by testamentary dis- 
position; and it is to this that the family automatically 
succeeds on the intestacy of the grantee member. The other 
type of individual interest is that of a member of family in 
occupation of land already belonging to his family but also 
held of the stool as a determinable estate. Although either
of these interests is an inherent one resulting automatically
T. See, e.g. N.A. Ollennu. Ibid.. pp.29. 33; and K. Bentsi- 
Enchill, op.cit.. p.8l.
2. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana. 
1962, p.57.
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from the fact of birth and not by contract, Ollennu points out 
that its continued enjoyment subsists only so long as the sub­
ject acknowledges his loyalty to the stool or tribe.^ Hence 
the interest is described by him as Mdeterminablen, inasmuch 
as the stool can terminate it in the event of disloyalty by 
the individual and for other reasons. The definition of the 
individual's interest within the framework of stool lands, 
however, is inapplicable to a community like the Northern Ewe 
where Akan-type stool lands are non-existent.
Bentsi-Enchill, although drawing the distinction between 
families which hold the paramount title to their lands and those 
which hold "determinable estates11 from their stools, nevertheless 
falls into practically the same error of suggesting thatjthe 
individual may do as he pleases with the land occupied by him, 
including the right to alienate his interest in it. This, like 
Ollennu's view, is not correct because it does not take account 
of a study of the Northern Ewe. For among the Northern Ewe the 
individual in occupation cannot alienate his interest in family 
land to a stranger, though he may transfer it gratis to another 
member of the family.
The individual in Northern Eweland has an inherent right of 
occupation and user in respect of his family's lands. This is an 
incident flowing automatically as a matter of law from birth into 
his family. Thus far the position is the same among both the Akan
1. N.A. Ollennu, Ibid., p.55.
and the Ewe. The difference, hov/ever, is that, unlike the Akan, 
the right of,occupation and user among the Ewe is an indefeasible 
one which not even the stool or head of family can deny or ter­
minate. For the right is not one of permissive occupation but 
an inherent one created by law and subsisting for the individual's 
membership of the family. Since the Ewe have no means of ter­
minating the membership of a family by an individual, it means 
that the right, which is an inseparable incident of membership 
of the family, is itself incapable of being ended or denied.
The individual's right over his family land cannot, therefore, be 
described as a determinable estate because it cannot be terminated 
under any circumstances. The explanation by Ollennu that the 
individual's determinable estate can be terminated for disloyalty 
to the stool may be applicable to only stool lands occupied in 
areas where they exist. As stool.lands in this sense do not 
exist among the Northern Ewe, the individual's interest in this 
part of the country cannot be determined for disloyalty to the. 
stool because the stool has no proprietary interest in family 
lands. The penalty for disloyalty to one's stool is differently 
exacted v/ithout affecting land titles among the Ewe. It is, 
therefore, difficult to visualise a situation in which an 
individual's interest in occupation of his family land can, 
short of death, be terminated.
Technically the individual needs the permission of the 
head of the family in order to go into occupation of a vacant
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virgin land belonging to the family. Such permission is granted 
as a matter of course, unless there are compelling reasons for 
refusal, such as that permission had already been granted to 
another member in respect of the same spot, or that the family 
has some other plans for utilising the vacant land. Another 
reason why the permission of the head of the family must be 
sought is that the approval is a fairly reliable indication 
that the available spot falls within the boundaries of the 
family lands. The individual member of the family, like the 
subject of a stool on stool lands, as stated by Ollennu, J., 
as he then was, in Oblee v. Armah.^  is not rationed in his use 
of family land. The head of the family, however, has the 
supervisory power, though rarely applied in practice, to ensure 
that even the most avaricious has due regard for the needs of 
other members of the family.
The general principle of Ewe law is that an individual in 
occupation of family land cannot alienate his interest in that 
land, as distinguished from the fruits of his own labour, without 
the authorisation of the family. This, however, is not the 
generally accepted view of the law in Ghana. Ollennu, for 
instance, enunciates the contrary proposition when, writing of 
the individual's interest in land, he states that "an outstanding 
incident of the determinable estate is that it is inheritable 
and alienable, either by transfer inter vivos or by testamentary 
±~. Oblee v. Armah" (1958) 3 W.A.L.R.
disposition” .^  This had always been Ollennu*s view of the law
and, with his appointment to the Bench, it is being entrenched
and clothed with judicial authority. While still practising at
the Bar, Ollennu forcefully but unsuccessfully urged this view
2
on the Court in Golightly v. Ashrifi. popularly known as the
Kokomlemle Consolidated Cases. Ollennu's view was rejected by
Jackson, J., who stated that ,!by Native custom the owner of the
usufructuary title cannot transfer that title without the
previous consent and concurrence of the absolute owner”. An
appeal argued by Ollennu on behalf of the Atukpai family was
dismissed by the West African Court of Appeal and the judgment
of Jackson, J., was affirmed. Barely two years later, in 1957*
Mr. Justice Ollennu, now elevated to the High Court Bench, was
invited to the Court of Appeal in Thompson v. Mensah^ and he
did not let slip the opportunity to re-state the law. Delivering
the opinion of the Court of Appeal in Thompson v. Mensah, in
which the right of alienation of the individual's interest in
family land was in issue, Ollennu, J., stated that:
The submission of learned Counsel based upon the passage 
quoted from the judgment of Jackson, J., approved of by 
the West African Court of Appeal in the Kokomlemle Con­
solidated Cases 'that by native custom the owner of the 
usufructuary title cannot transfer that title without
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana. 
1962, p.57.
2. Golightly v. Ashrifi. (1955) l^ f W.A.C.A. 676.
3. Thompson v. Mensah. (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 2^0.
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the previous consent and concurrence of the absolute 
owner1 requires qualification. What the native custom 
guards against is alienation to the prejudice of the 
absolute owner, that is to say, alienation which deter­
mines the recognition of the title of the absolute 
owner and of the customary services due to him ... 1
In my opinion the correct statement of the native 
custom is that a usufructuary title can be transferred 
without the consent of the real owner provided the 
. transfer.carries with it an obligation upon the trans­
feree to recognise the title of the real owner and all 
the incidents of the subject’s right of occupation, 
including performance of customary services to the real 
owner. 2
With the greatest respect, Mr. Justice Ollennu was not merely 
adding a "qualification” to the dictum of Jackson, J. It was
3
a complete rejection of the proposition in Golightly v. Ashrifi.
In Golightly v, Ashrifi. the learned trial Judge had stated that
the owner of the usufructuary title cannot transfer that 
title without the previous consent and concurrence of 
the absolute owner.
The word "that” refers to "the usufructuary title” and nothing
more; and the alienation of the usufructuary title cannot be
"alienation which determines the recognition of the title of
the absolute owner” . It should be understood, therefore, that
in Thompson v. Mensah the Court of Appeal dissented from the
dictum of Jackson, J., in Golightly v. Ashrifi. which had been
approved by the then West African Court of Appeal. We are thus
presented with two conflicting dicta of two different courts,
1. Thompson v. Mensah. (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 2^0, 2i|8.
2. Ibid., at pp.2/+9-2$0.
3. XI955) l*f W.A.C.A. 676.
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none of which we can regard as superior to the other. It seems, 
however, that should the same issue arise again today, the view 
of Ollennu will prevail that the individual's dependent interest 
in family land is alienable without reference to the family 
which holds the paramount title to the land. Since Thompson v . 
Mensah,1 Ollennu, J., has also applied the principle of alien­
ability of the dependent title in Total Oil Products Ltd.. v.
2
Obeng by holding that the sale to a stranger of stool land 
by a subject in occupation was valid insofar as the paramount 
title of the head stool of Akim Abuakwa (through the Tafo stool) 
was not denied.
Whether we agree with him or not, Ollennu is consistent in 
his view of the law. In his opinion, stool land was first 
allocated to an individual by the stool, so that the family 
obtained title to it only through the individual and not vice 
versa. The individual's title, therefore, is fully alienable 
and the family has only a contingent interest which becomes 
vested on intestacy. As Ollennu was apparently concerned only 
with stool lands, his scheme of interests in land may fit in 
with the pattern of land holding among those communities, notably 
the Akan and Ga, who have stool lands. His proposition must, 
however, be confined to those communities which have stool lands.
1. Supra,
2. Total Oil Products v, Oberrg. (1962) 1 G.L.R. 228.
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The Ewe family lands not being stool lands, the Ewe law on 
succession to and alienation of the individual's interest in 
land under his occupation is different.
Among the Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana where 
there are no Akan-type stool lands, the individual cannot be 
said to be in occupation of.stool lands. All the lands are 
family lands except the small portions to which a stool has 
the paramount title, which portions are then not in occupation 
of individuals as holders of the dependent interest. An in­
dividual's dependent interest in family land is neither 
inheritable by nor alienable to a non-member of the family.
The land cannot be said to be inherited by the family because 
it is already family property, which is the only reason why 
the individual has the dependent interest in it at all. The 
individual's dependent interest cannot be inherited by any 
person of his choice because, as a matter of law, the interest 
automatically passes on to his heirs on his death. The deceased' 
children, who are the proper persons to succeed him, succeed to 
his interest in the land; but, the Ewe community being patri­
lineal, the children also have an inherent right of their own, 
of the same nature and extent, to use the family land. That a 
deceased's children farm or use the portion previously farmed 
by their father, therefore, is not only by a right of succes­
sion but also by virtue of an inherent right flowing from their 
own membership of the family which has the paramount interest in
the land. Succession to the dependent interest of the deceased 
farmer, therefore, is only an additional right which determines 
the order of priorities as between members of the family. Hence 
the right to succeed to the dependent interest in family lands 
is not enjoyable by a non-member of the family.
Just as an individual's dependent interest in family land 
is not inheritable outside the family, so also is it not 
alienable by him to any person who is not a member of the 
family. No individual member of the family may alienate his 
interest in any parcel of family land that he occupies. Not 
only does the individual lack testamentary capacity with 
respect thereto, but he also cannot transfer his interest 
inter vivos either by way of sale or gift or otherwise. For 
the same reason, the individual in occupation of family land 
has no interest in the land, as distinguished from the crops 
or other development thereon, which can be attached in satis­
faction of the individual's debt: Lokko v. Konklofi.1 Any
person purchasing such property on the levying of execution, 
such as by way of fi,fa, purchases nothing more than the crops 
or building only, because the paramount title to the land it­
self remains vested in the family. The only valid way of 
alienating title to family land is through the head of the 
family on the authority of the family. The Ewe customary law 
on this point is founded on the common law principle of nemo dat
1. Lokko v. Konklofi (190?) Een. 45 1, 2*5 2.
quod non habet. In Lokko v. Konklofi. Brandford Griffith,
C.J., recognised the difference between family property and 
stool property and said that stool property in the individual's 
occupation may be attached in execution, but not so with family 
property.
Although an individual cannot devise or make an alienation 
inter vivos of his dependent interest in the family land, he can 
make a testamentary disposition, or a transfer inter vivos, of 
the produce of that land. Similarly, the crops or the house, 
but not the land itself, may be attached in execution for his 
personal liabilities. In the olden days this meant merely that 
he could sell the farm, that is, the crops on the land, or the 
building, to any purchaser or make a gift thereof and he could 
will all or part of it to any beneficiary of his choice. No 
difficulties arose with respect to farm land because the produce 
in those days normally consisted of foodstuffs, which were 
mainly annual crops, and the land reverted to the family 
unencumbered when the crops were harvested. In such circum­
stances the legal transaction of merely selling the farm, that 
is, its produce, without affecting title to the land itself, 
was easily distinguishable both as a matter of law and of 
practice.
The law in this respect has now been thrown into some 
confusion by the introduction of permanent cash crops like 
cocoa and coffee. If the individual can alienate his interest
in the cassava farm cultivated by him, there is no theoretical 
legal basis on which he can be denied the right to alienate his 
interest in a farm planted by him with cocoa or coffee. However, 
the nature of cocoa, coffee and other permanent cash crops is 
such that, because they are permanently growing in the soil for 
many years, the sale of such a farm implies, at least in fact 
if not in law, a transfer to the purchaser of the right to the 
exclusive use of the land for an indefinite period. Its effect 
is practically the same as that of the sale of the land because 
the reversion in the family is only consequent upon the very 
unlikely contingency of the total destruction of the crops; 
but it is not a sale of the paramount title or the dependent 
interest in the land. Probably the indigenous law did not 
contemplate this sort of situation, so that no express rule 
had been formulated to cover it. The first effort of the family 
today is to prevail upon the member not to alienate his farm.
If he persists and goes ahead-with the sale or gift, the legal 
theory is that the purchaser buys and the donee takes only the 
interest in the crops standing on the soil. It means that, 
when the farm no longer exists, the family automatically resumes 
possession of the land. It also means that only the family, and 
not the purchaser or donee, is entitled to the timber and palm 
trees naturally growing on the land, and any minerals in the 
land. Only the family is entitled to exploit^or permit the 
exploitation of the soil and sub-soil and stones thereon. It
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also means that, while the purchaser or donee may by normal 
husbandry maintain and improve his farm, he cannot change the 
character of the farm by planting different crops, such as 
cocoa in place of coffee. Unfortunately, it seems that families 
do not insist on these residuary and reversionary rights 
when permanent cash crop farms are sold by individuals without 
the concurrence of the family. They regard the possibility of 
regaining possession of the land as so remote that in practice 
they do not take the trouble to assert their rights. If this 
attitude continues, the situation may well become accepted 
whereby individuals can affect family titles to lands by simply 
selling their farms on family lands after growing permanent 
crops on them.
The next question is the individual's right to occupy 
family lands. Obviously there must be some rules governing 
the priority of claims to family land; otherwise, in a large 
family of the Ewe type, only chaos will result. Hence, although 
the rule is that any member of the family is entitled as of 
right to the occupation and use of family land, this refers 
only to unoccupied or virgin family land. For a member of the 
family in occupation of family land cannot be displaced by 
another member. Furthermore, the family cannot dispossess a 
member of the family in occupation of family land, however long 
that occupation may be. Thus the family cannot sell or otherwise 
alienate title to that portion of the family land which is in the
occupation of a member. So long as the individual is deemed 
to be in occupation, he may remain in such occupation for life, 
unless he abandons the portion. Thus the cultivation of per­
manent cash crops like cocoa has the effect of excluding other 
members of the family as well as the family itself for as long 
as the crops remain on the soil. The same exclusion applies 
when a house or other permanent structure is erected on the 
land.
The other rule governing the occupation of family land is 
that no person may farm on a portion of land left fallow by 
another member of the family, unless that portion has been 
allowed to revert to virgin bush again. Most African commun­
ities., the Ewe not excepted, practise shifting cultivation as 
a traditional method of farming so as to enable the land to 
regain its fertility. When a farmer leaves his land fallow, 
he nevertheless retains his right to it, which will prevail 
against any other member of the family. This type of fallow 
land is known as afuu or afluu in the different Northern Ewe 
dialects. It is land regarded as being in the continued 
occupation of the previous farmer but not under active cul­
tivation. Since a farm must have been made on it just recently, 
such fallow land usually has some crops scattered about, such 
as an odd cassava, cocoyam or plantain, which may be occasionally 
harvested by the previous farmer. Therefore, no other member 
of the family may go into occupation of that portion of land, 
unless the previous farmer consents to his doing so.
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The previous farmer's right, as we have stated, lapses 
when the fallow land or afuu has so overgrown that it becomes 
virgin bush once more. For in that event it is regarded as 
unoccupied virgin land which any member of the family is en­
titled to use. This rule presented no particular problems in 
the days when the population was small and land was easily 
available. Now, however, land has become increasingly scarce 
because of the expanding population and farmers cannot afford 
to leave the fallow lands long enough before returning to them. 
The result is that, by exercising the right to one's fallow . 
land, portions of family lands have become virtually tied to 
individual farmers as though they were self-acquired properties. 
Land, although family land, is, therefore, highly individualised 
in many areas today, although the paramount title remains in 
the family.
The individualisation of land has been further accentuated 
by the rule that, on his death, a previous farmer's children 
have a right Pf first refusal to the portion farmed by him. 
Therefore, when a farmer dies, his children have the prior 
right of occupation of his fallow land, the right being of the 
same nature and extent as the deceased farmer would have had 
if he had not died. If there are several children, the family 
determines their individual entitlements, daughters being 
usually postponed to sons. Failing children, this right de­
volves on other close relatives in an expanding circle, as in
the case of succession to interests in self-acquired property.
In practice, therefore, specific portions of the family land 
are tied to persons within certain lines of descent within the 
family, to the exclusion of other members.
The enjoyment of the right to use fallow land or afuu is 
limited to only members of the family which has the paramount 
title to the land. Although it is usually acquired by succession 
to the previous holder of the dependent interest, the successor, 
as a member of the family, already has an inherent potential 
right of occupation and user, which becomes vested on such 
succession. Upon succession, therefore, the successor acquires 
a vested interest which is in the nature of a prior right of 
occupation and user as against other members of the family who 
have a potential right to the occupation and use of the lands.
The table of precedence in the matter of such succession is a 
rigid one fixed by law strictly according to proximity in con­
sanguinity to the deceased farmer.. Therefore, even the deceased 
farmer, while in his own life-time he may transfer his interest 
to another member of the family, cannot will it to any member 
of the family to take effect after his death. Non-members of 
the family cannot benefit by acquiring the interest either inter 
vivos or post mortem by testamentary disposition. Therefore, as 
regards women, the interest cannot devolve on their children 
who are born into different families. In most cases today the 
woman would have been farming fallow land left by her father, 
so on her death her brothers or her brother's children would 
resume occupation.
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The farmer, in his own lifetime, may consent to another 
member of his family, but only another member, taking over the 
land. Such consent, however, if given, must be given gratis, as 
the new occupier must also be a member of the family with an 
inherent and potential right of user. It is not strictly an 
alienation of the interest but only a waiver of the prior right 
of occupation to another member of the same family who also has 
the inherent right of occupation and user.
The subjection of portions of the family land to individual 
interests in the farms or houses of several members of the 
family does not affect the paramount title of the family. The 
paramount title to the land remains vested in the family which 
is the only legal entity that can validly alienate it. How­
ever, individualisation of family land is a drastic limitation 
on the general rights of the members of the family. Individual­
isation is an obstacle to large-scale agriculture because it 
reduces the lands to small and individually controlled strips.
At the same time it is to its credit that, because of the 
system, every person has at least some small portion of land 
to farm, which would not be the case if there were unrestricted 
exploitation of family lands by its wealthy members. Perhaps 
the only way by which large-scale farming could be encouraged 
within the system would be for members of the same family to 
pool their resources to cultivate larger farms over contiguous 
areas of the family lands separately held by them.
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Having thus discussed the interest of the individual in 
family land among the Northern Ewe, we may attempt to fix that 
interest within a conceptual framework. We have already argued 
that the interest is not a determinable estate because it is a 
right of user which is legally incapable of being determined by 
either the stool or even the family itself which has the para­
mount title. Neither can we call it a usufructuary estate since 
the individual is part of the family which holds the paramount 
interest in the property. Nevertheless the individual's interest 
is an interest which cannot be alienated inter vivos to non­
members of the family and is not devisable to even members of 
the family. However, the interest, which persists for the life­
time of the individual, may in his lifetime be transferred within 
the family. Furthermore, the individual's interest devolves on 
his death on his heirs, who are mainly his children or certain 
close relations within the family. We may, therefore, describe 
the individual's interest in the family, land among the Northern 
Ewe as an inherent right of occupation and user for life which, 
however,, transmits certain preferential rights to the deceased's 
children and other relations within the family as against other 
members of that family. The individual's interest is thus a 
conjunction of two legal factors. Firstly, the individual must 
have an inherent right of occupation and user, derived from 
membership of the family. Then the right to the occupation of 
the specific portion in question must have been acquired by the
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individual going into occupation of virgin land belonging to 
the family, or else the right must have been transferred to him 
inter vivos or post mortem from a previous occupier. It is thus 
a dependent interest because it exists only as a qualification 
on the paramount interest of the family and not independently 
of it.
Community Rights Over Land
As already explained, the paramount title to practically 
all lands among the Northern Ewe of Ghana is vested in the 
families of the respective chiefdoms. Such family lands are 
not communal lands in the sense of belonging to the whole chief- 
dom, the whole village or the whole tribe. The entire community 
as such has no proprietary interest of any kind in the family 
lands.
However, members of the community constituting the chiefdom 
or the division have certain rights which they may exercise over 
all the lands within the territorial boundaries of the chiefdom. 
The explanation for the existence of the common public rights is 
that the families are protected in their title and the enjoyment 
of their lands by the collective power of the entire community. 
In the past, all the citizens of the chiefdom were under an 
equal obligation to tight to preserve the lands. Similarly, 
there was an obligation of common defence and protection for 
every citizen while on his lands, extending-to cases like
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attacks by assailants, bandits or wild animals and calamities 
like being trapped by falling trees or raging bush fire. In 
return for the different forms of protection and the guarantee 
of person safety and security, the holders of titles to lands 
have accepted certain common rights which the community may 
exercise over them. There is nothing really onerous about 
these common rights, because every family has lands and the 
common rights are exercisable by every member of the community 
over all the lands.
A form of direct obligation which the community exacts 
from the farmer is the requirement that the entire community 
of the division of the chiefdom must be given a free drink from 
palm wine tapped by a citizen on his family land. Whenever a 
citizen fells palm trees and taps palm wine, he must provide a 
large potful or a whole day’s collection of palm wine (whichever 
is less) for the free enjoyment of all the adult male members 
of his division. This is known as duha or nthe drink of the 
townspeople” . It is not a tribute paid on the land and it is 
not given to the chief. The duha is a direct right claimed by 
the entire community over the produce of the land. It is for 
the entire male population as an expression of gratitude and a 
reminder of their collective obligation to protect and defend 
the citizen. If a citizen sells the palm trees to a stranger for 
tapping palm wine instead of tapping it himself, he is never­
theless not relieved of the obligation to provide the duha; for 
he is then expected to ensure that a whole day’s collection or a 
large potful is supplied to the people at his expense.
Other, rights of the community, though not less effective, 
are not exercised by the community en masse over the land. One 
such manifestation of common rights over land is the virtual 
non-existence of trespass laws. The law with respect to tres­
pass as an actionable wrong per se is unknown to the indigenous 
Ewe law. A-family land or even an individual holding is not 
regarded as a "close” from which other citizens are in law 
presumed to be excluded. In the indigenous law, therefore, it 
is permissible to enter or pass through the land of another or 
walk over his farm without permission or invitation. Where 
necessary one may even cut a bush path through another’s lands 
without notice or permission. Neither of these acts is an 
actionable wrong per se in Ewe law. At the same time, they are 
not rights in the nature of an easement because they are not 
created in consequence of the express consent or even passive 
acquiescence of the landlord or the farmer or his predecessor. 
They are public rights affecting all lands and may be described 
as a public common right of passage.
The absence of trespass laws in the English common law 
sense does not, however, mean that one can cause damage to the 
property of another with impunity. If, in the exercise of the 
common right of free passage, the citizen deliberately causes 
any damage to the crops or other property on the land, he is 
fully liable for such damage. An action in that event will be 
founded on the specific injury suffered and limited to that 
only. The basis of such an action cannot be trespass as such,
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but the loss occasioned by the deliberate act of the tortfeasor.
The law, however, is not without those who dislike it. In 
the first place, even from time immemorial, farmers have often 
sought to exclude intruders if by their passage they cause 
unspecifiable damage to property on the land. This is done by 
a public announcement, usually through the gong-gong beater.
As the intention to exclude others is, however, not strictly 
enforceable at Ewe lav/ without proof of damage, such an announce­
ment of exclusion is coupled with threats that it is intended to 
make the area dangerous by planting thorns concealed in the soil 
or setting subterranean traps in the locality. Such threats do 
scare people because they are sometimes carried out; for they 
are not customary law offences. As regards homesteads, the only 
effective way to prevent people from walking across the house is 
to erect a fence enclosing the compound.
Today, as a result of the infiltration of English common
law ideas, people often try to have recourse to the common law 
remedy in trespass to enforce their claims of title to land.
Where there is a genuine dispute as to the title to a piece 
of land cleared by an adverse claimant, the practice, especially 
in the lower courts, is to found the action in trespass. At
times, because of an old vendetta, a plaintiff may sue for tres­
pass, even without damage, because the defendant had merely 
entered upon his land. These, however, are not cases of the 
application of Ewe customary law.
The right to hunt is one generally enjoyed by all citizens 
of a chiefdom over the territorial area of the chiefdom. 
Individuals are not restricted to hunting animals on only their 
own family lands. They may hunt at any place that there is 
game. Citizens could formerly also set traps for animals any­
where, though even then in practice this was better done near 
one’s own farm or family land. The holders of paramount interests 
in land and farmers are, however, objecting to such traps now. 
Where traps are buried under the soil, the person setting them 
must in any case inform the farmer, or the head of the family
in whom the paramount title is vested, of their existence and
location, otherwise he is liable for any injury resulting to the 
users of the land who fall into the traps.
Neither the chief nor the family or individual holding the 
paramount or dependent interest in the land is generally entitled 
to any portion of game killed on the land. However, as a matter 
of courtesy and to promote good relations, the farmer or head 
of the family on whose land a big game has been killed is some­
times given a leg of the animal. If the farmer is on his farm
when a big game is killed on his land, he is entitled to the 
right forelimb of the animal. If there was nobody on the land 
when the animal was killed, the first person met by the hunter 
on his way home gets the forelimb. The reason for this rule 
is that, if the hunter had met with any misfortune in attempting 
to shoot the animal, it would be either the farmer on his farm
or the passer-by who would come to his rescue.
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The general rule is that no chief is entitled to any 
portion of game by virtue of his official position. In Matse 
and Kpando, however, it is stated that the head chief is entitled 
to a leg of any big game killed on his territory because he is 
the protector of everybody on the land. Even in these places 
nothing goes to the holder of the paramount title or the depen­
dent interest in the land on which the game is killed. The 
portion of the head chief is sent through the divisional chief 
who is given a part by his superior. It is not clear whether 
the rule has been in existence in Matse and Kpando from time 
immemorial or is an innovation due to Akan influences.
Cattle grazing is not common in the Northern Ewe area and 
there does not seem to be any customary law rule on the point.
It seems, however, that cattle grazing on uncultivated land is 
free because this usually takes place on grasslands or dzogbe 
which were originally communal l a n d s b u t  informants disagree 
on this point.
Citizens of the chiefdom have a common right to collect 
uncultivated mushrooms growing anywhere within the realm. This 
does not cover mushrooms growing on dumping spots in the farm 
or on felled palm trees or other specified places. Snails are 
not as popular among the Ewe as among the Akan; but wherever 
they are found they may be collected without permission. Crabs, 
tortoise and other such animals may be caught or collected
1. See pp. 38k -JfOl infra for a discussion of communal lands.
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anywhere that they are found.
Wild fruits may he plucked for personal consumption from 
another person’s lands, with or without information to the 
farmer or landlord. This freedom is even extended to cultivated 
fruits such as pawpaws, bananas, oranges, mangoes and pears, 
so long as they are not collected in large quantities for sale.
In the same way, without a need for permission, one may take 
out cassava or cocoyam for personal consumption on the spot 
when in the bush.
Malleable clay or tsu may be dug occasionally from another’s 
land for pottery works. Pottery is a very advanced industry 
among the Ewe who make all kinds of earthenware pots, dishes 
and water holders. The Kpando, Sovie and Gbi areas are par­
ticularly noted for this, but it is a special preserve of the 
female sex. So long as the digging is not for commercial 
purposes, the individual is permitted to dig the clay for his 
own use. If, as is now often the case, it is for pottery works 
on a commercial scale, then permission must first be obtained 
from the family or individual who holds the paramount interest 
in the land. In the past such a permission was granted gratis, 
the potter occasionally showing her gratitude by making a token 
gift of her wares to the head of the family concerned. Today, 
however, mosU-.eitary payment is usually demanded as consideration 
for the commercial exploitation of malleable clay or tsu.
Firewood is still generally used in cooking among the 
Northern Ewe of Ghana. Every citizen, therefore, is at liberty 
to collect firewood anywhere for domestic use. It is not, how­
ever, permitted to collect firewood from another person’s farm 
or even from an old farm lying fallow, unless the farmer’s 
consent has been obtained. Collection of firev/ood from unoc­
cupied land (i.e. not a farm), though from land belonging to 
another family, requires no permission; but if, as is sometimes 
the case today, the collection is a systematic series for the 
purposes of sale for profit, then permission is necessary and 
such permission will usually not be forthcoming except for a 
good consideration. Permission may be obtained from the head 
of the family or stool having the paramount interest in the 
land, if it is an uncultivated land. If, however, it is a farm 
or a fallow land, the permission is obtainable from the farmer.
In places where thatch is still used for roofing houses, 
the grass may be cut without permission. If, however, these 
are required in commercial quantities for sale to others, then 
the holder of the paramount title to the land must first give 
permission, usually for a quid pro quo.
Rivers and streams, though flowing over lands belonging 
to specific families, are subject to the common rights of the 
v/hole community. Any person may draw water from the river or 
stream without permission. Fishing in the waters of a river 
or a stream is absolutely free and open to every citizen.
Originally sand could be dug free from the bed of a river or 
a stream for any purpose. However, since sand is now sold to 
builders in large quantities, holders of the paramount title to 
riparian land are insisting on valuable quid pro quo before 
consenting to such exploitation of sand and gravels from rivers 
In opposition to this, some divisional chiefs are also claiming 
that dues be paid to them for the collection of such sand, 
pebbles or gravels. It seems that the holders of land titles 
have a better claim, because traditionally the Ewe stools have 
had no proprietary interest in property belonging to families 
over which they exercise political authority.
Lakes, creeks and lagoons are in a special category. Ther 
are very few of these in Northern Eweland, Where they exist, 
title to them is exclusively vested in the families on whose 
lands they lie. Accordingly they are not open to fishing or 
collection of sand by non-members of the family. There is no 
prohibition against taking out water therefrom for personal use 
by non-members of the family; but tsikuklu. which is a v/ay of 
drawing out all the water in a pool or pond in order to isolate 
fish for catching, is prohibited in another family’s land.
The Individual’s Paramount Title to Land
The classic observation of Rayner, C.J., to which we 
have already referred, is that;
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The notion of individual ownership is quite foreign 
to native ideas. Land belongs to the community, the 
village or the family, never to the individual. \
This has been criticised in its application to other communities.
j
It should be pointed out, however, that it expresses a funda­
mental view of land law among the Northern Ewe-speaking people, 
of Ghana. Among the Northern Ewe, the traditional view was that
the paramount title to land could only be vested in the stool or
p
the family and never in an individual person. Therefore, even 
those who in the ancient times went into original occupation of 
vacant lands which have now become ancestral family lands, did 
so on the basis that whatever area they occupied became the 
acquisition of the family. Family lands, therefore, did not 
become family lands merely because the original occupiers died 
intestate. They assumed their family character by the very act 
of acquisition because, apart from the stool, the family was 
the only unit capable of holding the paramount interest in land 
in the view of the indigenous lav/. For land was regarded as 
different from other kinds of property, with man's very existence 
rooted in it. It was, therefore, governed by a different regime 
of property rights which excluded individuals from holding the 
paramount title to it.
1. Rayner, C.J., in a Report on West African Land Tenure.
Quoted by Lord Haldane in Amodu Ti.jani v. Sec, to the Government . 
of Southern Nigeria. (1921) 2 A.C. 399, kOk*
2. Rattray similarly observes that in ancient Ashanti 
"individual ownership in land did not exist". See R.S. Rattray, 
Ashanti. 1923, p.226.
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Rayner, however, has not been without his critics. Ollennu, 
for instance, says that Rayner's statement is good law only as 
regards the paramount title which, in Ollennu1s view, vests only, 
in the community or the stool and not even in the families.^ 
Since, as Ollennu sees it, the stool even today can make a grant 
of a “determinable estate11 to an individual, the individual is 
capable of holding that interest in land so that he holds it 
alone as an individual until his death intestate, when it 
assumes the nature of family property by reason of the family’s 
right of succession. In such a scheme of things, land can and 
does belong to individuals if we speak of the so-called deter­
minable estate. Ollennu1s criticism may be well founded when we 
consider the Akan and Ga communities in which paramount titles 
to lands are vested in the stools, so that family lands are 
created through specific grants to individuals who are sub­
sequently succeeded on intestacy by their families. This, how­
ever, is not the process among the Ewe where, as we, have, 
submitted, Akan-type stool lands do not exist and the paramount 
title to land is held by the families.
Bentsi-Enchill has also criticised Rayner's statement
because of the emphatic tone of the proposition that land
"never11 belongs to ah individual. Bentsi-Enchill1 s argument
is that the very notion of family land imports "an original
2
individual acquisition by the founder of the family". This,
1. N.A. Ollennu. Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana"! ' 
1962, pp. 5, 29.
2. K. Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit., pp. 80-81.
with respect, is a non seguitur because it is not necessary for 
the constitution of every family property that there should have 
been an individual owner. Bentsi-Enchill agrees with Ollennu 
here in thinking that in all cases the family property of today 
became family property as a result of intestate succession by 
the family to what was formerly individual or self-acquired 
property of some of its deceased members. That is not the 
correct explanation for the origin of family lands among the 
Ewe. Among the Ewe, original land acquisition was a special 
type of acquisition for and on behalf of the family, so that 
the lands became family property at the very time of their 
acquisition. The "mine" attitude to land was unknown in the 
old Ewe community. It was always "our" rather than "my" land. 
The progressive emphasis on individual interest in any property 
is a product of modern times, a product of urbanisation and the 
introduction of cash economy and partly a result of western 
capitalist influence. It is very recent in the field of Ewe 
land law.
However much we may defend the statement by Rayner, C.J., 
we must limit its effect as a proposition to the traditional 
view of Ewe law. The paramount title to land in Ewe law was 
traditionally vested in families and sometimes in stools, and 
an individual member of a family could enjoy no more than a 
limited interest, dependent on the absolute title of his family. 
This rule applied equally to land which had been originally 
brought into occupation by the present holder (which is original
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acquisition) and that which the holder had received by way of 
transmission from a previous occupant who was a member of the 
same family (derivative acquisition). That Rayner, C.J., was 
concerned with the traditionalist view may be read into his 
choice of words that "the notion of individual ownership is 
quite foreign to native ideas". Although he later says that 
land "never" belongs to an individual, that statement must be 
related to the earlier stage of society. For, at the time the 
learned Chief Justice uttered those words in 1896, he must have 
been aware that land was being purchased freely by individuals 
out of their own resources as private property in the then Gold 
Coast. His statement that the notion of "individual ownership" 
was "foreign to native ideas" must, therefore, be understood to 
mean that the notion was unknown until comparatively recently.
To say that an idea is foreign is not necessarily to say that 
it has never been received at all.
If, however, by being "foreign to native ideas", Rayner, 
C.J., meant that even at the time he used those words the notion 
of individual persons holding the paramount title to land was 
unknown to the native law, then we must also respectfully dis­
sent. For land, a commodity which because of its special nature 
was once not saleable, is now capable of being sold in most 
areas of Northern Eweland and has been so for some time. Private 
purchase of land for valuable consideration has been introduced 
and accepted even in many of those Ewe communities where the 
sale of land was formerly unknown and was prohibited. Therefore,
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any individual can today purchase land with his own resources. 
Any such piece of land purchased by an individual today becomes 
his own self-acquired property, like any chattel. Consequently, 
there are today lands to which individuals hold the paramount 
title and which are not family lands or stool lands. Today, 
therefore, there are individuals who hold the paramount title 
to land. Such lands are not family or stool properties but the 
self-acquired properties of those individuals in v/hom the para­
mount title is vested.
CHAPTER VI
STOOL INTERESTS IN LAND
The Concept of Stool Land in Ghana Generally
The "stool" is the wooden seat which symbolises the 
political authority of a' chief. As an inanimate object it is 
incapable of holding an interest in property. The stool, 
however, is regarded as a corporate personality in the customary 
law and as such may hold an interest in property, "Stool land",
therefore, may be understood as land to which the paramount
title is vested in the stool, which land is therefore under 
the administration of a chief and his councillors. The author­
ities, however, do not make this clear.
The statutory definition of "stool land" is not very help­
ful. Sweeping away previous legislation on stool lands, the 
Administration of Lands Act, 1962, defines "stool land" by 
saying that it
includes land controlled by any person for the benefit 
■ of the subjects or members of a stool, clan, company 
or community, as the case may be, and all land in the 
Upper and Northern Regions other than land vested in 
the President. 1
1. Section 31 of the Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123).
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The "company" is presumably the "asafu company" as known among 
the Fanti, a traditional youth organisation rather than a company 
under the Companies Code, It is not clear what is meant by 
"community" in the Act. If by that is meant any group of 
people, then it also comprehends the Ewe-type family, inasmuch 
as it is a large group of persons. In that case stool land also 
includes land to which the paramount interest is vested in a 
family among the Ewe, that is land which v/e have identified as 
"family land". More probably, however, "community" here refers 
to a political or territorial community, a unit certainly larger 
than the family, in which case it would include units of varying 
sizes and degrees of political organisation. The word "clan" 
in the Act is ambiguous and of imprecise meaning. Sometimes the 
word is used in Ewe to refer to a large unit like the sub­
division or saa which comprises several families. On the other 
hand it is understood in Ghana, especially among the Akan, to 
mean a totemistic and dispersed group of persons claiming 
descent from a common mystical ancestress, such as the "Asona 
clan" or "Bretuo dan". The genealogical tree in the latter 
case cannot usually be traced. In both cases it is hardly 
possible that it is the type of unit contemplated in the 
definition of stool land, because such a unit does not normally 
hold interests in property. Moreover, we can only guess what 
"control" means. For there are several types of control over 
land. The holder of the paramount title to land always has 
the power of control inherent in that title, manifested in the
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right to exclude others from the land, and the power to regulate 
the exercise of the right of user by those entitled to use the 
land. Political control over the use of land generally has 
always been a function of all stools, such as the power to 
decree days of mandatory rest when no work may be done on the 
land. Such control by the stool is no more than a political 
function and cannot be the basis of any stool interest in the 
land in a proprietary sense. Another type of control is the 
general power of superintendence exercised by the local chief 
over communal lands, but this is distinguishable from a prop­
rietary interest in the stool; for, as will be explained later, 
communal lands are not stool lands among the Ewe. Mere "control", 
therefore, cannot, as the Act seems to suggest, constitute the 
controlled land into a stool land. For control is exercised 
today by both the central government and local authorities over 
land, through town and country planning legislation and building 
byelaws. Such control, however, has no necessary implication of 
a proprietary interest in the central government or the local 
authority. This is an unsatisfactory piece of legislative 
draftmanship which makes the meaning of "stool land" anything 
but clear. In particular it does not afford any guidance in 
determining what unit of society is a "community" within the 
meaning of the Act. It confuses the issue by placing in a 
group, eiusdem generis with the stool, such organisations as 
the asafu company and other corporate bodies of the indigenous
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law. Nor can we say what measure of control by a stool will
stamp the land with the character of stool land.
Neither does the case law offer a satisfactory definition.
An example is the case of Ameoda v. Pordier.^ in which Ollennu,
J., stated a definition of "stool land". In that case the
plaintiff, as head of family, claimed that certain lands in
Ningo (not an Ewe area) were family properties of his family,
the Osabunya Family of Ningo. In order to sustain his claim,
it was urged on behalf of the plaintiff as a general proposition
that there were no stool lands in Ningo and the Adangbe area.
The learned Judge rejected the proposition that there were no
stool lands in Ningo and the Adangbe area because of the view
that he took of the concept of stool land. He said:
Now what in customary law is meant by 1 stool land*? By 
stool land we mean, land owned by a community, the head 
of which occupies a stool, such that in the olden days of 
tribal v/ars the said head of the community carried the 
ultimate responsibility of mobilising the community to
fight to save it, and in modern days to raise money from
the subjects to litigate the community*s title to the 
land. We may put it in another form, any land in respect 
of which an occupant of a stool is the proper person to 
conduct its extra-territorial affairs is a stool land. 2
With respect, not only is this definition not meaningful, but
it also shows some confusion of thought. First of all it
leaves unexplained the meaning of "ownership" of land by a 
community. If by "ownership" by the community it means unap­
propriated land which lies within the frontiers of a chiefdom
1. (1962) 1 G.L.R. 200.
2. AmQ^fda v. Pordier. (1962) 1 G.L.R, 203.
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or a traditional state, as we find among the Northern Ewe- 
speaking people of Ghana, then, as we shall explain later, this 
is certainly not stool land but communal land. If, on the 
other hand, "ownership** here means that the paramount title 
vests in the whole community, then it is probably the same thing 
as land belonging to the community as represented by the stool, 
such that it is under the administration of a chief for the 
benefit of his subjects within the meaning of Section 31 of 
the Administration of Lands Act, 1962 (Act 123). This type of 
land does not exist among the Northern Ewe. As to the learned 
Judge’s reference to the obligation of the head of the community 
to mobilise forces for the defence of the lands, it is respect­
fully submitted that the obligation bears no necessary relation­
ship to the concept of proprietary interests in land. Among 
the Northern Ewe and most other tribes, it was a political 
obligation on the chief as head of the community to mobilise 
his forces to defend even the private property of individuals 
or families against external aggression. It was part of the 
obligation of the political state, even in traditional political 
thought, to protect the individual, not only in his life and 
limb but also in respect of his property, whether movable or 
immovable. When the burden of the defence of property is today 
translated into terms of litigation of title at law, the 
obligation is indeed merely to contribute money towards the cost 
of litigation. But it is not all who in the past would have
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taken up arms in defence of the property that would today be 
under an obligation to contribute such money in Eweland. Today 
the obligation to contribute money for litigating land titles 
falls only on members of the family. In modern times, whenever 
there is a land dispute between two families from two different 
chiefdoms at a point which forms an inter-territorial boundary 
in Eweland, the head chiefs are interested because the territorial 
extent of their respective jurisdictions would be determined by 
the result. The cost of such litigation, however, is borne by 
the families which claim the paramount title to the land and 
not by the chief or the entire community. The obligation of 
the entire community in the past to defend such property with 
arms did not, therefore, arise out of any proprietary interest 
in the stool or the entire community, but out of the exigencies 
of the defence mechanism of those days.
The characterisation of land as stool land merely because 
the stool occupant is the proper person to conduct its extra­
territorial affairs is equally fallacious. In Togbe Gbogbolulu v. 
Togbe Hodo.^ for instance, the two head chiefs litigated over 
the lands which formed the boundary between Vakpo and Anfoega in 
the Northern Ewe area. However, the lands over which they 
fought were not necessarily stool lands. . In. fact in the.present 
instance they v/ere communal lands in which the stools had no 
proprietary interests. Such communal lands are not stool lands
1. (1941) 7 W.A.C.A. 164.
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in 3we law and they do not become stool lands merely because 
the head chief is responsible in his political office for the 
conduct of extra-territorial affairs connected with them.
It may be that the definition in Ameoda v, Pordier was 
formulated to cover the Ningo case only, though the .learned 
Judge did not put it in this form. For. the definition breaks 
down when, for instance, it is applied to the Ewe.
The proper approach, it is submitted, is to examine the 
real nature of stool land in the'customary law untrammelled by 
definitions. As the concept of stool land is perhaps most 
developed in the Akan communities in Ghana, we may refer to the 
Ashanti example.
The basic assumption of Ashanti land law, for example, is 
that the paramount title to all the lands of the realm is vested 
in the head stool.'*' As the occupant of the head stool or 
omanhene cannot personally be in effective control and adminis­
tration of all the lands, he delegates part of his functions to 
subordinate chiefs under him. The principle of delegatus non 
potest delegare being not applicable here, the subordinate 
chiefs may also sub-delegate their functions to still lesser 
chiefs under them, until we come to the families and individuals 
in actual occupation of the lands. We see in this arrangement
that political paramountcy is also the basis of proprietary
T] Though there are exceptions, e.g. Adansi, where some 
subordinate stools hold the Paramount title to their own lands 
without holding them from the Paramount Stool, See A.N. Allott, 
The Akan Law of Property, Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University 
of London, 195k, PP.91-92.
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interest in land in Ashanti, except that the Asantehene, the 
supreme lord of all Ashanti, does not hold the paramount title 
to all the lands. The paramount or absolute title being in the 
head stool, the politically subordinate stool has a sub- 
paramount title, and so on until we come to the family and 
individual interests which are usually described as the deter­
minable estate, V/hether they differ in the verbal identification 
of these interests or not, this scheme of land titles is 
accepted by many writers on Akan land law,1 In the case of 
Ashanti lands, therefore, there can be no valid alienation of 
the paramount title except by the head stool, which here means 
the head chief or omanhene acting with the consent of his 
principal councillors. Neither the family to whom the stool 
has allocated the land nor the individual in occupation can 
transfer the paramount title because nemo dat quod non habet.
The individual’s interest in occupation of stool land 
among the Ashanti and Akim Abuakwa has been described as a 
determinable estate because, it is suggested, the interest 
can be determined for good reason by the grantor stool. Among
1. See, e.g. A.N. Allott, The Akan Law of Property, Unpublished 
Ph.D. thesis, University of London, 1954, esp. pp.23-70 and his 
The Ashanti Law of Property. 1966, pp. 134, 140-142 and 1A4-145; 
K. Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit.« pp. 29, 42-45, 224; K.A. Busia, 
op,cit.. pp. 42-60; J.B. Danquah, Op.cit.', esp. pp. 199-200;
N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana. 1962, 
pp.4-28, 46-541 J.M. Barbahf op,cit,4 pp,A7-A8; R.S. Pattray, 
Ashanti, 1923. P P . 220-227 and his Ashanti Lav; and Constitution, 
1929, pp.340-366.
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the reasons which, it is alleged, may justify such determination 
of the individuals occupation and user is disloyalty to the 
stool.’*' This proposition, to say the least, is suspect and is 
certainly inapplicable to the Ewe. If loyalty is a basis for 
the continued occupation of land among the Akan, then their 
land tenure is inextricably related to political allegiance, 
a feature often associated with feudalism. Is it really much 
wonder, then, that Rattray described the Ashanti land tenure as 
feudalistic? For drawing this analogy Rattray has been
2
criticised by almost every modern scholar, including Allott, 
Busia,^ and Ollennu.^ It is indeed a valid objection to the 
analogy to point out that "feudalism” is so vague a term that 
it is not meaningful. Moreover, whatever may be the points of 
similarity between Ashanti land tenure and land tenure in 
feudal England, Rattray* seems to have ignored the serious 
differences in the two systems. Consequently, the application 
of the term 11 feudalism” to Ashanti land tenure may obscure 
rather than illuminate the Ashanti system. It should be pointed
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana.
1962, p.55.
2. A.N. Allott, The Akan Law of Property. Unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, University of London, 195^ -* pp.27-28 and his The 
Ashanti Law of Property. Stuttgart, 1966, pp.140-1A2.
3. K,A. Busia, op.cit.« pp.57-60.
k* N.A. Ollennu. Principles of Customary Land Lav/ in Ghana. 
1962, p.8.
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out, however, that feudalism was both a political and an 
economic system, and one of its essential features was the 
making of land holding conditional upon the political nexus 
of allegiance and loyalty to the political superior. The land 
was forfeit if the obligation of political allegiance and 
loyalty failed. In this connection, it may be pointed out 
that Ollennu, one of Rattray*s critics, has himself stated 
that:
So long as the subject acknowledges his loyalty to the 
Stool or tribe, his determinable title to the portion 
of stool land he occupies prevails against the whole 
world. 1
In the opinion of that critic and others, therefore, the tenure 
of the individual on Ashanti land is dependent on continued 
political loyalty and allegiance. This produces the point of 
similarity which, together with the hierarchy of land titles 
reflecting the hierarchy of political authority, provides some 
justification for the parallel drawn by Rattray, though it 
should be conceded that he pressed the analogy somewhat too far 
and at the expense of the differences. It is true that English 
feudalism also made land tenure dependent on the performance of 
services, ranging from one like the provision of horsemen for 
the King*s army, to such ridiculous ones as carrying the Lord’s 
pillow or praying for the eventual repose of his soul. Parallels
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary .Land Law in Ghana. 
1962, p.55.
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to these are not wanting in the various services and tributes
exacted by the Ashanti and Akan chiefs; but these alone do not
sufficiently justify the suggestion of an exact parallel between
the Ashanti (or Akan) and feudal systems.of land tenure.
The striking feature of the concept of stool lands among
the Akan is that it is interwoven into the fabric of government
and political authority. Allott tells us that the Ashanti
express the concept in the maxim that llthe farmer owns his farm,
but the stool owns the land11. The same authority also says:
The Ashanti system for the control and enjoyment of 
interests in land was fundamental to the whole structure 
of government, so much so that, if one removed the land 
rights Of the chiefs, the basis on which they held their 
office and exercised jurisdiction over their subjects 
would be destroyed. This network of land rights support­
ing the political structure extended both upwards and 
downwards. 2
Explaining the nature of the paramount title of the Akan stool
in all the lands of the realm, Danquah says:
The stool occupier is in common parlance, or by courtesy, 
referred to as the owner of land; but he is so only in so 
far as he occupies the Stool and represents the sovereignty 
of the people, giving due respect to the sacredness of the
Stool. If we were pressed for an answer to the fundamental
question as to ultimate ownership of stool property, we' 
should readily say the thing called ’Stool1, whose sup­
remacy is acknowledged by members of the family, section 
of the tribe, or subjects of the State, and to which they 
are bound by their own traditions and laws to serve and 
respect, is the ultimate and absolute owner.
No one can deny the reality of stool ownership, for to 
deny that is to deny the stool. 3
T. A.N. Allott. The Akan Law of Property. Unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, University of London, 1954, p.142.
2. A.N. Allott, The Ashanti Lav/ of Property, 1966, pp.140-141.
3. J.B. Danquah, op.cit., p.200.
The exact nature and extent of the stool's interest in land,
however, has not been easy to express. Some writers have tried
to express it in terras of English law by drawing an incongruous
analogy with a trust, describing the stool occupant as a trustee.
It was thus expressed by Sarbah:
At most the King or Chief is but a trustee, who is as
much controlled in his enjoyment of the public lands by 
his subordinate chiefs and councillors as the head of a 
family by the senior members thereof. 1
Then, after saying that nobody can deny the reality of the
stool's interest in land, Danquah nevertheless explains that:
In short Akan chiefs hold the lands and other stool 
property in trust for the Asamanfo and to the benefit 
of the subjects of the stools. 2
The language of English trust law does not adequately describe 
the nature of the stool's interest in Akan lands. The trust 
analogy has now been discarded by most Ghananian lawyers, 
primarily because the customary law scheme does not find an 
exact parallel in the English law of trusts. Firstly, unlike 
the case of a trust, the legal title to the property is not 
vested in the chief alone, so that he is incapable of alienating 
the title except with the authorisation of his councillors. 
Secondly, the chief does not incur the strict liabilities and 
obligations of a trustee, such as that of a strict account­
ability, Even with these distinctions Asante thinks that the
fiduciary principle nevertheless exists in the customary land la
T] J.M. Sarbah. op.cit." p.66. "
2. J.B. Danquah, op,cit. . p.200.
3. S.K.B. Asante, "Fiduciary Principles in Anglo-American Law
and the Customary Law of Ghana", (1965) 14 I.C.L.Q., 1144-1188.
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He argues that although incidents such as strict liability 
and accountability are not found in the customary land law 
with respect to the position of either the chief or head of 
family, the customary law concept is not very different from 
a trust in Anglo-American jurisprudence if the head of family 
is described as a trustee because he "holds an office of trust 
in the general sense"."*"
Avoiding the language of the trust institution, we may say 
that while the paramount interest of the stool in the lands is 
real among the Akan communities, the occupant of the stool is 
regarded as holder of the interest but only in his capacity as 
such occupant. The reality of the stool's paramount interest 
is to be seen in the fact that no alienation of the absolute or 
paramount title is valid unless effected by the chief and his 
elders together. It is also seen in the fact that it is in the 
exercise of the rights flowing from its paramount title that 
the stool can and does allocate land to its subjects for their 
occupation and use.
It is, howeve^ our submission that stool lands of the Akan 
type, as described above, do not, as a rule, exist among the Nor­
thern Ewe of Ghana. The Ewe chiefs exercise political jurisdic­
tion over all the lands; but the paramount title of the families 
in their lands is not affected by this exercise of political 
authority. V/e may, therefore, consider the distinction between 
jurisdictional authority and proprietary interests.
1. S.K.B. Asante, ibid.t pp. 1181-1182.
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Proprietary Interests and Jurisdictional Authority
Before we attempt to examine the question of the existence 
of stool interests in land among the Northern Ewe-speaking 
people of Ghana, we may briefly draw the distinction between 
proprietary interests and jurisdictional authority of Ewe chiefs 
over land. Quite often this distinction, even if not blurred, 
is not sufficiently appreciated in this part of the country.
As regards proprietary interests, we need not go further 
than identify them as the bundle of rights which constitute the 
beneficial enjoyment of land. In the case of a stool holding 
the paramount title to land as well as a family holding such 
title, these rights, among others, include the rights of approp­
riation, occupation and use, and, in the particular context of 
the Ghananian land lav/, the ultimate right of alienation of the 
paramount title. The person, whether a single individual or a
legal entity, in whom the paramount interest is vested, does not
hold his title at the mercy of any superior title holder.
Accordingly, the holder of the absolute or paramount title
must hold it in his^own right, his title being in no way sub­
ordinate to any other superior title. His right of appropriation 
of land in which he has the paramount interest, barring any 
encumbrances or qualifications on that title, must not be 
subject to the control of a holder of a superior title. Similarly 
no other person may alienate the absolute title to the land 
except the holder of the said title. Hence, when we identify a
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stool, a family or an individual as anyigbato or the holder of 
the paramount title to a parcel of land, the implication is 
that such stool, family or individual has the highest interest 
known to the law in that land. Among the Akan, to say that a 
stool has a proprietary interest in some land may mean that, in 
the final analysis, only the head stool may alienate the para­
mount title to that land. This is deductively so because, once 
we ostablish the sub-paramount title in a lesser stool, the 
general rule urged by the authorities is that the paramount 
title must vest in its head stool.
Jurisdictional authority over land is an entirely different 
concept. The basis of jurisdictional authority is essentially 
political rather than proprietary. From its base of political 
authority, the traditional concept of jurisdiction is manifested 
by political overlordship, legislative power, judicial authority 
and executive as well as administrative responsibility. The 
territorial extent of the head chief1s jurisdiction is the land 
area over which his authority runs as paramount ruler. All 
persons living within the boundaries enjoy the head chief’s 
protection, both as regards life and property; and they are 
also subject to his legislative, judicial and administrative 
authority. Transgressions within the boundaries are punishable 
by or with the authority of the head chief. For these reasons 
we may point at a defineable land area under the jurisdiction 
of a head chief, the totality of the area being, however, in
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many cases administered by lesser chiefs owing allegiance to
that head chief. Yet the chief or the stool has no proprietary
or beneficial interest in the lands under his jurisdiction. It
Is pure land control without any implication of proprietary
Interests even if the chief regulates the use of land generally,
whether as.regards days of rest, or prohibition of certain crops.
Although Allott has stated that in Ashanti "if one removed the
land righto of the chiefs, the basis on which they held their
office and exercised jurisdiction over their subjects v/ould be
destroyed” ,^ the same is not true of all indigenous African
political systems. It is a peculiarity of'the Ashanti and some
Alian and Ga political systems which are constructed around land
titles. For there is no inherent reason why the exercise of
political authority, with its concomitant functions, cannot be
divorced from proprietary interests in land.
Casely Hayford draws attention to the distinction between
jurisdictional authority and proprietary interests in land.
After describing two types of land to which the paramount title
is held by the "King" or head chief among the Fanti, an Akan
people, he says:
Thirdly, there are the general lands of the state over 
which the King exercises paramountcy. It is a sort of 
sovereign oversight which does not’carry with it the 
ownership of any particular land. It is not even owner­
ship in a general way ,...2
1. A.N. Allott, The Ashanti Law of Property. 1966, p.l^l.
2. Casely Hayford, op.cit., pp.AA-A5.
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In the Fanti example we see proprietary interests separated 
from the jurisdictional authority or "paramountcy" of the head 
chief. Even among the Ashanti, a classic example of a society 
in which interests in land are held by the stools, the con­
struction of land titles around the hierarchy of political power
is not carried to the apex of the pyramid of political authority.
The Asantehene is the paramount ruler of all Ashanti; but the
Asantehene is not the holder of the paramount title to all the
lands in Ashanti,^* Each omanhene or head chief under the 
Asantehene holds the paramount interest in his lands. The 
constitution of the Ashanti Union (later the Ashanti Confederacy), 
therefore, did not involve the cession of all lands to the 
Asantehene as political head of the Union, It is submitted, 
therefore, that even among the Ashanti the concept of juris­
dictional authority does not at all stages of the ladder neces­
sarily involve the proprietary interest in land; otherwise the 
Asantehene would be the holder of the paramount title to all 
lands in Ashanti. The distinction between political paramountcy 
and title to land exists also in several other Akan communities 
and is not illustrated by only the position of the Asantehene.
Of Adansi in the same Ashanti, Allott says
In Adansi, there are stools owning . their own lands, with .
the Adansi Paramount Stool as paramount in authority
rather than in title. 2
Yl See, e.g. K.A. Busia. op,cit.. pp. 52-53* Also A.N. Allott,
The Akan Law of Property. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University
of London, 195A, pp.89-91.
2. A.N, Allott, The Akan Law of Property. Unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, University of London, 195A, p#91.
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The same authority also says that in some Fanti areas, notably
Mankessim and Ajumako, there are no stool lands but title to the
lands are held by the families and clans which are subject to
the jurisdiction of and owe allegiance to the head stool.1 This
supports Danquah1s statement on Fanti land tenure that
In Fanti proper (Borebori Fanti) there are but very 
fev; Paramount stools which'can claim absolute right 
of ultimate ownership in all the lands in their state 
divisions. 2
In Akim Abuakwa also the finding in the Asamankese Arbitration
Award was that the paramount title to all the lands of Akim
3
Abuakwa was not vested in the Paramount Stool. Hence, although 
the subordinate chiefs served the head chief "with their lands", 
and although the Paramount Stool was entitled to one-third of
whatever was realised from the land, the consent of the Para­
mount Stool was not necessary for the alienation of title to 
the land. These examples, it is submitted, illustrate the 
distinction between political authority over land and proprietary 
interests in land, a distinction which exists throughout Northern 
Eweland.
Indeed the two concepts of proprietary interest and juris-, 
dictional authority are different, notwithstanding that they may
1. Ibid., pp. 105-106.
2. J.B. Danquah, op.cit., p.215.
3. Asamankese Arbitration Award, (1926-29) D.Ct., 220, 297,
301-302.
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be blended together in some communities. The political 
supremacy of the sovereign need not depend on any proprietary 
interests in property, whether movable or immovable. It is 
not a necessary incident of political sovereignty that the 
sovereign should hold the paramount interest in property within 
the realm, whether it be clothes, items of furniture, or the 
land itself. It should be borne in mind, therefore, that, 
regardless of what may be the experience elsewhere, proprietary 
interest in land is not always indivisible from the exercise 
of political sovereignty or jurisdictional authority in every 
traditional African political system.
Ewe-type Stool Lands
Stool lands, as the expression is generally understood in 
Ghanaian lav;, which in fact is the Akan sense of the term, do 
not exist among the Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana. • 
Among the Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana, the political 
sovereignty of the stool is not reflected in or even related to 
the system of land titles. Hence, although the stool has 
jurisdiction over the territorial area of the chiefdom, that 
jurisdiction does not lend itself to proprietary interests in 
the lands. The Ewe head stool, therefore, does not have any 
interest, not even a subordinate or dependent interest, in all 
the lands of the realm. As a corollary, the divisional and 
other subordinate chiefs do not have any proprietary interest
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in the lands over which they exercise political authority.
For, in this part of the country, the basic principle of land 
holding is that the paramount title to the lands is vested in 
the respective families. The families hold the paramount title 
to the lands in their own right and their title is not deter­
minable even by the stool.
The non-existence of Akan-type stool lands among the 
Northern-Ewe has not always been appreciated. On occasions when 
the subject has been discussed, the discussion has proceeded on 
the wrong assumption that all lands in Ghana, including the 
Northern Ewe area, are stool lands.1 However, at least some 
writers have recognised that the concept of stool lands does 
not exist everywhere in Ghana. As Pogucki, formerly Assistant 
Commissioner of Lands in Ghana, has put it,
The fact that certain principles or notions are known 
need not necessarily mean that they must be applicable 
in the whole country. For instance the notion of stool 
lands appears to be confined mainly to areas inhabited 
by people belonging to the Akan group; there is no
stool-land in the Northern Region nor e.g. among the
Ewe and Adangbe ... 2
Bentsi-Enchill, after discussing the concept of stool lands
among,some of the Akan communities, makes the significant
statement that:
. . In. most.other states of Ghana, there is no such basic , . . .
notion of what has been called ’state ownership’ above.
The principal owners of land - absolute or allodial
owners thereof - are clans or extended families, or 
village communities ... 3
l3 See e.g. N.A. Ollennu. Principles of Customary Land Law in 
Ghana. 1962, pp. 3-7, 20-21, et passim.
2, R.J.H. Pogucki, Land Tenure in Ghana. Accra, 1957, Vol. 6, p.5
3. K. Bentsi-Enchill, op,cit.. p.16,
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He goes on to explain that although the political authority of 
the head chief is acknowledged by families which hold title to 
the lands under his jurisdiction, Nevertheless the titles of 
such families to their land are regarded as independent and 
a l l o d i a l . I t  is respectfully submitted that both Pogucki
and Bentsi-Enchill are right. ....................................
It seems that the non-existence among the Northern Ewe- 
speaking people of stool lands properly so called has also been 
tacitly recognised by some of the administrative agencies of 
the state, notably the Lands Department. We have already 
referred to the definition of stool land which says that it is 
land controlled by any person for the benefit of the subjects 
of a stool, clan or community. It'means that, in the case of 
any land which falls within this definition, the "stool11 con­
cerned must be a party to any conveyance of the paramount title 
thereto. Now, in the Land Registry Act, 1962, for instance, it 
is provided that an instrument, including a deed of conveyance,
shall be of no effect until it is registered in the Land 
p
Registry. Before it can be registered, every conveyance 
relating to a stool land must first receive the approval of the 
conveying stool and the Administrator of Stool Lands. This is 
because Section 20(b) of the said Land Registry Agt, 1962, (Act 
122), says that registration may be refused if on the face of
1. Ibid,
2. Land Registry Act, 1962 (Act 122), esp. Section 2^.
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tlie records the grantor does not appear to be entitled to deal 
with the land as the instrument purports to do. Although this 
procedure has been adhered to in other parts of the country as 
a:n application of Section 20(b) of the Act, the information from 
the Lands Department is that the approval of the Administrator 
of Stool Lands is not required for conveyances of land in the 
Northern Ewe area. Neither is the approval of the local chief 
necessary, though some purchasers would obtain his signature, 
not as a party, but as an additional witness. The reason for 
this exception by the Lands Department is that stool lands as 
generally understood in Ghana, that is in the Akan sense, do not 
exist in that part of the country.
Although there are no stool lands property so called among 
the Ewe-speaking people of Ghana, there are certain lands which, 
either for lack of a better term or by the force of habit, are 
usually designated as "stool lands". One type of these lands 
can properly only be described as communal lands. These we shall 
discuss in the next sub-section. The other two types are lands 
in which a stool has a special controlling interest, which 
justifies their description as stool lands. These are (a) land 
which has traditionally belonged to a stool, and (b) land 
recently earmarked for a stool. .............
We may first consider lands recently earmarked for a stool. 
These are not strictly speaking stool lands. The origin of 
such lands is that they have comparatively recently been set 
aside for exclusive use in affairs connected with the stool.
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In all cases such lands are in fact part of the ancestral 
family lands of the stool family. Such portions are carved 
out of the stool family’s lands and are reserved for use only 
in connection with the purposes of the stool. Members of the 
stool family are thus precluded from the occupation and use of 
such lands that are specially set aside for the stool. They 
are, therefore, known as kpukpo nyigba or zikpui n.yigba, which 
precisely means "stool land11. The reason for the institution 
of such lands is that the Ewe stools have no independent 
economic resources with which to meet the ever increasing 
financial needs of the stool. Against this background must be 
considered the heavy expenses of the chief who must in these 
modern days maintain a certain minimum of dignity, decorum and 
grandeur both of his own person and of the stool. There are 
the nov; expensive customary rites and sacrifices, such as the 
purification of the stool and the yam festivals. The instal­
lation ceremonies as well as funeral rites of chiefs involve 
considerable expenditure of money today; and from time to time 
the stool paraphernalia must be maintained, repaired and 
augmented at great cost. Rather than rely on ad hoc contrib­
utions from members of the stool family or taxing the chief's 
own pocket, .the.stool family may decide to earmark some, pieces, 
of land, the proceeds from which are devoted exclusively to 
the purposes of the stool. This is why the kpukpo n.yigba or 
"stool land” of recent days came to be created.
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The second type, which are lands which have traditionally 
belonged to stools, are also known as "stool lands". The actual 
origin of such lands is not very clear and probably they are 
not all of the same origin. Some of them must probably have 
been attached to the stools in much the same way that recent 
attachments have been made and which we have just discussed.
It has been suggested, however, that most of these traditional 
stool lands became part of the stool property at the time the 
stools were created. If so, then the ancestral stool lands of 
this type are not really parts of the lands of the stool family, 
nor are they communal lands. They belong to the stool in the 
sense that the paramount title to them is vested in the stool
✓
as a corporate personality.
Such stool lands of ancestral origin are not common in 
Eweland because it seems that at the time of the creation of 
the stools the ancestors did not foresee the burden of the 
expenses of maintaining the status and prestige of the stools.
It is also for this reason that, even where they exist, they 
are only small strips of land, forming only a small and insig­
nificant portion of the lands of the division or chiefdom and 
hardly of any substantial economic value in modern terms. 
Nevertheless there are examples of them in places like Anfoega, 
V/oadje, Have, Aveme, Peki, Akome, Matse, Awudome and Ho, Thus
in Fia Dzomeku of Woad.je v. Kwasi Afutu of Have Etoe.^ both
l3 Fia Dzomeku per Theophilus Dzimega of Woad.je v. Kwasi Afutu"" 
of Have Etoe. Unreported, Native Tribunal of Akpini State, 
Kpando, 12th..September, 19kk.
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parties based their claims to the "Hefu land11 on stool owner­
ship. The plaintiff Chief, Fia Dzomeku of Woadje, contended 
that MThe land in dispute is property attached to the sub- 
divisional stool of Woadje-Tsamla.n"*" To this the defendant 
countered by saying: "The land in dispute was originated from
my great grandfather called Mude. It is stool property. It
2
was founded by Mude." Unfortunately, the trial Native Tribunal 
did not enquire in sufficient detail into the question of stool 
interests in land but decided the issue as a question of fact, 
depending more on evidence of specific boundaries as established 
by boundary marks and physical features. Nevertheless, it is 
one of those few cases which establish the notion of stool 
interests in land among the Northern Ewe-speaking people of 
Ghana, albeit with different incidents from the Akan-type stool 
lands. For the capacity or possibility of the stool as such 
holding an interest in land was not challenged by either the 
parties or the Native Tribunal itself, which may^be interpreted 
as a tacit acceptance of the existence of stool lands.
Another method by which the ancestral stool lands were 
created was through the confiscation of lands in satisfaction 
of the penalty for the swearing of oaths. In Aveme and a few 
other places it was explained that such confiscation was the 
origin of some of their stool lands. Traditional penalties 
are exacted whenever the oath of a chief is sworn in a dispute,
1. Ibid., p.478.
2. Ibid., p.498.
the guilty party being particularly liable. Again the oath
mav be sworn by the chief himself or any other person by way
of an injunction restraining a specified type of conduct (such
as a continuing public nuisance or private misconduct) or to
enforce a public duty or obligation (such as to render military
service or quench a raging fire). Disobedience to such an oath
also renders one liable to the oath penalty. In the olden days,
if an individual could not pay the penalty, the obligation fell
on his family. Hence, if the penalty could not be paid, part
of the family lands could be offered or seized in satisfaction
of the liabilities under the oath because the family was
1
equally involved. This was not a loss of title as a direct 
result of the infringement but in lieu of the penalty due.
Thus the land could not be forfeited if the guilty person or 
his family could pay the penalty. The land so forfeited to the 
chief in default of payment became stool property and retained 
such character. Recent examples of such seizure or confiscation 
of land under the oath procedure do not seem to exist.
It has been suggested that some lands which are now stool 
lands were acquired by direct grants to the stools. Such lands 
are very rare among the Northern Ewe because generally stools 
did not have the paramount title to lands of which they could
make gifts to other stools. Accordingly no ouch stool lands
1. Of. Ashanti where it is stated that "communal and family 
interest in land protected it from forfeiture, even when a 
clansman had committed some capital offence, and ... the king ... 
did not dare to seize the offender’s land ..." R.S. Rattray, 
M h a n t i . 1923, p.231.
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exist in the Northern Ewe area proper. The only lands alleged 
to be in this category are the lands in the Afram plains across 
the Volta River, The Ewe communities on the east bank of the 
Volta River claim that these lands were given to them by the 
Head Chief or Qmanhene of Kumawu in Ashanti who had overrun them 
during the unsuccessful Ashanti invasion of Eweland in about 
1868-69. It seems that, after the Ashanti forces had been 
beaten back, they abandoned these lands to the Kwahu and some 
of those Ewe communities which had assisted them in crossing 
the large and unfamiliar Volta River. It is, therefore, only 
among the Ewe communities along the Volta River, such as Aveme 
and V/ucuta, that we are told of the existence of stool lands 
originating from outright grants to stools. These types of 
lands, so far as the Ewe are concerned, are sui generis. In 
their nature, enjoyment and control, they resemble the Akan- 
type stool lands. They are administered by the stools in much 
the same way that the Akan-type stool lands in other parts of 
Ghana are administered. This is not very surprising because, 
assuming that the historical origins of these lands are correct 
as related, these lands have their origins in grants from a 
foreign stool accustomed to dealings in Ashanti-type stool 
lands. However, to leave no doubt about these, lands, it is . 
necessary to state that title to these lands on the west bank 
of the Volta River is being constantly contested even today in 
a series of court actions by the chiefs of Kwahu on'behalf of 
the paramount Stool of Kwahu in the Eastern Region of Ghana.
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In these contests the Ewe communities are having considerable 
difficulty in explaining the anomaly of Akan-type stool lands 
held, controlled and administered by Ewe-type chiefs whose 
system of government is not structured around land titles.
As regards the use of Ewe-type stool lands, the usual way 
which still preserves the property is the tapping of palm wine. 
The palm trees may be felled and the palm wine which is tapped 
is used directly on the occasion of important celebrations. At 
other times the mature palm trees are felled and the palm wine 
tapped is sold to bring money into the coffers of the stool. 
Timber and palm trees are also sometimes sold on the land and 
the amounts realised go into the stool funds. Sometimes portions 
of the lands are leased to farmers for cultivation, of which a 
third, two-thirds or one half of the proceeds are paid to the 
stool as may be agreed. In Matse and Aveme it is stated that 
such leases are permissible; but in other places, such as 
Anfoega, the information is that stool land may not be leased 
in this way. In most areas it is agreed that, in cases of 
absolute necessity, portions of the stool lands may be sold to 
bring in stool revenue.
As may be seen from the ‘above analysis, the Ewe-type stool 
land is very different from the Akan-type stool land. While 
the Akan-type stool land covers the whole of the territorial 
area under the political authority of the stool, the Ewe-type 
does not. Indeed what distinguishes the Ewe-type stool land
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from the rest of the lands of the chiefdom is that it is a very
small portion of the whole which has been carved out and
reserved for the exclusive purposes of the stool. By definition 
the Ewe-type stool land, therefore, is only a very small part 
of the lands under the jurisdiction of the stool and which has 
been set aside exclusively, for the purposes of the.stool. 
Following from this it is also empirically the fact that stool 
lands of the Ewe-type are usually very snail pieces of land, 
hardly of any substantial economic value today.
As the Ewe-type stool lands are only portions of the
general lands of the chiefdom, these lands are never allotted
to families and can never become family lands. They would 
cease to be stool lands once they were allocated to families.
In any event, the Ewe-type stool lands are usually too small 
to admit of such sub-division or allocation to families. In 
contrast, in the Akan system, as a rule, all the lands are 
stool lands out of which allocations are made to the individual 
families, such families then acquiring the so-called ndeter- 
minable” or "usufructuary” titles over their allocations as 
qualifications on the head stool’s paramount title. The Ewe- 
type stool lands, on the other hand, are by definition never 
encumbered by any lesser title or interest of any individual 
or family.
There is also a difference in the administration of Ewe- 
type stool lands. Among the Akan, the occupant of the stool is
personally in charge of the administration of stool lands. It 
is, therefore, only the chief who, acting with the consent and 
concurrence of his principal councillors, can alienate title to 
the stool lands or enter into any legal transactions affecting 
them. In the Ewe community, however, another limitation on the 
power of the chief is the distinction between the chief and his 
stool as separate legal entities. Hence, as the land belongs 
to the stool, the person for the time being on the stool does 
not have any direct legal control over the stool land. It is 
the zikpuito. which means "owner of the stool", who legally has 
control over the ancestral stool lands. The zikpuito or 
kpukpoto. as we have already explained, has come to be known as 
"stool-father".^ To use the more popular Ghanaian language, 
therefore, the stool-father is the person in charge of the 
administration and control of Ewe-type stool lands of ancestral 
origin. It is, therefore, only the stool-father, acting with 
the authority of the stool, expressed in the consent and concur­
rence of the chief and the principal members of the stool 
family, who can alienate title to such lands. Only the stool- 
father can sell palm trees on the land or fell them to tap palm 
wine. Only he can sell timber on the land and, where permis­
sible, lease part of the land for farming or any other purpose.
1. The position and function of the "stool-father" are 
briefly explained at pp. 7k*-75 supra. •
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In all cases, however, the proceeds must be applied only to 
the purposes connected directly with the stool. There are only 
rare occasions when stool lands are ever sold and examples are, 
therefore, hard to find. The information was given as an 
example, however, that when part of the stool lands of Togbe 
Dzeke of Kpando-Dzigbe was recently sold, it was the zikpuito 
or stool-father who conveyed title to the property. The chief, 
strictly speaking, is, in this connection, in a somewhat 
anomalous position of being regarded as only a principal 
councillor of the stool, though obviously a very important 
one. In practice, however, the chief and his stool-father do 
not insist on such fine legal distinctions, especially as they 
would in any event not act on their own but with the authority 
of the principal councillors of the stool. Moreover, as a 
result of the extension of Akan notions of stool land to the 
Ewe area by both administrators and lawyers, it has become a 
usual practice that the chief himself should personally join 
the stool-father in alienating or otherwise dealing with title 
to stool lands. This is not strictly Ewe lav;. The trend, 
however, suggests that in time the stool-father will even be 
supplanted completely by the chief in the control and adminis­
tration of stool lands.
The position of the Ewe chief is even less effective as 
regards the administration of stool lands which are lands only 
comparatively recently earmarked for the stool. Strictly 
speaking such lands are not stool lands in the sense that title
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to them can be said to be vested in the stool or its occupant. 
They are in reality family lands belonging to the stool family. 
The attachment of such lands to the stool as "stool lands" can, 
therefore, be properly described as a domestic arrangement.
The strict legal title still remains in the stool family and 
not in the stool. Therefore, logically, it is only the head of 
the stool family, who in Eweland is hardly ever the chief him­
self, who can, with the authority of the chief and the principal 
elders of the family, alienate title to such lands. However, 
as such lands differ from the other family lands because of 
their exclusive reservation for the purposes of the stool, both 
the chief and the stool-father have a special voice in the 
counsel of the family regarding such lands.
Unlike the Akan-type stool lands, title to stool lands 
among the Northern Ewe bears no relationship to the heirarchy 
of political superiority of stools. A lesser stool, though a 
political subordinate, may nevertheless have the paramount title 
vested in it in its own right in respect of its own stool lands. 
Such lands are not held by the subordinate stool as a lesser 
or .sub-paramount title under the head stool. Moreover, the 
stool lands of a subordinate stool are not in any way subject 
to the proprietary control of the head stool. Every head chief 
interviewed in the Northern Ewe area confirmed that the head 
stool has no proprietary interest in the stool lands of the 
subordinate stools, nor has the head stool any proprietary
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control over such lands. This is true of all such areas as Gbi, 
Aveme, Anfoega, Kpando, Peki, Matse, Awudome and Ho where some 
form of stool lands exist. There are even some cases where 
the head stool itself has no stool land, although the sub­
ordinate stools have their own. For the Ewe scheme of land 
titles is that it is independent of the structure of political 
power. It is because of the absence of stool interests in 
lands generally that the Ewe families directly hold the para­
mount title to land without holding it from the stool. It is 
by the same process of acquisition of the paramount title in 
its own right that even a subordinate stool may directly hold 
the paramount title to its own stool lands.
As the paramount title to their stool lands may be vested 
in subordinate stools in their own right, the title to stool 
lands either way is not derivative among the Northern Ewe.
The general proposition about stool lands in Ghana, however,
assumes that title to them is derivative, as seen in cases like
1 2 Golightly v. Ashrifi. the University College Acquisition Case
and Nana Kwasi Nkyi XI v. Sir Tsibu Darku IX. Having dis­
cussed some of these decisions, Ollennu draws the conclusion 
that:
1. (1953) W.A.C.A. 676. Also known as the Kokomlemle 
Consolidated Cases.
2. (195k)'Ik V/.A.C.A. h72.
3. (1954) H  W.A.C.A. 2*38.
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The ratio decidendi in all these cases cited is that a 
head stool or skin cannot acquire an absolute title to 
land unless that land belongs to or is vested in a sub­
stool or sub-skin under the head stool or head skin. 
Therefore if any land is proved to be vested in a head 
stool or skin for an absolute estate, that land must of 
necessity belong to or be vested in a sub-stool or sub­
skin or a quarter also for a sub-paramount estate ... 1
Then he continues:
It will be seen from the principles of the custom thus 
stated that for any piece of land properly to be said to 
belong to a head stool, it must first of all belong or 
be attached to a substool or quarter under the head stool 
or head skin. Therefore to say that any land, particularly 
land in the occupation of members of a quarter or sub­
stool, belongs to a head stool, and in the same breath 
to say that that very land is not attached or does not 
belong to a sub-stool or quarter, is to fall into a 
grievous error; it is contradiction in terms. Such a 
view is against all principles of customary land tenure.
A head stool can never have the absolute title in any 
land vested in it, unless it can show first of all that 
that land is attached to a sub-stool or quarter under 
his head stool or head skin ... 2
It is with the greatest respect that we must disagree v/ith the
opinion so emphatically expressed by Ollennu. It is true that
in Golightly v. Ashrifi^ the Court found as a fact that the
Ga Mantse held the paramount title to the disputed lands
through the Gbese Mantse and the Korle We. Similarly the claim
by the Osu Stool in the University College Acquisition Case^
failed because the dependent interest in the disputed area was
no longer vested in the Anarhor sub-stool under the Osu Stool.
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana.
1962, p.20.
2. Ibid., p.21.
3. (1955) lk W.A.C.A. 676.
k. (195k) lk W.A.C.A. k72.
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More examples can be cited but, as they are all from the Ga 
and Akan areas, we may now discuss the only Ewe case cited as 
authority for the derivative theory of stool lands.
One case to which reference is sometimes made^ in connection 
with the derivative paramount title of a head chief is Yaw
p
Nkansa v. Chief Wudanu Ewasi Djaba of Wusuta. hereafter 
referred to as the Wusuta case. As Wusuta is in the Northern- 
Ewe speaking area of Ghana, we may explain the proper significance 
of that case and the decision therein. The version of the 
facts accepted by the Court is that the Wusuta people originally 
inhabited the disputed lands but that they were later driven 
away during the Ashanti invasion of Eweland. After the re­
treat of the Ashanti forces the lands were then left to the 
Kwahu who had been Ashanti allies. Field research, however, 
shows a slightly different version of the facts, as narrated 
by the Wusuta and the Ewe people generally. As the lands 
involved remain the subject of litigation even today between 
the Kwahu and Ewe communities, it may well be that some of the 
information may be suspect. Nevertheless, that the story 
separately related to me is substantially the same in Aveme,
1. e.g. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in 
Ghana, 1962, pp.16-17. .............................................
2. Yaw Nkansa & other v. Chief Wudanu Kwasi D.jaba of Wusuta.
Unreported, Land Court, Accra, 2nd May, 19 V7. Suit No. 1/1942. 
Hereafter referred to as the Wusuta Case.
3. This was in about 1868-69.
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Wusuta and other areas bordering the Volta River may lend some 
credibility to the Ewe version. The Ewe version is that during 
the Ashanti war in about 1868-69, to which some refer as the 
nTede Afram war” , the Ashanti were in fact assisted by some Ewe 
communities in the crossing of the Volta River and general re­
connaissance, just as the Kwahu did. Without such assistance 
the Ashanti, who were unfamiliar with the Volta River, would., 
have found their crossing far more difficult. When eventually 
the invading Ashanti forces were beaten back, they retreated 
and left the lands to their Kwahu and Ewe allies. Among the 
Ewe beneficiaries of the fleeing Ashanti forces were the people 
of Averne and Wusuta. The contention of Wusuta and Averae people, 
therefore, is that the lands were donated to them as absolute 
gifts by the Ashanti. The Ashanti division specifically men­
tioned in the Ewe accounts is the state of Kumawu and it was 
alleged that in a recent litigation over these lands the present 
Omanhene of Kumawu gave evidence to that effect.
The Aveme story, a typical Ewe one, is that as the invading 
Ashanti army was driven back in flight across the Volta River, 
the Kumawuhene re-apportioned the lands to communities including 
the Bukuruwa, Akwatia and Pitiku (who are Kwahu) and Wusuta and 
Aveme (Ewe). ‘ These communities probably paid tribute to the 
Kumawuhene for some time but the payments later ceased. The 
Aveme gift, it was alleged, was made at that time to Togbe 
Desufoli I who became fia or chief over those areas donated to
him. For this reason, the present occupant of the stool,
Togbe Desufoli IV, claims.the following villages and settlements 
in the Afram plains to be under his jurisdiction, viz., Dadiase 
(his headquarters), Nyigbenu, Amuvinu, Bethal, Canaan, Kpegbadzi, 
Kodidi and several other small settlements. It is even suggested 
that the village of Honkorkrom got its name from the fact that 
Kroho Donkor, a Krobo man from the Eastern Region of Ghana, who 
had a European gun, had obtained permission from the Aveme (Ewe) 
chief, Togbe Kofi Abufuo, to settle there to hunt game in the 
area. The authority of the Ewe chiefs could hardly be exercised 
when the Volta River formed a boundary between the British 
colony of the Gold Coast and the then German colony of Togoland, 
the Ewe communities being under German jurisdiction. It was 
suggested that it was this intervention of a colonial boundary 
that blurred the historical facts.
These being the facts alleged on both sides, we may now 
examine whether the Wusuta case does in fact support the general 
proposition that the paramount title to stool land is always 
derivative. The statement from the Y/usuta case which is now 
urged as a general proposition, is that, since the title of 
the head stool of Wusuta is derivative from the lesser title 
in the sub-stool in occupation, therefore any settlement by the 
sub-chief binds the head chief as res judicata in respect of 
the lands. Therefore, when the Kwahu contended that the head 
stool of Y/usuta was estopped per rein judicatam by reason of a 
previous arbitration award against the chief of Nfrarna, a
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sub-chief of Wusuta, M'Carthy, Ag.C.J., upheld that contention 
and said that:
under customary law, assuming that the ultimate ownership 
rested in the Wusuta Head Chief, the local Wusuta Chief 
would have a vested interest in the land held under him. 1
Although the decision itself was unsuccessfully appealed 
against, this preliminary ruling was not questioned on appeal.2 
This statement of the learned Acting Chief Justice, however, 
stems from the error of viewing the Ewe land law in terms of 
the known law of the Akan. In Ewe law political overlordship
has no bearing on land titles. Therefore, it is perfectly
normal in Ewe law for the Wusuta head stool to hold the para­
mount title to these lands without deriving its title from any 
sub-stool. Similarly, in Eweland it is possible for a sub­
stool to hold the paramount title to land in its own right 
which is not held of the superior stool. The Wusuta and Aveme 
claims to the lands in the Afram plains illustrate both 
positions. In Aveme, for instance, the lands were alleged to 
have been donated to Togbe Desufoli, a sub-chief of Aveme.
Togbe Desufoli, however, claims the paramount title to these 
lands which are, therefore, not held of Togbe Gazari, the Fiaga 
of Aveme. Thus although Togbe Desufoli is under the political 
authority of the Fiaga of Aveme, yet the Fiaga does not lay any 
claim to these lands held by his sub-chief. Assuming that
1. The Wusuta case, supra.
2. Wadunu. Kwasi v. Nkansa, (19*+8) 12 W.A.C.A. 303.
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title can be established by proving the gift to him by the 
Omanhene of Kumawu in Ashanti, the title of Togbe Desufoli is 
in no v/ay invalidated by the fact that he does not hold the 
land on behalf of his head stool. As a corollary, any tran­
saction with respect to these lands by Togbe Desufoli does not 
bind his head chief because there is no privity of interest 
between them in the property.
The converse situation is found in Wusuta, Here the 
head stool claims the paramount title in its own right without 
tracing title through a sub-stool. It is submitted that this 
is a possible situation, indeed the usual one, in Ewe lav/. If 
the land was donated by the Omanhene of Kumawu directly to the 
Fiaga of Wusuta, it is illogical to defeat the title of the 
Fiaga merely because he does not and cannot trace title through 
his sub-chief. If the alleged gift to the head stool of Wusuta 
can be satisfactorily proved, it is wholly irrelevant to advert 
to a lesser title in the sub-chief because this does not go to 
the proof of the original gift which is the root of title.
Even in the Akan case, if a large tract of land was donated to 
a head chief, although he would apportion it among his .subor­
dinate chiefs, his title is no less recognised over any part of 
the land that he may choose to hold directly without allocating 
it to any sub-chief. As an Akan example, Hattray had recorded 
an interview with an old Ashanti man, apparently from a head 
stool family because of how he had described the allocations to
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sub-chiefs, in which the informant had stated that his head 
stool still held some lands which it had not allocated to any 
sub-stools, It would be incorrect to argue that in this 
Ashanti instance the head stool did not hold the paramount 
title to those unallocated lands simply because its title could 
not be proved through a subordinate stool.
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that the learned 
Acting Chief Justice, especially when one considers the sweeping 
generality implied in the tone of his language, was wrong in 
his dictum that if the paramount title to the land was vested 
in the Wusuta head stool then the local sub-chief of Wusuta 
ipso facto had a vested interest therein. In Ewe law this 
deduction is a non sequitur. It is a conceivable position 
among the Northern Ewe that a subordinate chief would politically 
be in charge of a territorial area in the lands of which his 
stool has no proprietary interest. Field research has not dis­
closed a single instance in Northern Eweland where a sub-stool 
holds any land from its head stool. It is perfectly in accord 
with Ewe notions, therefore, that the chief of Nframa may rule 
over these lands as a political vassal of the head chief of 
Wusuta but without any proprietary right or interest in the 
lands under his jurisdiction. For political jurisdiction in 
this part of Ghana is neither synonymous nor coterminous with
1. R.S. Fattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution. 1929, PP.350-351*
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proprietary interests in land. Therefore, unless it is proved 
that the chief of Nframa, apart from his political office, was 
also an agent of the head chief of Wusuta in his proprietary 
capacity, the chief of Nframa could not hind his head chief on 
the principle of res .judicata as regards the head chief's prop­
rietary interests in those lands. It is respectfully submitted, 
therefore, that the ruling by the learned Acting Chief Justice 
on the question of res .judicata was wrong because, having failed 
to discuss and inform himself on Ewe law on the point, he was 
content to apply the derivative principle of Akan stool lands 
to the peculiar circumstances of the Wusuta case.
The derivative theory of stool lands, it is respectfully 
submitted, is inapplicable in the Northern Ewe-speaking area 
of Ghana. In this part of the country, any stool of whatever 
status can have the absolute title to land vested in it without 
deriving such title from the title of a superior or a subordinate 
stool, a family or Individual subjects, A subordinate Ewe 
stool can have the absolute title to land which it holds 
directly in its own right and not on behalf of or from its 
head stool, A subordinate stool holding the paramount title 
to land does not base its title on the occupation, title or 
interest of its subjects. In Peki, for instance, the head stool 
has no stool lands of its own but some of the subordinate stools 
have their stool lands to which they hold the paramount title.
The Fiaga of Peki, however, does not hold or claim any interest
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in the stool lands of his subordinate chiefs. Neither does 
the Fiaga of Peki control these lesser chiefs in the use or 
management of their stool lands. Conversely the head stool 
among the Northern Ewe may have its own stool lands to which it 
holds the paramount title but without tracing its title through 
any of its subordinate stools. An example of this is found in 
Anfoega. The head stool of Anfoega has its'own stool lands to 
which it holds the paramount title. The paramount title to the 
stool land held by the Anfoega head stool, however, is not 
derived from the subordinate title in any of its sub-stools.
It is a direct but paramount title. It is in no sense derivative. 
Some of the sub-stools of Anfoega also have their own stool 
lands; but their interests in them are paramount and they are 
not held from or on behalf of the head stool. Thus the head 
stool and the subordinate stools each hold the paramount title, 
of exactly the same nature, in their respective stool lands, 
the political paramountcy of the head stool notwithstanding.
The scheme of direct, non-derivative but paramount title of 
head stools in their stool lands is also found in other places 
including Aveme, Kpand.o, Awudome, Wusuta and other Northern Ewe 
areas where stool lands exist. Contrary to what Ollennu says,"** 
there is no "contradiction", either in terms or in concept, in 
such holding of a direct but paramount title to land by the 
head stool without deriving title from its sub-stools. Neither
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana.
1962, p.21.
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is it against any principle of Ewe customary law. For the 
head stoolfs paramount title may be established only as a 
matter of evidence in Eweland, in the same way that family 
titles are proved. Y/e would even go further to state that such 
a derivative title to lands held by head stools is unknown among 
the Ewe. There is no known stool land among the Northern Ewe 
to which title is held by a head stool through any of its sub­
stools .
In concluding this part we may also draw attention to the 
discrepancy in the definition of "stool land" in Section 31 of 
the Administration of Lands Act, 1962,^ and the nature of Ewe- 
type stool lands. The Act concerns "land controlled by any 
person for the benefit of the subjects ... of a stool 
Assuming that this means proprietary control, then, as we have 
explained, the Ewe-type stool land is hardly controlled by the 
occupant of the stool. The ancestral stool lands are controlled 
by the stool-father or zikpuito; lands recently attached to 
stools as stool lands are treated essentially as family lands 
of the stool family and are controlled by the head of the stool 
family who is normally not the chief. The more striking feature 
of the Ewe-type stool land is that it is not controlled "for the 
benefit of the subjects" but is exclusively reserved for the 
purposes of the stool. Perhaps the definition in the Act was 
not formulated to contemplate Ewe-type stool lands.
1. Act 123.
3 8k.
Communal Lands
The term "communal land" may on occasion be misleading.
In the sense in which it is more often used in Ghana, it tends 
to be understood to mean land to which the paramount title is 
held by the whole community as an entity. Such a community may 
be, and indeed usually is, as large as a whole chiefdom or a 
division of it. If it is understood in this sense then it is 
hardly distinguishable from stool land of the Akan type. For, 
as was stated by Ollennu, J., as he then was, in Ameoda v.
Pordier. f,By stool land we mean land owned by a community, the 
head of which occupies a stool11.^
In another sense, which is more relevant here, "communal 
land" is unappropriated land lying within the boundaries of a 
chiefdom, to which every citizen has a right of access and user. 
Such communal land is the type found among the Northern Ewe- 
speaking people of Ghana. The community as a whole, the head 
of which is the head chief of the chiefdom, has a common 
interest in such communal lands in the sense that every member 
of the community has a right of user. Nevertheless, contrary 
to the definition of "stool land" by the learned Judge in 
Ameoda v. Pordier. a Ningo case from the Ga-Adangbe area, such 
communal land is not regarded as stool land among the Northern 
Ewe. Such Ewe-type communal lands are appurtenant to particular 
divisions of the chiefdom. Hence the communal land is subject
1, Ameoda v. Pordier. (1962) 1 G.L.P. 200, 203.
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to the overall control of the divisional chief or fia; but it 
is open to limited occupation by individual members of the whole 
division and those from other parts of the chiefdom. The 
occupation is limited because it cannot ripen into a paramount 
title. In other words, the paramount title is not vested in 
any stool, family or individual, but every individual has a 
several common right to take portions of the land into occupation. 
The stool or the stool occupant, therefore, has no proprietary 
interest in such lands, such as to constitute them into stool 
lands. They are thus different from the Ewe-type stool lands 
to which the paramount title in a proprietary sense is held by 
a stool or which are reserved exclusively for the purposes of 
a stool. For neither the stool nor the occupant of the stool 
has any greater right of occupation or use of the communal 
land as against any individual citizen. Perhaps the nature of 
Ewe-type communal lands may be explained by their origin.
Wherever an Ewe community settled, there was an eventual 
delimitation of the territorial boundaries of the community, 
even if somewhat imprecisely at times. This is the territorial 
area known as the chiefdom; for every Ewe chiefdom is con­
tained within a defineable land area. Sometimes the boundaries 
were already fixed, such as when the community settled on 
unappropriated lands lying between other settled chiefdoms.
At other times the boundaries were fixed and determined by the 
amount of land that citizens of the community were able to reduce
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into effective occupation. The picturesque presentation of 
this phenomenon is that the inter-chiefdom boundary was deter­
mined at "the point of meeting of the hoes" of two farmers 
from the two adjacent chiefdoms. In the case where a large 
tract of land lay between two chiefdoms, the inter-chiefdom 
boundary was either deliberately fixed by negotiation, or by 
tacit consent it was sometimes regarded as the point up to 
which each chiefdom had the responsibility of clearing the 
footpath linking the two chiefdoms, known as mota.sefe.
. However determined, there is always a generally defineable 
territory known as the chiefdom. This is the land area, over 
which the chief has political authority and jurisdiction, 
though the paramount title to the land itself does not belong 
to the stool or the chief in any proprietary sense. Once these 
inter-chiefdom boundaries were determined, original paramount 
title to parts of the lands could only be acquired by a family 
of the chiefdom or a stool on an equal footing. A family from 
a different chiefdom could not by the process of original 
settlement acquire unappropriated lands within the territorial 
boundaries of another chiefdom. Hence, even today, in cases 
of disputes as to title between families belonging to contiguous 
chiefdoms, proof of the territorial boundary is conclusive that 
the original paramount title to the land was vested in the 
family within whose chiefdom the land falls. In Doh v . Klu .^
1. Doh v . Klu, Unreported, Kpando District Native Court "A", 
Kpando, 30th September, 1957.
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for instance, there was a dispute as to the paramount title
to land between two families belonging respectively to Leklebi-
Kame and Kuma-Apoti, Leklebi and Kuma being two different
chiefdoms sharing a common boundary. The plaintiff family of
Leklebi-Kame contended that the top of a mountain was the
inter-chiefdom boundary and that, as the disputed land fell
on the Leklebi side of the boundary, title to it was vested
in them. In proof of the boundary the plaintiff family of
Leklebi-Kame deposed:
In olden times when people of Leklebi Kame and Kuma Apoti 
were about to perform 1Dzonyinyi1 custom or to make peace 
or pact among them, since it is the top of the mountain 
that is the divisional boundary between the two divisions, 
the said custom was effected on the top of the mountain. 
According to custom, fdzonyinyi! custom is never done on 
any man’s land, except on a divisional boundary and, upon 
the boundary, some stone should be fixed as a dove or 
hearth on which animals killed should be cooked and later 
buried the articles used in performing the custom in a 
red pot on the boundary (sic) ...1
Dzonyinyi is the conclusion of either a peace pact or a treaty
of friendship on the cessation of a war or the settlement of
an inter-chiefdom feud. The Native Court accepted this evidence
and, regarding it as very material, stated that:
The Court believed the evidence of the Plaintiff that ■ 
according to custom, where a mountain lies between two 
divisions, top of that mountain is always the divisional 
boundary for the divisions concerned ,.. The Court
recognised, and accepted ’dzonyinyi1 spot and the old
’anya* tree as the ancient and ancestral boundary marks. 2.
1* Ibid*. at pp.89-90 of Civil Record Book.
2* Ibid*, at pp. 175-178-of Civil Record Book.
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Having thus accepted the evidence of custom as stated above, 
the Kpando District Court nAfl held that this was conclusive of 
the matter and decided in favour of the plaintiff, since the 
disputed land fell on the Leklebi side of the inter-chiefdom 
boundary as defined and identified in accordance with the said 
custom. In oral interviews this conclusion was supported as, 
the correct one. It is submitted, therefore, that the general 
proposition illustrated by this case is that within the ter­
ritorial boundaries of a chiefdom, a foreign family cannot 
acquire the paramount title to land through the process of 
original acquisition of unappropriated land. This does not 
mean, however, that a foreign family cannot subsequently acquire 
paramount title to land in another chiefdom by alienation from 
the previous holder of the title.
The point here is that, although only they may acquire 
the lands of the chiefdom, the families of the chiefdom may 
not immediately go into actual occupation of all the lands within 
the boundaries of the chiefdom. In fact the process of 
acquisition was a gradual one of continued expansion until 
boundaries were agreed between the families in different 
directions. As 110 foreign families could acquire original 
paramount title to parts of the unappropriated lands, some of 
the lands within the boundaries of the chiefdom remained 
unappropriated. It is such unappropriated lands within the 
chiefdom that are regarded as communal lands.
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Communal lands of this type are of two kinds, being 
either forest land or grassland. Indeed few forest lands or 
ave are ever left unappropriated. The forest lands were what 
the Ewe ancestors really regarded as "land" for purposes of 
acquisition. Today, therefore, unoccupied forest lands are 
extremely rare unless they are obviously barren or unsafe spots 
or are otherwise unattractive for the purposes of cultivation. 
Nevertheless, a few such unappropriated forest lands existed 
until recently. In Gbi-Kpeme in Gbi the title to the MKodzofe 
lands” near the territorial boundary between Gbi and Likpe was 
not vested in any family or individual, nor were the lands 
appropriated or occupied until about 1923 when the then chief or 
fia of Gbi-Kpeme, Togbe Adzima, asked the citizens of that 
division to go into occupation. Similarly, the MAbudome lands” , 
also of Gbi and near the border with Alavanyo, were only recently 
taken up and divided among the various divisions of Gbi. Another 
example to which we have already referred is the ”Dra-to lands” 
of Aveme-Dra in Aveme, to which no-family, stool or individual 
holds the paramount title. In Kpando also we are told of the 
”Kpatoe lands” near the Volta Elver which belonged to no family 
or stool until they were recently flooded by the waters of the 
Volta Lake.
The more common type of communal lands in the Northern 
Ewe area of Ghana are the grasslands, known as dzogbe. The 
dzogbe is the grassland as contrasted with forest land or ave.
The grassland or dzogbe was regarded as being of little economic 
value to the farmer because only annual food crops like cassava 
and maize could be cultivated on it. Such lands were, therefore, 
left untouched in the scramble for the acquisition of land by 
the families. The result was that until recently nobody held 
the. paramount .title to the grasslands or dzogbe and they re­
mained communal lands.
It is perhaps necessary to emphasise the free and open 
nature of communal lands among the Ewe, They do not belong to 
the stool, nor does the paramount title to them vest in any 
family or individual. Therefore, every citizen is entitled to 
make farms on any unoccupied portions of the communal- lands. 
"Occupation” as regards communal lands of the grassland or 
dzogbe is strictly construed. Occupation of dzogbe creates 
in the farmer an interest which lasts only until the harvesting 
of his crops. At the longest this may be only'an annual 
interest. There is no recognition here of the concept of 
fallow land or afuu with any prior right of re-occupation in 
the previous farmer. Hence, although regard must be had to 
the right of the farmer to harvest his crops, the land falls 
into the common pool as soon as it ceases to be under active 
cultivation,......................................
As a rule no permission was necessary to go into occupation 
of any unoccupied portion of the communal lands, not even the 
chief1s permission. Occupation of such lands, therefore, was
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not permissive but flowed as an inherent common right arising 
by law from citizenship. However, unlike the case of forest 
land or ave. such occupation of an unoccupied portion of com­
munal lands could never ripen into the acquisition of a para­
mount title therein, based on the appropriation of a res nullius. 
because in law the paramount title was incapable of being 
acquired in dzogbe.
V/hat, then, is the position, as regards legal title? If 
we should ask any knowledgeable Ewe man about title to these 
lands his answer would be, Dzogbe n.yigba menye amea deke to o: 
en.ye fia to. The meaning is "The grassland is owned by nobody: 
it belongs to the chief". This expression, however, needs a 
careful analysis. In the case of the Ewe-type stool land, where 
it exists, the Northern Ewe term it zikpui n.yigba or kpukpo 
nyigba, which means "the stool’s land". In the case of the 
communal lands a legal distinction is drawn between the "stool" 
(that is zikpui or kpukpo) and the "chief" or fia who occupies 
that stool. Hence, of the communal land it is said en.ye fia to 
or "it belongs to the chief". The reason for this distinction 
is that "en.ye fia to" is an elliptical expression which really 
means that it is under the jurisdiction of the chief as head of 
the community. Its full import' is that it is communal land 
available for use by any member of the community. The chief, 
whether in his personal or official capacity, has no proprietary 
interest in communal lands. His right to the use of such land 
is none greater than that of any of his subjects.
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It may be pointed out that the question of legal title 
to the dzogbe communal lands is a modern one which did not 
bedevil the indigenous lav;. The dzogbe or grassland being * 
incapable of being the subject of an exclusive paramount interest 
but available to all, it was inalienable as well. Therefore, 
questions of title were never raised. It is only recently, 
after the inception of European rule, that the issue of title 
to these lands has been raised from time to time. Since then 
the tendency has been to assume that since every individual 
subject has a several common right to the use of the communal 
land and since the communal land is subject to the overall 
political control of the divisional chief or fia. the paramount 
title must be regarded as vested in the political head of the 
community, who is the chief. This, however, is only an expedient 
to answer the continued pressure from both the government and 
investors who would like to identify a title holder in cases 
of the acquisition of an interest in these communal lands.
Some chiefs and stool families have, however, sought to extend 
the proposition by making claims to the paramount title in some 
communal lands.
In one case in the Wli area, the stool-father claimed that 
the communal land, known as "Haveme land" was the property of 
his stool family. In that case, Boniface Nkekesi, Zikpuitor of
VJIi-Afegame v. Marcelinus Anku of Wli-Afegame.^ the trial Native
~  Boniface Nkekesi. Zikpuitor of Wli-Afegame v. Marcelinus 
Anku of Wli-Afegame. Unreported, Akpini Native Appeal Court, 
Kpando, 6th April, 195k*
393*
Court rejected the plaintiff stool-father’s claim on the ground
that the paramount title to communal lands was incapable of
being held by any individual or family, not even by the stool
family. On appeal to the Akpini Native Appeal Court at Kpando,
the appeal was dismissed and the Native Appeal Court stated the
law.thus; ..........................................................
The above speaks by itself in that the land in dispute ... 
has always been succeeded by chiefs of the Division and 
not by any ordinary man or woman ... The Court is greatly 
convinced, too, that fIiavemef land being the land in dis­
pute is a communal land and not an individual person’s 
land property ... That according to native customary law, 
the chief of a Division becomes automatically headman for 
communal land or lands in the Division, and that none of 
the said chiefs1 families has the right to claim that 
communal land as their father’s property ... 1
From the statement by the Native Appeal Court it can be seen
that communal lands in the Northern Ewe area are not stool
lands and even the stool family cannot claim any proprietary
interest in them.
As regards litigation of title to such communal lands,
especially when title is contested on behalf of another chiefdom,
the proper person to prosecute or defend the action is the
chief, usually the head chief. That, however, does not mean
that communal lands are stool lands in the Ewe sense. That is
2
why we have disagreed with the definition in Ameoda v. Pordier. 
that stool land is "any land in respect of which an occupant of
a stool is the proper person to conduct its extra-territorial
1. Ibid,, at pp,192-3 of Civil Appeals Decord Book,
2. (1962) 1 G.L.K. 200.
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affairs". For, although we have submitted that the head stool
in Northern Eweland does not hold the paramount title to all the
lands of the chiefdom, yet there are cases in which Ewe chiefs
have litigated title to communal lands. There is the case, for
instance, of Togbe Gbogbolulu v. Togbe Ho do'*' in which there was
a dispute between the two head chiefs of Fiagawo or Vakpo and
Anfoega respectively concerning the title to certain lands.
The dispute centred primarily around the question 01 the correct
identification of the inter-chiefdom boundary between the two
chiefdoms as delineated by Dr. Gruner, then German Commissioner
at Misahohe, during the German colonial administration. The
dispute assumed such form because, once the inter-chiefdom
boundary was determined, all lands falling on one side of the
2
boundary would belong to the chiefdom on that side. When
asked the capacity in which his predecessor had litigated over
these communal lands, Togbe Tepre Hodo III, Fiaga of Anfoega,
offered a written reply in which he stated:
We have two systems of land holding in our area. (a) All 
forest lands are owned by individual families and stool 
families. These individual lands are almost always forest 
lands ... (b) The grasslands are our communal lands.
These lands in aggregate are held in trust by the Fiaga 
for all the people ... All farming and hunting on these 
lands are done by both citizens and strangers without 
hindrance. In fact you need not obtain permission from
either the Fiaga or a subordinate chief before farming
or hunting on these lands ... In the case of litigation 
over such communal lands, the%Fiaga leads as the trustee 
and the litigation is financed by the whole people, in 
that the land in lav; properly belongs to the people, The 
cost of that litigation v;as borne by the people. The 
Fiaga had no individual interest ....
13 Togbe Gbogbolulu v. Togbe Hodo, (19kl) 7 W,A,C.A . l£k3
2. On the principle in Doh v. Klu, supra.
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Those comments of Togbe Hodo are typical of those from other 
Fiagawo in the Northern Ewe area. The Fiaga1s reference to 
his position as trustee may be excused, as he explains that 
the Fiaga "leads" the people in contesting claims to such lands. 
It is a fight by the whole people, led by their Fiaga as he would 
have done in-the days- of tribal-warfare. It is the same idea 
that the Akpini Native Appeal Court expressed in Boniface 
Nkekesi. Zikpuitor of V/li Afegame v. Marcelinus Anku^ by saying 
that the head chief is "headman" for communal lands. For the 
communal lands belong to the entire people and not to the stool 
or the stool family.
The traditional view of Ewe law is what we have expressed, 
that grassland or dzogbe is communal land in which the entire 
community has the right of user and that the paramount title 
thereto cannot' be vested in the families or the stools. How­
ever, since the inception of European rule, the law on this 
point has not remained totally unchanged. The regret of many 
informants is that the communal lands are rapidly disappearing 
through the avarice of those holding the paramount title to the 
adjoining forest lands. It is stated that the German colonial 
authorities had changed the law by declaring that the paramount 
title to the grassland or dzogbe n.yigba was vested in those who 
held the paramount title to the adjoining forest lands. This
1. Supra,
change has apparently been readily embraced in many areas. In 
most Ewe areas today, therefore, these grasslands no longer 
exist as communal lands of which one can say en.ye fia to or 
"it belongs to the chief11. The law today seems to be that the 
family which holds the paramount title to the forest land also 
has title to the adjoining grassland in a straight line. This 
means that the forest land or ave is deemed to extend in all 
directions that it is bordered by a grassland or dzogbe. until 
a boundary is agreed in each direction with the holder of the 
paramount title to the forest land bordering on the other end 
of the grassland. If such a boundary cannot be agreed, it is 
arbitrarily settled mid-way between the two forest lands. So 
complete is the acceptance of the new rule that, in a place 
like Abutia, it is stated that from time immemorial the para­
mount title to the grassland or dzogbe has been vested in the 
holders of the title to the adjoining forest lands. The recent 
rule has been allowed to crystallise into a rule of customary 
law, not only in Abutia but also in Gbi. Thus in Noviewu v . 
Gazo.  ^ a case from Gbi-Kledzo in Gbi, the plaintiffs sued in 
trespass but the substantive issue was the question of title to 
the "Dzogbekpo land" which was grassland or dzogbe. Before 
considering the question of trespass, the trial Atando Native 
Court, sitting at Hohoe, gave the dictum on grassland or dzogbe 
that:
d. Noviewu v. Gazo. Unreported, Suit No. k6/52, Atando Native 
Court, Hohoe, Bind October, 1932, at p.281 of Civil Decord Book.
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According to the evidence of both parties and their 
witnesses, it is certain that both parties and Paul Yawo 
have forest lands at this Dzogbekpo respectively and for 
which a grassland is lying between their respective lands 
, ,, According to our Gbi native customary law, if some 
forest lands are having grassland between them every 
respective forest land among them should continue into 
the grassland, Hence the forest land on which this ant­
hill (being a boundary mark) is standing should not simply 
stop at the end of the forest land but should normally 
enter into the grassland ahead accordingly ..... 1
With this the plaintiffs succeeded on the question of title to 
the grassland or dzogbe. It is submitted on the strength of 
field research that this decision represents the current trend 
in the law in most areas.
Although a change has been brought about in the law, so 
that generally the grassland or dzogbe is being deprived of its 
communal character and is being claimed by individual families, 
there has been little change in the corollary to the original 
law of communal interests in dzogbe lands, whereby any citizen 
may cultivate the grassland without permission from anybody. 
Today, therefore, it is still generally the law that any 
citizen, and even a stranger, may freely cultivate the grassland 
or dzogbe. for the purpose of growing foodstuffs, without per­
mission from anybody, not even from the holder of the paramount 
or dependent interest in the adjoining forest land, who may be 
adjudged to hold the.paramount interest in the grassland. Any 
entry upon the grassland for the purpose of cultivating such a
1. Noviewu v. Gazoy supra, at p,283 of Civil Record Book.
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farm, therefore, does not constitute an act of trespass action­
able at Ewe law. Thus in the case of Noviewu v. Gazo.1 a case 
from Gbi to which we have just referred, although the substantive 
issue was the question of title, the plaintiffs founded their 
action in trespass because the defendants had cultivated food­
stuffs on their (plaintiffs*) grassland or dzogbe. The Atando 
Native Court, Hohoe, found for the plaintiffs on the question 
of title but rejected the claim for damages for trespass and 
said:
According to our Gbi native customs, mere food farms 
made on grasslands show no trespass and do not give 
any title to ownership ... /Hence7 the trespass so 
alleged by the Plaintiffs to have been committed by 
the Defendants on their (Plaintiffs*) land is unfounded.
We therefore enter judgment for the Defendants ... 2
The decision in the above case is also supported by the written
statement by Togbe Tepre Hodo III, Fiaga of Anfoega, already
referred to, when he says of the grassland or dzogbe that
all farming and hunting on these lands are done by both 
citizens and strangers without hinderance. In fact you 
need not obtain permission from either the Fiaga or a 
subordinate chief before farming or hunting on these 
lands.
This is the general opinion throughout the Northern Ewe area.
It is the free access to the grassland or dzogbe which distin­
guishes it from the forest land or ave, which had properly been 
reduced into occupation and subjected to proprietary acquisition 
by the families bolding the paramount title to them.
Noviewu v. Gaz~ supra, at pp. 28^-285 ol 6'ivil Record Book.
2. Supra.
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One cannot, however, predict for how long the ordinary 
citizen may continue to enjoy the open liberty of farming on 
the grassland or dzogbe without the permission of the holder 
of the paramount interest in the land. The attempt by the 
plaintiffs in Noviewu v. Gazo to treat such farming on another’s 
grassland or dzogbe as an act of trespass was not successful.
But it is one of several cases symptomatic of the attitude 
developing among those who have now become holders of the 
paramount interest in the grasslands or dzogbe. With the 
continued pressure on arable land, it would appear that holders 
of the paramount title to grasslands would eventually assert 
their exclusive rights over the grasslands in the same manner 
as they do over the forest lands, so that farming without the 
permission of the families holding the paramount title might 
in future be wholly prohibited. Even in a place like Anfoega, 
where the Fiaga declares that any citizen and even a stranger 
may farm freely on communal lands, there is a qualification that, 
if the person carries on commercial activities like making 
charcoal for sale or planting semi-permanent cash crops, then 
some form of rent or tribute becomes payable to the traditional 
authority for development purposes which apparently do not 
include stool or chieftaincy affairs. In Kpando also it is 
stated that permission, now granted as a matter of formality, 
must be obtained from the divisional chief to use communal 
lands, thus very much resembling stool lands proper.
1. Supra.
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The Kpando and Anfoega examples are cases where the chief’s
authority is being asserted over communal lands. In places
where the communal nature of these lands is disappearing, the
families holding the paramount interest in the lands are even
exerting greater powers of control. In Abutia it is stated
that, although no permission was formerly needed to enter upon
grassland or dzogbe for farming, such permission must now be
obtained from the family In which the paramount title to the
dzogbe is vested, even for the cultivation of foodstuffs.
Similarly it is maintained in Taviefe that, although in the
past the paramount title to grassland or dzogbe could not be
held by any individual or family, the change of law which now
confers title also makes it necessary to seek the permission
of the title holder before entering upon the grassland for the
purpose of cultivation of food crops. It will be realised from
this that the case of Noviewu v. Gazo.^ although decided along
the lines of the rule applicable in most chiefdoms, would be
decided differently in places like Abutia and-Taviefe and the
/ -
defendants would probably have been found liable In damages for
i
trespass for cultivating foodstuff farms on the plaintiffs1 
grassland or dzogbe without permission. This trend, however 
regrettable, is a logical development because the paramount 
title to land becomes meaningless and void if any member of the 
public may enter upon the land at any time for the cultivation
1, Sunra.
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of a farm. For the right of the holder of the paramount title 
to exclude other persons from the land is one of the incidents 
which distinguish individual family property from communal 
lands,
Town Lands ............................  ......................
By "town land” here we mean a territorial area permanently 
settled upon by the subjects of a chiefdom with dwelling houses 
therecn, It is thus to be distinguished from the farming lands 
which ordinarily form the bulk of the lands of the division or 
chiefdom. The term 11 town land’1 is, therefore, used here only 
as a matter of convenience and in conformity with local usage.
In most cases the chiefdom territorially settles in separate 
and detached divisions. In most cases, therefore, "town land" 
or jgjbcme nyigba refers to the land on which a particular division 
is settled. Where the constituent divisions are within a close 
proximity to each other or are joined, it may mean the settled 
area of the chiefdom as a whole; otherwise the "town lands" of 
one division may be separated from those of another division 
within the same chiefdom.
Among the Northern Ewe, town lands are regarded and treated 
as ordinary lands of the chiefdom as far as proprietary 
interests in them are concerned. The paramount title to town 
lands, therefore, is vested in the respective families, just in
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the same way that the families hold, the title to their farming 
and other lands. Usually it is one family or the other that 
releases its lands for occupation by the whole community as a 
town land. Hence, although political control over town lands 
is perhaps more pronounced because of the necessity to regulate 
so.cial life, town lands do not thereby become stool lands. They 
remain family lands in which the stool as such has no proprietary 
interest, though as town lands they are open to every subject 
of the stool who wishes to build on them and no rent is payable 
for such use.
It seems that in many parts of Ghana, excluding the 
Northern Ewe area, town lands for building purposes are stool 
lands of which allocations are made to the respective families. 
The right to build on the town lands is, therefore, only con­
ferred by a grant, express or implicit, to each individual in 
those parts of Ghana. Thus, although the individual is not 
ordinarily rationed in the use of his family land,1 limits are 
set to the amount of bpilding land in the township that he may 
use for building.
Regarding town lands it was stated by Ollennu, J., in 
Oblee v. Armah that:
It is different in the case of lands adjoining the town 
which are ready for development for the extension of the 
town ... In the case of such lands, express permission 
of the stool is always required, and limits are set to
1. Oblee v. Armah. (1958) 3 V/.A.L.R. A8A.
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the extent of land which one subject may occupy .,,
It is in the case of such grants that the area granted 
to the subject is demarcated. 1
The above dictum is based on the assumption that the town lands
are stool lands because "express permission of the stool is
always required11. We cannot, therefore, be guided by the
dictum in Qblee v, Armah.in the Northern Ewe area of Ghana where
town lands are diffeTently administered. For the basic position
in Northern Eweland is that the paramount title to the town
lands, like the rest of the lands, is vested in the respective
families. The Ewe town lands, therefore, are not stool lands
and the stools have no proprietary interest in them. Neither
are the town lands communal lands. They are family properties.
Though the paramount title to them still remains in the
respective families, town lands are nevertheless subject to
public rights of user which largely derogate from the private
nature of the property. The reason lies in the mode of acquiring
town lands. The procedure is that the divisional chief and
his councillors, on behalf of the entire divisional community,
approach the family holding title to the lands with a request
to release the lands needed for the settlement of the community
as a township.. The request is made at divisional level because
each chiefdom settles on divisional basis. Although the
family holding the paramount title to the lands is technically
in a position to refuse to grant the request, the pressure of
1. Ibid., p.Z|.8A.
public opinion is so overwhelming that the request can hardly 
ever he refused without incurring public opprobrium and possible 
ostracism. The consent of the family is, therefore, normally 
obtained only as a matter of formality and as a matter of course.
Once the family*s consent has been formally obtained for 
.the occupation of the land as town land, it becomes family land 
with a difference. Individual members of the division have a 
common right in the land which is the right to build houses for 
dwelling purposes. This very severely restricts the exercise 
by the family of rights flowing from its paramount title to the 
lands. For the family thereafter has no effective control over 
the use of the land, as citizens cannot be rationed in their use 
of town lands by the title holding family. The citizens select 
places according to their individual choices, the only guiding 
principle being that in practice the members of the same sub­
division or saa settle in close proximity to each other, so that 
the saa is an identifiable sector of the divisional township.
That is why the sub-divisional elder or saame1metsitsi is 
usually informed through the head of family or dzotinu1metsitsi 
when intending to build on a plot within the sub-divisional area 
or saame.
■ Once the area has been settled upon as a township, the 
sites selected by individuals cannot be taken away from them 
even by the family holding the paramount title to the land.
Not only can the individual not be dispossessed of his building 
site in his own life-time, but he also has in the site an
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inheritable interest which he may hand down to his children and 
successors. However, the interest is not that of a purchaser 
of the paramount title and is far short of it. Therefore, al­
though the builder may sell his house, he cannot alienate the 
paramount title to the land, on which it stands by a transfer 
inter vivos or by a testamentary disposition. However, it is 
inheritable only by his children or members of his family or 
dzotinu. It is thus a very limited interest which does not go 
beyond the right to have a house on the land.
On the death of the individual builder, if the buildings 
are still standing they are inherited by his children or succes­
sors on intestacy. Should the buildings collapse after, or even 
before, the death of the. builder, the site still remains reserved 
to members of his family and will not revert to the general pool 
of town lands unless there is the rare act of unequivocal aban­
donment by the individual or the family. Abandonment, however, 
is not only rare but difficult to establish. As was stated by 
Ollennu, J., in Total Oil Products Ltd.. v, Obeng:^
Abandonment has a special meaning in customary law.
Mere neglect or non-user of land for a period however 
long, does not by itself constitute abandonment.
Some act or conduct must be exhibited by the owner 
which show's intention not to use the land any longer. 2
Abandonment by the family even after the death of the original
occupier is difficult to establish. Usually even when the
1. (1962) 1 G.L.R. 228.
2. Total Oil Products Ltd.. v, Obeng, (1962) 1 -G.L.R. 228, 2.3b.
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buildings collapse it takes quite some time before new ones are 
erected in their place. If the children of the deceased are 
too young or incapable of erecting new buildings it may require 
some time. In the event of failure or inability of the 
deceased*s children, the family or dzotinu of the deceased 
would eventually, authorise another relative from the same family 
to build on the spot. Even when the visible walls or gli have 
been washed away, the old building site is still known as glidzi 
which literally means non top of the walls” . So long as it is 
somebody’s glidzi. even though the grass may have grown, and 
indeed usually grows, there, it is different from an unoccupied 
land; for the glidzi cannot be sold by the holder of the para­
mount title to the land, and it cannot be re-occupied, by any 
other citizen except with the consent of the deceased’s family 
or dzotinu. Because usually there is a long intervention of 
time even after the collapse of the original buildings, it is 
well-nigh impossible to say that a building site has been 
abandoned by the individual or his family merely because for 
many years a new building has not been erected in place of the 
collapsed one. Particularly in these days of the growing 
scarcity of land, families and individuals jealously guard 
their rights to the use of the glidzi or old building sites of 
members of the family or' dzotinu, whether dead or living.
Abandonment may, however, be manifested by the individual 
and his family physically moving away to settle elsewhere. If 
the individual builder alone moves away, this is not abandonment
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because the right to use the site so left by him passes to his 
family or dzotinu. There is abandonment only when the individual 
moves away as part of his family, and such occasions are rare 
today. An example, however, occurred in the 1930’s in Gbi when 
a section of the division of Gbi-Kpeme, because of an intractable 
chieftaincy, dispute, broke -away to form the new-division of Gbi- 
Abansi. In that case the building sites abandoned by those who 
left for the new settlement became available for occupation by 
other citizens. Similarly, the people of Gbi-Godenu abandoned 
their building sites in Gbi-V/egbe in the .19A0’s when they moved 
away to constitute themselves into a new division. Technically 
such abandoned sites become available to the family which holds 
the paramount title to the land, for sale or other forms of 
alienation, provided that no citizen earlier manifests his 
intention to build on them.
Generally the chief has no proprietary interest in lav; 
over town lands and cannot exercise proprietary control over 
them. They belong to the entitled families. However, in some 
places the chiefs have been attempting to influence the use of 
town lands, with the explanation that, it is a function which 
forms part of the chief’s general responsibility for the welfare 
and development of the township, the village or the settlement.
In Kpando, for example, it is stated that any person wishing to 
build on town land must first obtain permission from the fia or 
divisional chief (not the head chief), through his sub-divisional 
chief or saamefia. The explanation for this procedure does not
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lie in the existence of any proprietary interest of the stool 
or the chief in town lands, but in the assumption of respon­
sibility by the chief for development and planning, in much 
the same way that the central government or local authority 
would today have to approve of building plans in the urban areas 
and townships. It has gone so far that in Kpedze and Awudome 
the law is stated that, even if the interest holding family 
refuses, the local chief can authorise a citizen to build on 
town lands, as it may result in the restriction of the growth 
and development of the town or village if the grant of permis­
sion is left to the unfettered discretion of the families holding 
the paramount interest in town lands. The rationale and justif­
ication for such a residuary power in the chief is that, by 
giving their original consent to the settlement of the community 
on the town lands, the families have surrendered their rights 
of exclusive control and have accepted some measure of common 
rights over the lands. Furthermore, the control by the chief 
is necessary as a political control, as seen in any system of 
government today. In spite of these limitations, the families 
have not lost the proprietary title to their lands which have 
become town lands. For the family holding the paramount title 
in the town land may sell any unoccupied portions of its land 
within the town just like any other of its lands. There are, 
however, restrictions generally accepted as regards which un­
occupied portions of town lands may be sold in this way. In 
particular, as has already been stated, the family holding the
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paramount interest cannot sell a citizen1s old building site 
cr glidzi merely because the building has fallen into ruins or 
las totally collapsed and there has been no attempt to rebuild 
there, unless there is a clear and unequivocal abandonment of 
the site. Similarly, the land holding family may not sell 
unoccupied town land which .is a space left.between existing 
buildings in the same compound, otherwise there can be no 
expansion and extension of existing buildings.
Gradually but somewhat effectively, families holding the 
paramount title to town lands are beginning to assert their 
power of control over town lands, partly because of the enhanced 
economic value of land since their ancestors consented to the 
settlement of these lands as townships. It is stated as still 
the law in places like Gbi, Aveme, V/usuta, Taviefe, Kpedze, 
Awudome, Ho and most other areas that a citizen needs no per­
mission to build a dwelling house on town lands. However, in 
other places,'notably Peki and Abutia, it seems to be the law 
now that formal permission must be sought from the holder of 
the paramount title to the land before building on town lands. 
Though it is explained that such permission for a citizen is 
only a mere formality and is granted as a matter of course, 
there is no reason to assume that this development may not in 
time lead to the crystallisation of the right to withhold such 
permission until valuable consideration is forthcoming. Signs 
of such a development are already noticeable even in a less 
urbanised place like Matse where it is now the law that a 
citizen must seek permission from the family holding the
paramount title to the land before building on town lands, and 
that such permission must be sought with such expensive drinks 
cs v/hi sky and schnapps. In the course of time the 11 drink” or 
sha may be commuted to cash payments. In Anfoega it has gone 
even further because not only must permission be obtained, but 
the traditional council has fixed the consideration for the 
grant of such permission as cash payment of about three to five 
guineas (i.e. between N/ 6.30 and N/10.50) in lieu of'"drinks” , 
depending on the size of land granted.
Owing to the growing commercialisation of land through 
buildings which are in the nature of capital investment, families 
holding the paramount title to town lands are naturally ques­
tioning the unrestricted right of the citizen to build on town 
lands. The question is whether a citizen may freely build on 
town lands in excess of what is reasonably necessary for dwelling 
purposes and with a view to letting out the rooms for profit.
It is being contended that, where a citizen builds several houses 
which are- clearly intended to be rented, then this exceeds the 
normal limits of free use of town lands and the citizen must 
pay some rent therefor. A case involving this issue arose a few 
years ago in Gbi-Kpeme in Gbi. In the case of Thomas Kuma v.
Yawo Akoto.^ a native of Gbi-Kpeme, who.had only a small family, 
already-had several houses In Gbi-Kpeme on different sites on 
the town lands. Most of the rooms in these houses were let out
1. Thomas Kuma v. Yawo Akoto, Unreported, Suit No. 32/33 of
1953, Gbi-Hohoe Native Court, Kohoe, at p.118 of Civil Record 
Book.
for profit. The said citizen then began constructing another 
large building of many rooms on an open space forming part of 
the compound of one of his premises. There could be no doubt 
that these rooms were only meant to be let out for profit.
The plaintiff, as head of the Xevi family of Gbi-Kpeme, 
the family that holds the paramount title to that- part of the 
Gbi-Kpeme town lands, demanded that one room in the proposed 
r.ew building be given to the said Xevi family in lieu of rent 
for the land.. The demand was interpreted as an attempt to 
demand ground rent from a citizen for building on town lands 
snd the matter was reported to the defendant, then the Regent 
of Gbi-Kpeme, The defendant Regent, without discussing the 
matter with the family in which the paramount title was vested, 
ordered the prospective builder not to comply with the request 
of the said family and authorised him to proceed with the 
building in exercise of his rights as a citizen.
The plaintiff, as head of the Xevi family, therefore, sued 
the defendant as Regent of the Gbi-Kpeme Stool, claiming £25 
damages for "interfering with the inheritance of the Plaintiff1s 
landed property ..."
The judgment of the Gbi-Hohoe Native Court, then constituted 
by a panel of members, is interesting when contrasted with the 
opinion of the Head Chief. In his evidence on behalf^of the 
defendant, it was deposed by Togbe Kwasi Gabusu IV, Fiag& of 
Gbi, that:
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... Since from the time of the Germans, no native of 
Gbi who wanted to build has to consult the town land 
owner or the chief or anybody before erecting the walls, 
and because of this the inhabitants of the town use to 
fight for the peace of the town ... 1
The Head Chief was fully supported by the senior divisional
chief, Togbe R. Kofi Buarni VI of Gbi-Bla, who said in evidence:
Since I was born,- I have never heard that a native of 
Gbi built a living house after obtaining permission 
from the landlord to do so. Any native has the full 
right to build a living house freely on town lands 
without obtaining any permission. If your father 
built and he died, his son has the right to build 
on his late father’s premises (sic) ... 2
By "living house" Togbe Buarni meant a dwelling house as
distinguished from a factory or other business premises.
The clear evidence by the' traditional rulers on the native
lav: was brushed aside by the Native Court who gave judgment for
the plaintiff as head of the family in which the paramount title
was vested. In its judgment the Gbi-Hohoe Native Court said:
In fact it is most annoying that Defendant gave L.A. 
authority to build on Plaintiff’s land without the 
knowledge and consent of Plaintiff the landowner, and 
it is wrong on the part of the Defendant that when he 
received the report from L.A. concerning the conditions 
given him by the Plaintiff about his new building he 
the Defendant failed to call the Plaintiff landowner to 
interview him about the conditions the Plaintiff so 
gave ... On account of the above facts this Court sees 
it clearly that Defendant really interfered with Plain­
tiff’s landed property as Defendant is not a member of 
Plaintiff’s family and therefore has no interest in 
Plaintiff’s landed property ... 3
1. Thomas Kuma v, Yawo Akoto. supra, at p.176 of Civil Record 
Book.
2. Ibid.. at p.188 of Civil Record Book.
3. Ibid,, at pp. 190-191 of Civil Record Book,
The Native Court thus appears to have condemned the 
defendant Regent on the ground of having authorised the 
citizen to build on the town lands "without the knowledge and 
consent" of the plaintiff as head of the family holding the 
paramount title to the town land. Knowledge and consent, how­
ever, are not the same thing. As regards "knowledge" the 
Native Court elaborated by explaining that the Regent was wrong 
in not discussing the matter with the title holding family be­
fore authorising that construction work should proceed. On 
this point the Native Court had the support of the Fiaga himself 
who, in the course of his evidence, also stated that:
It is the duty of every native whom a certain condition 
is given on building on the town land to report the 
condition to the chief of that town. It is"the duty 
of the chief that receives such complaint to invite 
the landowner who gave the condition and warn him not 
to do so again .., The chief of that town should by 
all means invite the town landowner and talk to him 
and warn him. 1
While both the Native Court and the Fiaga concur in the opinion
that the matter must first be discussed by the chief with the
holder of the paramount title to the town lands, they disagree
on the objective of such a discussion. The Fiaga makes it
clear that the purpose of such an interview with the holder
of the paramount title is not to solicit his consent but to
"warn" him against the imposition of any conditions on the use
of town lands by natives. In the Fiaga’s opinion, therefore, the
lav; is settled that no restrictions can be imposed on citizens
1. Thomas Kuma v. Yawo Akoto, supra, at p.176 of Civil Record 
Book':-------------------------  —
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with respect to town lands and the holder of the paramount 
title is simply to be warned to desist from attempting to go 
contrary to established law and practice.
The Native Court, on the other hand, was not so explicit 
in its reference to the necessity for obtaining the consent of 
the holder of the paramount title before building, on .town . . . . 
lands. By giving only a brief and cursory treatment to the 
question of consent by the family holding the paramount title, 
to the town lands, the Native Court, perhaps deliberately, 
avoided making a direct and authoritative pronouncement on 
the central issue of whether the chief can overrule the family 
which holds the paramount title to the town lands as far as 
the building rights of citizens are concerned. Though the 
trial Native Court rightly censured the Regent for failing to 
discuss the matter with the interest holding family, it did 
not provide the answer to the main question of what were the 
powers of the chief in the event of that family*s consent 
being not forthcoming even after such a consultation. In other 
words the question which was left unanswered was whether the 
Native Court would still have found for the plaintiff, if the 
facts were that the Regent had discussed the matter with the 
land holding .family but, failing to obtain their agreement to- 
lift the condition, he nevertheless subsequently authorised 
the citizen to proceed with his building on the town lands.
The answer given in Kpedze and Awudome, and which the Fiaga of 
Gbi also stated in the present case, is that the chief reserves
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the power to authorise any citizen to build on town lands even 
if the family holding the paramount title to the town lands 
attempts to impose any limitations or conditions on the citizenfs 
right; for without such a residuary but overriding authority 
in the chief, personal inclinations and even greed and mercenary 
motives of members-of the families holding■the paramount'title " 
to town lands could result in a restriction on the expansion 
and development of the town or even lead to its disintegration.
Much can be said for either side of the argument because 
it is an example of a crisis in the law as a result of changing 
social and economic conditions. When the rule of the unrest­
ricted right of a citizen to build on town lands was formulated, 
the present townships were small communities and the renting 
of rooms for profit was not known. With urbanisation, general 
development and expansion, houses are now being built in most 
areas for the sole purpose of letting them out for profit, a 
phenomenon which was unknown to the old law and which it did 
not contemplate. The law itself must., therefore, also change 
to suit the changing economic and social conditions of today.
In comparatively smaller places like Aveme and Wusuta, it is 
hardly a surprise that it is maintained that no lawful restric­
tions can be placed on the number of houses that an Individual 
citizen can build. But even in such places there must be some 
measure of indirect control, such as public opinion, to impose 
some limit on the amount of town lands which an individual may
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grab for himself alone. In the rapidly developing urban areas 
like Ho, Kpando and Hohoe (Gbi), there is some force in the 
contention of those v;ho consider it unfair that individual 
citizens who already have dwelling houses should freely build 
on town lands for the obvious purpose of renting the rooms for 
profit. For this is. a commercialisation of land for personal 
gain which exceeds the mere exercise of the traditional right 
to build a house on town lands for personal occupation. In 
such cases, it' is submitted, the family holding the paramount 
interest in the town lands may be justified in insisting that 
such use of the town lands exceeds the permissive use contem­
plated by the old law and that either the plot of land concerned 
must be purchased by the builder or some form of ground rent 
must be paid for it. This could have been a reason for entering 
judgment in favour of the plaintiff in Thomas Kuma v, Yawo AkotoJ 
However, although the Native Court in that case appears to have 
generally arrived at the right decision by finding for the 
plaintiff as head of the family holding the paramount interest 
in the town lands, it did so for inadequate reasons because it 
did not direct its attention to the underlying social issues.
The Native Court also unfortunately, but perhaps deliberately, 
let slip the opportunity for a clear exposition of the law on 
town lands.
However inadequate the Native Court!s judgment may be, it 
leaves little doubt about the view it takes of town lands.
1, Supra,
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The view of the Native Court is that town lands retain their 
essential character of family property. Excusing the choice 
of language, this view is forcefully expressed by the Native 
Court when it says of the defendant in his capacity of Regent 
that
this Court sees it clearly that Defendant really inter- ■ ■ 
fered wrongly with Plaintiff’s landed property as 
Defendant is not a member of Plaintiff’s family and 
therefore has no interest in Plaintiff’s landed property.
The view of the Native Court, therefore, is that even the chief 
cannot interfere with the management and control of town lands 
unless he is also a member of the family that holds the para­
mount title to such lands. This is the view generally expressed 
as the law in most Ewe areas, though the extent of its appli­
cation is blurred by the equally forceful view that the chief 
may exercise some political control over town lands.
Unfortunately Thomas Kuma v, Yawo Akoto was not taken on 
appeal. This was perhaps the deliberate intention of the Native 
Court because of the possible repercussions of a clear and 
authoritative pronouncement on the issue. For while the Native 
Court found for the plaintiff land holder, it disallowed the 
damages on the ground that no injury was in fact occasioned.
The head of the family holding the paramount interest in the 
town land was, however, satisfied that his legal right had been 
upheld and he did not appeal. The Regent also did not appeal 
because he understood that his order was merely nullified 
because of his failure to have a prior consultation with the
land holding family and, while he incurred no damages, the 
matter was left to be settled between the citizen concerned 
and the family. Enquiries indicate that perhaps the full 
effect of the judgment was never really appreciated by either 
the parties, the builder or the citizens generally who had 
supported the Regent in the litigation. Be that as it may, 
it is understood that the builder concerned regarded the 
decision as a victory for the family holding the paramount 
interest in the town lands and has settled by agreeing to 
allocate a room to that family as demanded. No other instances 
have since arisen within the chiefdom and one cannot forecast 
the extent to which this principle may be pursued.
The strong argument against selling town lands to or 
demanding ground rent from citizens by the families which hold 
the paramount title to such lands is that, once the concession 
is made, no brakes can be placed on the desire of families to 
sell the land or demand rent in every case. Difficult cases 
would, for instance, arise where a citizen erects on town lands 
a large building, part of which he occupies but part of which 
he also lets out for profit. Would such a building be regarded 
as a personal dwelling house entitling the citizen to the free 
use of town lands? It is submitted, that., .if,.in view of all 
the facts, including the general standards of the locality, it 
can be concluded that the building is in the nature of a 
capital investment mainly for the purpose of gain, then the ,
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housebuilder must be giveii the choice of either paying rent 
for.the land or purchasing it at its market value. It is 
suggested, however, that in deciding these issues the Court 
must on social grounds lean in favour of free building by 
citizens.
Another pressing issue today is the availability of town 
lands, particularly in the expanding townships. One facet of 
the problem is the determination of the precise extent of what 
is known as town lands. Y/hen the families ceded their lands 
for occupation as townships many generations ago, these com­
munities were but small settlements. It was, therefore, not 
necessary to define with exactness the actual extent of the 
lands so granted. Today the population is growing fast and in 
every township the town lands are expanding outwards. Parts of 
surrounding lands not previously intended to be used as town 
lands or gborne nyigba are being occupied as such. The question 
is whether the citizens have a right of occupation by extending 
the limits of the town lands. To accede to such unlimited 
extension of town lands means the deprivation of families of 
their lands which they do not intend to offer or release for 
public use, which is an economic injustice arising from an 
invasion of.their proprietary rights.. On the other hand, to . 
unduly restrict the expansion of the township to its small 
original limits would inhibit and even prevent the growth and 
expansion of the township, which is socially both indefensible 
and undesirable. The solution seems to be to balance the
proprietary interests against the social justification for the 
continued expansion of townships.
In Kpando the question came before the court in Ashiemoa 
v . Bani, In that case, because of the expansion of the town, 
the plaintiff!s land at Kpando'became what the High Court 
described as -"outskirt land”, that .is, land on the peripheral 
boundary of the township or what is known in Ewe as gboto nyiaba, 
The chief contended that, inasmuch as the town had grown to 
those limits, the "outskirt land" or gboto nyigba became part 
of the town lands or gbome nyigba and, therefore, became stool 
property which was ’’absolutely vested in the stool for all 
purposes, namely, full title - ownership coupled with possession 
and occupation” The High Court, constituted by Ollennu, J,, 
as he then was, rejected the chief’s argument and held that 
even if there was such a custom by which a person was divested 
of his title when his land became outskirt land, it must be 
rejected as ’’contrary to natural justice, equity and good con­
science" . Those were still the days when native customary law 
was regarded as foreign law to be proved in the statutory courts
by evidence and when the High Court could invoke the "repugnancy 
3
clause” to dispose of intricate problems of customary law.
1, (1959) G.L.R. 130.
2, Ibid., at p. 132,-
3, Section 87 of the former Courts Ordinance, Cap, k- Nov: 
repealed.
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The "repugnancy clause11 has ceased to apply since the Courts 
Act 1960,^ came into force on 1 st July, I960, and the Courts 
Decree of 1 9 6 6 has not re-introduced it, Shouid the problem 
be posed today, therefore, it cannot be disposed of with the 
blanket declaration that the relevant customary lav/ is 
"repugnant to natural justice, equity and good conscience", 
whatever that phrase means.
Indeed the correct position is that no such Ewe customary 
law exists which divests a family of the title to its lands 
when such lands become part of the town lands. Both the trial' 
Native Court and the Kpando District Native Appeal Court rejected 
such a rule of customary law as non-existent. It was because 
of his knowledge of the non-existence of such a customary law 
that the second defence witness sought to treat the alleged law 
as a bye-law made by the stool; but he could not prove the 
passing of such a bye-law.
However, it seems that in Ashiemoa v, Bani,^ the argument 
on behalf of the chief was misconceived in averring that the 
land became vested in the stool for absolute title because it 
became part of the outskirt lands or town lands. The miscon­
ception was certainly fatal. The Ewe lav; is that even v/hen 
lands become town lands they do not thereby become stool lands,
1. The repealed Courts Act, I960 (C.A.9), Sections 66 8c 67; 
and the Interpretation Act, i9 6 0 (C.A.K), Sections 17 8c 18.
2. ' N.L.C. Decree No. 8 A of 1 9 6 6 .
3. Suiora,
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They still remain family lands though, because they are town 
lands, common rights of use for building purposes are a burden 
on the paramount title to such family lands. Therefore, the 
argument of the chief cannot be supported that such lands 
become stool lands in any sense. This could have been the 
basis of the judgment in favour of. the plaintiff, who, in this 
case, claimed the paramount title to the land.
If the argument in Ashiemoa v, Bani^ were simply that the 
Moutskirt land” or gboto nyigba had become part of the town 
lands or gborne nyigba in consequence of the natural expansion 
of the township and should, therefore, be treated as such, it 
could hardly be resisted in the traditional customary lav/. For 
townships cannot, in the view of the customary law, be confined 
within rigid boundaries without a scope for expansion. That is 
why township sites were always chosen with an eye inter alia on 
possible future expansion. The proprietary rights of the 
families holding the paramount interest in the town lands must 
be respected, but they should not be allowed to prevent the 
expansion of townships. If the assertion of such proprietary 
rights over town lands and outskirt lands is not curtailed, 
the development is likely to result in a situation when even 
citizens’ will have to rent dwelling rooms from rich landlords 
because, although such citizens can just manage to build their 
own dwelling houses, they cannot afford the extra money to
1. Supra,
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purchase the building site or pay the ground rent. However 
desirable this may be in modern times, it is contrary to the 
Ewe way of life. Such a development would lead to the dis­
integration of the family and the disruption of the whole 
pattern of society in this part of the country.
CHAPTER VII
FAMILY PROPERTY
The Meaning of Family Property
Stated simply, family property is property to which the 
paramount title is vested in a family. The only question, then, 
is what is the "family11. The answer we have suggested is that 
among the Northern Ewe-spcaking people of Ghana there is only 
one type of family, generally known as dzotinu. There are thus 
110 immediate as distinguished from wider families."^ The Fwe 
family or dzotinu. as we have seen, is in principle constituted 
by the patrilineal descendants of a male ancestor, members of 
the group being identifiable as a legal entity inter alia by 
their exclusive entitlement to ancestral property and the right 
of succession to interests in property and certain hereditary 
offices. ~ Family property in the Ewe context, therefore, means 
property to which the paramount title is vested in the family 
or dzotinu. . It is, "dzotinu. properly11. , This, characterisation . . 
excludes from the ambit of "family property" even undivided 
property in which the absolute interest is jointly held by the
1 . See flp.^ h£fcg~'supra.
2. See /p. 1-Q3 I&» supra.
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children and descendants of a deceased man as successors, insofar 
as such children and descendants do not constitute a family or 
dzotinu. Similarly it is not family property if property is 
acquired by two or more members of the family through their own 
exertions or as a result of a gift, a bequest or a devise made 
to them jointly and personally. Such property, inasmuch the 
interest in it is jointly vested in several individuals, is a 
group property; but it is not a family property because those 
holding the interest in it do not constitute a family as under­
stood in Ewe law.
The essential nature of Ewe family property, therefore, 
is that the absolute title to it is held by the corporate entity 
known as dzotinu and not merely by some of its members individ­
ually. The ultimate control and management of such property, as 
well as the paramount title thereto, vest in the family as an 
entity and not merely in some part of it. Disposition of such 
family property is valid only if effected by the head of the
family or dzotinu1metsitsi. acting on the authority of the
2principal elders of the family. In other words the property is 
family property or dzotinu property if, but only if, title to it 
is vested in the family or dzotinu as an entity, such that its 
alienation is invalid except when effected by the head of the 
family with the authority of the principal members.of the 
family,
~  The nature of the familyfs paramount interest in property 
is discussed in pp. 2 9 2 - 2 9 5  supra.
2. See Chapter VII supra on the alienation of family interest 
in property.
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Family property as described above is practically non­
existent among the Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana, except 
for ancestral family lands. The reason for the non-existence of 
family property among the Northern Ewe is to be found in their 
system of succession to property. As explained below,^ the Ewe 
family does not succeed to the intestate estate of its deceased 
members. Although members of the family severally have a spes 
successionis in each otherfs self-acquired property, the spes 
successjonis is in the individual members and not in the family 
as a unit. The right to succeed to rights in property derives 
from membership of the family, but the family itself never suc­
ceeds to the property rights of its members. For the family is 
not an ultimus heres in Ewe law. It is individuals who succeed 
to property and in every case an entitled individual must be 
found as successor. The principle of succession by am individual, 
as against the family as an entity, means that there is no re­
version in the family. The result is that the circumstances are 
inconceivable when, through the failure of successors, the 
property may devolve on the family as an entity. There is, 
therefore, no creation of or accretion or addition to family 
property today among the Ewe as a result of intestate succession.
The nature of the interest which.a.successor .takes in.......
inherited property also affords some explanation for the virtual 
non-existence of family property among the Ewe. The interest
1. See pp.625-626 infra.
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which a normal Ewe successor takes in an inherited property is 
that of a p u r c h a s e r T h i s  includes the absolute title if this 
was held by the predecessor in title; otherwise it is the 
highest interest held by the predecessor. The successor also 
has the capacity to alienate and dispose of his inherited 
interest in the property, either inter vivos or.post mortem.by . . . 
testamentary disposition. The inherited interest in the property, 
if not disposed of, is in turn inheritable by the successor of 
the original successor. The inherited property is, therefore, 
regarded for the practical purposes of Ewe law as a self­
acquired property of the successor, even as regards alienation 
and disposal, and is thus transmissible to a series of successors 
ad infinitum. This means that in any event the family does not 
acquire any title or vested interest in the intestate estate of 
its deceased members. Furthermore, even the spes successionis 
of the individual members of the family is effectively destroyed
if, as he is entitled to do, the successor disposes of the
2interest in the inherited property. In such a scheme of 
succession to interests in property, utterly different from 
Akan law, there can be no family property as a result of 
intestacy of deceased members of the family.
1, See pp. 708 and 7 1 3-4 infra.
2, For example, as did the successor who sold the property in 
Yaw0ga v , Yaw0ga. (1958) 3 V/.A.L.F. 309.
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There is a contrast here with the institution of family 
property among some of the other communities of Ghana, notably 
the Akan and the Ga, The lav; to be deduced from a long line of 
cases is that among some other Ghanaian communities the self­
acquired property of a deceased person automatically becomes
family property, o n .intestacy.1 ■ It is■the family and not.........
individuals who succeed to rights in property in such commun-
- j. • 2i^ies. Those who are appointed "successors" in such commun­
ities do not, therefore, enjoy more than a life interest In the 
property, thus lacking both the power of alienation inter vivos 
and of testamentary disposition as regards the inherited 
property. For the inherited property in such communities is 
indeed family property. In effect and in practice, therefore, 
there is a continuing addition to family property in those 
communities. This seems to be the origin of family property 
in some Ghanaian societies. As Ollennu puts it:
Ancestral family property is property which was once 
the individual self-acquired property of a very remote 
ancestor, and which has become vested in a very wide 
family, consisting of a number of small families or 
tribes, 3
The same view is held by Bentsi-Enchill that "self-acquired 
property is for ever becoming ancestral property",^
1. Larkai v. Arnorkor. (1933) 1 V/.A.C.A. 323; ' Amarfio v. Avorkor 
(195A) 1A V/.A.C.A. 33A; In re Eburahim. (1938) 3 V/.A.L.R. 317; 
Ennin v. Prah. (1939) G.L.R. AA; Kwakye v. Tuba. Unreported,
High Court, Accra, 20th September, 1961; and Krakue v, Krabah. 
Unreported, Supreme Court, Accra, 2Ath June, 19^3.
2 . N.A. Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession 
in Ghana, 1966, pp6 70, 558
3. N.A. Ollennu. Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana.
1 9 8 2 , p.33.
A# K. Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit.. p.183.
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However true these propositions may be of other communities, 
it is not correct to say that self-acquired property among the 
Ewe becomes family property on intestacy. The interest in self­
acquired property in Ewe law is succeeded to as of right by 
entitled successors and is never stamped with the character of 
family property even on intestacy.- As a result, in principle ■ 
the only property which can be identified as family-property 
among the Northern Ewe is the ancestral family land. This is 
not only legal logic; it is also the law as practised by the 
people. Throughout extensive field research a large number of 
heads of families were interviewed. Every single head of family 
stated that the only family property administered by him in that 
capacity were the family lands of ancestral origin. The interest 
in all other property, even though left intestate, is held by 
individual members of the family. The family as an entity has 
no title to such property, though each member of the family 
severally has a spes successlonis of varying degrees of remote­
ness in the property belonging-to another member.
It should not be understood, however, that apart from the 
ancestral family lands, other forms of family property cannot 
exist in Ewe law. Though on the empirical evidence such forms 
of family property, other than'family lands,'are noticeably rare, 
it is legally possible for them to be created by deliberate and 
conscious effort. In the first place any property purchased 
with money ‘from the proceeds of the sale of family property 
would automatically become family property, on the principle of
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the decision in Nelson v # Nelson.1 It is also possible that a 
member of the family or even a stranger may make an absolute 
gift inter vivos or a testamentary disposition in favour of the. 
family as an entity. In such a case the property becomes family 
property by reason of the gift, bequest or devise. Another 
possible genesis of family property is where members of. the . . . . 
family contribute money or other resources as constituents of 
the family and not in their individual capacities. The money 
itself automatically becomes family money. Any property acquired 
out of such family contributions also becomes family property. 
Indeed It is possible that there are other origins of family 
property which Ewe law would recognise. It is the case, however, 
that such family properties are so rarely encountered that their 
existence is largely theoretical.
V/e may draw the conclusion that inasmuch as Mfamily property*' 
means property to which title is vested in the family or dzotinu 
as a unit, the main type of family property found among the 
Northern Ewe are the ancestral family lands. Title to all other 
forms of property is, as a rule, held by individuals and groups 
of individuals who do not constitute a family. Questions, how­
ever, may sometimes arise as to the title to property on family 
land,, property acquired -with some assistance from members of the ■ 
family and family property redeemed by a member of the family. 
These questions will be discussed; but we shall first consider 
ancestral lands which are family property.
1. (195D 13 V/.A.C.A. 245.
Land as Family Property
In the discussion of land titles, it was pointed out that 
originally the paramount title to lands was vested in the 
families of the chiefdom, V/e now state the general proposition 
that, as a general rule, the main type of family property
properly so called among the Northern Ewre consists of the ances­
tral family lands. The paramount title to such lands vests 
absolutely in the family as an entity, which only has the rights 
of ultimate proprietary control, outright alienation and dis­
posal!.. As already explained the paramount title to Ewe lands • 
is thus held by the respective families but in their own right 
and independently of any stool interest in it. Hence, as far 
as the Northern Ewe are concerned, Beane, C.J,, was right when 
he stated that nthe presumption with regard to land in this 
country is that it is family landn .~
The origin of ancestral family lands among the Northern Ewe
is that their acquisition was on behalf of the family. The 
family title was not derived from any doctrine of intestate 
succession to the interests in the self-acquired property of its
deceased members, V/e cannot, therefore, agree with Bentsi-
»
Enchill’s observation that
The very notions of family, sub-family, and immediate 
family property carry with them the acknowledgment of 
an original individual acquisition by the founder of 
the family or branch of the family, 2
T] United Products v. Afari, (1929-1931) D.Ct.12.
2. K. Bentsi-Enchill, op,cit., p.81.
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There is a non sequitur in the argument which assumes that every 
family property was originally self-acquired by a member of that 
family. In the old Ev/e lav; it was the rule that individual 
persons could not hold the paramount interest in land. All 
acquisitions of land were, therefore,' family acquisitions. They 
were not regarded as self-acquired properties of the individuals 
who had reduced the unappropriated lands into effective occup­
ation, That explains why only ancestral lands are family 
property among the Northern Ewe,
The above explanation should also be viewed against the back­
ground of the Ewe law of succession. If the ancestral family 
lands were regarded as originally self-acquired individually by 
members of the family, the paramount interest in the lands would 
have been duly transmitted to the successors of those individuals 
as of right on their death intestate, as with other property. 
This, however, was not the case and the paramount title to the 
lands has been retained as a group title held by the respective 
families or dzotinuwo, Conversely, if it were true that self­
acquired property of today would become family property of 
tomorrow, then this would not have been limited to land alone.
The principle would have been applied to all other types of 
property so that, in.addition to. family, lands,, there would.also, 
be other kinds of family property. As pointed out already, 
however, as a rule there are no other kinds of family property, 
save family lands, among the Northern Ewe, V/e are driven to the 
conclusion, therefore, that original' acquisition of and title to
land was subject to a different regime of property law among the 
Ewe. This was that, while the absolute interest in other kinds 
of property could be held as individual acquisitions, the para­
mount interest in land could only bo vested in the family as a 
logoi personality; for an individual lacked the legal capacity 
to hold the paramount interest in land. The lav; has since 
changed and the individual’s capacity to hold the paramount 
interest in land is now recognised. Nevertheless the change 
has not affected family titles to ancestral lands, even as 
regards the individual member’s interest in them. In Ewe law, 
therefore, there can be no succession to the paramount interest 
in family land by any individual.' Membership of the family 
simply but automatically confers an inherent right of occupation 
and user which is shared with other members, thus conferring on 
the individual a dependent interest in that.portion of the 
family land which he occupies.
Evidence of original acquisition for the family is also' 
found in the absence of internal boundary marks between the 
holdings of members of the same family. If the acquisitions 
were originally on individual basis, certainly all the lands 
wpuld not have fallen into intestacy and would not all have 
become, family, property as.a result. . In. that case.some members , 
of the family, apart from the general family lands, would be 
exclusively entitled to some lands transmitted to them from the 
original acquirer, either by successive succession or a series 
of transfers inter vivos. Such exceptions, however, are not
k3k.
known to exist. That is why no internal boundary marks 
indicative of paramount title are found as between lands 
occupied by members of the same family* The extent of individual 
cultivations are sometimes marked, but never with the special 
boundary trees which demarcate the area for purposes of para-
.mount title,.........................................................
Land, therefore, was a special type of property. The old 
rules of land acquisition were based on paramount title in the 
family. Ancestral land is thus the main type of family property • 
a m ong the N o r t h e r n 2 w e.
Property on Family Land
In Ewe law property built on family land does not thereby
become family property. A house built on family land as well as
a farm cultivated on family land are self-acquired properties
of the builder and the farmer respectively, even though they are
members of the family in which the paramount title to the land
is vested. The land itself remains family land, but the house
or the farm is a self-acquired property of the person who
erected or cultivated it.
The above propositions are not supported by the judicial
customary law. The rule of judicial customary law is as stated
by Ollennu that
A house which a person builds out of his private means on 
family land (as distinct from waste ancestral land) is 
family property. 1
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana,
1962, p.AO,
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The builder is considered by the judicial customary law as 
having only a life interest in such property on family land.
A number of decided cases illustrate the judicial customary
I T - 1 .  "Ilaw. .ror instance in the Ga case of Owoo v, Owoo the testator
purported in his will to devise title to a house he had built 
on family land. It was held by the West African Court of Appeal 
that the disposition in respect of that property was void be­
cause it was family property in respect of which he lacked the 
testamentary capacity. That it became family property, however, 
was only due to the fact that the house had been built on 
family land by a member of the family. The West African Court 
of Appeal said:
The learned Judge held that there is according to Ga 
customary lav: a presumption that a house built by a 
member of a family upon family land is family property, 
or becomes so upon his death. He further held that the 
presumption had not been displaced, and we are of opinion 
that he was entitled to reach this conclusion upon the 
evidence. 2
No doubt both the trial and appellate courts were influenced 
by the fact that in the particular circumstances of this case 
some dwelling houses were torn down to enable the testator to 
erect the new building. However, it is equally clear that the 
decision was meant to establish the general proposition that a 
house built on family land becomes ipso facto family property.
, In a subsequent case, Ansah v. Sackey,-^ the proposition was 
statedWith greater clarity as a general one. Said Ollennu, J.:
1. (19A3) 11 V/.A.C.A. 81.
2. Owoo v . Owoo. (19A3) 11 V/.A.C.A. 81, 86.
3. (19587 3 v / . A . L W .  323.
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A building erected by a member of a family on bare family 
land, that is family land which has no family buildings on 
it, is property in which the builder has a definite life 
interest. The builder may deal with it in any way he likes 
except create an interest which can subsist after his life. 
Any interest he grants in it, unless created with the con­
sent and concurrence of the head and principal members of 
the family, determines with his life, and the property 
becomes discharged from the incidents of the interest so 
created. The property then becomes family property not 
.burdened with any incumbrances created by the builder, 
during his lifetime. 1
With equal force it was also stated by the Land Court in Tetteh 
v . Anang that:
The land, is an ancestral property, therefore a member of 
the family who builds on it with his own money will have 
only a life interest in it, and ^nothing more; he cannot 
dispose of any interest in it which will extend beyond 
his life, and he cannot devise it under his will. 2
The general proposition in these cases is that, merely because 
the house is built on family land, the builder has no more than 
a life interest in it, as it is family property.
It is respectfully submitted that the judicial customary 
law, although it may be applicable to some Ghanaian societies, 
does not represent Ewe law. The decision of the West African 
Court of Appeal in Santeng v . Darkwa which, however, was dis­
tinguished in Owoo v. Owoo. comes closer to the correct view of 
Ewe lav;. In Sant eng v. Darkwa one of the issues before the 
court was whether a house erected on family land was a self- 
acquired property of the builder. The house in this case was
1. Ansah v, Sackey. (1958) 5 W.A.L.R. 325, 329-330.
2. Tetteh v. Anang. Unreported, Land Court, Accra, 11th 
December, 1957.
3. (19-40)16. W. A.C. A. 52.
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constructed on the ruins of a family house. The West African 
Court of Appeal held that it was not a family house because the
simple fact that it stood on family land and on the ruins of a •
family house was not enough to brand it with the character of 
family property. It was said for the West African Court of 
Appeal .that:........................................................
■ No custom was proved that when a house is built on 
the site of the ruins of a family house it becomes 
family property, and I know of no such custom. The
general rule is that which the 'learned trial Judge 
applied in the case of the other house, namely that 
if a house is built by the unaided efforts of the 
deceased and without using any family building 
materials, it is regarded as his self-acquired 
property and will pass under his will ... I can 
find no authority for the proposition that the mere 
using of the site brands the house with the stamp 
of family property; although, of course, the site 
on which the house is built remains family land, 1
This dictum was distinguished in Owoo v. Owoo on what appears to
be a tenuous ground that in Owoo v. Owoo the new building was
erected on a site obtained on the family land by demolishing
existing buildings, v/hereas in Santeng v. Darkwa the new house
was constructed on what was only the ruins of a family building.
In both cases the essential fact seems to be that the building
was erected by an individual person out of his own resources
but on his familyfs land. That being so, so far as Ewe lav; is
concerned, Santeng v. Darkwa is to■be preferred. For, among the
Ewe, a house built on family land is not a family property in
any sense.
1 . Santeng v, Darkwa. (1940) 6 V/.A.C.A. 52, 54-55.
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The nature of Ewe town lands has already been explained.^-
V/e may re-state it briefly that, among the Ewe, citizens are not
restricted to building on their own family lands within the
township. Among the Ewe it is only in the case of farming that
one is limited to the occupation of one’s family, lands. As
regards town, lands the - position is that the paramount title
to the lands is usually held by one or two families, or perhaps
several of them, who release them for general occupation and
settlement as a township. The vast majority of the citizens in
any township, therefore, build their houses on lands to which
their families do not hold the paramount title. This was
2
illustrated in Thomas Kuma v, Yawo Akoto. already discussed, 
when the family holding the paramount title to the town lands 
sought to restrict the building rights of a citizen who was not 
a member of that family. It is only a small proportion who 
build on their own family lands. Houses built by citizens who 
are non-members of the family holding the paramount title to 
the town lands belong absolutely to their builders, though the 
paramount title to the land itself remains vested in the family 
originally holding such title. It would be absurd to hold that, 
on the contrary, houses built by citizens who are members of 
the' family-holding the■paramount title to town lands do not ■ ■ 
belong to the builders but to their families. If we were to
1. See pp. /|01-/;23 supra,
2. Supra,
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apply the general rule of the judicial customary law as laid
1 ? down in cases like Owoo v , Owoo. Ansah v . Sackey and Tetteh v .
3
Anang, an anomalous situation would result. In a typical 
Norshern Ewe township there would be two categories of houses. 
Those houses built by citizens who are members of the family 
helling the paramount title to the town lands would.be family 
properties on the strength of the decided cases, but those built 
by non-members of that family would be self-acquired properties 
of the builders, thereby placing the non-members of the land 
holding family in a more advantageous position. It is submitted 
that this is not Ewe law. Among the Northern Ewe, any house 
built by an individual on any land, on which he is entitled to 
build, belongs to that individual as his self-acquired property, 
whether the land in question is his own family!s land or not. 
Similarly a farm cultivated on family land does not become a. 
family farm. Indeed, while the land itself always remains family 
property, emy development of family land by a member through his 
own exertions becomes a self-acquired property of that individual 
and is in no way branded with the character of family property.
It is respectfully submitted, therefore, that, as applied to the 
Northern Ewe of Ghana, the decision in Owoo v, Owoo and other 
authorities to the effect that a house built on family land 
becomes family property is not good law,
1. (19A5) 11 V/.A.C.A. 81.
2. (1958) 3 V/.A.L.9. 325.
3. Unreported, Land Court, Accra, l6th December, 1957.
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Property Built with Family Assistance
Among the Northern Ewe, property built with assistance from 
me’mbers of the family does not ipso facto become family property. 
Similarly family property is not created just because the in­
dividual who built it was assisted by the family without more.
In either case the property is a self-acquired property of the 
individual who benefits from such assistance, whether the assis- • 
tance comes from some members of the family or from the family 
itself. It is an old form of mutual assistance among the Ewe 
that members of the family and other relations freely assist by 
direct: labour, or donations of money or materials, when a mem­
ber is building a house, cultivating a farm or executing any 
other worthwhile project out of his own resources. It is assis­
tance given in fulfilment of the general moral obligation arising 
from the bonds of kinship and on the tacit understanding that 
there is a corresponding moral obligation 011 the person bene­
fiting from such assistance' to render similar assistance in 
return when others need it. It docs not, however, mean that 
the property becomes family property in any sense. Among the 
Ewe, family property is created only if it is a corporate 
endeavour by the family as such, not by only some of its members, 
and with the unequivocal intention, whether express or implied, 
of instituting a family property.
The trend of judicial authority, however, is generally in 
the contrary direction. As a commencing point Pedwar had stated 
a very general proposition as a doctrine of the customary law
that
... even the slightest contribution of labour or 
materials in building a house by members of the
. . . deceased.personTs . family, gives these relatives a ...........
vested joint interest in the house as a family house. 1
This is a very sweeping proposition, inasmuch as it says 
emphatically that "even the slightest contribution of labour or 
materials” by some members of the family brands the property as 
family property. Pressed to its logical implications, even the 
contribution of a nail, a brief: or a stone, or the casual supply 
of a head-load of sand, however slight a contribution, would 
convert the otherwise self-acquired property into family property 
By this test there could hardly ever be a self-acquired property 
anywhere among the Northern Ewe; for it has always been of the 
nature of Ewe society that members of the family give all pos­
sible assistance to each other in building, farming and other 
endeavours. It is respectfully submitted that Bedwar!s prop­
osition does not represent Ewe law.
There are, however, decided cases in which Pedwar*s prop­
osition has been accorded judicial blessing that the contribution 
by members of the family in the building of the property auto­
matically transforms the property into a family property. For
1. H. Pedwar, Comments on Some Ordinances of the Gold Coast 
Colony. 1909, p.35.
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instance, in Mensah v , S .C .0 .A ..' two brothers purchased a 
piece of land out of their own resources and title was conveyed 
to them by a deed of conveyance in English form as joint tenants. 
In the construction of a building on the said land, however, 
they received a small assistance from some members of their 
family. It was. held.by Ollennu, .J,,. that, by virtue of the 
assistance given by some members of the family, the property 
had become a family property in which the acquirers had only a 
life interest. Hence it was held that on the death of the two 
brothers the building had become a family property which could 
not, therefore, be sold, to satisfy a personal debt of one of the 
deceased brothers. In Ewe law also the property could not be 
sold or attached in execution to satisfy a personal debt of 
only one of the brothers; but the reason is not that it would 
be family property but because it would be a joint property of 
both brothers without a' common law right of survivorship in the 
last of the brothers who died in indebtedness. In Ewe law, 
therefore, though arriving at the same conclusion, the reasoning 
of the learned Judge would be wrong insofar as, in refusing to 
allow-the sale, he based himself on the ground that the property 
had become a family property simply because of the small assis­
tance received, from some members-of the' family, ■ Mere assistance 
in such circumstances cannot create family property in Ewe law, 
unless there is to be inferred the intention to create a family 
property.
1. (1953) 3 V/.A.L.9. 336.
kk3r
Reliance is also sometimes, placed on Sarbah for the 
proposition that assistance from some members of the family 
converts an otherwise self-acquired property into a family 
property, Sarbah's words, however, do not directly state such 
a proposition, Sarban limited himself to the definition of two 
ty.peG.of "family property"-, ■ According- to -him- family property is 
property acquired "by the joint labour of two or more of the 
members of a family", or "by contributions from the members of 
a family",’ Neither of these two modes of acquisition can be 
said to be based on mere assistance from some members of the 
family. A "joint labour" of some members of the family is cer­
tainly distinguishable from a casual assistance given to one 
member. Contributions from "the members of the family" seems to 
presuppose a general contribution by the family rather than 
occasional assistance given by only some members pf the family, 
Sarbah indeed goes on to define one species of self-acquired 
property as that acquired by a person through his own exertions
"without any help or assistance from his ancestral or family 
2
property". This, however, should not be misinterpreted, as it 
seems to be, to mean that it ceases to be family property simply 
becamse some members of the family offer their assistance. What 
Sarbah seems' to mean Is that the property is no longer a self-' 
acquired property if it was.acquired with help.from "family 
property", such as family funds or materials belonging to the
1, J.M. Sarbah, op. cit, 4 p.60-,
2 . J.M. Sarbah, op.cit,. p.60. Also at p.89.
family. His words, it is submitted, do not rule out from self- , 
acquired property any occasional assistance by some members of 
the family who must be distinguished from the family as an en­
tity. For, in any case, assistance by some members of the family 
is not the same as assistance by the family. The brevity of 
FarbahVs treatment of the subject may be partly responsible for- 
b he mi sinter pre t a ti on.
For example, the interpretation placed on Sarbahfs words in 
Araba Tsetsewa v. Acquah1 is that a property jointly acquired by 
throe brothers was family property and not the self-acquired 
property of the contributors. In that case three brothers built 
several premises out of their own joint exertions, with only 
some minor assistance from some members of their family. The 
statement of Sarbah was endorsed and the Vi cert African Court of 
Appeal said:
It has never, so far as we are aware, been suggested 
before this case that where two or more members of a 
family combine to acquire property, the property so 
acquired becomes the private joint property of the two 
or more and not family property. In our opinion the 
evidence adduced on behalf of the defendants is not 
sufficient to rebut the strong presumption in favour 
of 1family property1 which is the rule among Fanti- 
speedring people. 2
Accordingly it was held that the property in Araba Tsetsewa v,
■Acquah was family property.- If that case- was correctly decided, .■
then it is respectfully submitted that its application must be
restricted to the Fanti to whom it relates. If Air aba Tsetsewa
(mi) 7 V/.A.C.A. 216.
2 , Araba Tsetsewa v , Acauah. (19a) 7 V/.A.C.A. 216, 221.
v. Acquah v/ere an Ewe case, on the same facts the decision 
should be that the interest in the properties was jointly held 
as self-acquired by the contributing brothers. There is no 
presumption of family property in Ewe law where two or more 
members of a family combine to acquire property. The brothers 
would- in ■ such a case take the'property with- a joint interest in 
all of them. They would not, however, he joint tenants in the 
common law sense with a right of survivorship; consequently 
the last surviving brother could not validly dispose of the 
title to any of the properties by his will. Nevertheless they 
would not be family properties. In Ewe law, therefore, the 
successors to the rights in property of each of the three 
brothers would succeed to their interests per stirpes, all the 
successors of each brother counting as one.
Following Sarbah and Redwar, an equally strict attitude wa 
adopted by the courts to the absolute interest in property in 
the construction of which even a small assistance was obtained 
from the family or family property was used. For example in 
Santeng v . Farkwa  ^ the property was not held to be family prop­
erty but only because the use of family property in its con­
struction was not positively established.' The West African 
Court of Appeal, however,‘did not fail to state the strict rule 
that:
1. (19A0) 6 V/.A.C.A. 52.
.In the case of the store, if it had. been proved that a 
single brick from the ruins of the former family house 
had been used by the deceased in building the store, 
the store would be family property, 1
Current judicial attitude, however, is changing and is becoming 
more conformable to the view of Eve lav/. In Codjoe v , Kwatchey~ 
the deceased had used wood, corrugated iron roofing sheets and 
a gate which had been removed from a demolished family house in 
building his own house. In addition he had received the sum of 
E-100 from the family funds which either he directly utilised in 
the course of building the house or which was by way of assis­
tance in trading, whereby ho earned some profits which also went 
into the cost of the house. There is also the additional fact 
that a member of the family had lived in the house and had 
constructed a two-roomed swish building on the premises. On 
account of all these facts it was contended that the property 
was family property. The trial Judge rejected this contention 
and said:
Is any assistance in money or in kind, however slight, 
sufficient to impress a block of buildings worth thousands 
of pounds, otherwise erected by a man entirely at his own 
expense and on a valuable land he himself has purchased, 
with'the character of family property? Surely ther’e must 
be some limit ,.. and I venture to suggest as such a limit, 
the proviso that the family’s contribution, whether in 
money or in kind, must be a substantial contribution be­
fore this court will hold that -the whole of the land and 
buildings in question in any case have been thereby 
impressed with the character of family property, V/hat 
will amount to a substantial contribution must, of course, 
always be a question of fact depending on the particular 
circumstances of every case, 3
T. Santeng v . Darkwa„ (19d0) 6 V/.A.C.A. 52, 35*'
2. (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 371,
3. Quoted in Cofl.joe v. Kvfatchey. (1935) 2 V/.A.C.A. 371, 377*
.Applying this criterion the trial Court held that the contrib­
utions from the family and members of the family were not suf­
ficiently substantial for the property to be deemed to be family 
property. In the West African Court of Appeal, Kingdon, C.J., 
dissented from the test adopted by the learned trial Judge 
because it derogated from the strict rule enunciated by Redwar. 
'The judgment itself, however, was affirmed and it is remarkable 
that all the members of the West African Court of Appeal con­
curred in the dictum of Webber, C.J., who said:
Does the removal by a member of a family of a portion 
of the debris of demolished house stamp a property self­
acquired by that member as family property? I say this 
is not the native law. 1
This is a significant departure from the strict dictum in
Santeng v. Darkwa where it was stated that even the use of a
single brick from the debris of the demolished family house
would have been enough to brand the new house as family property.
It is submitted that Cod.joe v. Kwatche.y is preferable because
it accepts in principle the test of a substantial contribution
from family resources. In Ewe law the use of such materials
from a ruined family house would not convert the new house into
a family property.
2In the more recent case of Larbi v. Cato when the problem 
arose again,before the Land Court, Ollennu, J., significantly 
shifted in favour of the proposition that the new property would
1. Cod.joe v. Kwatchey. (1935) 2 W.A.C.A. 371, 376.
2. (1959) G.L.R. 35.
not be deemed to be family property unless the contribution from 
the family or its members was substantial in relation to the 
cost of the property. In that case the deceased, a legal prac­
titioner, had been educated with money from the proceeds of 
family property. Out of fees earned from his legal practice he 
erected a building on a piece of land purchased from his own 
resources. In erecting the building, however, he also utilised 
a small amount of money received by him as his personal share 
from the proceeds of family cocoa farms. It was contended that 
the building was family property. One reason for the contention 
was that he had partly used family money, received by him as a 
personal share, in constructing the building. This argument 
was rejected by Ollennu, J., who said:
In my opinion, however, it would be repugnant and contrary 
to all principles of natural justice and good conscience to 
hold in modern days that where, for example, a man employs 
contractors to build on his land, the house so built would 
become family property simply because one member or another 
of the family occasionally visited the site of the work 
when it was in progress, and casually carried a pail of 
water, a piece of brick, or helped the contractors1 labour­
ers to lift a board or so. I should take the same view 
where a member of the family gave the member building on 
his own land some temporary financial assistance to an 
amount which was insignificant when considered in relation 
to the actual cost of the building. 1
An appeal against this decision was dismissed by the Ghana
Court of Appeal and we may suppose, therefore, that the current
judicial attitude has moved away from "the slightest contribution11
test propounded by Redwar and applied in the earlier cases.
1. Larbi v. Cato. (1959) G.L.R.' 35, 37-38.
In the Court of Appeal an ingenious argument was urged on 
behalf of the family in Larbi v, Cato that, as the deceased had 
been educated mainly out of family funds, everything that was 
purchased or acquired by him by his own efforts and earnings as 
a legal practitioner assumed the character of a profit earned 
from the use of family funds. It was contended, therefore, that 
the house built from the earnings of his professional practice 
belonged, not to the deceased as his self-acquired property, but 
to the family. As would be expected this argument was flatly 
rejected by the Court of Appeal as an absurdity. It does, how­
ever, indicate the extent to which the issue can be pressed if 
it is to be presumed that contributions from some members of 
the family, without more, would transform into family property 
what would otherwise be regarded as self-acquired.
We may conclude this section by repeating that assistance 
given to an individual by some members of his family or the 
family itself, however substantial, cannot in Ewe law brand the 
property acquired with such assistance as family property. Such 
an assistance creates an obligation, moral or legal as may be 
inferred from the circumstances, on the beneficiary; but it 
does not affect the private nature of the property as self­
acquired. Children, wives or husbands, brothers and sisters 
freely assist individuals among the Ewe, and so do other members, 
of the family. Indeed such assistance is always expected in 
building a house and is often forthcoming in the cultivation of
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farms. Such assistance, often unsolicited, is usually in the 
nature of direct free labour; occasionally it consists in a 
financial contribution or a loan. In all cases the property 
nevertheless remains a self-acquired property of the builder 
among the Ewe, regardless of whether the assistance was sub­
stantial or not. It does not even become a joint property of 
the builder and his benefactors, let alone family property.
Were it otherwise many would reject even the mo?t modest assis­
tance offered freely and in good faith by members of their own 
families while welcoming the assistance of non-members, lest 
the property become family property against their wish. Per­
haps the reason for this attitude of Ewe law lies in the fact 
that the notion of family property is not sufficiently developed 
among the Ewe. Apart from the ancestral family lands the pre­
sumption of Ewe law is in favour of individual property. There 
is, therefore, no presumption of family property in Ewe law 
arising from the fact of assistance given to an individual 
by the family or members of the family in building the property. 
In Ewe law family property is created only by a deliberate act 
with the necessary intention. It cannot be an inference from 
the mere operation of law based on the acceptance of family 
assistance; for otherwise assistance would cease, to mean 
assistance and would become synonymous with collaboration.
Defence and Redemption of Family Property
Among the Northern Ewe of Ghana the defence or redemption 
of family property, even if undertaken unaided by a single mem­
ber of the family, does not convert the property into a self- 
acquired property of that member. There is a joint and several 
responsibility on all members of the family to preserve, defend, 
.maintain and redeem every item of family property. Restoring 
<or defending property belonging to the family is, therefore, no 
more than a discharge of that general obligation and it does 
not affect the title of the family.
There are two capacities in which a person may expend his 
money or resources in the defence, preservation, restoration or 
redemption of property belonging to his family. He may be 
acting in the capacity of head of family or as an ordinary 
member of the family. In either case the defence or redemption 
of family property does not create title in the defender or 
redeemer. The property remains family property.
Defence of family property today mainly takes the form 
of litigating the family title. Among the Ewe the general 
practice is that, in litigating the title of the family to 
family lands, the member of the family who is in occupation of 
the spot in dispute bears the major part of the expenses, unless 
he obviously lacks the means. On many occasions such an 
individual is delegated by the head of the family to represent 
the family in the actual proceedings, as he is more likely to
know with greater precision and certainty the limits of the 
boundaries of the land. However, such an individual does not 
thereby assume the paramount title to the land as if it were 
his self-acquired property.
There is also a defence of family property if an individual 
pays off all or any balance outstanding on property purchased by 
the family. Even then the individual who pays such a family 
debt does not thereby acquire title to the property but only 
the dependent interest conferred on him by his membership of 
the family. As far as the redemption of family property is 
concerned, it seems that among the Ewe this is limited to the 
redemption of a pledged or mortgaged family property. If the 
property had been sold then there can hardly be a question of 
redemption because in Ewe law a sale is irrevocable. Redemption 
in such a case can, therefore, occur only if the purchaser 
consents to release the sold property to the vendor family upon 
a return of the purchase price. In all such cases the family, 
and not the person redeeming, regains the absolute title to the 
redeemed property.
The decided cases also hold generally that any family 
property defended or redeemed by a member of the family remains 
family property and does not become a self-acquired property of 
that member. In Bruce v. Adjah -^ it was contended that a family 
house had become a self-acquired property of the member who had
1. (1921-1925) D.Ct. 192.
paid a family debt of £30 to recover it. The contention was 
rejected and it was held that the redemption was presumed to 
have been on behalf of the family and, therefore, that the 
house remained a family house. In another case, Akyirefe v . 
Paramount Stool of Breman-Esiam.^  land originally belonging to 
the stool family was pledged. Later it was redeemed by a mem­
ber of the family by paying the outstanding debt. The succes­
sors to the property of the individual member who had redeemed 
the land claimed it as a self-acquired property of the deceased. 
It was held by the West African Court of Appeal that on redemp­
tion the property still remained a stool family property. 
Similarly in Kwainoo v. Ampong. when an individual member of 
the family redeemed family land which had been sold, it was 
held by the West African Court of Appeal that it did not become 
a self-acquired property of that member but resumed its original 
character of family property.
A case involving this principle which came before the
x
courts from Gbi in the Northern Ewe area is Ahoklui v. Ahoklui.
In this case the parties were descended from the same grandfather 
but were not of the same father. The plaintiffs claimed the 
paramount title to the disputed land as the self-acquired prop­
erty of their deceased father because, while in charge of the
1. (1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 331.
2. (1953) I k  W.A.C.A. 250.
3. Ahoklui v. Ahoklui. Unreported, Land Court, Accra, 1st June, 
1959. Reproduced in N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land 
Law in Ghana. 1962, p.212.
land as head of family, their father had paid some money to the
original vendors from whom the property had been purchased some
generations earlier. The evidence in the trial Native Court
was somewhat inconclusive as it was urged by the plaintiffs
that that payment constituted the purchase of the land as a
self-acquired property by their father. The Native ‘Court,
however, accepted that version of the story which suggested
that the money paid by the plaintiffs* father was only a
balance outstanding on the original purchase price. On these
facts the appellate Land Court held that the property was
family property and not the self-acquired property of the
plaintiffs* father who had paid the balance of the money. As
was said by Ollennu, J.:
According to native custom any improvement which a 
successor makes on the family property under his 
control and any extension he makes to existing farms 
in the estate do not become his self-acquired property, 
they inure to the benefit of the family as a whole. 1
The principle in Ahoklui v. Ahoklui conforms to that in another
2
unreported decision of the same Judge in Boafo v. Staudt. In 
Boafo v. Staudt the land to which the deceased had succeeded 
was originally sold by the Akanteng Stool but, on a fresh de­
marcation, part of the land was found to belong to the Asamankese 
Stool, whereupon the deceased had to pay £30 to the Asamankese
1. Ibid., p.214.
2. Boafo v. Staudt. Unreported, Land Court, Accra, 17th 
February, 1958. Reproduced in N.A. Ollennu, Principles of 
Customary Land Law in Ghana. 1962, p.183.
Stool for that portion. For this and other reasons it was 
contended that the property had become a self-acquired property 
of the deceased. The Land Court rejected the contention and 
held that the property remained family property because the 
additional payment produced only a situation analogous to that 
of a family property under mortgage being redeemed by a member 
of the family with his own money.
The judicial attitude on the issue is largely the result 
of the influence of Sarbah. It does not appear, however, that 
the courts have noticed the direct manner in which Sarbah con­
tradicts himself. First Sarbah says:
If any property lost by the ancestor or any of his 
successors be recovered by a member of the family out 
of his own private resources, it is no longer considered 
as ancestral or family property, but is private property; 
unless such property had been recovered by the use of 
any part or portion of the ancestral or family patrimony; 
or it was acquired for the purpose of its forming part of 
the ancestral possessions, and this was made known to the 
members of the family. 1
About thirty pages later, however, he says:
But where any land, lost by an ancestor or any of his 
successors, has been recovered by a member of the family 
out of his private resources, such land is considered 
to have been purchased for the family, and is not self­
acquired property, unless the members of the family were 
made distinctly to understand at the time of the purchase 
that it will not resume its former condition as the 
ancestral property. 2
This latter statement, that family property recovered remains
family property, is the principle applied by the Courts. In
1. J.M. Sarbah, op.cit.. p.60.
2. J.M. Sarbah, op.cit.. p.89.
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Kwainoo v. Ampong.^  for instance, the family land had been sold. 
Later it was repurchased by another member of the family which 
had originally held the paramount title to it. After reciting 
this latter statement of Sarbah with approval, the West African 
Court of Appeal held that the repurchased property resumed the 
character of family property. If this was the implication 
intended by Sarbah in his latter statement, then we must with 
respect dissent from his view as applied to the Ewe, Among the 
Ewe, once property is effectively sold, whether it be family 
property or not, the vendor is divested of all title and the 
sale is irrevocable. If Kwainoo v, Ampong were an Ewe case, 
therefore, the starting point in the reasoning should be that 
the vendor family had no more title or interest in the property. 
Hence any member of that family who subsequently -purchased 
the property would hold it as self-acquired. This proposition 
comes very close to the first contradictory statement of Sarbah. 
For it would become family property only if, though he was using 
his own resources, he re-purchased it in his capacity as a 
member of the family and because he was a member of the family.
We may elaborate the Ewe position thus. No individual 
person has the right to redeem for himself any property pledged 
or mortgaged by his family. For a third party or a stranger to 
the transaction cannot redeem property encumbered by a tran­
saction to which he was not a party. Therefore, any person who
1. (1953) I k  W.A.C.A. 250.
undertakes to redeem his family's pledged or mortgaged property 
can only do so on behalf of the pledgor or mortgagor family. 
Consequently the redeemed family property remains family property 
on redemption, and does not belong to the individual who had 
redeemed it on behalf of the family. This reasoning is in­
applicable if a member of the family purchases in his own right 
what was once family property but to which the family title 
had been effectively lost. It becomes family property only if 
the individual refunds the purchase price in his capacity as 
a member of the family, which implies the intention of restoring 
the property to the family.
If the family property had been lost in the sense that the 
family had been divested of its title by an outright sale or 
otherwise, then it is presumed that any member of the family who 
subsequently acquires the interest in that property by whatever 
process, in his own right and out of his own resources, becomes 
the holder of that interest in it as a self-acquired property. 
This is substantially the proposition in Sarbah1s first state­
ment"!: If, however, the lost property is released to a member
of the family, not only because of the consideration coming 
from him but also by virtue of his membership of the said family, 
then the released property automatically resumes its original 
character of family property. It is in that case a redemption 
or restoration of the property on behalf of the family.
1. J.M. Sarbah, op.cit,. p.60.
We have drawn a distinction between redemption of family 
property which had been encumbered but to which the family title 
had not been lost, and re-acquisition of what was once family 
property but the family title had been lost. In the case of 
the latter, that is where the family title had been lost,' the 
presumption is that the ‘acquisition is not for the family. In 
the case of the former, where the property was merely encumbered^ 
we agree with Sarbah's second and more popularly known statement 
that it is presumed to retain its character of family property,'*’ 
We do not agree with Sarbah, however, in saying that family 
property, which is merely encumbered but to which the family 
title had not been lost, can be redeemed by a member of the 
family on the understanding that the family consents that the 
redeemed property shall become a self-acquired property of 
that member. Perhaps the explanation for Sarbah's view is that 
among the Fanti and some other Akan this would not make much 
difference because, in any case, the property would eventually 
become family property on the death intestate of the member who 
had redeemed it. Such a proposition is not the law among the 
Ewe where the law of succession is such that a self-acquired 
property does not become family property even on the death 
intestate, of the original acquirer.
Among the Ewe it is an irrebuttable presumption of law 
that any pledged or mortgaged family property redeemed by a
1. J.M. Sarbah, op.cit.. p.89-
member of the family remains a family property. It can hardly 
be otherwise, and it is difficult to imagine why the family 
should consent that an individual member may redeem a pledged 
or mortgaged family property for himself, so as to have the 
interest in it vested in himself as in the case of a self­
acquired property. Such a concession would ignore the general 
responsibility of all members of the family to defend, preserve, 
maintain and restore every item of family property. More 
important, there is nothing to be gained by the family in allow­
ing one of its members to redeem family property in order to 
acquire title to it as if self-acquired. In that case it is 
hardly different from selling the property to any willing 
purchaser, even if it is a sale by a decree of the court or 
under a power of sale. While the property remains encumbered 
with a customary law pledge, irrespective of the length of 
time, the family title is preserved because of the principle 
of perpetual redeemability.1 Similarly the family title is 
not necessarily destroyed by other circumstances, such as a 
mortgage. It is to the disadvantage of the family if an 
individual assumes the absolute title to the property on 
redemption because in that case the family's right to redeem 
is effectively destroyed and its title determined. For these 
reasons the redemption of a mortgaged or a pledged family
1, Agbo Kofi v. Addo Kofi. (1933) 1 W.A.C.A. 2.8k; Kuma v. Kofi. 
(1956; 1 W.A.L.R, 128; Dzanku v. Adza Kwadwo. (I960) G.L.R . 31.
property is deemed in Ewe law to be a redemption by and on 
behalf of the family and the property remains a family property.
In Ewe law, however, an individual who redeems family 
property out of his own resources has the prior right of user.
He thus creates in himself an interest which is dependent on 
and inferior to the paramount title of his family. In the 
case of land, the main type of family property among the Ewe, 
this has practical consequences to the benefit of such an 
individual. Once the redeemer goes into occupation of the 
redeemed land, he also enjoys the accompanying right of re- 
occupying the fallow land or afuu. The right of re-occupation 
of afuu or fallow land, as we have seen, is self-perpetuating. ■*" 
The right, furthermore, devolves on children and successors.
In effect, therefore, the land will remain tied to the lineal 
descendants of the individual member who redeemed it. The 
paramount title to the property, however, remains vested in 
the family just as in the case of any other family property.
It follows that, while the individual has the dependent interest 
in the nature of a right of occupation and user, he cannot make 
any inter vivos or testamentary disposition affecting the 
paramount title to the property. Like any other family property 
only the family can alienate the paramount title to it. Being 
a dependent interest in family property, the interest is not
1. See pp.322-32if supra.
A-61#
alienable to a non-member of the family; it may be trans­
ferred jjiter_vivos, and gratis to another member of the family, 
or else it devolves on the successors automatically on death. 
These limitations show that the property remains family 
property.
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CHAPTER VIII
ALIENATION OF FAMILY PROPERTY
The Capacity to Alienate Family Property
A preliminary question, perhaps rather theoretical, is
whether, if "land belongs to a vast family of which many are
dead, few are living and countless members are yet unborn", a
few of the few who are living possess the capacity to alienate
the interest not only of themselves and their contemporaries
but also of the dead and the unborn. Danquah espouses the
cause of the dead and the unborn when he says:
An absolute sale of land was, therefore, not simply 
a question of alienation of realty; notoriously it 
was a case of selling a spiritual heritage for a mess 
of pottage, a veritable betrayal of ancestral trust, 
an undoing of the hope of posterity, 1
Yet the theoretical problem remains unsolved. As far as the
dead are concerned,although their continued membership of the
family may be regarded as sentimental rather than real, the
fear of their wrath is a considerable inhibiting factor in the
1. J.B.. Danquah, Akan Lav/s and Customs. Routledge, London,
1928, p.212.
way of the misuse or mismanagement of family property. There is 
always the fear that careless dissipation of family property may 
bring death to those responsible, as the deceased ancestors may, 
in their anger, summon the guilty persons to account before them 
for their misdeeds. Nevertheless the living get round the prob­
lem by assuming, like the Biblical Peter and his successors, that 
■whatever is bound or unbound on earth is also bound or unbound by 
those silenced by death. It has been enough, therefore, merely 
to notify the dead by communicating with them through the pouring 
of libation and, at times, by the slaughter of a sheep. As for 
those yet unborn their consent is presumed. The assumption is 
that, even if those yet unborn were to be born at the material 
time, they would be junior members on whose behalf it would be 
enough that the principal members of the family gave their con­
sent. For, even as regards those living, if they are still 
young or have not attained the position of a "principal member", 
their consent is presumed once the principal members of the 
family signify their consent and concurrence.
This may not be a satisfactory legal explanation for the 
assumption by the head and principal members of a family of the 
right and authority to alienate the family title to land, or any 
other family property for that matter. But it is a practical 
way to avoid being inhibited by the unexpressed and inexpressible 
wishes of the dead and those still unborn.
Having disposed of that preliminary question, the next 
one is whether any special reasons must exist for the valid sale
k6k .
o r alienation of the family title to family land or other family 
property. The answer in Ewe law is that alienation of family 
property, where such alienation is permissible by the law, is 
not conditional on the existence of any special circumstances 
or reasons. It is enough that the family, through its approp­
riate organ, authorises the alienation. Accordingly, the 
existence of a family debt is not a pre-condition for the valid 
alienation of family property in Ewe law. When the question was 
raised before Jackson, J,, in Golightly v, Ashrifi.'*' his answer 
was that stool lands could not be sold outright except for the 
purpose of satisfying a stool debt. Although the learned trial 
Judge said that he had evidence before him which justified such 
a conclusion, it is more probable that he misinterpreted the 
evidence of the natural reluctance to alienate stool or family 
property, except in the special circumstances of a pressing 
debt or other financial obligation. Such reluctance to alienate 
stool or family property does not, however, mean that the 
existence of a stool debt is a necessary condition for a valid 
sale of stool land or that family land or family property cannot 
be sold except to satisfy a family debt. In any case the West 
African Court of Appeal properly set the matter at rest when it 
rejected that finding of Jackson, J., and proceeded to state in 
clear words that:
1. (1955) 14 W.A.C.A. 676.
In our opinion the existence of a stool debt was not 
at the times material to this inquiry a necessary 
preliminary condition to the sale of stool land, 1
Among the Ewe, therefore, in the areas where land is saleable, 
the non-existence of a family debt cannot, indeed no other 
condition can, vitiate an otherwise valid alienation of title 
to family land or family property. Otherwise a good reason may 
be found in Eweland for invalidating many of such transactions 
which are nothing but the result of mercenary irresponsibility 
and culpable disregard for the interests of the succeeding 
generations. However morally reprehensible such careless dis­
sipation of family property may be, it cannot affect the legal 
validity of the alienation itself of family land or other family 
property.
Our next question is who may validly alienate property, 
especially land. The answer depends on the type of land or 
property with which we are concerned, that is whether it is 
the self-acquired property of an individual person or a family 
property, stool property or communal property.
An individual is fully competent to alienate property 
self-acquired by him. Today an individual person may acquire 
the paramount interest in land either through a personal gift 
to him or by purchasing it solely with his own resources. Such 
land is not family or stool land but individual private property. 
The individual is, therefore, capable of alienating his title
1. Golightl.y v, Ashrifi. (1955) 1A- W.A.C.A. 676, 681.
to such self-acquired property without reference to any other 
person or his family. For, as Ollennu, J., put it in Ad .jab eng 
v. Kwabla. when a son sought to impugn the sale of land previous­
ly purchased by his father with a small assistance from the son,
By customary law a person is entitled to alienate his 
self-acquired property by way of sale or gift without 
the necessity of members of his family concurring in 
it ... All that customary law requires (to make an 
alienation of self-acquired property valid) is pub­
licity. 1
Different considerations, however, apply in the cases of
the sale of family property, stool property or communal property
among the Ewe. As regards family property, the generally
accepted rule in Ghana applies also among the Ewe that only the
head of the family, acting with the authority of the principal
elders of the family, can validly alienate title to such 
2
property. Among the Northern Ewe, however, such family property 
in the main consists of family land.
The capacity to alienate title to Ewe-type stool lands^ 
is not the same as for stool lands generally in Ghana and depends 
on the type of stool land. The general rule in Ghana is that
only the occupant of the stool may, with the consent and concur-
L
rence of the principal councillors, alienate stool property.
1. Ad.jabeng v, Kwabla, (I960) G.L.R. 37. 40.
2. Agbloe v. Sappor. (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 187; Nelson v. Nelson, 
(1951) 13 W.A.C.A. 238; Bassil v, Honger. (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 
569; Manko v, Bonsu. (l936) 3 W.A.C.A. 52,
3. For a description of Ewe-type stool lands, see pp.359-383 
supra.
k. Allottey v. Abrahams. (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 280.
As regards the Ewe-type stool lands, if it is in fact land only 
recently earmarked for the purposes of the stool, then it falls 
to he treated essentially as family land of the stool family.
In that case only the head of the stool family, acting on the 
authority of the chief and the principal members of the stool 
family, can alienate title to the land. It is not necessary 
in this case to obtain the consent of those councillors of the 
stool who are not members of the stool family. It should be 
further noted that, as a general rule among the Ewe, the chief 
is not at the same time the head of the stool family; for 
chieftancy affairs are strictly distinguished from family 
affairs. In the transaction, therefore, the chief is in the 
somewhat anomalous position of an !telderM, though more than an 
ordinary "elder11 since his consent is vital because of the 
attachment of the land to the stool.
The Ewe-type stool land of ancestral origin is land which 
had been attached to the stool from time immemorial. As 
already pointed out, the derivative theory of stool lands is 
inapplicable among the Northern Ewe of Ghana. For each stool, 
whether a head stool or a sub-stool of whatever status, directly 
but competently holds the paramount interest in its stool lands. 
Therefore, the sub-stool does not require the approval of its 
head stool to alienate its interest in its stool lands. Con­
versely the head stool*s paramount title is not qualified, 
burdened or encumbered by any sub-paramount interest of the
subordinate stools. Therefore, the head stool can also 
directly alienate its paramount title without the consent of, 
or even a reference to, any sub-stool. Having said this, 
however, it should be pointed out that the occupant of the 
stool is not the proper person to convey title to such Ewe- 
type stool lands. Such Ewe-type stool lands of ancestral 
origin are regarded as property of the stool and not of the 
chief. And the stool, as we have explained earlier, belongs 
to the zikpuito or kpukpoto. meaning "owner of the stool", who 
is generally known as the "stool-father".^  The proper person 
in Ewe law who can alienate title to such ancestral Ewe-type 
stool lands is, therefore, the kpukpoto or stool-father; but 
he can only do so validly with the authority of the stool, 
that is with the authority of the chief and the principal 
councillors of the stool. The same provision applies to the 
alienation of any other item of stool property, except stool 
lands which are indeed stool family lands only recently ear­
marked for the purposes of the stool. Strictly speaking, the 
chief is here regarded as a "councillor" of the stool which 
is owned by the kpukpoto or stool-father. Yet the chief is 
more than an ordinary councillor because his consent is 
inescapably necessary to the validity of the alienation.
1. The office of "stool-father1* has already been briefly 
discussed in pp.74-75 supra.
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Today, as a result of the reception of Akan ideas and the 
insistence of lawyers, the Ewe chiefs are arrogating to them­
selves the right to convey title to such stool property; but 
the change has not yet crystallised into a new rule of customary 
law. In Anfoega, for instance, the Fiaga and his elders stated 
that it was still the rule that only the stool-father or 
kpukpoto who, with the necessary authorisation, could convey 
title to stool property. In Kpando a recent example was given 
that when Togbe Dzeke, formerly chief of Kpando-Dzigbe, wanted 
a part of the stool lands to be sold, it was his stool-father 
who effected the sale and conveyed the title. Whether the 
old rule will survive for long, however, cannot be confidently 
predicted.
Communal lands, as we have explained, are those lands to 
which the paramount title is not held by either the stool or 
any family, but which are contained within the territorial 
boundaries of the chiefdom and to which every subject has a 
right of user,^ The proper person to convey title to such 
communal lands is the divisional chief acting on the authority 
of his principal councillors. It is suggested in many areas 
that such a conveyance by the divisional chief requires the 
approval of the head chief, but this is doubtful.
In all the above cases we have suggested that, whoever 
conveys title, the conveyance must, in order to be valid, be
1, Communal lands are discussed in pp.38if-^01 supra.
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with the authority of the principal councillors of the stool 
or the principal elders of the family as the case may be.
This is the body of persons that Bentsi-Enchill would call the 
"management committee" of the family or of the stool.'*' The 
expression is hardly well-chosen. The idea of a committee 
pre-supposes that it is a committee of a larger group. In 
actual fact, however, the family head and his elders constitute 
the governing body of the family. They are not the agents of 
any principal but constitute the expression of the legal per­
sonality of the family. For that reason their decision is 
not subject to the ratification of the entire membership of 
the family. In fact even if the head of the family and the 
principal members, who numerically constitute only a small 
minority of the members, alienate title to family property 
in an irresponsible manner, there is no process by which the 
unanimous decision of the members, the great majority, can 
invalidate the alienation.
A further objection is that the "management committee"
analogy imports the undertones of a board of directors of a
company or other statutory body. Even such a faint suggestion
can create problems for the efficient functioning of the
2
family as a unit. For , instance in Lar.te.y. v. Mensah. Ollennu, J.,
1. K. Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit.. pp.57-59, et passim.
2. (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. i+10, ifll-412.
virtually treated a family meeting as if it were a meeting 
of a board of directors of a statutory company, with require­
ments as to adequate notice, publication of agenda and quorum. 
To regard a head of family and his elders as a "management 
committee" may lead to the importation of rigid rules which 
are not known in' that form to the customary law. For that 
body is not a "management committee" or a board of directors 
of a company, with any rules as to adequate notice, quorum, 
advance publication of agenda or matters of that nature. 
Generally all the principal elders of the family must be 
notified to attend the meeting and a substantial consensus, 
not a bare majority, is necessary before any important action 
is taken, such as alienation of title to immovable family 
property. If such a consensus cannot be obtained, the proposal 
is regarded as having been rejected. But, as pointed out in 
Ennin v. Prah. the absence of a few members cannot invalidate 
their action, for
A member of a family who goes abroad does not, and 
cannot, expect family life to come to a stand-still 
whilst he is away. The rest of the family carry on 
without him, until he comes back to take his full 
share in the life of the family. 1
It is the same when a principal member of the family is, for
any other cause, unable or unwilling to participate in the
p
deliberations of the family. That Bentsi-Enchill has in mind
1. Ennin v. Prah. (1959) G.L.R. 44, 47.
2. Welbeck v. Captan. (1956) 2 f/.A.L.R. 47.
the type of "management committee" of a statutory company 
is manifest from his other suggestion, not only that every 
succeeding head of family should obtain recognition or auth­
ority from the court, but also that all members of this
"committee" should be registered and the list reviewed from 
1time to time. These are suggestions which would transform 
the body into a different one from that known to the customary 
law.
It is submitted that it is not necessary to devise any 
special terminology for referring to the head of the family 
acting with the principal members of the family. There has 
been no real inconvenience in referring to the group, as it 
is now, as the head of family and the principal members of 
the family. If we are pressed to find a name, perhaps the 
nearest to the customary law conception of the group is 
"governing body", which in fact the head and principal members 
of the family are.
Irregular Alienation: Void or Voidable?
Having determined the appropriate body of persons who can 
validly alienate interests in stool or family property, the 
next issue is whether any purported alienation is void or 
merely voidable when that body is not properly constituted,
I. K. Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit,. p.59.
In Ewe law any purported alienation of family or stool property,
If irregular, is totally void and not just voidable. Judicial
authority, however, suggests that the answer depends on the
nature of the irregularity in the composition of the body.
Any single individual, being not the head of the family
or occupant of the stool, is incompetent to alienate the
paramount title to stool or family property and, therefore,
cannot convey it. Any such purported alienation of the family
title or stool title by the individual, whether by way of
gift or sale, is null and void. As Ollennu, J., stated in
Ohimen v, Ad.jei;
By native custom it is only the head, acting with the 
necessary consent, who can bind the family. It would 
be chaotic if any member could compromise the portion 
of the family by any act which, while benefiting him 
personally, was detrimental to the interest of the 
family as a whole. 1
Such alienation is, therefore, void and not merely voidable.
For, as Coker puts it:
It is an essential characteristic of a family property 
that it should exist for the benefit not of any 
individual or member, but of the family as a whole. 2
The next possible situation is where the elders alone,
without the head of the family or the occupant of the stool,
purport to alienate title to family or stool property. All
the authorities are agreed that such a purported alienation
1. Ohimen v. Ad.jei. (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 276, 280.
2. G.B.A. Coker, Family Property Among the Yorubas. 1966, p.61. 
Also Ollennu, J,, says the same in Ohimen v. Ad.jei. supra.
is not merely voidable but void ab initio and of no effect.
Sarbah states the view quite clearly that:
Neither the head of the family acting alone, nor the 
senior members of a family acting alone, can make any 
valid alienation nor give title to any family property 
whatsoever. 1
Ollennu expresses it more forcefully that:
The one indispensable person in the alienation of 
stool or skin land is the occupant of the stool or 
of the skin, and the one indispensable person in 
the alienation of family land is the head of the 
family. 2
In Agbloe v. Sappor^ the competent body for the alienation of 
Interests in family property consisted of the head of the family 
and five other principal members. Four of the five principal 
members, without the head of the family, purported to convey 
title to the family land by a deed of conveyance. If the 
family had met, this would have been a majority of A to 2 in 
favour of the alienation. The West African Court of Appeal, 
however, held that the purported conveyance was void ab initio. 
It said:
In the first place we can find no authority for the 
statement that the principal members of the family 
can give any title in a conveyance of family land with­
out the head of the family joining in the conveyance, 
even though he may be in agreement.... The head of the 
family may be considered to be in an analogous position 
to a trustee, from which it follows that it is quite 
impossible for land to be legally transferred and legal 
title given without his consent. The alleged deed,
Exhibit ’B1, was therefore void ab initio, and the 
Respondents derive no right to absolute ownership by 
virtue thereof. if
1. J.M. Sarbah, op.cit,. p.79.
2. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana.
1962, p.127.
3. (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 187.
'*• Agbloe v. Sappor. (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 187, 189.
475.
The above dictum of Harragin, C.J., in the West African Court 
o)f Appeal may be criticised for regarding the head of a family 
ais a trustee, which would lead to the erroneous supposition 
that the legal title to family property is vested in the head 
o>f family. Nevertheless, such a criticism does not affect the 
fundamental proposition that, without the head of the family, 
a.ny purported conveyance of title by the principal members of 
the family, even if by a clear majority of them^is void ab 
initio.
The other position is where the head of the family, or 
o»ccupant of the stool, acting with the consent and concurrence 
of only a minority of the principal members or councillors, 
purports to alienate any interest in family or stool property.
In Bassil v, Honger  ^ the West African Court of Appeal held 
that a lease granted by the head of the family with the con­
currence of only some, but not all, of the principal members 
of the family was "not valid as against the ... other principal 
members of the family" and, to mak,e it clearer, that it was 
"of no effect as a lease". This, it is submitted, means that 
such a lease was void ab initio and not merely voidable.
Ollennu was counsel for the respondents who, in Bassil v. Honger,
succeeded in obtaining xftjb&ii the declaration that the lease
with
granted by the head of the family/ only some principal members 
of the family concurring, was "of no effect as a lease".
1. (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 569.
k 76.
However, Ollennu seems to take a different view now and he
says that such an alienation is not void ab initio but is only
voidable at the instance of the family if the family act
,ftimeously" to set it aside. As Ollennu puts it:
An alienation of stool or family land which on the face 
of it purports to have been made by the occupant of the 
stool or the head of the family acting with the consent 
and concurrence of the principal elders, and with that 
consent and concurrence evidenced by at least one prin­
cipal member of the family (e.g. a holder of traditional 
office like a linguist) is not void, but is voidable; 
that is to say, it is valid until it is declared void 
by a court of competent jurisdiction, at the suit of 
the family. But in order that the court may interfere, 
the family must act timeously, i,e, they should ins­
titute the proceedings for the avoidance of the trans­
action without undue delay so that the purchaser may 
be restored to the position he was in before the sale.
In such a suit the onus is upon the family to prove 
that in fact no consent of the principal elders was 
obtained, 1
2
For this statement Ollennu relies on cases like Manko v, Bonso.
3 L. 5
Bassil v, Honger. Owiredu v, Moshie. Allottey v, Abrahams.
6 7Mensah v, Ghana Commercial Bank and Quarrri v, Yankah,
Of all these cases, however, it is only in Q.uarm v, Yankah 
that there is some support for Ollennu1s proposition of void­
ability, The case of Manko v, Bonso is not one of a sale by 
the head of the family with at least one other principal member 
concurring in it, but by the head alone. It does not, therefore, 
support the present proposition of Ollennu. Indeed it would
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana.
1962, p.128,
2. (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 62.
3. (195*f) U  W.A.C.A. 369.
k. (1952) I k  W.A.C.A, 11.
5. (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 280.
6. (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 12 3.
7. (1930) 1 W.A.C.A. 80.
appear that, in any case, Ollennu would not endorse that 
decision inasmuch as, in that case, a purported alienation 
of family property by the head of family alone was held to be 
not void but voidable, thus barring the intervention of the 
family by laches amounting to acquiescence. For Ollennu him­
self disagrees with the decision in Manko v. Bonso when he 
says that any alienation by a head of family alone or the
occupant of a stool alone is void ab initio and not merely 
1
voidable.
The decision in Bassil v. Honger also does not support 
011ennufs proposition. For, on the contrary, the West African 
Court of Appeal held in that case that a lease granted of 
family property by the head of the family with the consent 
and concurrence of only a minority of the principal members 
of the family, more than one of them, was Mof no effect as a 
lease11, A purported lease which is !!of no effect as a lease11 
is not merely voidable but void ab initio. Thus, while Ollennu 
contends that the consent of at least one principal member 
would leave the alienation voidable, the decision in Bassil 
v, Honger is that even if more than one of them consent, yet 
the transaction will not be merely voidable but void ab initio 
if those consenting are in the minority. Similarly, in Owiredu 
v, Moshie, the West African Court of Appeal, contrary to 
Ollennu’s view, held that a lease granted by a chief was void
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana.
1962, pp.127-128.
because the chief did so with the consent of only three of his 
councillors and also because the superior stool’s approval was 
lacking.
It is true that in Allottey v. Abrahams and Mensah v. Ghana
Commercial Bank, both of which were decided by Ollennu, J., it
was stated that a deed executed by the stool occupant or head
of family and a linguist or other principal elder of the stool
or family is only voidable and not void. However, in each of
these cases the statement was not necessary for the determination
of the issues before the court and must be regarded as an
obiter dictum. In Allottey v. Abrahams it was the case of a
deed executed by the stool occupant and the senior linguist
and signed also by about five other principal elders and the
reason why the deed was not set aside was that:
The recital in the document that it was executed with 
the knowledge, consent and concurrence of the principal 
elders of the Sempe stool, but that it is only some of 
such elders and the linguist who signed and marked the 
document to evidence such knowledge, consent and con­
currence of all the principal elders, has not been 
refuted. On the contrary, that recital is confirmed 
by the evidence of the linguist ... who deposed that 
although he, a linguist, and other elders were present 
at the execution and consented and concurred in it, 
yet they did not sign the document. 1
In that case, therefore, although all the elders did not
actually sign the deed, the necessary authorisation was proved
to have been given.
1. Allottey v, Abrahams, (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 280, 287.
In Mensah v. Ghana Commercial Bank, the real reason why 
the document was set aside was that there was not a sufficient 
proof that it had in fact been signed by the chief himself and 
that, even if so signed, there was a Government Gazette notice 
to the effect that the alleged signatory had ceased to be a 
chief at the time of the execution of the document.^ The reason 
here, therefore, was not that the deed had been signed by only 
the chief and his linguist, but that the proper occupant of the 
stool, !!the one indispensable person1^ had not signed the deed.
We now come to Quarm v. Yankah. the only authority with 
some apparent support for Ollennu1s proposition. In that case 
the West African Court of Appeal referred to Sarbah1s exposition 
that
A person who desires to procure a grant of land or 
any concession from a local ruler, should make 
special inquiries and inform himself who the members 
of his council are, and get them or the linguist of 
the Council to join the head chief in making such 
grant, 2
By construing disjunctively the requirements of consent by the 
elders or by the linguist, the West African Court of Appeal 
held that the consent of the linguist alone was enough in lieu 
of the consent of the principal elders. It said:
1. Mensah v. Ghana Commercial Bank. (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 123, 129.
2. J.M. Sarbah, op.cit.. p.67.
It is clear, therefore, that in the opinion of the 
learned author it is sufficient for the linguist of 
the Council alone to sign in lieu of the elders and 
councillors in order to bind the stool - a rule that 
appears to me so useful and reasonable that I think 
this Court should, even if there was no good authority 
for it, lay it down so as to put an end to uncertainty 
that seems to be prevalent in this matter. 1
The West African Court of Appeal then proceeded to compare the
chief and his linguist to the chairman and secretary of an
English corporation and drew the analogical conclusion that the 
two of them should be able to bind the stool in much the same
way that a company can be bound by its chairman and secretary.
What the Court meant here was not merely to regard an alienation 
by only the chief and his linguist as simply voidable as Ollennu 
urges. The Court thought that such alienation should be absol­
utely binding in the same way that a deed executed by the 
chairman and secretary could validly bind their company in 
English law. This goes further than Ollennu*s own proposition 
that such an alienation is merely voidable and it is almost 
certain that Ollennu himself would not accept it. In any case 
it is clear that the West African Court of Appeal did not con­
sider Sarbahfs work as a whole, for the same author has also 
said:
The head of the family cannot, without the consent of 
all the principal members of the family, or the greater 
part thereof ... alienate the immovable ancestral or 
family property. 2
1. Quarm v. Yankah. (1930) 1 W.A.C.A. 80, 83-84.
2. J.M. Sarbah, op.cit.. p.78.
It is to be remarked that Quarm v. Yankah has not been followed 
in declaring as valid any alienation by only a stool occupant 
and his linguist. The trend, on the contrary, has been to 
declare invalid the alienations which have the approval of 
even a minority of other elders in addition to the chief and 
his linguist.^ Indeed Quarm v. Yankah seems to have stood 
alone until the obiter dicta of Ollennu, J., in Allottey v . 
Abrahams and Mensah v. Ghana Commercial Bank. It is to be 
hoped that the rule stated in Quarm v. Yankah will not be 
followed by the Courts. In any case the actual facts of that 
case were that the deed in that case was not signed by only 
the chief and his linguist but also by three other councillors. 
This could well be the reason why the Court was anxious, per­
haps over-anxious, to save the transaction and proceeded to 
lay down such a wide rule.
On the strength of the authorities, therefore, it is
submitted that the better view is that alienation by the head
of the family or the occupant of the stool, together with only
a minority of his elders or councillors, is not just voidable
but void ab initio. The cases in which this was the main issue
to be decided are Bassil v. Honger. Owiredu v. Moshie and
Quarm v. Yankah. In the first two the alienation was declared
to be void. It was only in Quarm v. Yankah that it was decided
that the alienation was only voidable and not void. As Quarm v.
Yankah was decided earlier than the other cases, it would 
Y] e.g. Bassil v. Honger. supra, and Owiredu v. Moshie. supra.
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probably have been followed if it were good law; but it has 
not been followed. It is submitted, therefore, that the prop­
osition in that case is not good law.
The last possibility is where a head of family alone 
alienates title to family property. It would seem logical 
that, as title to family property does not vest in its head 
alone, he alone should not be competent to alienate such title. 
The decisions on this point, however, are surprisingly conflict­
ing, In Awortchie v, Eshon"^ when family property was sold by 
the head of the family without the authority of the principal
members of the family, the sale was set aside as void. Then
2
later in Gaisiwa v, Akraba, when the head of family sold 
family property for the perfectly legitimate purpose of defraying 
the expenses incurred in family litigation, the sale was set 
aside as void because it was effected without the knowledge, 
and therefore without the authority, of the principal members 
of the family. Also in Nelson v. Nelson^ where, because of 
an English form of conveyance to him as head of family, the 
head alone sold the proper-ty, it was held to be null and void 
because the sale was without the consent of the appellants who 
were the principal members of the family entitled to the 
property,........................................................
1. (1872) Sar, F *C.L. 170,
2. (1896) Sar, F.L.R. 9k.
3. (1951) 13 W.A.C.A, 22*8.
Ollennu also supports the law set out in these decisions
that alienation of family property by the head of the family
alone is void. Having stated that the stool occupant or head
of family is indispensable to the valid alienation of stool or
family property, he says:
But the occupant of the stool or skin alone, or the head 
of the family alone, is incapable of making a valid 
alienation of stool or family land. Any conveyance made 
by the occupant of the stool alone, or by the head of 
the family alone, is null and void ab initio. 1
2
This is also the view of Bentsi-Enchill.
However, there are some decisions which point in a dif- 
ferent direction. For instance, in Bayaidee v. Mensah, stool 
land was sold by the occupant of the stool alone. At the time 
of the transaction a member of the stool family had warned the 
purchaser of the family character of the property; but the 
purchaser chose to ignore this warning and the sale was con­
cluded. Instead of setting the sale aside as void, the court 
confirmed it and said:
Now, although it may be, and we believe it is the law, 
that the concurrence of the members of the family ought 
to be given in order to constitute an unimpeachable sale 
of family land, the sale is not in itself void, but is 
capable of being opened up at the instance of the family, 
provided they avail themselves of their right timeously 
and under circumstances in which, upon the rescinding of 
the bargain, the purchaser can be fully restored to the 
position in which he stood before the sale.
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana.
1962, pp.127-128.
2. K. Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit.. pp.50-59.
3. (1878) Ren. 45; (1878) Sar. F.C.L. 171.
k8k.
We are of opinion that whatever right of impeaching 
the sale the family possessed is barred by their 
acquiescence and the plaintiff’s continued course 
of undisturbed possession. 1
2Then in Insilhea v. Simmons the principle in Bayaidee v. 
Mensah was upheld but, because the purchaser himself, by his 
conduct, had realised that the title conveyed to him by the 
head of the family alone was doubtful, the sale was set aside.
It was in Manko v. Bonso^ that the principle of Bayaidee 
v. Mensah was fully applied. In that case the head of family 
alone had sold family land in about 1885 without the knowledge, 
consent or concurrence of the other members of the family.
After over 1+5 years, the validity of the sale was called in 
question. The West African Court of Appeal held that, on the 
principle in Bayaidee v. Mensah. the sale of 1885 by the head 
of the family acting alone was not void but only voidable. 
Hence, as the family had been guilty of laches because of the 
long intervention of time, the sale was not set aside. There­
after, in Kwan v. Nyieni.^ the Ghana Court of Appeal stated 
that such an irregular alienation by a head of family alone 
is to be regarded as voidable, though on the facts of that 
case the alienation was declared null and void because the 
family was not guilty of acquiescence by laches.
1. Bayaidee v. Mensah (1878) Ren. z+5, (1878) Sar.
F.C.L. 171.
2. (1899) Sar. F.L.R. 105.
3. (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 62.
k. (1959) G.L.R. 67.
The authorities are in apparent conflict and confusion.
In a case like Bassil v. Honger the lease was set aside because
it was executed by the head of the family acting with the con­
sent of only a minority of the principal elders. And in 
Owiredu v. Moshie it was held to be void because the chief 
acted with only a minority of his councillors. It is, there­
fore, difficult to justify the principle on which the stool 
occupant alone, or the head of a family alone, can bind the 
stool or the family as in Bayaidee v. Mensah and the cases 
following it. It is submitted that as a matter of principle 
the law in Bayaidee v. Mensah is not good law and that where 
the head of family acts alone in alienating title to family 
property then such purported alienation is null and void ab 
initio.
In any case it should be stated that Ewe law does not
recognise "voidable*1 alienation of property. The concept of a
legal transaction hanging mid-way between validity and inval­
idity until the intervention of other factors is unknown to 
Ewe law. In that system of law, if the alienation is duly 
effected it is valid. If it is an irregular alienation vitiated 
by the lack of the requisite authority or otherwise, then it is 
void ab initio and the defect is incurable. The only way out 
of such a void alienation is to enter into a fresh contract 
with the proper persons, though perhaps on identical or the 
same terras and possibly with any previous payments being 
credited to the purchaser. It is presumably so also with the 
customary laws of some other communities in Ghana.
If the notion of a "voidable" alienation of family or 
stool property is unknown to the customary law, where can we 
look for its origin? The answer is that it is an equitable 
rule developed by the Ghanaian courts to save invalid tran­
sactions in which it appears to the Court that the equities 
are on the side of the purchaser. Bossman, J., describes it
as "equitable rules administered by the Supreme Court" to
1 2 modify the customary law. For instance in Bayaidee v. Mensah
the validity of the alleged purchase was not challenged until 
over 1A years later. In Manko v. Bonso^ the sale had been 
effected for over L+5 years and the property had changed hands 
several times. It would certainly have resulted in consider­
able hardship to the purchasers and those claiming title through 
them if such transactions were nullified. Instead of stating 
that the transaction in such cases is itself void, but that 
the rights and title it purports to convey are recognised by 
the intervention of equity, the proposition is stated that the 
sale itself is not void but only voidable when irregularly 
effected. It is submitted that Ollennu, J., came nearer the 
correct position when he explained in Ohimen v. Ad.jei^ that 
equity will not permit the true owner afterwards to recover 
possession of the land if that owner sits by and allows another
1. Ennin v. Prah. (1959) G.L.R. kk,
2. (1878)' Ren. Z+5, *f6; (1878) Sar. F.C.L. 171.
3. (1936) 3 W.A.C.A. 62. 
k. (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 275.
person to improve his land in the honest, though erroneous, 
belief of title. The principle of the decisions upholding 
voidability is, therefore, defeasance of title by laches 
amounting to acquiescence on the part of the family. This 
principle of estoppel by laches was enunciated in Abbey v, 
Ollennu^ by the West African Court of Appeal, applying the
p
dictum of Fry, J,, in Willmot v. Barber.
If the underlying rationale of the decisions supporting 
the principle of the voidability of irregular alienation of 
stool or family property is the equitable doctrine of laches, 
then this principle is in conflict with another rule of 
customary law that there are no prescriptive rights in Ghana. 
The non-existence of prescriptive rights in Ghana means that 
the long possession of land cannot by itself mature into 
absolute title if title cannot otherwise be established,-^ In 
applying the equitable doctrine of acquiescence by laches, 
adopting the dictum in Willmot v. B a r b e r the West African 
Court of Appeal significantly failed to discuss the impli­
cations of applying that doctrine to communities in which 
there is no recognition of prescriptive rights. It is sub­
mitted that, unless the doctrine of acquiescence by laches 
is trimmed to very limited proportions, its practical effect
would be the introduction of a variant of prescriptive rights
T. (1954) 14 W.A.C.A. 5 6 7.
2 . (1880) 15 Ch. D. 9 6, 105-106.
3. See, e.g. Kuma v. Kuma. (1936) 5 W.A.C.A. 4, 7, 9;
Ado v. Wusu. (1940) 6 W.A.C.A. 24. 25; and Ohimen v. Ad.jei.
(1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 275, 279. 
k* Supra.
in a different guise. When Ollennu, J., grappled with the 
problem of the conflict of these principles in Ohimen v. Ad.jei"*" 
he found himself on the horns of a dilemma and almost contra­
dicted himself. For, after stating that f,undisturbed possession 
of land by a stranger for however long a time cannot ripen into 
ownership” , he proceeded to say that, if the true title holder 
was guilty of laches amounting to fraud, yet ”not that the
stranger acquires title to it, though in actual fact he does
2
thereby acquire title to the land.11 It is submitted that, if 
Min actual fact he does thereby acquire title” , then in law 
the stranger has acquired title to the land. In confirming the 
title of an irregular alienee, however, even these verbal 
distinctions are ignored and the title is deemed to be a valid 
one. This knocks at the very root of the principle of the 
non-existence of prescriptive rights in Ghana.
The problem here is to balance the interests of the pur­
chaser against those of the family, both of whom have been de­
frauded by the unauthorised vendor. In doing this the courts 
seem to be inclined to protect the vendor who has spent his 
money. But where indeed do the equities lie? As Kingdon, C.J., 
put it in the Nigerian case of Adebubu v. Makan.juola. stressing 
the necessity of the authorisation of the family to the valid 
alienation of title to family land:
1. (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 275.
2. Ohimen v. Ad.jei. (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 275, 279.
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The native law and custom throughout West Africa in 
regard to the alienation of family land quite naturally 
has as its basis the interests of the family and not the 
interest of strangers who may wish to acquire family 
land. 1
The interest of the family was similarly recognised as paramount
p
by Ollennu, J., in Mensah v. Ghana Commercial Bank. It should,
therefore, be the policy of the law to protect the family by
leaning in favour of family and stool titles. This cannot be
achieved when, as in Bayaidee v. Mensah. it is held that the
family can only recover the property
provided they avail themselves of their right timeously 
and under circumstances in which, upon the rescinding of 
the bargain, the purchaser can be fully restored to the 
position in which he stood before the sale. 3
This exaggerates the interests of the purchaser against the 
family. The policy of this dictum implies that in any event 
the careless or reckless purchaser shall not be the loser; for 
either he retains his defective title as perfected by laches 
or he is fully restored to the status quo ante. It is respect­
fully submitted that this attitude of the courts is not commend­
able because it accords undue protection to the purchaser. The 
proper policy approach, it is further submitted, should be to 
preserve and protect the interests of the family as against 
those of the speculative purchaser, unless it is seen that the 
family has properly divested itself of its rights and title.
In that case the onus would lie on the purchaser to prove that 
he has acquired a valid title.
Y] Adebubu v . Makan.iuo 1 su (19Mf) 10 W.A.C.A. 33, 3^.
2. (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 123.
3. Bayaidee v. Mensah. (1878) Ren. k 5 ,
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It may be objected that the suggested approach would leave 
the purchaser unprotected. The answer to this is that the pur­
chaser has his remedy against the fraudulent vendor in an action 
for the return of his purchase-money for failure of consider­
ation and damages for the breach of covenant of title. If the 
fraudulent vendor is impecunious, as is often the case, the care 
less purchaser must bear the loss. The point is that, in any 
case of the fraudulent vendor’s impecuniosity, the loss would 
have to fall on either the purchaser or the family, and it is 
submitted that a lesser injustice will be occasioned if the loss 
falls on the shoulders of the purchaser. The principle of 
caveat emptor is fully applicable here, and the prospective 
purchaser must have his eyes wide open to satisfy himself as 
to the vendor’s title even in the absence of a scheme for the 
registration of land titles. It is a presumption, though rebut­
table, in Ghana and particularly among the Northern Ewe, that 
land is family land.'*' The prospective purchaser is, therefore, 
under a duty to himself to ensure that he acquires title from 
the proper person and with the necessary authorisation. If he 
fails to do this, it is his own fault and the purported alien­
ation must be deemed to be void. In many cases this should not 
be particularly difficult because a stranger purchasing land 
always does so with the assistance of a native who becomes his
sponsor or afeto. The afeto advises the intending purchaser on 
2
land titles.
±~. United Products v. Afari. (1929-31) D.Ct.12.
2. The role of the afeto in such transactions is explained at 
pp.510 -511 infra.
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The principle on which the alienation of family or stool in­
terest in property can be said to be irregular is that the person 
or persons purporting to alienate the group title do not possess 
the authority in that behalf. What is usually expressed as ’’the 
consent and concurrence” of the principal elders of the family is 
in fact the procedure for authorisation in the customary law. It 
is not merely a consent to what the head is competent to do. With­
out the proper authorisation the act of the head of family is 
simply ultra vires. An ultra vires transaction is void, not just 
voidable, and the defect cannot be cured by the intervention of 
time to make it intra vires.^
One implication of regarding such an irregular alienation of 
family property as not void but voidable is that, even without 
being guilty of laches, the family’s title can be defeated by the 
intervention of a ius tertii. The principle of nemo dat quod non 
habet does not invalidate the title conveyed by the holder of a 
voidable title to a bona fide purchaser for /value without notice. 
Therefore, the family’s title may be lost if in the interim the 
irregular purchaser disposes of the property to another purchaser 
for value whose title would then become unimpeachable.
By holding an irregular alienation of stool or family 
property to be voidable and, therefore, confirming it if not 
’’timeously” set aside at the suit of the family, the Courts are 
sanctioning the devaluation of the legal purpose of authorisation 
by the family. The essence of authorisation in customary law
is that it is the only means of making the alienation of stool
T~. Ashby Railway Carriage & Iron Co. v. Riche. (1875) L.R.7.
H.L. 653, 672-673, 679.
or family interest in property valid. Authorisation by the 
family is thus not an alternative to any other means of per­
fecting title and certainly not an alternative to the efflux 
of time, the intervention of laches or the intervention of 
ius tertii. Otherwise the door may eventually be open for 
by-passing the requisite authority if it is known or suspected 
that the authorisation may not be forthcoming. Already there 
is an example in Bayaidee v, Mensah  ^ when the vendor ignored 
with impunity the warning that the stool occupant alone could 
not alienate the interest in the property. It is submitted 
that the only way to insist on the necessary authorisation is 
to make it a sine qua non to the validity of any alienation 
of group titles, and to hold such alienation to be void ab 
initio in the absence of the requisite authority.
Alienability of Individual Interest in Family Property
The rule of Ewe law is that an individual person has no 
alienable interest in the family property which he enjoys by
2
the right of membership of the family. As pointed out earlier, 
an individual in occupation of family land among the Ewe cannot 
alienate the paramount title to the land either inter vivos or 
post mortem by testamentary disposition. He is in this respect 
in an analogous position to a joint tenant without any speci­
fiable portion that he can alienate; but he is not a joint
T. (1878) Ren. i+5; (1878) Sar. F.C.L. 171.
2. See pp.313-318 supra.
tenant because inter alia there is no right of survivorship or 
ius accrescendi. For this reason the rule in Lokko v. Konklofi^ 
also applies that execution cannot be levied against an indiv­
idual's interest in family land among the Ewe.
2
A contrary opinion is held by Ollennu. In spite of the
........................   ■ ■ -z-
decision in Golightly v. Ashrifi that it is not possible,
Ollennu argues that an individual in occupation of stool or 
family property can alienate his interest therein, provided 
that the paramount title of the stool or family is unaffected. 
Supporting this contrary position are cases like Thompson v .
l± c:
Mensah and Total Oil Products Ltd. v, Obeng. judgments
delivered by Ollennu, J. It is submitted that these authorities
are inapplicable to the Ewe. The individual has an almost un­
limited right to the occupation and use of family land among 
the Ewe but, as stated in Golightl.y v. Ashrifi. he cannot under 
any circumstances alienate his interest in the portion under 
his occupation. Even the family cannot authorise him to alienate 
his interest because the individual's interest in family property 
is inalienable. It is transferable to another member of the 
family but it cannot be alienated to a non-member of the family.
1. (1907) 2 Ren. A50.
2. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Lav/ in Ghana.
1 9 6 2, pp.57-59.
3. (1955) l*f W.A.C.A. 676.
k. (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. ZkO.
5 . Total Oil Products Ltd.. v. Obeng. (1962) 1 G.L.R. 228.
As explained earlier, however, Ewe law draws a distinction 
between the land itself and the things on it. Therefore, while 
the individual cannot alienate his interest in the land itself, 
he may alienate his interest in the crops or building cultivated 
or erected by him on family land. This leaves intact the family 
title to the land itself.
CHAPTER IX
SALE OF LAND
Saleability of Land
There is little doubt that, from time immemorial, property 
other than land has always been alienable outright, either by 
way of sale or gift. We cannot say the same of land among the 
Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana; for among the Northern 
Ewe the rule was that the paramount title to land could not be 
alienated outright. It has, in fact, been seriously doubted 
whether land,- the main type of family property among the Northern 
Ewe, could be alienated outright by sale in other Ghanaian 
customary laws. By outright alienation is meant here the alien­
ation of the paramount title by sale or absolute gift as con­
trasted with transactions like tenancies and pledges of various 
kinds. Outright alienation in this context, therefore, implies 
divesting the holder of the paramount title of that paramount 
title either by way of sale or gift. It is submitted that in
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this context outright alienation by sale or gift of the paramount
interest in land was formerly unknown to Ewe law, but that such
alienation is now recognised in most Ewe chiefdoms.
Some writers today contend that interests in land have
always been saleable. Bentsi-Enchill, for instance, thinks that
land has always been saleable. He says:
Sales of land, for example, are matters of such common 
occurrence today ... But there is a view ... that in 
former times land could not be alienated. There can 
indeed be little doubt that sales of land were rare in 
former times; but it would seem desirable to distinguish 
between lack of willingness to sell land and lack of the 
capacity to do so. 1
Then he declares:
Those who assert that land could not be alienated in 
former times have yet to account satisfactorily for 
the existence of indigenous and immemorial procedures 
for the alienation of land by sale or otherwise, 2
The "indigenous and immemorial procedures" refer in particular 
to the guaha custom for passing title and sealing the tran­
saction in case of a sale of land among the Akan,
A similar argument also comes from Asante, who says:
Contrary to many familiar assertions, outright alienation 
of land by sale, involving total divesture of the prop­
rietary interest in land, was not unknown to the traditional 
legal process. 3
1, K. Bentsi-Enchill, Ghana Land Law. Sweet & Maxwell, London, 
196/+, pp. k k -k 5 .
2, Ibid., p.Zf5.
3, S.K.B. Asante, "Interests in Land in the Customary Law of 
Ghana - A New Appraisal", (1963) 7k Yale L.J., 8lf8 at p.860.
Then, like Bentsi-Enchill, Asante also makes the point that if 
land were not saleable in the past there would not have existed 
the guaha custom which is the indigenous procedure of breaking 
a leaf, a twig or a blade of grass to conclude the sale of
i
land and pass title. He also says that self-restraint in the
sale of land, which one also discovered among the English
especially in the last century through the creation of entailed
interests, should not be mistaken for the supposition that land
was not formerly saleable.
Woodman, who also discusses the question, is inclined to
think that perhaps land was formerly not saleable but he does
not go further than mentioning the probability. He says:
It is now established, that a family can alienate its 
entire interest in land. It is probable that at one 
time such alienations were unknown, but changes in 
economic conditions have brought changes in the lav/. 2
When Allott first considered the question in relation to the
Akan generally he said:
It is a commonplace to the student of African customary 
law that the sale of land itself was not formerly 
recognised ... /but7 there can be no doubt that at the 
present day in the Gold Coast ... the land itself has 
been the subject of sale. 3
Some twelve years later, however, Allott seems to have changed
his opinion. Writing about the Ashanti, he now says:
1. See also C.K. Meek, Land Law and Custom in the Colonies.
O.U.P., London, 1949, p.180, where the same argument is attributed 
to Sir W. Brandford Griffith, Chief Justice of the Gold Coast, 
1895-1911.
2. G.P. Woodman, ,!The Alienation of Family Land in Ghana11,
(1964) 1 Univ. of Ghana L.J., p.23.
3. A.N. Allott, The Akan Law of Property. Unpublished Ph.D.
thesis, Univ. of London, 1954, pp.283-284.
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It is often stated, not only for Ashanti law but for 
other systems of African customary law as well, that 
alienation of land (in the sense of its sale) was 
entirely unknown before modern times ... Statements 
of this sort tend to be misleading unless one takes 
care to analyse the position a little more deeply.
It is quite certain that in Ashanti a land-controlling 
stool could decide to sell its lands, i.e. sell the 
absolute title to its land, if it so chose; it would 
not choose to do so if it could possibly find some 
alternative, means of meeting its obligations; but its 
legal power to do so is unquestioned. 1
We thus have considerable support for the opinion that land has
always been saleable. The support, however, is by no means
unanimous.
Danquah seems to suggest that in the early times land was
not saleable among the Akan. He states that:
Tradition has it that absolute alienation of land was 
until recent times not generally practised by the Akan 
people. 2
In the next sentence, however, he admits limited types of sale 
because
Alienation or transfer of land as between family and 
family, tribe and tribe, or even between state and 
state, was certainly common, but sale of land for 
private or non-communal purposes was foreign to the 
people. 3
This type of limited alienation is in fact reported also by 
Rattray when the Offinsohene, having become impecunious when 
fined for an unsuccessful rebellion against the Asantehene, had
1. A.N. Allott, The Ashanti Law of Property. Stuttgart, 1966, 
pp.173-174.
2. J.B. Danquah, op.cit.. p.212.
3. Ibid.
to sell some villages to the Bekwaihene.^" Busia records the
information that "only the stool can sell land" in Ashanti,
hut v/ithout indicating whether the sale of land had been
recognised from the early times,
Sarbah goes further in giving the impression that, although
the sale of land was known in his days, it was an innovation.
He says it is observable that
Of all things, land is about the last thing which became 
the subject of an out-and-out sale. Owners of land were 
as reluctant and unwilling to part with their land and 
inheritance as was Ephron, the Hittite, to sell a 
burying-place to Abraham, as recorded in the Holy Writ. 
Rather than sell his land, the Fanti landowner prefers to 
grant leave to another, a friend or alien, to cultivate 
or dwell upon it for an indefinite period of time, thus 
reserving unto himself the reversion and the right to 
resume possession whenever he please. 3
He explains that the sale of land has become more frequent
since the abolition of slavery because, in the past, members
of the family would volunteer to be sold into slavery rather
than see a part of the family land sold.
Rattray is emphatic in his view that in the past land was
not saleable in Ashanti, In his earlier work he said that in
Ashanti
the idea of sale /of land7 as an ordinary legal process 
did not have any place in the old legal code. 4
1. R.S, Rattray, Ashanti Law and Constitution. 1929, P#149 and 
n.3 on p.149.
2. K.A. Busia, op,cit.. p,50.
3. J.M. Sarbah, op.cit.. pp.83-86.
4. R.S. Rattray, Ashanti, 1923, P.231. Also ibid,, pp.234, 236.
After a further study of the Ashanti, Rattray was confirmed in
his opinion on this point and was able to say that:
The next important point .,. was the virtual impossibility 
of the idea of anything in the nature of alienation of the 
land # .. Land could not be sold, land could not be given 
away, land could not be willed, or be the subject of 
inheritance outside the tribe. 1
These are strong views in support of the proposition that in
the early law the sale of land was not recognised.
The weight of judicial authority, it is submitted, also
leans in favour of the view that land was not formerly saleable.
2
It is true that in the early case of Awortchie v, Eshon it was 
implied that land was saleable, because it was stated that 
family 'land was not alienable except for the purpose of satis­
fying a debt incurred by the family. However, it is not 
justifiable to argue that, because in 1872 land was presumed 
to be saleable, we have to assume that land has always been 
saleable,
Sarbah relied on the dictum in Awortchie v, Eshon in
stating that, although family land was alienable,
the alienation must be for the benefit of the family, 
either to discharge a family obligation, or the proceeds 
of such alienation must be added to the family fund, 3
It was this principle, enunciated in Awortchie v, Eshon and
restated by Sarbah, that Jackson, J., applied in Golightl.y v .
Ashrifi^ when he held that stool land could never be sold
T] R.S. Rattray. Ashanti Lav; and Constitution. 1929* P>346.
2. (1872) Sar. F.C.L. 170.
3. J.M. Sarbah, op.cit,. p.90.
4. (1933) 14 W.A.C.A. 676.
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outright except to satisfy a stool debt. That principle was
exploded on appeal to the West African Court of Appeal. The
finding by the learned trial Judge, described as too sweeping,
was reversed'by the West African Court of Appeal and Foster-
Sutton, P., accepting that stool land was saleable, said:
In our opinion the existence of a stool debt was not 
at the times material to this inquiry a necessary 
preliminary condition to the sale of stool land. 1
Following this decision by the West African Court of Appeal, 
the saleability of land has been generally accepted as the 
modern law. For instance in Sasraku v. Na.ia David when, as 
co-dofendant, the Kokofuhene contended that land was not sale­
able in Ashanti, the Ghana Court of Appeal held that, whatever 
may have been the case in the past, land was now saleable.
Although in Golightl.y v. Ashrifi the West African Court 
of Appeal rejected the restriction on the alienability of 
stool land, and, therefore, of family land, it did not hold 
that land has always been saleable. For it said:
Reference to the works of Redwar and Casely Hayford 
shows that outright alienation of land, although 
originally unthought of, has for many years past 
come to be recognised by native usage, 3
This is an express finding that the notion of sale of land is
an innovation to the Ghanaian community. This also agrees
with the earlier view of Danquah that
1. Golightly v. Ashrifi, (1935) 14 W.A.C.A. 676, 681.
2. (1959) G.L.R. 7.
3. Golightly v. Ashrifi. (1955) 14 W.A.C.A. 676, 681.
Tradition has it that absolute alienation of land 
was until recent times not generally practised by 
the Akan people. 1
So also does it agree with the view of Rattray just quoted
above. It is submitted that this is the correct view, at least
as far as the Northern Ewe of Ghana are concerned. Among the
Northern Ewe land was.not. saleable in the early times.
Among other communities in West Africa, Elias tells us
of Nigeria that
There is perhaps no other principle more fundamental 
to the indigenous land tenure system throughout 
Nigeria than the theory of inalienability of land. 2
Of the Yoruba, also in Nigeria, Speed, Ag. C.J., has said:
It is perfectly well known that by strict ancient native 
lav/ all property was family property and all real property 
was inalienable. 3
Of the same Yoruba, Coker says:
Strict and orthodox native lav; and custom does not 
recognise the sale of land,
and that
The methods of absolute alienation are few and simple, 
for such dealings with family property v/ere unknown to 
the indigenous native law and custom and have only 
crept into the lav/ as a result of modern ways of life, 
coupled with the growing influence of Western civil­
ization, 4
1. J.B, Danquah, op.cit.. p.212.
2. T.O. Elias. Nigerian Land Law and Custom, London, 1962, 
P.181.
3. Lev/is v. Bankole. (1908) 1 N.L.R. 82, 84*
4. G.B.A. Coker, Family Property Among the Yorubas, Sweet & 
Maxwell, London, 1966, p.94.
We similarly have it on the authority of Lloyd that the notion 
of sale of land is an innovation to the Yoruba because it was 
formerly unknown.1 The same, it is submitted, may be said of 
the Northern Ewe.
Among the Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana, although 
changes have now occurred, the general rule was that absolute 
title to land was inalienable, whether by gift or by sale.
Land could be pledged for however long a time, but it was not 
saleable. For this reason, although the notion of sale of land 
has now been accepted in many Ewe areas, the formalities do 
not only differ in the various chiefdoms but they are generally 
simple and they do not date from time!,immemorial!l.
We may at this juncture suggest that the Ewe had not been 
adequately considered by those who support the proposition that 
land has always been saleable in Ghana. The argument, for 
instance, by Bentsi-Enchill and Asante, that the existence of 
the guaha custom for passing title to land is evidence of the 
saleability of land from time immemorial is one which is in­
applicable to the Ewe. The argument itself even as applied to 
the Akan for whom it is intended, is suspect and unconvincing; 
for there is no evidence that the guaha custom dates from time 
“immemorial”. There is no reason why we should assume that the 
native genius could not have devised such a custom if the sale 
of land were introduced only a few generations ago. In any case,
1. P.O. Lloyd, Yoruba Land Law. O.U.P., London, 1962, pp.11-12, 
17-18, et passim.
among the Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana not only is the
Akan custom of guaha generally non-existent but, as stated above,
the formal ceremonies evidencing sale of land in the Ewe areas
where land is now saleable vary from place to place. The Ewe
ceremonies are generally improvised formalities which can .
scarcely be said to. have originated from time immemorial. In
many Ewe areas imported items like wax prints and imported
drinks like schnapps form part of the ceremony, which would
lead to the supposition that the ceremonies were devised after
the advent of Europeans, unless the imported items are recent
substitutes for indigenous articles.
Of those who have conducted a study of the Ewe, Spieth
records that land was formerly not saleable among the Ewe and
that, rather than sell the family land, the debtor or another
member of the family might be sold into slavery to obtain the
money needed.1 Manoukian, though she could not be specific
on the point, speaks of the rarity of the sale of land even
today and then goes on to say:
Portions of lineage land may be temporarily transferred 
to members of other lineages, though never by alienation 
... The grantor lineage, however, always retains the 
right to resume ownership of the land. 2
Manoukian, however, is right only if she is referring to the
old Ewe law. For the sale of land is now recognised in most
parts of Eweland.
1. J. Spieth, Die Ewe-StHmme. Berlin, 1906, p.112.
2. M. Manoukian, op. cit.. p.^ t-0.
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Although the sale of land is now recognised in most of the
Ewe chiefdoms, it has been emphasised in interviews that this
is a modern innovation and that originally land could not be
sold. Some of those chiefdoms in which land could not be sold
in the early times, but which have now accepted the change,
include Gbi, Anfoega, Kpando, Abutia, Ho and Awudome. In the
Gbi case of Ahoklui v, Ahoklui.1 for instance, the claim of the
plaintiffs was based on the contention that the land in dispute
had been purchased by their grandfather for seven bags of
cowries. Though that case was decided on other grounds, the
possibility of a purchase of land went unchallenged by the
defendants. Indeed the root of title to the disputed Blave
lands, now lying at Gbi-Abansi, is that they had been purchased
at a price of seven bags of cowries from a family from Gbi-
2Kpoeta some generations ago.
In Peki and Kpedze land is now saleable, but it was not 
possible to ascertain the old rule.
In most Ewe areas the question of saleability of land in
the past may now be simply academic. The justification for
the present discussion, however, is that the old rule has
persisted in a few areas. It is the survival of the old rule
in these few places that we would like to offer as extant.......
evidence that, in the past, land was not saleable among the
l"! Ahoklui v. Ahoklui. Unreported', Land Court, Accra, 1st June, 
1959. Reproduced in N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land 
Law in Ghana, 1962, p.212.
2. Ahoklui v . Ahoklui. supra. These facts are from the proceed 
ings in the Gbi-Hohoe Native Court, Hohoe, before the appeal to 
the Land Court. Ref. Suit No. 6 1 /5 6 of Gbi-Hohoe Native Court.
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Northern Ewe of Ghana. For it is still the law in Taviefe and 
Matse that land is not saleable. Similarly it is still the law 
in Aveme and Wusuta that land is not saleable. The only excep­
tions in Aveme and Wusuta are the Afram plains lands across the 
Volta, lands which, as we have explained, are sui generis 
because title to them is.based on. an alleged gift from the 
Kumawuhene of Ashanti. In the Taviefe, Matse, Aveme and Wusuta 
chiefdoms, therefore, any transaction affecting land must be 
presumed to be not a sale. Whether the Courts will accept such 
a contention is yet to be seen. Perhaps the Courts will follow 
the decision in Sasraku v. Na.ja David^ and rule that land must
be presumed to be saleable even in those chiefdoms, relying, if
2
need be, on the principle in Golightl.y v. Ashrifi that native 
law is flexible enough to allow such changes. Whatever the 
attitude of the Courts may be to the substantive rule, it is 
submitted that the examples of these four chiefdoms establish 
the evidence that probably land was not saleable among the Ewe 
in the early times. For these chiefdoms have withstood the 
innovating onslaught of the western European influence and the 
introduction of a cash economy.
Although the sale of land was formerly unknown, its com-
3
pulsory alienation or seizure was known from the earliest times.
1. (1959) G.L.R. 7.
2. (1955) I k  W.A.C.A. 676.
3. The contrary view is stated by Rattray that in Ashanti an, 
offender1s land could not be seized because land was family 
property. See R.S. Rattray, Ashanti. 1923, p.231.
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One type of compulsory alienation, to which we have already 
referred in connection with the origin of some Ewe-type stool 
lands, was the forfeiture of family lands to the stool in 
satisfaction of an oath penalty.^" This was not a voluntary 
alienation but it divested the family of its paramount title 
to the land.
Compulsory alienation of land was also known in the 
earliest times, in settlement of obligations arising from feuds 
between families and even between individuals. If a member of 
a family committed a serious delict for which compensation could 
not be adequately exacted in any other way, lands could be 
ordered to be forfeited to the injured party and his family.
Such O'ffences included the killing of a human being, or arson 
resulting in a great loss of property or the loss of life.
Such offences were regarded as implicating the whole family. 
Therefore, even today the Ewe say of such a tortfeasor that 
edo hlo or "he has implicated the whole of his people", that is 
he has brought a great calamity and liability onto his people. 
Since the family was in those days ultimately answerable for 
the serious delicts of its members, in lieu of or even in 
addition to any other penalty, some lands of the tortfeasorfs 
family were forfeited to the injured family as compensation.
This is how some family lands had changed hands among the Ewe.
1. See pp.36J-366 supra.
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In Awuma v. Anukuma.^ which was heard by the Asogli Native
Court f!BM at Ho, the plaintiff, claimant of a disputed parcel
of land, founded his contention on such forfeiture to his
family in the past. He deposed:
In our claim we said the ownership of Ahorlor land 
is for Awumaviwo ... In Akwamu War the people of Ho 
dispersed, and as such the ’Yebute* clan, in. which 
Awumaviwo also was, travelled together towards Klepe 
side to Palime Wegbe. On their way going the Klepes 
waged war on them and killed Awuma Mortsu at the spot, 
and wounded one person known as Vovlo. The killing 
and wounding of the above persons was about to create 
war between Klepes and Hos; but the matter was settled 
and the Klepes were asked to pay for their act. They 
gave out their land formerly known as Torlele which 
we now called ’Ahorlor1 for the person Awuma Mortsu
killed and also cowries (ftuowievef) and calico for
the person Vovlo who was wounded ... 2
One effect of such a compulsory alienation was to convey the 
absolute title.
As regards gifts of land, the position was basically the 
same as for the sale of land. When the sale of land was un­
known, outright gift of land resulting in the transfer of the 
paramount title was also not known among the Ewe; Relatives 
and even strangers could be permitted to occupy the land for as 
long as they wished, even as gratuitous tenants or licensees,
but an outright gift of land as such was not recognised by the
law. Changes which now allow the sale of land also allow the 
making of outright gifts of land in those areas where the 
changes have occurred. Hence, although the outright gift of
1. Awuma v . Anukuma. Unreported, Asogli Native Court "B", 
Ho, 23rd September, 1959.
2. Awuma v. Anukuma, supra, at p.238 of Civil Record Book.
509.
land is now possible in most Ewe areas, it is still the lav; 
that outright gifts of land cannot be made in places like Aveme, 
Wusuta, Taviefe and Matse where land is not saleable.
Whatever was the past position, the present position, as 
already indicated, is that the paramount title to land is now 
alienable by way of sale or gift among the Northern Ewe of 
Ghana, with the exception of the four chiefdoms mentioned above 
and possibly a few others. The capacity to alienate, the 
requisite formalities and the effect of the transaction will, 
therefore, be now discussed. It should be understood, however, 
that whatever is said on these issues does not apply to Taviefe, 
Matse, Aveme, Wusuta and those other places where it is still 
the law that land is not saleable and cannot be the subject of 
an outright gift.
Formalities for the Sale of Land
In the sale of land, as in that of any other property, 
there are some preliminaries which must be satisfied. The 
contract of sale must as usual be negotiated. This means that 
the land to be sold must be identified or identifiable, and its 
size determined or determinable, before the purchase price is 
agreed. This process usually forms part of the publicity which 
is vital to the validity of the alienation in Ewe law. There­
fore, assuming that this is family land, the head of the family
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and his elders, or their accredited representatives, visit the
site together with the intending purchaser. In the case of
self-acquired property it is enough that the vendor goes with
some members of his family. If the intending purchaser is a
native, his relatives and friends accompany him. If he is a
stranger, he must be accompanied by a native whom he would have
adopted as his sponsor or afeto. together with any other per- 
%
sons of his choice.
The position of the afeto in this connection may be 
explained here. When discussing naturalisation it was stated 
that every stranger or amedzro settling in the community must 
have a respectable, usually an elderly, man who is to him in 
loco parentis,'*' Because this is usually the man in whose house 
the stranger resides, the word afeto is usually translated as 
"landlord1*, In actual fact, however, there need not be the 
relationship of landlord and tenant between the stranger and 
his afeto. It is a relationship in which the afeto, as it were, 
sponsors the local residence of the stranger. The afeto : . 
is answerable to the traditional political authorities for the 
acts of the stranger or amedzro. and he also champions the 
cause of the stranger in all matters. Any important act of the 
stranger or amedzro. such as important contracts or the defence 
or prosecution of claims at customary law, must be done through 
the afeto. It is suggested, therefore, that the meaning of afeto
1. See pp.173-174 supra.
here is "sponsor", though where one lets out a land or other 
premises one is also known as afeto in the sense of "landlord".
As just stated, a stranger cannot by himself alone enter 
into an important contract at Ewe customary law, such as one 
for the purchase of land. Therefore, any stranger intending to 
buy land, even if not locally resident, must have an afeto or 
sponsor through whom he may enter into the transaction. It is 
the duty of the afeto in this connection, as a native with local 
knowledge of land titles, to advise the prospective purchaser 
whether the land belongs to the family or the individual pur­
porting to sell, whether the person conveying is the head of 
the family, and whether the principal members of the family are 
those who have signified their consent and concurrence. When 
satisfied on these matters the land is identified and measured, 
usually with the afeto or sponsor present.
The area or size of the land was formerly measured in terms 
of "ropes", A "rope" in some areas is twenty times the length 
of the out-stretched arms of the tallest man in the locality, 
that is about twenty fathoms. In other areas it is sixteen 
arm-stretches. The total length of one "rope" is, therefore, 
approximately 120 feet in some areas and 96 in others. Today, 
however, most people use the tape in measuring town lands in 
terms of feet, but the "rope" is still used in the forests.
Once the land is identified and its size is determined, 
the purchase price is agreed by negotiation. The contract is, 
however, not binding at customary law until the prospective
purchaser signifies his intention to be bound. This he may do 
by sealing the transaction with a drink as "earnest money1'.
This is known as aha tutu anyigba dzi or "stamping a land 
purchase with drinks". It is essentially the same as the tramma 
among the Fanti and other Akan communities; but, among the Ewe, 
as the name implies, drinks, usually an expensive one such as 
schnapps, must literally be provided, which are shared by all 
who have participated in the identification and measurement of 
the land. If the purchaser has not provided the customary drinks 
for this purpose or effectively bound the transaction in another 
way, the agreement is not regarded as binding and the vendor 
may sell to another willing purchaser. If after aha tutu 
anyigba dzi the purchaser fails to carry out his part of the 
contract by paying the purchase price, the cost of the drinks 
or aha is lost. Today he may also be liable at common law for 
the breach of contract.
If on the other hand, after the aha tutu anyigba dzi. the 
vendor resiles from the contract, the purchaser has a choice 
between a refund to him of the cost of the drinks or applying to 
the local chief for a customary law order to enjoin performance 
by the vendor. Damages against a vendor in such circumstances 
are unknown to the Ewe law. The position was that the vendor 
could in the olden days be compelled by the chief to honour his 
agreement. Such an order compelling a vendor to sell was very 
rare, though not unknown. Because the remedy was known to the
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customary law, it has been held that today an action will lie
for an order of specific performance either as an equitable
relief or as a customary law remedy.^ This proposition is
expressed by Ollennu, J., thus:
It is true also that specific performance is an equitable 
relief. But it does not follow that every claim which a 
Ghanaian makes to compel another Ghanaian to fulfil a 
promise or an agreement is a claim for specific performance 
under English principles of equity. Long before the 
introduction of English law into this country a person 
could be compelled by the Council of the Chief to fulfil 
his promise or comply with the terms of an agreement he 
enters into with his neighbour where such compulsion 
could be effectively carried out. Thus where a person 
bargains and sells land to his neighbour, but fails to 
put him in possession, the elders would compel the vendor 
to give possession of the land sold to the purchaser, and 
upon his default the elders themselves would go upon the 
land known to belong to the vendor, and out of it demarcate 
for the purchaser a portion equal in size to the dimensions 
agreed between the parties. 2
The aha tutu anyigba dzi or payment of the earnest money, 
however, is not a sine qua non to the making of a contract 
binding for the sale of land. It is only a preferred method 
of evidencing an agreement to be bound, because the provision 
of the drinks or aha in the circumstances is a most unequivocal 
expression of an intention to be bound. Sarbah, it is submitted, 
went too far in stating that without payment of the earnest
1. Hervie v. Wiresi. (19b7) 12 W.A.C.A. 256.
2. Lartei v. Fio. (I960) G.L.R. 119. 120. On appeal, this 
decision was affirmed by the Supreme Court for different reasons 
which, however, do not affect the above proposition. See 
Lartei v. Fio. (1961) G.L.R. 12i+.
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money, known to the Fanti as tramma. !lno contract exists11 and 
the vendor may re-sell ‘the land to another purchaser.^ Where, 
for instance, the purchaser makes a substantial payment on 
account or pays the whole of the purchase price at the time of 
the agreement, no earnest-money is necessary to make the agree­
ment , binding* .....................................................
Publicity is always emphasised as necessary for the 
validity of alienation of land, whether by sale or by gift* 
Publicity is indeed necessary and even vital* However, it is 
submitted that, contrary to the judicial attitude, absence of 
publicity cannot per se be a ground for setting aside a sale 
of land. The reason why lack of publicity vitiates a sale of 
land is that in that case the proof of the transaction becomes 
impossible without written evidence. The question of publicity 
is discussed further in connection with gifts. In addition to 
what is said there, we may emphasize here that as a necessary 
rule of caution the purchaser should insist on adequate pub­
licity. For publicity means that there will be witnesses on 
both sides who can testify to the sale having taken place.
Thus publicity was particularly necessary in the days when 
writing was unknown and proof of the transaction depended on 
witnesses. Publicity also enables other members of the family
or the true holder of the interest in the land to intervene and 
T~. J.M. Sarbah* op.cit.. 'p.93.
2. See, e.g. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Lav; in 
Ghana, 1962, p.109, and Kwakuwah v. Nayenna. (1938; k W.A.C.A.
165.
3. See pp.327-333 infra.
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and protest or stop an irregular or unauthorised sale. Then, 
because of publicity, those holding interests in adjoining lands 
are able to protest if by error or by design parts of their 
holdings are included in what is being sold and, in any case, 
they are vital witnesses. The absence of publicity may, there­
fore, prove, fatal, but only insofar as it also means the absence 
of these safeguards and insofar as proof of the sale may be 
impossible.
In any sale of land, a few people are engaged to demarcate 
the area by cutting bush paths connecting the boundaries of the 
land. They are known as motsolawo or !!those who cut the path". 
They are entitled to a fixed rate of payment of about 5 per cent 
of the purchase price, and this is known as motsoga or "path 
cutting fee". The motsoga is payable by the purchaser. What­
ever may be the other purposes, one main objective of employing 
these people, usually young men, is to obtain additional wit­
nesses. Their employment and remuneration, however, are also 
consistent with a gift of land,,but not with a pledge or a 
tenancy. That motsolawo were employed and paid, therefore, is 
a vital evidence distinguishing a sale and gift (which are forms 
of outright alienation) on the one hand from other transactions 
which do not imply outright alienation of the paramount interest 
in the land.
The fixing of boundary marks has already been discussed and 
is essentially the same for both the sale and the gift of land.'*'
1. See pp.297-306 supra.
516.
Today, however, as regards town lands, most people only erect 
concrete pillars in the soil as boundary marks.
Among the Akan a special ceremony of guaha exists for the 
final transfer of titie when land has been purchased.^ This 
conveniently distinguishes a sale from a gift, a pledge and 
other transactions. The Akan ceremony seems to consist in 
pulling asunder a piece of string, threaded cowrie shells, a 
leaf or a blade of grass from the land, by two young represen­
tatives from the families of the vendor and the purchaser. The 
breaking of the piece of string, a leaf or a blade of grass is 
a symbolic dramatisation of the severance of the previous con­
nection of the vendor with the land. This also seems to be 
largely of evidentiary value, for which reason young persons 
perform the actual ceremony so that they can pass on the story 
of the sale even when the older generation has passed away.
The guaha custom as such, especially as an immemorial 
custom, is not known among the Ewe generally. Perhaps the 
reason is that land became saleable among the Northern Ewe but 
only recently. Hence the custom does not exist in some places.
In others it exists but is simple and in yet others it is 
obviously of a comparatively recent origin, perhaps copied from 
the Akan.............................................................
In the chiefdom of Awudome, for example, no special ceremony
exists for the transfer of title to land. When the sale is
T~. See e.g." J-.B. Danquah. op.cit.. p.217 and Tei Angmor' v. 
Yiadom. (1959) G.L.R. 157, and A.N. Allott, The Akan Law of 
Property. 1954, pp.353-357*
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concluded and the purchase price is paid, title is presumed to 
pass.
In Gbi the ceremony is described thus. The head of the 
vendor family, or in his absence the most senior elder present, 
says prayers to the ancestors, first with palm wine and then 
with imported spirits like schnapps or whisky, a t .the spot 
being sold. The vendor provides the drinks. The land belongs 
also to the ancestors and so they must be given an explanation 
why the sale is necessary and then be implored to intervene, 
through their spiritual medium, to ensure that in future the 
family should not find itself in such difficult circumstances. 
After the full purchase price has been paid, the purchaser' must 
additionally provide a sheep to be slaughtered, a pot of palm 
wine, two bottles of schnapps and a twelve-yard piece of wax 
print or dokpo. Even without these additional payments the 
purchaser is nevertheless entitled to the land and is let into 
possession; but until they are provided the transaction is not 
final and the vendor still has a locus poenitentiae whereby he 
can recover the. land by refunding the purchase price. When the 
additional payments are made the sale is complete and can never 
be revoked. The device of land vendors in these days of deeds 
of conveyance is to refuse to execute the deed'until the 
additional payments are made.
In Adaklu the ceremony is described in the following 
passage from a judgment of the Native Court nB!t of Adaklu:
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The court was greatly astonished to hear that the alleged 
custom of sale was performed under a tall oil palm tree, 
which is about 86 years old and is still standing. The 
court is aware that, from time immemorial, when one 
purchases land, a custom is performed by the elders of 
the different clans who ascertain and confirm the sale.
When the custom is performed, animals are slaughtered 
and the bones are buried under the heaps of sand as 
evidence against any future land dispute and a quantity 
of beads called ”soe” are buried there because they last 
long.,,,. Then two guns.are fired to complete the ceremony 
... The Defendant who said his grandfather had purchased 
the said land could not point out anything about these 
customary ceremonies. The transaction was therefore a 
pledge and not a sale. 1
In Peki there is a special ceremony for concluding a sale of 
land and it is known as gbetsotso de anyigba ta or r,breaking 
grass on land11. Two young male representatives, one from the 
vendorfs family and the other from the purchaser’s, pull a roof­
ing thatch or ebe until it breaks in two, symbolising the 
severance of the vendor’s title to the land. Each representative 
holds the roofing thatch at the opposite end with his left hand
passed under his left leg, with the two facing each other to
2
pull it to break.. The ceremony in Peki may be performed either 
on the site being sold or at home. It is the belief in Peki that 
after this ceremony any party who denies the sale will be 
afflicted with an incurable consumption or ekpee.
As can be seen from the above examples, there is no 
uniformity in the final ceremonies for sealing the effective
purchase of land among the Northern Ewe.
Glamor Kuma v. Amega Kofi. Unreported. Native Court ”B” , 
Adaklu, 2nd April, 1955, srt p.82 of Civil Record Book.
2. This is very similar to the Aburi (Akwapim) ceremony, as 
given by Allott, except that in Aburi threaded cowrie shells are 
used and the hand is passed under the right leg. See A.N. Allott, 
The Akan Law of Property. Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of 
London, pp.353-35^.
The Effect of Sale of Land
Among the Ewe the dependent interest of an individual
member of the family in family land cannot be sold or alienated
to a non-member. The only interest in land which can be sold
in Ewe lav; is the paramount interest itself. In Ewe law,
therefore, a sale of land completely divests the vendor of the
paramount title to the land. The opinion of Ollennu, however,
is that the paramount title to land is not transferable to an
individual person. He says the principle is that "absolute
title in land is inalienable except to a foreign stool which
comes to settle".^ Again he says:
The absolute title, it is affirmed, is inalienable 
to an individual ... What purports to be the purchase 
price of land allegedly sold is but part-performance 
in advance of customary services or tolls which a 
stranger-purchaser is liable to perform and to 
observe, as having stepped into the shoes of a sub­
ject of the stool (skin) or of a member of the 
family in whom the determinable title is vested 
for the time being. 2
Ollennu1s proposition is based on the assumption that the
individual lacks the capacity to held the paramount title in
land. This is also the old rule of Ewe law. However, it is
no longer true of Ewe lav; since the introduction of the notion
of the sale of land.
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana. 
1962, p.52.
2. Ibid.
3. E.g. Ibid., p.71.
More fatal to Ollennu*s proposition, as applied to the 
Ewe, is that the paramount title to Ewe lands is held by the 
respective families and the individual member’s right to the 
user of family land is not conditional upon the performance 
of any customary services to the family, the stool or any other 
body.. Unlike the Akan individual’s dependent interest which, 
as Ollennu suggests,^* can be determined among the Akan for 
disloyalty to the stool, the Ewe family cannot determine the 
individual member’s right of occupation and user of the family 
land under any circumstances. Performance of customary ser­
vices not being the basis of the individual’s right to the use 
of the E\ve family land, a sale by the Ewe family of its lands 
cannot be regarded as a commuttal for cash payment of any 
customary services due to the family or any stool.
Ollennu*s proposition is also based on a further assumption 
that the individual can also alienate his "determinable" or
p
"usufructuary" title in stool or family land. Hence he regards 
the stranger-purchaser as merely having "stepped into the shoes" 
of a subject of the stool or a member of the family. Therefore, 
he warns the prospective purchaser to satisfy himself as regards 
the nature of the estate or interest to be acquired by the sale.^ 
This warning is not necessary in the purchase of family land 
among the Ewe because, as already explained, the individual’s
1. Ibid.. p.55.
2. Ibid., p.57.
3. Ibid.,. p.108.
dependent interest in family land is inalienable. It is, 
therefore, only the family which can sell the original para­
mount title to land and, when it does so, it alienates the 
paramount title vested in it. To quote the Privy Council in 
the Nigerian case of Qshodi v. Balogun:
In .the. olden days it is probable that family' lands were 
never alienated; but since the arrival of Europeans in 
Lagos many years ago a custom has grown up of permitting 
the alienation of family lands with the general consent 
of the family. These alienations in the great majority 
of cases have been to persons not members of the family 
to whom the lands have been allotted, and their Lordships
see no reason for doubting that the title so acquired by
these purchasers was an absolute one and that no reversion
in favour of the chief was retained. 1
This, it is submitted, also expresses the basic principle of
sale of land among the Ewe. It is further submitted, therefore,
that among the Ewe it is the law that:
If the proper authorities with the proper consenting 
parties purport to make an outright grant without any 
reservations, ... they cannot later be heard to say
that reservations of some kind were implied. 2
For a sale by the Ewe family is an alienation of the family’s
paramount title, and there is now no incapacity on the part of
the individual to acquire or hold the paramount title to land.
A point urged by Ollennu is that, if the stranger can by
purchase acquire the paramount title, then it means that for
1. Qshodi v. Brimah Balogun. (1934) 4 W.A.C.A. 1, 2. Emphasis 
supplied.
2. Golightly v. Ashrifi. (1955) 14 W.A.C.A. 676, 681.
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money he acquires an interest higher than that of the individual 
member of the family or subject of the stool who would have had 
to lay down his life in defence of the property in the ancient 
days."1* That may well be so. One reason for this is that it is 
the family itself which gives the authority for its interest to 
be alienated, so that the alienee rightly succeeds to the whole 
of the interest held by the family. Furthermore, this also shows 
the difference between an inherent right of the individual mem­
ber of the family and the interest acquired by a purchaser for 
value. For Ollennu himself would accept that a stranger who 
purchases a movable property (e.g. a gold nugget)belonging to 
a family acquires the absolute title which is greater than the 
right of use which an individual member of the family had in 
that movable family property. The same reasoning applies to the 
sale of land among the Ewe, and it extends also to absolute 
gifts.
In any case, the Ewe law is that a sale or an outright 
gift completely divests the vendor or the donor of the paramount 
title to the land. The purchaser or donee, therefore, acquires 
the paramount title. The sale of 'an interest in land less than 
the paramount title is not known to Ewe law. If the transaction 
conveys anything less than the paramount title then it is not a 
sale in Ewe law: it might be a tenancy or a pledge, A sale
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana. 
1962, p.11.
of land in Ewe lav; means only one thing and that is the 
alienation of the paramount title free from any reversion or 
reservation in the vendor. That is why, while an individual 
may sell his self-acquired land, only the family can sell 
family land among the Ewe.
A sale of land among the Ewe is an irrevocable transaction. 
There is no right in the vendor to re-open the transaction in 
order to recover -his interest in the land. In this respect Ewe 
lav; may be different from Ashanti law. For Rattray says that 
a sale of land in Ashanti was not an ’’alienation of the land 
beyond all hope of redemption” because it could be regained by 
refunding the original purchase price and making an extra pay­
ment.^ This procedure is unknown to the Ewe law.
1. R.S. Rattray, Ashanti, 1923, pp.236-237.
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CHAPTER X
GIFTS
The Nature of Gifts in Ewe Law
A gift is a form of alienation of interest in property. 
Its effect is to transfer the title and interest of the donor 
to the donee. When validly effected it has the same effect in 
Ewe law as a feale in divesting the donor of his title and 
investing the donee with the same. The only basic difference 
between a sale and a gift, therefore,'is that, whereas a sale 
is a contractual arrangement involving the payment of money or 
other consideration, a gift is not contractual and is essen­
tially a unilateral offer.
Although a gift is not a contractual transaction, the Ewe 
law is that, once perfected, it is irrevocable. This means 
that it is binding on the donor and he cannot recall it. The 
donee, however, may at any time renounce the gift previously 
accepted by him and return the property to the donor.
It seems that originally among the Ewe an outright gift 
of land was unknown, so that gifts were confined to only mov­
ables and immovables like houses and farms which were not 
strictly regarded part of the land itself. This was because 
the notion of divesting the holder of the paramount title of his
title to land was repugnant to Ewe ideas* Accordingly, what
appears to be a gift of land in the olden days was in fact a 
gratuitous tenancy whereby the beneficiary was permitted a free 
use of the land for an indefinite period, with a right of suc­
cession, but with a reversion always in the grantor family.
Since land became saleable in most Ewe areas, however, the 
outright gift of land has also been recognised and is known in 
many areas,
A special gift of land in consideration of marriage was 
known to exist, for instance, in Kpedze, though it is not common 
today. When a daughter of the family was married into another 
family, some part of her family’s lands could be given to her 
husband to the use of the children of the marriage and their 
descendants. Title to the property was then vested in the 
descendants of the body of that woman, similar to the entailed 
interests in English law. The descendants were traced in the 
male line, so that the entailed interest resembled the tail male, 
with a reversion in the donor family. This type of land was 
known as mama-ve or "grand mother's land" to distinguish it from 
the husband's family land. It did not belong to the husband or
his family and was not inheritable as such property. Therefore,
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if no issue survived the marriage, or if the patrilineal - 
descendants died out, the land reverted to the donor family. 
Otherwise it was an outright gift conveying absolute title 
to the land.
Today a gift of land may be made under any circumstances.
No reason is necessary for the validity of such a gift, but 
usually there are reasons therefor, extending from consider­
ations of blood relationship to friendship or appreciation of 
services or kindness. In the same way that the sale of land 
among the Ewe implies the transfer of the paramount title, an 
outright gift of land for whatever motive transfers to the donee 
the paramount title thereto. Hence, if it is family land, then 
the gift can be validly made only through the head of the family, 
on the authority of the family, as in the case of a sale of 
family land.
The notable exception should be stated that in those Ewe 
chiefdoms like Taviefe, Matse, Aveme and Wusuta where land is 
not saleable, it is also the rule that there can be no outright 
gift of land. In those places the old rule still prevails that 
a gift of land is no more than a gratuitous licence to occupy 
and use the land for an indefinite period, even extending into 
generations.
As far as chattels are concerned, they have been the sub­
ject of gift from time immemorial. Similarly, from time immem­
orial gifts could be made of property like buildings, trees and 
crops standing on the land, as distinct from conveying title to
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the land itself. The effect of such gifts, as in the case of 
land, is to transfer title to the donee.
Certain preliminaries must be satisfied in the case of any 
gift. These are generally the same as in the case of sale of 
property,1 They include the identification of the subject- 
matter , that is the.location, size and nature of the land or 
the object of which the gift is to be made. The nature of the
property will, especially today, determine the interest conveyed;
<
otherwise this should also be ascertained. In the past, the 
identification of the nature of the interest was unnecessary if 
it was a gift of land because the "gift" amounted to no more 
than the creation of a gratuitous tenancy in favour of the 
"donee". Today also the identification of the interest in a 
gift of land is not necessary because in modern Ewe law a gift 
of land means the transfer of the paramount title to the donee 
and just that.
To make a gift effective there should be publicity and, in 
addition, a formal acceptance of the gift by the donee. These 
will now be discussed.
Publicity
Publicity is an essential requirement in the making of an 
unimpeachable gift in Ewe lav;. The main objective of publicity 
in this context is to bring the alienation to the notice of the
1. Discussed in pp. 509-512 supra.
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general public and especially to the notice of those who would, 
but for the gift, be entitled to the property. It creates, if 
we may say so, a sort of “estoppel by notice1*. If it is a self­
acquired property, publicity ensures that those with a spes 
successionis are made aware during the lifetime of the donor 
that he. has divested himself of title to the property. It thus 
goes to the proof of title and forestalls adverse claims even 
after the death of the donor. The essence of publicity is that, 
in the old customary law which knew no writing, it was only by 
means of publicity that the making of the gift itself could be 
proved. Today, therefore, publicity is not necessary per se in 
Ewe lav/, except insofar as the gift cannot be proved without 
adequate publicity.
However, the requirement as to the publicity of gifts in 
customary law has been applied at times with such rigidity that 
its main purpose appears to have been misunderstood. An example 
of such a mechanical application of the rule as to the publicity 
of a gift is to be found in the decision of Kwakuwah v , Nayenna.^  
In that case the plaintiff claimed that, in consideration of the * 
financial assistance she had given him, her deceased husband 
had made a gift to her of some part of his building, with the 
other parts to his sister and his nieces. There had, however, 
been no publicity of the gift to her. The Native Tribunal of
1. (1938) k W .A .C .A . 165.
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Yamoransa (not an Ewe area) held that the alleged gift was
invalid because of the lack of publicity. It said:
The Tribunal find that, although it might be that Assimaku 
intended to make a gift of a portion of his building to the 
plaintiff, his wife, the course adopted seems to have been 
improper; it is tantamount to private transaction or deal­
ing; gifts of this kind must be made public: relatives
of both the donor and the donee and some outside persons 
must be' present to act as witnesses, and the donee in 
accordance with custom acknowledges'or accepts the gift by 
giving some present or presents in return as thanksgiving. 
This is not so in this case and it cannot therefore be said 
that the gift is valid in accordance with Native Customary 
Law. The claim of the plaintiff fails, and the building 
left by Kobina Assimaku on his death automatically goes to 
his family. 1
The Provincial Commissioner1s Court reversed this decision. On
a further appeal, however, the West African Court of Appeal
referred to the statement of law by Sarbah that publicity was
2
necessary for the validity of a gift, and then reminded itself 
that the native courts were the repositories of the customary 
law. There being an agreement between the exposition by Sarbah 
and the Native Tribunal, the West African Court of Appeal 
restored the judgment of the Native Tribunal and held that “the 
gift relied on in this case was invalid according to native lav; 
and custom".
In applying the rule as to the publicity of gifts in this 
case, the Native Tribunal as well as the West African Court of 
Appeal treated publicity as if it were a requirement of intrinsic 
value in itself. It was an inflexible approach as though the
T3 Kwakuwah v, Nayenna. ( 1 9 5 8 ) W.A.C.A. 165, at p.165.
2. J.M, Sarbah, op.cit.. p.81.
3. Kwakuwah v. Nayenna, (1938) k W.A.C.A. 165, 167.
need for publicity were an absolute and unalterable formal 
requirement of a statute* which did not permit of an enquiry into 
the reasons for the provision, It was as though a claim were 
being dismissed because the formal statutory requirement of 
obtaining the Attorney-General1s fiat had not been complied with. 
It is submitted that this approach is wrong. Publicity is not 
necessary per se, The only need for publicity, albeit an 
important one, is that in a system of lav; which knows no writing, 
publicity facilitates the proof of the gift or sale by providing 
witnesses who know of the transaction. Contrary to what the 
Native Tribunal had said, there is nothing wrong in Ewe customary 
law in a "private transaction or dealing" in the nature of a 
gift.
The only problem raised by the lack of publicity in a 
system of lav; which knows no writing is that it is difficult, 
if not impossible, to prove the gift. Therefore, if, in spite 
of the lack of publicity, the donee is able to prove the gift 
satisfactorily, there can be no basis on which the gift can be 
set aside. Such a method of proof is now available where the 
gift, though a "private transaction or dealing"^ is properly 
reduced into writing in a manner which leaves no room for doubt.
A deed of gift., for instance, may, not have been, accompanied, by 
the usual publicity known to the customary law. It is nonethe­
less a customary law gift, because the use of such a form does
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not necessarily import English common law.1 Such a gift cannot 
be set aside merely because it lacks the amount and kind of 
publicity normally required at customary law.
In the Kwakuwah v. Nayenna case itself,, the issue could 
have been decided on the sufficient ground that the alleged 
donee could not satisfactorily prove the. mailing of a gift to her. 
It was stated that even the mother of the deceased donor did not 
know of the alleged gift and nobody else did. As the alleged 
donor himself was dead, the donee wife could call no independent 
witness to prove the alleged gift. The Court was, therefore, 
left with only the bald declaration by the wife alone that a 
gift had been made to her of the property. Even in English law 
this would not have been enough to satisfy the Court that a 
gift had in fact been made to her. It is submitted, therefore, 
that although the lack of publicity was the main obstacle to the 
plaintiff in her claim in Kwakuwah v. Nayenna. the actual 
reason for her failure was that she could not lead appropriate 
evidence in proof of the alleged gift. The Native Court admit­
tedly did not reason along this line. However, if the issue of 
the gift had been raised in a different context during the life­
time of the donor husband, and the donor husband had given 
evidence confirming the gift to the plaintiff, could the Court 
have set it aside as invalid because of the lack of publicity?
1. Nelson v. Nelson. (1932) 1 W.A.C.A. 215.
It is submitted that in that case, notwithstanding that it 
could be described as a "private transaction or dealing", yet 
it could not have been set aside. The gravamen of the problem, 
then, is one of proof and not of publicity per se.
In any case, it is submitted that in Ewe lav; publicity is 
not an absolute necessity in itself. If the gift, can be other­
wise proved satisfactorily, it will not be vitiated by the lack 
of publicity as such. The only reason why one must insist on 
publicity, even in Ewe law, is that it is the safest and most 
practical means of proving alienation of property in customary 
lav/. To pursue the requirement of publicity in a mechanical 
way would lead to such difficult enquiries as to what would 
constitute adequate publicity in particular circumstances.
Would it, for instance, have been enough in Kwakuwah v. Nayenna 
if only the donorfs mother knew of the gift? What if she was 
also dead at the time of the enquiry? Would it have been dif­
ferent if about five members of the family knew of the gift but 
v/ere all dead when the gift was being questioned? It is sub­
mitted that the solution of the problem lies in treating 
publicity as essential only to proof. In that case the onus 
will be on the donee to prove the gift only as a matter of 
evidence............................................................
There are other reasons also why a donee would be well 
advised to insist on publicity. As the property, especially 
immovable property, may be family property, publicity enables
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the prospective donee to satisfy himself that the intending 
donor has the capacity to make the gift. For, by giving 
publicity to the transaction, members of the family are given 
the opportunity to draw attention to the family nature of the 
property if it is such, and to object if they wish to.
In the case, of a gift of self-acquired property, publicity 
serves only as a notice of alienation to those who have a spes 
successionis in the property. The purpose of publicity of a 
gift of self-acquired property is not to obtain the consent of 
the donorfs family. Contrary to what Allott says of the Akan,1 
among the Ewe the consent of the family is not necessary for 
the validity of a gift of self-acquired property, whether of a 
movable or immovable property. Perhaps the reason for the 
difference here is that, as we shall see, the Ewe family does 
not succeed to the self-acquired property of its deceased 
members.
The question of publicity, as affecting proof of the gift, 
is also linked with the mode of acceptance. We go on now, 
therefore, to consider the acceptance of gifts.
Acceptance of Gifts
It can hardly be disputed that in Ewe law a gift, to be 
effective, must be accepted by the donee. Without acceptance 
the purported gift remains but a unilateral act which does not
1. A.N. Allott, The Akan Law of Property. Unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, Univ. of London, 195^ -, P.519.
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take effect. The question, however, is what constitutes a valid
acceptance in the eyes of the customary law.
As far as movables of small value are concerned, there is 
an effective acceptance if the donee is placed in possession by 
the donor with a donative intent. The transaction is then com­
plete, and,there is.no need in law to give the donor formal • 
thanks therefor, though the donee*s gratitude is almost invar­
iably .expressed, even if only informally, among the Ewe.
In the case of gifts of such immovables as land, houses 
and farms, apart from taking legal possession, the alienation 
is marked with a formal acceptance to indicate the change of 
title. Similarly a gift of very valuable movables is also 
marked with such formality. The mode of acceptance of immov­
ables and very valuable movables, therefore, really consists of 
two separate acts. One is an act of possession and the other 
is a formal expression of thanks for the gift.
Talcing possession of the subject of a gift is a question 
of legal possession which is basically the same in both the 
customary law and the common law. In either case there is
possession if the donee has the animus possidendi coupled with
that amount of physical control which is commensurate with the 
nature of the object and the circumstances of the case. The 
animus possidendi here is the donee’s intention to accept the 
gift. Physical control depends on the nature of the property.
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Small objects like a gold necklace or nuggets may be delivered 
by physically placing them in the hands of the donee while 
expressing the donative intent. Possession is normally taken 
of a gun when it is physically presented to the donee. Such 
physical possession of the object, however, is not necessary 
nor practicable in. all cases, so that a symbolic act may suffice. 
Thus the delivery of the key to a house may be an effective act 
of giving possession to the house. However, in all cases, if 
the object or the key is deliverable by some other person and 
the appropriate instructions are issued by the donor, then 
physical delivery is not necessary. If the donee is already 
in possession of the property it may not be necessary to deliver 
it to him afresh.
Land is, however, in a different category because it is 
immovable. The practical way to give possession to land, there­
fore, is to identify it to the donee. Of the giving of posses­
sion to land in the case of a gift, Ollennu says:
The actual transfer is made by taking the donee round the 
boundaries of the land, and making him touch a tree or 
leaf on it, while the donor or his representative says 
the words of transfer. 1
While this may be substantially correct, Ollennu has over­
formalised the process. The essential thing in Ewe lav; is that
the donee must know the land he is taking. For that reason he
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana. 
1962, p.113.
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is taken to the land to be shown the physical boundaries or the 
property in question. In Ewe law it is enough that he is shown 
the boundaries of the land or the farm or that the building is 
identified to him. No symbolic act of touching a tree or a 
leaf on the land is necessary. If the donee already knows the
j
land, the farm.or the.building .which is the subject-matter of 
the gift, it is not necessary to take him to the site at all.
The second act of accepting important gifts, especially 
a gift of a land, a farm or a house, is to provide a small 
thanks-offering to the donor in return for the gift. This is 
known as akpedanu. translated as nthanks-offering", the equiva­
lent of aseda among the Akan. The akpedanu or thanks-offering 
must include some actual drink or aha, such as schnapps, whisky, 
or sometimes palm wine. The other objects included differ in 
the several chiefdoms. In Gbi, for example, it is stated that 
in the case of a gift of land the akpedanu consists of a sheep, 
two bottles of schnapps and a small amount of money. If the 
gift is being made of family property, then the sheep is 
slaughtered and the meat is shared among the principal members 
of the family who also share the drinks and the money. In the 
case of a gift of self-acquired property, only the drinks and 
the meat of the sheep are shared among the witnesses. In most 
other chiefdoms it is enough to provide the sheep and drinks, 
even palm wine. In all areas, if the gift is property other 
than land, it is enough to provide only drinks as thanks-
offering. As was stated by Ollennu, J., in Asare v. Teing:
The acceptance must be evidenced by the presentation 
of 1 drink1 or some small amount of money to the donor, 
part of which is served to or shared among the witnesses 
to the transaction. 1
Danquah says:
Whenever a gift is made, and especially when the thing 
given is in. the form of. landed, property, it is -always . . . . 
customary to give drink or money thank-offering to the 
person making^the gift in the presence of witnesses.
When this is done the transaction is complete. 2
As a formal requirement, the presentation of the akpedanu or
thanks-offering to the donor finally seals the gift and makes
it effective.
Among the Ewe the donee formally expresses his or her 
thanks through a special delegation to the donor for the purpose. 
The donee joins the delegation which must be led by either the 
donee's father or another male member of the donee's family who 
is in the position of "father" to the donee. There must be 
representatives, from the families of both the donor and the 
donee, as well as their maternal relations. They serve as 
witnesses. It is not necessary, however, that the chief or 
other traditional dignitaries should be present.
The Ewe method of presenting the thanks-offering to the 
donor appears to differ from that of other communities. In
1. Asare v. Teing, (I960) G.L.E. 155, 160.
2. J.B, Danquah, Akan Laws and Customs. 1928, p.219-
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Add.y v, Armah.^ a Ga case, the question to be determined was
whether a gift by a man was made to his wife or to his daughter.
The plaintiff daughter was an infant at the time of the alleged
gift. The evidence was uncontradicted that the defendant wife,
mother of the plaintiff, was in the delegation which went to
present the thanks-offering to the donor. It was equally. . . .
uncontradicted that the plaintiff daughter was not in the
delegation. It was held by Ollennu, J., that the law is that
the donee may not be personally present when the thanks-
offering is presented to the donor and, therefore, that, as
between the two, it was presumed that the gift had been made
to the plaintiff daughter, the party who was absent at the
presentation of the thanks-offering. The learned Judge said:
Custom lays it down that the donee does not join such a 
delegation (to present the thanks-offering), members of 
his family and his friends are the proper persons who 
must go on his behalf, though he himself should supply 
the articles to be presented. And where the donee is a 
child, and the donor happens to be one of his parents, 
the other parent provides the articles and leads the 
delegation to make the presentation to the donor parent 
‘assembled with members of his or her family ... Upon 
the undisputed facts and the evidence of custom referred 
to above, the only irresistible conclusion which can be 
drawn from the circumstantial evidence is that the gift 
made in accordance with customary lav; could not have been 
made to the first defendant, and that the only person to 
whom it must have been made is the plaintiff. 2
1, Addy v, Armah. Unreported, Land Court, Accra, 23rd June, 
I960. Reproduced in N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary 
Land Lav; in Ghana. 1962, p.21-0.
Ibid,, at pp.2A2-211-#
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The final decision of the learned Judge can itself scarcely be 
criticised. The donor himself was still alive and gave evidence 
that the gift he made was to the plaintiff and, except for the 
question of credibility, that could have been conclusive of the 
matter. The dictum of the learned Judge expounding the law does, 
however, invite some comments.......................................
In the first place, it is not usual among the Ewe for a 
child to thank his parents formally for gifts made to him. The 
Ewe say vi medaa akpe na to o. that is, na child does not thank 
his father11. The rationale of this maxim is that the father is 
presumed to be always showing his kindness to his child and the 
child cannot be repeatedly expressing his thanks. To thank one's 
parent formally for ordinary gifts is, therefore, regarded as an 
indication that the parent had been unkind but had bestowed only 
an occasional bounty. This principle extends also to classific- 
atory parents. Among the Ewe, therefore, it is only in the case, 
of a special gift, such as valuable land (self-acquired), a farm 
or a house that a child may thank his father formally, openly 
and in the presence of witnesses.
It is difficult to agree with the learned Judge that, when 
a gift is made to a child by one of his parents, then the other 
parent leads the delegation to express formal thanks for it.
This is not Ewe lav/. If the gift is made by a mother to her 
child, the child's father leads the delegation to express thanks; 
but it cannot be vice versa. Among the Ewe a woman, however old
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she may bo, is incapable of leading any important delegation.
An important delegation of this kind must always be led by a 
male member of the donee1s own family of which, as a rule, the 
Ewe mother is not a member. Therefore, if the gift is made by 
a father to his child, it is not the childfs mother but a 
paternal uncle, that is a brother of the donor, or another 
male member of the patrilineal family acting in loco parentis 
to the child, who should lead the delegation to express formal 
thanks to the donor father.
The most important, and therefore the most controversial, 
part of the law laid down by the learned Judge, however, is that 
in customary law a donee may not join in the delegation to 
thank the donor formally for a gift. It is respectfully sub­
mitted that this proposition is not true of the Northern Ewe,
The Ewe law is that, unless unavoidably prevented, the donee 
himself must be present at the formal thanking of the donor.
To be sure, the donee himself does not lead the delegation.
The delegation is led by the father, or the "acting father11 of 
the donee if the donor is the father himself. Almost all verbal 
expressions of thanks are uttered on behalf of the donee by his 
father or the leader of the delegation. The essence of the 
presence of the donee i s .to dramatise his personal appreciation, 
lest it be thought that it is only a routine being followed on 
behalf of a disinterested donee. Another reason for the 
personal presence of the donee is that this is also an oppor­
tunity to,advise him on general good behaviour and the wise
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management of the subject-matter of the gift. If, therefore,
Addy v , Armah were a case from the Ewe area, the fact of the 
mother’s presence on the delegation to thank the donor formally 
would, if anything at all, rather strengthen the supposition 
that the gift was intended for her. In any event, in the Ewe 
area that fact would not operate to her disadvantage in estab­
lishing her case. Conversely, as the daughter did not go to the 
formal expression of thanks, this would’ in Ewe law raise a 
presumption against her, which is rebuttable, that she was not 
the donee. In Addy v. Armah perhaps the absence of the infant 
donee may be excused on account of her infancy.
The purposes of a formal acceptance of a valuable gift are 
the justification for the formality. Its primary purpose, no 
doubt, is formally to stamp or seal the transaction. It sig­
nifies beyond doubt the acceptance of the gift by the donee and 
the acceptance perfects the gift.
The occasion also presents a unique opportunity for 
adequate publicity of the gift, especially to the family of the 
donor, if there had not been previous publicity. The confir­
mation of the gift by the donor accepting the thanks-offering 
or akpedanu is publicity to all who did not know before. Because 
of the attendant publicity it is also a guarantee against-com­
promising the interests of the family of the donor. At this 
stage it is still open to the members of the donor’s family to 
object that the subject-matter of the gift is family property.
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which the donor acting alone lacks the capacity to alienate. 
Therefore, the gift also binds the family if they consent or 
acquiesce in its perfection through a formal acceptance in 
their presence.
As regards the donor it is an opportunity for him to deny 
the gift if his intentions had been misconstrued by the sup­
posed donee. If he did not intend to make an outright gift 
but had been misunderstood, he has the chance to remove the 
misconception. He may now also rectify any errors as to the 
location, nature, extent or size of the property conveyed.
The donor also has at this stage what we may call a locus 
poenitentiae. It is possible that, although he did make the 
gift in the first instance, It was made in exuberance of joy 
or was prompted by a temporary fit of wrath or anger producing 
a momentary desire to deprive others of the benefit of the 
property. It could also have been made under the influence 
of terror or under the pressure of some other undue influence.
The gift could also have been made in a state of intoxication 
or through inadvertence or when the donor was not compos mentis. 
In any such case the donor can, at this stage, withdraw the 
offer he had made. His acceptance of the akpedanu or thanks- 
offering, therefore, is his confirmation of.the gift after he 
has had time to reflect on it.
It should be pointed out, however, that the failure to 
offer akpedanu or thanks-offering will not necessarily invalidate
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the gift. As pointed out by Sarbah, the acceptance of the gift
may take other forms, such as using or enjoying the subject-
matter of the gift or exercising rights of title over it with
the knowledge and concurrence of the donor. ^  This was also the
2m a m  issue m  Boakye v. Broni. In that case the successor-to a
deceased brother claimed a cocoa farm as being the property of
the said brother. The defendant contended that it was not a
property of the deceased because, although he had made a gift of
it to the deceased, the necessary ceremony of acceptance with
formal thanks before witnesses had not been performed and that
the gift was, therefore, revoked by him. This argument by the
defendant was rejected by the Land Court and Ollennu, J., said:
Now, the defence that the gift made forty years ago to 
Owusu could be revoked because it was not made in the 
presence of a witness, is to my mind untenable. An 
essential element in alienation of land by native custom 
is publicity of the fact that title in the land has passed 
from the transferor to the transferee. The usual way of 
publicising this is by carrying out the transaction of 
transfer in the presence of witnesses. But this is not 
by any means the only method of giving publicity to a 
transfer. Any act done or steps taken or conduct of 
the transferor which manifests to persons, other than 
parties to the transaction, an intention to transfer, 
or amounts to an assertion that the property in the land 
has passed from the original owner to the other party, 
is quite sufficient. 3
Thus even in the absence of the aseda or akpedanu. that is the
thanks-offering, the gift may still become effective and, as
held in this case, irrevocable.
17 J.M. Sarbah. op.cit. ~ p.8l^
2. (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 475.
3. Boakye v. Broni (1958) 3 V/.A.L.R. 475, 479.
Idevocability of Gifts
A gift of any kind among the Ewe, until effectively 
accepted by the donee, is revocable. However, once effectively 
accepted, whether formally or informally, a gift as a general 
rule becomes irrevocable. The maxim of Ewe lav/ is womenaa nu 
ame gaxoe o. that is na gift cannot be recalled’1. The appli­
cation of this maxim means that a gift of movables becomes 
effective and irrevocable once accepted by taking possession.
In the case of a gift of land, a house or a farm, the gift be­
comes effective and irrevocable when the akpedanu or thanks- 
offering has been presented to the donor and received by him.
It is, however, argued by Bentsi-Enchill that, as a gift 
in customary law is on the basis of a general assumption of
continued good relations and gratitude, it may be revoked for
1
serious misconduct. The objection to this contention is that 
if gifts were revocable in such circumstances then the right 
and grounds for the revocation would extend to the relationship 
between the successors of both the donor and the donee. In 
that case even a gift made some generations ago could be revoked 
today by the successor of the donor for ingratitude, bad 
relations or general misconduct. It cannot, however,- be 
seriously contended that this is the law.
Bentsi-Enchill dismisses the value of the decision in Bimba
v , Mansa which held that a gift is irrevocable. Bentsi-Enchill
“  K. Bentsi-Enchill. op.cit.« pp.366-367.
2, (1891) Sar. F.C.L. 137.
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makes a valid criticism of that case on the ground that, although
Redwar had said:
A further point was raised by the plaintiff’s counsel 
that, according to native custom, a gift is revocable.
He has produced no authority for this proposition, and 
the cases cited tend rather the other way, 1
yet Redwar went on to declare that:
In the absence of any authority as to the native law on 
this point, I feel myself bound to be guided by the settled 
principles of English law on cases of this kind, and hold 
that ... even as a voluntary gift it is good against the 
grantor himself, and those claiming under him, 2
Bentsi-Enchill points out that the learned Judge erred in
applying the principles of English lav/. He suggests instead
that what the Judge should have applied were ,!the principles
of natural justice, equity and good conscience” under the then
Courts.Ordinance, While disagreeing with the learned Judge in
applying the principles of English law in those circumstaiices,
we differ also from the opinion of Bentsi-Enchill. If the
authorities cited to the learned Judge ,!tend rather the other
way” , then he should have decided the issue along the way
indicated by the cases cited. From the context ”the other way”
was that gifts were Irrevocable. Hence, although Redwar erred
inasmuch as he did say that he v/as guided by the principles of
English law, yet his ruling that, a gift is irrevocable is in
conformity with the general trend of the authorities cited to
him.
1. Bimba v. Hansa. (1891) Bar, F.C.L. 137, 142,
2. Ibid.
Even then Bentsi-Enchill argues further that in any case 
Binta v. Mensah had been overruled by Adai v . Daku.^ He, there­
fore, prefers to rely on Adai v . Daku for the proposition that 
customary law gifts are revocable. With great respect it is 
submitted that a careful perusal of Adai v # Daku shows that it 
is not an authority for the general proposition that customary 
law gifts are revocable. The facts are that the holder of the 
paramount title to the land sought to eject a grantee from the 
land because, having made a "gift11 to him of part of the land, 
tlio grantee claimed absolute title to the whole land. The 
ejection of the grantee was tantamount to a revocation of the 
gift and it was held that the grantor could revoke it. In his 
judgment affirming the decision of the Court of the Omanhene of 
Akwapim, Brandford Griffith, C.J., said:
It is a well-known native custom or lav/ that a gift of 
land is not irrevocable, and evidence has been given to 
the effect and is not contradicted. 2
It is because this view of the lav/ was later confirmed by the
Full Court that Bentsi-Enchill argues that it is to be preferred.
What the learned Chief Justice meant' in this case, hov/ever,
v/as not just the proposition that gifts were revocable. His
proposition was that the particular "gift" could be recalled
because land could not be the subject-matter of an absolute ^
gift and that, in any event, the donor in the present case did
1. (1905) Hen. 343, and 418.
2. Adai v. Daku. (1905) Hen. 348, 350. Emphasis supplied.
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not intend to make an absolute or outright gift. In the Full 
Court, after referring to answers given by the donor to ques­
tions put to him by the Court, Brandford Griffith, C.J., said:
This clearly indicates to me that he /i.e. the donor7
never intended by his answers to the questions to
convey to the Court that he had made an absolute and 
irrevocable gift of the land to the appellant. 1
Then the evidence was recited that the land was only given to
p
the appellant "to eat on". In that case the transaction was
not a gift properly so-called but only what we have described
as a gratuitous tenancy for an indefinite period. Such a
gratuitous tenancy is often referred to as a-"gift" in many
of the Ghanaian languages; but it is not a gift conveying the
title to the property. It is only a "grant” of a right of
user. As such a "gift" does not transfer the paramount title
to the property it can be determined at any time, especially
for misconduct such as that of the appellant in setting up an
adverse title against the grantor.^
On the general question of outright alienability of land
by way of a gift, the Full Court in Adai v. Daku said:
It was admitted by learned Counsel for the appellant that 
lands are not absolutely given away by natives, and it is 
for this reason that lands are so frequently and willingly 
given away by natives. The native knows that the land is
still his, and that he can take it back should an adverse
claim-be made by the person to whom it is given. The
1. Adai v. Daku. (1905) Fen. 418, 418-419.
2. Adai v . Daku. (1905) Fen. 418, 419*
3. Fattray says that this was a familiar type of alienation
of interest in land in early Ashanti law and it was revocable.
See F.S. Fattray, Ashanti. 1923, pp.231-232.
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person to whom it is given knows that he can use the 
land as long as he likes, provided he recognises title 
in the owner. No gifts of land would be made by the 
natives if such gifts are to be taken as absolute 
gifts. 1
From the above dicta it is submitted that the decision in Adai 
v , Daku is a narrow one which must be confined to gifts of land. 
Even if.valid, which we. submit it.is not, yet.it cannot be 
extended as a general, proposition to cover all gifts. The 
reasoning of the Court was that the paramount title to land 
was incapable of being alienated absolutely, whether by gift 
or by sale. Therefore, the Court regarded the purported "gift" 
as no more than a gratuitous tenancy which was determinable. •
In Adai v. Daku. therefore, the donor, to reduce the decision 
of the Full Court to its logical terms, was not actually 
revoking a gift but terminating a gratuitous tenancy, which 
he was entitled to do. It has already been pointed out that 
this is still the rule in some Ewe areas, notably Aveme, V/usuta, 
Taviefe and Matse where, because the paramount title to land is 
inalienable, a "gift" of land means only a gratuitous but 
determinable tenancy of an indefinite duration. The theory of 
the inalienability of land, however, has now disappeared in 
most parts of the country. The rule formulated on the basis 
of that theory, therefore,- is no longer good lav;* At best it 
can only apply in the few places where the principle of 
inalienability of land still survives. It is submitted,
1. Adai v . Daku, (1905) Fen. ifl8, 419.
therefore, that v/e cannot rely on Adai v, Daku for the propos­
ition that gifts of land, let alone all gifts, at customary law 
are today revocable.
If we reject Adai v . Daku. what are the authorities on this 
point? Sarbah contradicts himself by giving grounds on which a 
gift may be revoked and yet stating immediately thereafter that:.
Every gift when completed is irrevocable, except in gifts 
between parent and child, which can be recalled or exchanged 
at any time by the parent in his or her lifetime, by his 
will or dying declarations. 1
Danquah considers the matter in doubt and says:
To withdraw or recall a gift is always a matter of 
controversy. It can hardly be done, but If a father 
grant his son or daughter a piece of cocoa farm in 
anticipation of filial services and the child delib­
erately fail to do any service for the father, the 
gift may be taken back. 2
V/e may say, however, that both Sarbah and Danquah lean in favour
of the principle that gifts are irrevocable.
The modern authority is Boak.ye v. Broni.^ In that case
the defendant claimed back property of which he had already
made a gift, his reason being that he had recalled the gift
because the appropriate ceremonies of acceptance had not been
performed. It was held that, notwithstanding that there was
no formal acceptance, the gift had nevertheless been effectively
accepted. Having.made.a, finding that the gift had. been validly
accepted and had become effective, the Court held that the
1. J.M. Sarbah, op,cit.« p.8l.
2. J.B. Danquah, op,cit., p.219.
3. (1938) 3 v/.A.L.a. 473.
defendant could not revoke it because a gift was irrevocable.
It was said by Ollennu, J., that:
A gift of land made inter vivos is irrevocable once it 
is completed and the donee is placed in possession.
The defendant, therefore, is not .entitled to revoke 
the gift ... 1
It is submitted that Boak.ye v. Broni. taken together with the
2
earlier case of Bimba v. Mansa. is to be preferred to the 
narrow decision in Adai v , Daku, In any case, the law as 
stated by Ollennu, J., in Boakye v. Broni represents Ewe law. 
In Ewe law a valid gift, once made, is generally irrevocable’, 
for womenaa nu ame gaxoe o . The gift, however, can be nul­
lified by the donee returning the property previously accepted 
by him.
To the general rule of irrevocability of gifts among the 
Eve, however, an exception must be made. Gifts to children 
are in a different category because of the special parent- 
child relationship. Therefore, as pointed out by both Sarbah^ 
and Danquah,^- a gift made by a parent to a child is revocable 
by the parent for a variety of reasons such as ingratitude, 
failure of filial services, gross disobedience or general 
misconduct, Ollennu does not seem to agree that even a gift 
to a child may be revoked, because he only grants the donor
parent the right to "exchange the land for other land of the
13 Boakye v. BronI3 (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 473, 479.
2. (1891) Bar. F.C.L. 137.
3. J.M, Sarbah, op.cit,, p.81.
4. J.B. Danquah, op.cit., p.219.
same or a higher value", It is submitted, however, that among 
the Ewe a gift to a child by a parent or a person in the position 
of a parent is revocable by the donor for the reasons stated 
above and only during the lifetime of the donor.
The converse position is not very clear. Can a child 
revoke a gift he has made to his parent? If the child was still 
very young when he made the gift, there is no doubt that on his 
attainment of majority he may revoke the gift. This, however, 
does not cover a gift made by an adult child to his father or 
mother. The view expressed in a majority of the Ewe chiefdoms 
is that, although a parent may revoke a gift previously made to 
him child, an adult child cannot revoke a gift validly made by 
the child to his parent or a person in the position to him of a 
parent. The reason given for the rule of irrevocability of a 
child's gift is that, having been the beneficiary of the parent 
from the cradle, his gift is indeed a manifestation of gratitude 
which must be irrevocable.
In the other chiefdoms it was stated that a gift by a child 
to his parent is revocable for cruelty, ill-treatment, lack of 
consideration or ingratitude of the parent, 'A further explan­
ation in support of revocability is that there is always the 
possibility that a gift by even an adult child to his parent 
may be a result of subtle but undue parental influence on the
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana. 
1962, p.115.
child. This latter view seems to be more logical, though logic 
is not always the lav;. If a parent can revoke a gift to his 
child because of the parent-child relationship, it seerns 
logical that by reason of the same special relationship the 
child should also be able to revoke a gift to his parent.
Special, considerations also apply.to gifts, between a hus- . 
band and his wife. Although a man is under a duty to maintain 
his wife, all gifts, including clothing and personal effects, 
supplied to the wife are recoverable on the dissolution of the 
marriage. This forms part of the tanu or "head money". The 
only item excepted is the traditional underwear or godotse 
which is not recoverable if the marriage has been consummated. 
The cost of maintenance with food’, is also not claimable. If 
the actual clothes are returned, even badly tattered or thread­
bare, the cost is not recoverable. Other gifts to a wife, such 
as a land, a farm or a house, are governed by the ordinary rules 
as to revocability of gifts but are recoverable on the dissol­
ution of the marriage. The wife is also entitled to claim back 
all gifts made by her to her husband during the pendency of the 
marriage, and this is usually set off against the bill reckoned 
by the husband.
Surprisingly, the Ewe law is that gifts to concubines are 
governed by the ordinary rules as to revocation. Hence gifts 
like clothing, trinkets or money are irrevocable. This places 
a concubine in a more favourable position than a wife in this 
respect,
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A Gift in Contemplation of Death
A gift made in contemplation of death, or even in 
expectation of death, is in Ewe law essentially in the nature 
of a testamentary disposition. For it does not take effect, 
and the gift does not become vested, until after the death 
of the !fdonorn, This is discussed in connection with succes­
sion to property'1'. Here it is only necessary to say that a 
"gift" in contemplation or expectation of death, even if 
accepted by the udoneen , is revocable at any time by the 
,rdonort! before his death. After the death of the ,!donort! 
his family and his successors in title are not bound by the 
disposition.
1. See pp. 726 - 731jnfra.
CHAPTER XI
PLEDGES
Old Style Pledges
A pledge of the old style is what we normally read about
in the books. It is described by Ollennu as
the delivery of possession and custody of property, 
real or personal, by a person to his creditor to hold 
and use until the debt due is paid, an article bor­
rowed is returned or replaced, or obligation is 
discharged. 1
This is essentially what it is also among the Ewe. In the past 
human beings could also be pledged to work for the pledgee, but 
the pledging of human beings disappeared with the abolition of
p
slavery when it was made illegal by statute.
Because a pledge in customary law bears a close resemblance 
to a pawn, it is sometimes suggested that the transaction would 
be better known by that latter name. Others suggest the term
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana,
1962, p.9k.
2. Secs. 2 and 3 of the Slave-Dealing Abolition Ordinance, 187k; 
Cap. 109.
"customary mortgage" because in English lav; realty cannot be 
pledged. However, as Ollennu rightly points out, judicial usage 
has fastened so much on the term "pledge" that it is too late 
now to substitute another one. In Ewe itself it is known as 
nu dede megbe or nu dede awoba; hence a pledge of land is known 
as anyigba, dede.megbe or. anyigba dede awoba. . The Ewe.word .awoba 
is so similar to and has the same meaning as awowa in Twi that 
it suggests the possibility of the institution having a common 
origin or having been copied by the Akan from the Ewe or vice 
versa.
The understanding of the purpose of an old style customary 
law pledge is essential to the appreciation of the legal incid­
ents flowing from it. In the first place the property pledged 
is not a security that can be realised on the failure to pay the 
debt due or to discharge the relevant obligation. It is a tran­
saction in which the property is held by the creditor as a 
"security" only in the sense that, because of the value of the 
pledged property, it 'reasonably ensures that the relevant 
obligation shall be discharged, because the pledgor cannot leave 
property of that value permanently in the hands of the pledgee. 
There is, therefore, no implied power to sell the property in 
default. Bentsi-Enchill casts doubt on this proposition because, 
when stated by Ollennu, no authority could be cited in support 
of it.^ There is indeed no direct authority in the decided
1. K. Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit.. p.38l,'n.k9.
cases to this effect. We agree with Ollennu, however, that it
is of the very nature of a customary lav; pledge that a pledgee
is not entitled to sell the pledged property even in default.^*
If nothing else establishes it, the perpetual redeemability of
a pledge, which will be discussed more fully later, means that
a power of sale is not implied.. For.a power of sale would .de-.
feat the right to redeem after a sale in default. In any case
a recent interview in the Northern Ewe area confirms that in
that area there is no power of sale in a customary lav; pledge.
It is submitted, therefore, that a power to sell a pledged
property in default can only be obtained from the court.
Apart from ensuring the performance of the obligation due,
a pledge in customary law also has the objective of dispensing
with the payment of interest on the money borrowed or the debt
due. The pledgee, therefore, has the possession and use of the
pledged property in .lieu of interest, so that only the principal
debt is due at any time. It is for this reason that the pledgee
is not accountable to the pledgor for the profits derived from
the use of the property.
Again, Bentsi-Enchill criticises the principle of non-
2
accountability of the pledgee in possession. In the case of 
the old style customary law pledges among the Northern Ewe,
1, N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana. 
1962, p.103.
2, K. Bentsi-Enchill, op,cit,. p.382.
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however, there is nothing unconscionable in holding the pledgee 
to be unaccountable. What perhaps does not strike the critic 
of this arrangement is that land given for such purposes in the 
past was undeveloped land, usually a thick forest. The benefit 
derived from it by the pledgee, therefore, consisted mainly in 
the right to farm on the.land. Before the introduction.of 
permanent cash crops like cocoa, the pledgee exercised his 
right of user by growing only foodstuffs on the land. The profits 
were, therefore, not as substantial as one would today be misled 
to suppose. Similarly, on a pledge of movables such as a ring 
or nugget, no measurable profits accrued to the pledge© beyond 
the right to wear them. When the pledging of cocoa farms was 
introduced, a new form of customary lav; pledge, based on 
accountability, was also evolved and we shall discuss this new 
type of pledge hereafter. As regards the old style pledges, 
non-accountability does not mean any unfair advantage to the 
pledgee. To make the old style pledgee accountable would 
transform the pledge into the kind of self-liquidating arrange­
ment that we shall discuss under modern pledges. If accounting
2
were to be applied in a case like Agbo Kofi v, Addo Kofi, 
where property pledged in about 1869 was not redeemed until 
about 1930, the- results could be startling. .With the accruing
1. See pp.573 - 579 infra,
2. (1937) 1 W.A.C.A. 28k.
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profits over these years the sum due to the pledgor-debtor as 
in excess of the original debt would have been astronomical.
The pledgee, on losing the land by releasing it on redemption, 
would probably have become indebted to the original pledgor- 
debtor. It is submitted that this is not the nature of an old 
style customary law pledge among the Ewe.
A distinguishing feature of a customary law pledge is 
that the pledgee must be placed in possession. This feature is 
particularly important when a pledge'is to be distinguished 
from a common law mortgage. In a common law mortgage, the 
mortgagee need not be in possession, and he is strictly accoun­
table if he goes into possession. Thus in Adu Sei v. Ofori.1 
where the mortgage deed was not properly drawn up, the fact that 
the debtor remained in possession of the land induced the Court 
to hold that it was not a customary law pledge but an equitable 
mortgage. For in a customary law pledge the debtor does not
remain in possession: the pledgee takes possession. Conversely,
2
in Iforh v. Gbedemah where a deed expressed to be a mortgage was 
executed by the illiterate parties, it was held to be a custom­
ary law pledge because, inter alia, the creditor was let into 
possession without the liability to account. The Full Court 
thus distinguished Adu,Sei v. Ofori on the main ground that in 
the present case the pledgee was placed in possession of the
1. 1926-29, Full Court, p.87*
2. 1926-29, Full Court, p.595.
property. Again in Asafu Ad.jei v. Yaw Dabanka1 the possibility 
of a pledge was excluded because the deed expressly provided 
that the mortgagor shall be in possession and not the mortgagee.
This feature of a pledge, that the pledgee must be placed in 
possession without any liability to account, is one which makes 
it easy to confuse with a sale. For it is also, of .the. nature, of. 
a sale that the purchaser shall be placed in possessiorl. Many 
land cases in both the native courts and the superior courts turn 
on the question whether the transaction giving possession to land 
many years ago was a sale or a pledge. The question has always 
been difficult to resolve. This type of problem confronted the- 
Native Court MBM of Adaklu in Glamor v. Amega Kofi^ when one 
party alleged a pledge but the party in possession contended 
that it was an outright sale. The trial Native Court’s decision 
was that:
The Defendant who said his grandfather had purchased the 
said land could not point out anything about these 
customary ceremonies /of sale/ The transaction was
therefore a pledge and not a sale. 3
The transaction was alleged to have taken place about 86 years 
before the dispute. It was, therefore, not surprising that the 
defendant could not adduce convincing evidence of the customary 
ceremonies for sealing a sale, even if there were such cere­
monies. Yet the Native Court was faced with an almost impossible
1. (1930) 1 VJ.A.C.A. 63.
2. Glamor v. Arnega Kofi. Unreported, Native Court MBn, Adaklu,
2nd April, 1955, at p.lA of Civil Fecord Book.
3. Ibid.. at p.82 of Civil Fecord Book.
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decision and was driven to rely on the performance of the
ceremonies of sale, as the only conceivable criterion for
distinguishing a sale from a pledge. The fact of possession
alone was not regarded as conclusive because possession is
^consistent with both a pledge and a sale. The High Court
has also expressed the difficulty of the problem. In Dotse
v, Komia. Sowah, J,, referring to the perpetual redeemability
of ancient pledges, said:
The problem however arises when the Judge has to assess 
the evidence in order to come to a conclusion whether or
not the transaction is one of pledge or sale ,,, The
evidence in almost all these cases is traditional and 
the Judge is called upon to say which set of witnesses 
he believes. It is, however, difficult to say one is 
lying and the other is speaking the truth when both of 
them tell the Court that they are only reproducing the 
oral history they had learnt from their fathers. In 
my view none can be said to be lying. 1
It was a similar problem that faced the court in Agbo Kofi v .
Add O' Kofi when Horne, J., said:
If this court were bound to apply the principles of 
English law to this matter, then the arguments 
relating to possession would have force, if not 
compelling force ... /But7 all that the defendant 
could set up was possession which, in customary 
law, is consistent with either sale or pledge, 2
The learned Judge then concluded that as "There was no evidence
of tradition as to the price paid, whether as guaha or mtrimmsa
(sic)M, the transaction was.a. pledge, though.guaha and tramma
are not ©we customary ceremonies.
1, Dotse v. Komla. Unreported, High Court, Ho, 28th May, 1965* 
Digested in (1965) Current Cases, paragraph lho.
2. Agbo Kofi v. Addo Kofi. (1955) 1V/.A.C.A. 28h, 28A-285*
Apart from placing the pledgee in possession, there are 
no special formalities for the creation of a customary lav: 
pledge. That is why in Glamor v, Amega Kofi1 the Native 
Court conveniently but somewhat simply relied on the absence 
of proof of the special ceremonies of sale to decide that the 
transaction was.only a .pledge, . A n ,essential feature deduced, 
from the absence of formalities in a pledge is that no special 
boundary marks are fixed. The absence of boundary trees or 
marks, therefore, pre-supposes that there was not a sale. 
However, such a rule of thumb is not a very reliable or safe 
guide because, quite often, the pledgor simply pledged all 
his land in the particular locality, thus touching all the 
boundaries,
The other important feature of a customary law pledge is 
that it is always redeemable, regardless of the length of time. 
The redeemability of pledges is discussed in the next section.
Perpetual hedeemabillty of Pledges
A notorious feature of the ©we customary law pledge is that 
it is perpetually redeemable. The principle, to plagiarize the 
maxim of another system of jurisprudence, is "once a pledge, 
always a pledge". The principle means that nothing in the 
transaction or thereafter may defeat or clog the right of the
1. Supra.
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pledgor to redeem his property at any time, however long after
the pledge. This principle is so entrenched in Northern Eweland
that that area has produced most of the classic cases which
illustrate the frustrating effect of this rule in Ghana.
The locus classicus of the principle of perpetual redeem-
ability.of pledges is Agbo Kofi v, Addo Kofi,1 .the case that.
opened the flood gates to similar claims in the Northern Ewe
area. In that case the Tribunal of the Fiaga of Peki held that
a pledge could be redeemed at any time, regardless of the long
intervention of time, and therefore that the Dove lands pledged
in about 1869 could be redeemed in about 1930 on tendering the
principal debt of six shillings and sixpence. The decision of
the Fiaga1 s Tribunal was confirmed on appeal by the V/est
African Court of Appeal and the principle received judicial
endorsement. Following that decision the Land Court also held
2
in Kuma v. Kofi that land pledged for a keg or half a keg of 
gunpowder many years ago in Adaklu, another Northern Ewe chief- 
dom, could be redeemed at any time. The words of Lingley, J,, 
are that:
It is established law that a pledgor can redeem 
his land after any lapse of time. 3
Also in Dzanku v, Adza Xwadwo.^ the Court of Appeal held that
land near Ho, which was pledged many years ago for six shillings
1. (1933) 1 W.A.C.A. 28k.
2. (1956) 1 V/.A.L.R. 128.
3. Kuma v. Kofi, (1956) 1 V/.A.L.R. 128, 130.
k. (I960) G.L.R. 31.
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but now valued "about £500", could be redeemed even after the
long efflux of time. Delivering the judgment of the Court of
Appeal, Korsah, C.J., said:
There are decided cases which establish that, by native 
customary law, the long deration of a pledge (no matter 
how long it may last) does not prevent the successors of 
the original owners from exercising their right to re­
deem the property whenever- they decide to do so.■ And 
since by native custom a pledgee is entitled to use the 
property pledged, for his own benefit and without account­
ing to the pledgor, the fact that the pledgee has spent 
money to improve the property cannot bcir the pledgor from 
recovering the property upon payment of the debt. 1
If, therefore, a pledge can be proved today, the right to redeem 
is unchallengeable, The unsettling effect of this rule on 
property rights cannot be over-estimated, if claims can succeed 
merely because the ceremonies of a sale cannot be proved to 
have taken place generations ago. The realisation of the mis­
chief in the rule of perpetual redeemability of pledges led 
Sowah, J., to say that:
It seems to me that the time is ripe when there should 
be enacted in our laws the lav/s of prescription and 
limitation. 2
The learned Judge was constrained to appeal for a legislative 
remedy because he felt himself bound by authority under the 
principle of stare decisis. Without the intervention of the 
legislature, it is suggested that one way to close the door to 
absurd and frivolous claims is to place the onus on the party 
alleging a pledge to prove it, instead of the present tendency
1, Pzanku v. Adza Kwadwo. (I960) G.L.R. 31, 33.
2. Dotse v, Komla. supra.
r
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which requires the party in possession to prove a sale in order 
to retain the disputed land. It is submitted with respect that 
the learned Judge in Agbo Kofi v. Addo Kofi erred in stating 
that in the customary law, unlike English common law, possession 
is a neutral factor because it is consistent with both a sale 
and a pledge.^ At common law the possession of realty is by 
itself alone equally consistent with a sale, a mortgage and a 
lease. Yet at common law the fact of possession raises a 
presumption of title which can be dislodged with evidence of 
other facts. There is no basis on which one can agree with 
the learned Judge that the same rebuttable presumption of 
title is not raised by possession in the customary law. There 
is no reason why in the customary law the fact of long and 
uninterrupted possession for generations cannot raise a prima 
facie presumption of title, so that the onus must lie on the 
party disputing that title to prove that possession was obtained 
only through a pledge. When a similar problem arose in a Vakpo 
case before the Native Court of Appeal for Akpini State, Kpando, 
that Court adopted a more realistic and reasonable approach. 
There being a doubt whether the transaction was a sale or a 
pledge, the Native Court of Appeal treated the fact of long and 
uninterrupted possession, and occupation as prima facie evidence 
of title. The onus accordingly lay on the alleged pledgor to
1. A.cbo Kofi v, Addo Kofi. (1933) 1 W.A.C.A. 28A, 28^-285.
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rebut the presumption of title and, failing to discharge that
onus, he failed in his claim. The Native Court of Appeal said:
Neither the Plaintiff-Respondent nor the Defendant- 
Appellant could clear the doubt as to whether the land
was pledged or bought ,,, Now the Court below admitted
in its judgment that the Defendant-Appellant was in 
possession of the said land for a very long time, indeed,
over 70 years ... The benefit of the doubt ought to
. . have.been given, to.the Defendant-Appellant.because he.......
possessed the land for long years without anybody dis­
puting it with him and he was known as the owner of the
land to Vakpo people, 1
It is submitted that this should be the correct approach of the
Courts in admitting proof of ancient pledges. It is not indeed
a case of a "benefit of the doubt", a phrase which is ill-chosen.*
It is a case of failure to establish positively on either side
whether it was a sale or a pledge, much as the learned Judge
2
in Dotse v. Komla said that in his view it was difficult to 
believe one party as against the other. The general rule in 1
civil cases, when the evidence is inconclusive either way, is 
that that party fails who should prove the issue in order to 
succeed. Therefore, if possession is held to raise a prima 
facie presumption of title, then in the case of inconclusive 
evidence on either side, the rebuttable presumption should tilt 
the balance in favour of the party who had been in long and 
uninterrupted possession in the character of the holder of an 
absolute title.
1, Akpo v. Dzeble, Unreported, Native Court of Appeal for 
Akpini State, Kpando, 4th March, 1950, Civil Appeal Record 
Book, p.463 at p.465.
2. Supra.
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In one case which came before the Privy Council the com­
bination of the two facts of long and uninterrupted possession 
and the failure to give the customary reminder wras held to 
defeat the claim of title by the plaintiff. These two facts 
have always been considered.by the Ghana Courts to be incon-
1 pelusive, one way or the other , . In Adielbl Ko.jo v , Bonsie. , ■ 
however, the Privy Council said:
Two facts stand out as established: The first is that
the defendants have enjoyed the profits of the land 
without interruption for 80 years. Three or four ■ 
generations have passed and no suggestion has been 
made that it was the subject of a pledge. The evidence 
shows that, if there had been a pledge, it is customary 
on the death.of the pledgee for a reminder to be given 
to his successors, whereas none such was given. Even 
if the custom were the other way round (as was suggested), 
still no reminder was given: and surely, if no reminder
was given, the plaintiff ought to have taken steps long 
since to draw the defendants* attention to his claim.
The failure of the plaintiff and his predecessors to 
do this goes far to negative his claim. 3
It is submitted that this decision of the Privy Council, as
well as that of the Native Court of Appeal for Akpini State
in Alkpo v, Dzeble.^ state the correct approach to the proof
of a.ncient pledges.
Having proved the pledge, it is nevertheless a principle
of t'he customary law that, while redemption may be allowed at
any time, it may not be claimed with such lack of notice as
1. See e.g. Glamor v. Amega Kofi, supraj Agbo Kofi v. Addo 
Kofi. supra; Kuma v. Kofi, supra,
2. (1957) 1 '.V.L.R. 1223.
3. Ad.jeibi Ko.jo v. Bonsie. (1957) 1 V/.L.H. 1223, 1227.
k. .Supra.
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will result in the pledgeefs losing the fruits of his labour. 
Hence the pledgee is entitled, even after redemption, to harvest 
current crops on the land. The difficulty today is with per­
manent cash crops like cocoa and coffee. The principle that 
the pledgor must give adequate notice before redemption, and 
the general principle that the customary law abhors ill-gotten 
gain, have combined to mitigate the loss to the pledggg^when 
there is a redemption today of ancient pledges of lands planted 
by him with permanent cash crops. The result is that although 
the successor of the pledgor may be permitted to redeem the 
property pledged some generations ago, he may at times be 
allowed to do so only on terms. The discussion of the law on 
perpetual redeemability of pledges has not given enough prom­
inence to the rule that redemption after a long interval of 
time may be on terms. The terms usually imposed on redemption 
of such ancient pledges are that the pledgee shall continue to 
be entitled to at least part of the proceeds of permanent cash
crops planted by him on the redeemed land. For instance, in
1the case of Agbo Kofi v, Addo Kofi, the rights of the defendant 
pledgee were recognised by both the Fiaga*s Tribunal and the 
West African Court of Appeal, The West African Court of Appeal, 
after declaring that the plaintiff was.entitled to redeem, said:
1. (1935) 1 W.A.C.A. ZSk.
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A word may be said as to the position of Addo Kofi the 
defendant, who has according to the Fiaga*s Tribunal 
1 cocoa farms in some parts of the Dove lands1. There 
is authority for making an order in this Court pro­
tecting his rights thereto, but as the Tribunal of the 
Fiaga has ordered that this matter be settled amicably 
between the parties, there appears to be no necessity 
for such an order. 1
The amicable settlement contemplated was that the proceeds of 
the farms on the redeemed land shall be shared in agreed por­
tions. The Court of Appeal went even further and stated the 
nature of the pledgeefs right in another case thus:
The Native Appeal Court in the instant case went to 
the trouble of defining the exact nature of Dzanku's 
interest in that portion of the land cultivated by 
his predecessors when they said: 'The respondent
Dzanku to pay 6s. to redeem the disputed land from 
the appellant Kwadwo, Any farm or farms made by the 
appellant or by his agents to be used on dibinamdlbi 
system with the respondent1. 2
It is not altogether clear what type of dibinamdibi or
dlbimadibi is contemplated here. It shows, in any case, that
the pledgee did not lose all his rights over the crops on the
land. For the Ewe dibimadibi is an arrangement whereby a farm
is made on the land of another, so that the physical area of
the farm itself, or sometimes its proceeds, may be shared in
agreed ratios, usually equal halves but sometimes in 2 to 1
ratio.
1. Aflbo Kofi v. Addo Kofi. (1933) 1 W.A.C.A. 284, 284.
2. Dzanku v. Adza Kwadwo. (I960) G.L.R. 31, 34.
3. See pp.584-594 infra for discussion of dibimadibi under 
"Tenancies” .
It is submitted that the condition imposed here is both 
fair and reasonable. Where after a long delay the redemption 
of property is allowed, the pledgee who had improved the land 
in the reasonable belief of paramount title thereto should be 
entitled to share in the fruits of his labour. This, however, 
cannot apply, to .a.pledgee or his successor who had.been.aware 
all along that he occupied the land as a pledgee. Such aware­
ness can be inferred from such facts as a formal introduction 
to the family of the pledgor on the latter!s death.
It is a rule that, in the case of pledges, the pledgor 
should introduce himself to the family of the pledgee-creditor 
if the pledgee predeceases him. In the same way the pledgee 
should introduce himself to the pledgor's family if he sur­
vives the pledgor. However, as the property pledged is usually 
of a greater value than the debt due, as a practical proposition 
the pledgor or his family should particularly ensure that there 
is a proper introduction on the death of any of the parties, lest 
title to the pledged property be lost. For it may be in the 
interest of a dishonest pledgee that there is no such intro­
duction, so that he may in the course of time raise a presump­
tion of absolute title to the property in his favour. The 
introduction is done-with drinks a few days after the burial, 
or as soon as possible thereafter. Among the Ewe this intro­
duction is not permitted while the body lies in state as
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suggested for some other communities,^ While the body lies 
in state it would be a gross and unforgivable insult to the 
family of the pledgor to proclaim publicly his indebtedness.
As regards a deceased pledgee the bereaved family would be 
concerned with more pressing problems than listening to the 
list of creditors. Introduction of either a pledgor or a 
pledgee is always a quiet family affair some reasonable time 
after burial, when the members of the family can be considered 
as mentally prepared to listen to such claims.
The necessity for introducing oneself after the death of 
the other party is only a device for refreshing the memory of 
the families as regards the transaction. It was, therefore, of 
a special evidentiary value because of the absence of writing.
It has been attempted now, however, to elevate the procedure
to a sine qua non in establishing the existence of a pledge, 
so that failure to observe it may be construed to mean that the 
transaction was a sale and not a pledge. This attempt was 
rejected in the -Adaklu case of Kuma v, Kofi by Lingley, J., 
who said:
I do not think that the custom referred to is anything
more than the usual attempt of systems of law that had
no writing to endeavour to lay down methods of proof by 
means of a large number of oral witnesses, I do not 
think that it can be regarded as.affecting the.continu- . 
ing validity of a pledge.
1. Ollennu says this is done while the body lies in state. See 
his Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana. 1962, pp.105-6.
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I do not think it v/ill be equitable to allow a 
pledgee to rely on the breach of this custom to defeat 
the rights of redemption, 1
It is submitted that, if the learned Judge was right, there is 
an anomaly in the law. The introduction of the pledgor to the 
pledgee’s family on the death of the pledgee, or vice versa, is 
only incidental to the existence of the pledge itself. Similarly 
the customary ceremonies sealing a sale of land are also merely 
incidental to the transaction itself. It is submitted that in 
both cases they are essentially only of evidentiary value. Why 
then should the failure to introduce the pledgor or pledgee be 
excused, while the failure to describe the performance of the 
customary ceremony of sale many generations ago is regarded as 
fatal to the claim of title by a party who has been in undisturbec 
possession for generations? It is submitted that the only 
rational and practical approach is to regard both ceremonies 
as technicalities, proof of which v/ould, however, aid the parties 
in establishing a sale or a pledge as the case may be. In that 
case the question of a sale or a pledge would be decided on the 
totality of the evidence, relying all along, however, on the 
principle that long and undisturbed possession raises a rebut­
table presumption of absolute title.
1. Kuma v, Kofi. (1956) 1 W.A.L.P. 128, 130, Cf, Ad.jeibi Ko.jo 
v, Bonsie. supra, where a contrary view was taken by the Privy 
Council.
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Pledge of Movables
Pledges of the old style, which have been discussed so 
far, are practically obsolete and are scarcely created today 
in respect of land.. Today it is not the land as such but the 
farm on it that is pledged, I-Ience a new form of pledge has 
been evolved to serve this purpose. This will be discussed 
in the next section.
It is necessary to mention briefly here, hov/ever, that the
old style pledge is still used in the pledging of movables.
In spite of the limitations in the Pawnbrokers Ordinance,^- 
movables or chattels are still pledged. That enactment places 
pledges on a commercial basis by providing that any person who 
takes goods or chattels from another person by way of security
p
lor the repayment of a sum not exceeding £ 5 0  is a pawnbroker, 
ils the pawnbroker is required by the statute to fulfil some 
conditions as to registration and keeping of books,^ it seeks 
in effect to eliminate the customary pledging of chattels to an 
occasional lender of money.
It is a fact, confirmed by field research, however, that 
in spite of the statute, movables are still pledged today in 
the old way among the Ewe under the statutory limit but without 
the statutory formality. When movables are so pledged, the
1. Cap. 189 of the Laws of the Gold Coast, 1951 Edition.
2. Sections 2 and 3 of the Pawnbrokers Ordinance, Cap. 189*
3. Sections 8 and 16 of the Pawnbrokers Ordinance, Cap. 189*
573,
incidents are precisely the same as for the old style pledging . 
of land as described above. The pledgor delivers the pledged 
article, such as a ring, a necklace, bangles, or an expensive 
kento cloth, to the pledgee and receives in return an advance 
of a sum of money. The pledgee keeps the pledged article, 
and is entitled to use it without accounting, until the sum 
advanced is repaid. - Possession is thus essential to such a 
pledge of chattels. Like the old style pledge of land, a pledge 
of chattels is also redeemable at any time the sum due is 
tendered. As the pledgee of chattels is not generally expected 
to improve the property as one would develop or cultivate 
undeveloped land, there' is no requirement as to notice before 
redeeming a pledged chattel.
Modern Pledges
Pledges of the old style, that is to hold property for use 
in lieu of interest until the principal debt is discharged, are 
now obsolete as far as land is concerned. Existing pledges 
made generations ago may still be redeemed today; but no new 
pledges of this type are created now relating to land. Today 
the old style pledge is created in Eweland. only in relation to 
movables or chcittels.
The reason why old style pledges have disappeared is that 
land as such, that is undeveloped land, is no longer pledged.
The modern pledge is a pledge of only the farmer’s interest in 
the farm, that is agile or bofo, and not of the interest in the 
land itself or anyigba, As already explained, Ewe law distin­
guishes between the land itself and the things on it. There­
fore, a pledge of a farm does not in the law extend to the 
land itself. Hence, while the old style pledge is known as 
anv1gba dede megbe or anyigba dede awoba. the modern pledge is 
known as agble dede mogbe or agble dede awoba. which means 
"the pledging of a farm". As the distinction leaves title to 
the land itself unaffected, the individual farmer has the 
capacity to pledge his interest in his farm on family land 
v/ithout the consent of his family. The family’s consent is 
dispensed with in any.case because in the modern pledge the 
pledged property pays off the debt and the property auto­
matically reverts to the pledgor.
The simplicity of the modern pledge is that it is a self- 
liquidating pledge in which the proceeds of the farm are utilis 
to extinguish the debt due. For this reason the pledged farm 
cannot conceivably remain indefinitely in the hands of the 
pledgee as is the case with old style pledges.
This is the important point of difference between the old 
style pledges and modern pledges. The.old style pledge means 
that the pledgee uses the property in lieu of interest on the 
loan and is, therefore, not accountable. In modern pledges,
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however, there is accountability and the property is not held 
by the pledgee to be used in lieu of interest. In modern 
pledges interest is charged on the loan in practically every 
case; but, to circumvent the usury laws, the loan is described, 
oven in any document evidencing the transaction, as an interest- 
free loan. The rate of interest, according to information, is 
50 per cent, sometimes as high as 100 per cent. The principal 
and the interest thereon, are then added together and described 
as one interest-free loan which is repayable from the proceeds 
of the pledged farm. To illustrate it with actual figures, if 
the loan is £200 at a 50 per cent interest, the transaction is 
described as an interest-free loan of £300, It is usually 
difficult to dispute with parole evidence the description of 
the modern transaction as recorded, because practically all 
modern pledges are reduced into writing and signed or thumb- 
printed by the parties and attested by witnesses. This works 
hardship in many cases. It is suggested that, in appropriate 
cases, the courts should go outside the written agreement and 
admit parole evidence in order to ascertain the true terms of 
the agreement.
There are two types of modern pledges. In one case the 
debt Is. regarded as. extinguished after, a fixed term of years 
and the farm is then returned to the pledgor. In the other type 
the farm is held by the pledgee only until the net proceeds 
pay off the sum due, Vie may examine the incidents of both types.
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A pledge for a fixed term of years is indeed a calculated 
gamble. In return for a loan the debtor pledges his farm to 
the creditor-pledgee by placing the said pledgee in possession 
for a fixed number of years. Obviously this kind of arrange­
ment can only be established regarding farms with permanent cash 
crops like cocoa and coffee,. .The. term . of years, is, therefore, . . 
usually determined with respect to the crop seasons and not 
necessarily to the calendar year. There is no accountability 
and the pledgee is entitled to all the proceeds of the pledged 
farm over the agreed, years, in satisfaction of the principal 
loan and the (unexpressed) interest. If he gets a good harvest 
and the market price is good, he may make a considerable profit. 
On the other hand, if there is a poor harvest or the price falls, 
it is a loss against which he cannot be indemnified by the 
pledgor. For at the end of the fixed term the pledgor regains 
possession and the debt is deemed to be automatically extin­
guished, A pledge for a fixed term of years, unless expressly 
stated otherwise, is redeemable at any time by the pledgor 
tendering the whole of the original debt. The pledgor in such 
a case is not credited with the profits accruing to the pledgee 
for that part of the term that he had been in possession. Thus 
if for a loan expressed to be £200 the term fixed, is 6 years but 
the pledgor decides to redeem the property after A years, he 
must tender the whole of the original £200,
7/hen a farm is pledged over a fixed term of years, the 
pledgee also takes over the actual management of the farm. The 
pledgee becomes responsible for clearing the weeds and harvest­
ing the crops, A prudent pledgee manages the farm well to ensure 
a maximum yield, at least until the closing years of the term. 
Quite, often,, however, such management by a pledgee leads to the 
deterioration in the condition of the farm. For the pledgee 
takes only a short-term view of the. maintenance and development 
of the farm. At times there is an actual neglect of the farm, 
Fven without actually neglecting the farm a pledgee will, for 
instance, resist the cutting out of diseased cocoa trees, since 
this may mean a loss to him in the produce over the remaining 
years of the term. Pledging in this manner, therefore, often 
leaf Is not only to the deterioration of the farm but also to a 
decline in annual yield of crops.
The other type of modern- pledge is where the proceeds of 
the farm are directly utilised to pay off the principal debt 
and the (usually unexpressed) interest. The pledgee is placed 
in possession of the farm. In this case, however, like the 
mortgagee of the common law, he is strictly accountable for his 
earnings while in possession. The basis of the arrangement is 
that' the pledgee agrees to be repaid in dribblets by re-irabursing 
himself every crop season with the net proceeds of the farm. As 
soon as the amount due has been repaid in this manner, the tran­
saction lapses and the farm is immediately returnable to the
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pledgor. Any receipts in excess of the debt due are payable to 
the pledgor. There is, therefore, a strict accountability in a 
pledge of this nature. The reckoning, however, is on net pro­
ceeds only. The pledgor, although not in possession, remains
responsible for maintaining the farm, including weeding it and 
harvesting the crops for the pledgee. If the pledgor cannot do
these himself, a labourer is hired at his expense and the cost
deducted from the gross earnings. In spite of these liabilities 
on the pledgor to maintain the farm, he is not legally in pos­
session. If the debtor remains in possession then, in Ewe law, 
the transaction is not regarded as a pledge but only as a loan 
transaction, in which the creditor simply expects to be paid 
out of the proceeds of the farm. At times there is a variation 
in the arrangement whereby not all the net proceeds go to the 
pledgee, so that the pledgor is allowed a small fraction of the 
proceeds annually for his own use. A pledge of this nature is 
redeemable at any time. Redemption is obtained by tendering 
the balance due at any time after deducting the actual receipts 
of the pledgee. Until then the pledgee is entitled to be, and 
as a rule is, in possession of the property, on the basis of 
accountability. It is stated by Allott that among the Alcan 
the pledgee does not normally.go into occupation in the.case, 
of a self-liquidating pledge, though he admits his right to be 
in possession. In this respect the Alcan practice varies from
1. A.N. Allott, The Akan Law of Property. 195A, PP.A05-A06.
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the Ewe; for among the Northern Ewe the pledgee normally 
goes into possession and sometimes even replaces the pledgorfs 
farm labourers with his own.
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CHAPTER XII
TENANCIES
Gratuitous Tenancies
There are two possible types of customary law tenancies.
One Is the type of tenancy granted on the condition that the 
tenant makes a payment of some sort for the use of the land.
The other type is where the tenant is allowed -a free occu­
pation and use of the land to which he is not otherwise entitled. 
This latter type is what is described here as a gratuitous 
tenancy, because it involves no payment either in cash or in 
kind. It may also be described as a licence.
Gratuitous tenancies are usually granted to relatives and 
friends of the family by allowing them a free use of the land; 
but they may also be granted to any other person. It is then 
said that the land is given to the grantee "to eat on" or du 
nu 1 e edzi. It is apt to be confused with an outright gift 
because of the absence of the obligation on the tenant to pay 
any form of rent, particularly if the tenancy subsists over a
considerable time. It is, however, not a gift and the para­
mount title to the land is not transferred. Therefore, the 
grantee, unless specially permitted to do so, cannot fell or 
sell palm trees, odum, mahogany or other valuable timber 
naturally growing on the land. For the right to these vests 
in the holder of the paramount title to the land or an.yigbato. 
Similarly the rights over minerals and treasure trove in the 
soil remain in the holder of the paramount title.
A gratuitous tenancy may be determined if the tenant tries 
to set up an adverse title to the land."1' As its basis is 
usually blood relationship or friendship, it may also be deter­
mined for ingratitude, disobedience and bad behaviour towards 
the grantor or for committing waste. The right and grounds 
for determining a gratuitous tenancy extend to the successors 
of the grantor and grantee. Hence a gratuitous tenancy granted 
several generations ago may be determined today if a bad 
relationship develops between those who have succeeded the 
original parties,
Thore are two species of gratuitous tenancies and their 
consequences differ. They are those granted (a) for the 
cultivation of foodstuffs, and (b) for the cultivation of 
permanent cash crops, ...........................................
1. As, indeed, it was determined in Adai v, Daku. (1905)
Fen, 313, 118, when the grantee raised an adverse claim of 
title.
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Gratuitous tenancy for foodstuffs: A gratuitous tenancy for
the cultivation of foodstuffs is limited to the cultivation of 
cassava, cocoyam, yam, plantain, maize and other foodstuffs; 
but there is no restriction on the kind of foodstuffs which may 
be cultivated. However, cocoa, coffee and other permanent cash 
crops like palm trees may not be cultivated on land granted for 
the growing of only foodstuffs.
As foodstuffs are harvested within a year or so, the 
tenancy ends with the harvest, unless renewed. The tenant 
enjoys a security of tenure and his tenancy cannot be determined 
while his crops are on the land.. His interest in the crops is 
alienable inter vivos and he may dispose of them post mortem.
The gratuitous tenant, however, does not by virtue of his 
tenancy acquire a right to re-occupy the fallow land or afuu.
The right of re-occupation remains in the individual member of 
the family who, but for the tenancy, would have been entitled to 
use the land. However, within a reasonable time of the deter­
mination of the tenancy, the former gratuitous tenant may enter 
upon the land to collect remaining foodstuffs.
Because a gratuitous tenancy for foodstuffs terminates at 
the harvest, it may be granted by an individual member of the 
family over family land in his occupation. The consent of the 
anyigbato or the family holding the paramount title is not in 
this case necessary for the validity of the tenancy; but the 
head of that family must be informed. If the gratuitous tenancy 
is to be on a continuous basis, then the authorisation of the
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family is required, and publicity is necessary because of the 
possibility of the grantee or his successors setting up an 
adverse claim of title in the future.
Gratuitous tenancy for cash crops: A gratuitous tenancy may be
granted for the cultivation of permanent cash crops like cocoa, 
coffee or palm trees. In that case foodstuffs may also be 
cultivated along with the permanent cash.crops.
The grant of a gratuitous tenancy for the cultivation of 
such permanent -cash crops resembles a gift because the land 
becomes permanently tied to the grantee, since the grantee's 
interest in the farm is both inheritable and alienable. For 
this reason it is only the family, that is the head of the 
family acting on the authority of the family, who can grant such 
a tenancy. In spite of the authorisation by the family, such 
a tenancy is not an outright gift transferring the paramount 
title to the land. The grantor family always retains the 
paramount title to the land. There is thus a horizontal strati­
fication of interests. The family as anyigbato.' or holder of 
the paramount interest, reserves the right of ultimate control, 
including the right to sell, since a sale of land in Ewe law 
has the only effect of alienating the paramount title. The 
family also retains the right to minerals and trees growing 
naturally on the land. The family's interest, however, is 
encumbered by the co-existing interest it has created in favour 
of the tenant, which is the right of user.
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A gratuitous tenancy for permanent crops may be deter­
mined when the crops die out and the farm cannot be said to 
be existing as such. Unless this happens the gratuitous tenancy 
cannot be determined because otherwise the grantee’s labour 
would be lost. There is thus a security of tenure for as long 
as the. cash crops are.on the.land, That is why the family must 
authorise such a transaction affecting family land in order to 
be valid.
Tenancies for Consideration
A tenancy for consideration is one in which the occupation 
and use of another’s land is allowed in the customary law, on 
condition that part of the proceeds shall be pa,id to the land­
lord, The rent, it should be noted, is not reserved in terms 
of a monetary payment but as part of the proceeds of the land. 
Among the Ewe the normal arrangement is that the physical area 
of tlie farm itself, that is agble or bofo« is divided into 
equal halves between the farmer and "the anyigbato or the holder 
of the paramount title to the land. It is known as dibimadibi, 
In Akofi v, Wiresi.^ Coi^sey, P., in the West African Court of 
Appeal, described the essential features of such a tenancy 
thus :
1. (1957) 2 Y/.A.L.R. 257.
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It is a common form of tenure throughout the country 
for a landowner who has unoccupied virgin or forest 
land, which he or his people are unable to cultivate, 
to grant the same to a stranger to work on it in return 
for a fixed share of the crops realised from the land. 1
It seems that this type of tenancy is an innovation intro­
duced to the Ewe from the Akan areas. For the tenancy is known 
among the Ewe as dibimadibi . a corruption of the Twi expression 
dibi na mennibi which means "eat some and let me also eat some'’. 
Its development, however, has not followed exactly the Alcan 
pattern among the Ewe. Among the Allan there are two types of 
tenancy for consideration, viz. abusa and abunu. The abusa 
tenancy is created when an uncultivated or virgin land is 
granted to another person, who then cultivates it under the
agreement that the proceeds are to be shared in the ratio of
a
2 to 1 between the grantee and the g r a n t o r . T h e  abunu, however, 
is an agreement under which an old farm is taken over to be 
managed by another person, or where the landlord or anyigbato 
financially or materially assists another person to cultivate 
a farm on his land, so that in either case the proceeds of the 
farm are shared equally between the farmer and the landlord.3
The abunu type of tenancy does not seem to exist among the 
Ewe. Field research did not disclose any abunu type of tenancy 
among.the Ewe,. Where an .existing, farm.is placed under the
1. Akofi v. Wiresi. (1957) 2 W.A.L.P. 257, 259.
2. N,A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana.
1962, p.81,
3. Ibid.
management of another person among the Ewe, it is strictly in 
the nature of a hiring of labour and the person talcing charge of 
the farm is known as a labourer or agb1edzikpola or bofodzikpola. 
As such farms are usually cocoa or coffee farms, the labourer is 
remunerated at the rate of a fixed sum of money per load of the 
crops cold, the remuneration being known as kotoku nu dede. The 
rate varies according to the official buying price of the pro­
duce, but is uniform throughout the chiefdom every crop season. 
Thus, for clearing the weeds twice in the year and harvesting 
the crops, the labourer was paid about six shillings per load 
of cocoa when a load of 60-lbs., was officially purchased for 
25. 12 the labourer enters into the agreement too late, so
that he clears the weeds only once before the harvesting, or 
only harvests the crops, the rate of remuneration is reduced 
pro rata, but usually by negotiation. On the termination of the 
contract the rights of the labourer end there, because this is 
not a tenancy but just the hiring of labour.
From the description, therefore, it seems that the tenancy 
for consideration or dibimadibi among the Ewe has as its near- 
equivalent the abusflu tenancy among the Akan. A dibimadibi 
tenancy is created among the Ewe if virgin land is given to a 
stranger for cultivation so that the farm may.be .shared., The. . . 
normal arrangement among the Ewe is that the physical area of 
the farm or agble or bofo is shared in two equal halves, though 
at times it is agreed that the farmer shall have two-thirds.
r
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Among the Ewe the ratio in which the farm may he shared is 
negotiable. In all cases, however, it is the area covered by 
the farm which is physically shared, each party thereafter being 
entitled to only the yield from his own portion of the farm.
The Ewe system, differs in some material respects from the 
Alian system. It borrows part of the features of both the abusa
and the abunu of the Akan, Like the Akan abusa, the Ewe
dibimadibi is a cultivation of virgin land without any assist­
ance from the an.yigbato or the holder of the paramount title 
to the land. In the division of the farm, however, the Ewe
dibimadibi somewhat resembles the abunu of the Akan because
the area of the farm is usually divided into equal halves, just 
as the proceeds of the farm in the abunu tenancy of the Akan are 
usually shared equally between the farmer and the landlord. On 
the other hand, the Ewe dibimadibi differs from both the abusa 
and abunu because the dibimadibi implies a division of the 
physical area of the farm itself and not merely the produce. 
Perhaps it is because the Eve tenancy is a hybrid of the two 
Akan systems and is thus sui generis that it is not known as 
either abusa or abunu, hence the name dibimadibi. One gets the 
impression that among the Akan the abusa tenancy is of a fixed 
pattern .whereby one-third share of the proceeds.goes to the
landlord and the farmer takes two-thirds."^ Among the Eve the
1. See e.g. Id.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in 
Ghana, 1962, p.8l and J.B. "Danquah, op.cit,« p,220. This is 
also the basis of the reasoning in Akofi v, Wiresi. (1957) 8 
Y/.A.L.P. 257. But see also A.N. Allott, The Akan Law of Property 
Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of London” 195^ f> P.A80, where he
says the ratio may be varied by agreement, and p.A8A wher» he
says in note 51 that in Bekwai and Ajumako the division is into 
na.lv es,
ratio is negotiable; but where it is not specifically 
negotiated it is implied that a division in equal halves is
intended.
One major difference between the Ewe dibimadibi and the 
Akan tenancies is in the nature of what is shared. The Ewe 
divide the farm itself, that is the physical area of the farm, 
so that each party reaps the fruits of his portion of the farm. 
They thus become two separate farms in effect. This sort of 
arrangement has been rejected as inapplicable to the Akan 
tenancies. In the Kwahu case of Sasu v. Asomani. for instance, 
a case of abusa tenancy, the suggestion that the physical area 
of tho farm itself, rather than.the proceeds, should bo shared 
was rejected, by the Court. In that case Quarshie-Idun, J* , 
s ai d:
I agree with the judgment of the Native Court that 
’abusa1 does not imply a right in an owner of the land 
to divide a farm cultivated by another person into 
three and himself collect the proceeds of the third 
share. ’Abusa* implies that the owner of the land is 
entitled to be paid a third share of the proceeds 
accruing from the whole farm cultivated by another. 2
Quite clearly this is different from the Ewe dibimadibi tenancy.
The difference also explains why the same ratio is not applied
in the division of the farm and the sharing of the proceeds among
1. •Sasu v . Asomani. Unreported, Land Court, 11th June, 19A9# 
Reproduced in N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law 
in Ghana. 1962, p.171*
2. Ibid.. at p.172. This decision is, however, .doubtful* For 
it is stated by Allott that in some Akan areas, Bekwai and 
Ajumako for instance, there is sometimes a physical division of 
the farm itself and not merely the yield. See A.N. Allott,
The Akan Law of Property. 195A, P*A8A.
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the Eve and the Akan respectively. In the Akan system the 
farmer remains on the whole farm and is responsible for clear­
ing it of weeds and for harvesting all the crops. Among the 
Ewe, once the -farm is divided the landlord or anyigbato becomes 
responsible for clearing his own portion and harvesting the 
crops there,, , The .farmer rs . responsibility ceases over the-land­
lord’s portion as soon as the diviion of the farm has talien 
place. It means that the Ewe dibimadibi tenant does less work 
than the Akan abusa or abunu tenant. If the Eve landlord wishes 
the dibimadibi tenant to manage his half of the farm for him, 
this is a fresh contract subject to the usual terms of remuner­
ation for the agbledziknola or a labourer as already discussed,^ 
The total earnings of a dibimadibi tenant re-employed in this 
way, when added to the proceeds of his own half of the farm, 
may amount to something in the neighbourhood of the 2. to 1 
ratio in his favour over the proceeds of the entire farm, which 
is the usual remuneration of his Akan counterpart on the abusa 
tenancy.
Even though the farm is physically divided among the Eve, 
the tenant farmer takes the interest in only the farm and does 
not acquire the paramount title to the land itself. The 
arrangement does not involve alienation of title to the land, 
though it creates in the tenant the right to cultivate the
1. See pp, 585-58$ supra.
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land and enjoy the proceeds therefrom. Therefore, the tenant 
may not sell timber or fell or sell palm trees naturally growing 
or_ the land, and he has no interest in any minerals in the 
soil. Nevertheless, because the land becomes permanently tied 
to the grantee, the dibimadibi tenancy for permanent cash crops 
is not valid but void unless created on the authority of the 
aryigbato or the family holding the ■paramount title to the 
land.
The dibimadibi tenancy of' the Ewe is both inheritable and
alienable under the same terms as the original grantee had. As
regards succession the landlord has no choice but to accept
that parson who, according to the personal lav; of the grantee,
is entitled to succeed to his interests in property.^"
Tv.ro different situations, however, arise with respect to
alienation inter vivos. While the young trees are still being
tended and the farm has not yet been physically divided, the
tenant cannot alienate his interest without the consent of the
landlord, Danquah puts it rather mildly when he says:
A tenant on the abusa system has no right to alienate 
the property held, but he may transfer his own share 
to a third person, with due notice to the landlord. 2
Among the Ewe "due notice” is not enough. The consent of the
landlord or anyigbato,is necessary,. The. landlord can reject a.
1. The same is said of the Akan abusa tenancy. See, e.g.
J.B. Danquah, All an Laws and Customs, 1928, p.220.
2. J.B. Danquah, op.cit,. p.220,
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prospoctive alienee inter vivos if, in the opinion of the 
landlord, he is not a suitable person. For this is a personal, 
contract in’which the personality of the grantee is vital, 
since a lazy or careless transferee may neglect or fail to 
maintain the young farm properly,
. . If, on.the other hand,, the farm has been divided between, 
the dibimadibi tenant and the landlord, then the tenant is 
unfettered in the alienation of his -interest in his half of 
the farm. The tenant may in that case alienate his interest 
in liis part of the farm by sale or gift, and he may pledge it, 
without the landlord1s consent. For in that case the so-called' 
tenant no longer performs any services for the landlord or 
anylgbato,
lirf . I nmJi ,mm ■■ .
Ollennu suggests that the interests of the Akan abusa 
tenant may be attached in execution of a judgment debt.^ It 
is submitted that he is right and that the interests of the Fwe 
dibimadibi tenant may be similarly attached. If the Ewe 
dibimadibi farm has already been divided, then the purchaser 
succeeds to the tenant’s interest in the farm, though he does 
not thereby acquire any title to the land or anyigba itself.
If the Ewe dibimadibi farm has not yet been divided, a purchaser 
of the tenant’s interest in execution takes it subject to all . 
the obligations under the tenancy to maintain the farm,
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana,
1962, pp.86-87,
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Like all tenancies, the Ewe dibimadibi tenant forfeits the 
tenancy if he denies the title of his grantor. Before the 
division of the farm the tenancy may be terminated if the 
tenant fails to develop and maintain the farm reasonably well; 
but after the division the neglect by the tenant of his own 
portion of the farm cannot be a ground for terminating the 
tenancy. If the farm dies out completely, which is very highly 
improbable, the land, reverts to the landlord unencumbered.
Except in the above cases, the dibimadibi tenant anjoys a 
security of tenure and the tenancy cannot be terminated.
The Ewe dibimadibi tenancy may be granted, like the 
gratuitous tenancy, for either foodstuffs or permanent cash 
crops. These need, a brief treatment.
For foodstuffs: This is a type of tenancy granted exclusively
for the cultivation of only foodstuffs. It lasts only until 
the foodstuffs are harvested, which is about a year, unless 
renewed. The grantee has no automatic right to re-occupy 
the fallow land or afuu after the harvest, though he is entitled 
to enter upon the land thereafter to collect any foodstuffs 
remaining there. The individual member of the family may, 
therefore,.grant such a tenancy, on family land in his occupation, 
with the head of the family informed. But, again, if the ■ 
tenancy for foodstuffs is to be on a continuous basis from year 
to year, then the authority of the family is necessary and 
there must be due publicity in order to forestall any adverse 
claim to title by the tenant or his successors in future.
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In particular a dibimadibi tenancy for the cultivation 
of foodstuffs implies that the physical area of the farm itself 
is to be divided. The landlord may wish to have the foodstuffs 
solely for domestic consumption while the tenant may wish to 
sell his produce. By partitioning the farm itself each party 
is at liberty to do as he pleases with the. crops on his portion, 
of the farm. For if only the produce may be shared as held in 
rosn. v , Asomani.^  then it may compel both parties to consent to 
the sale of all the produce.
For Permanent Cash Crops: An Swe dibimadibi tenancy may be
created for the cultivation of permanent cash crops like cocoa, 
coffee or palm trees. In fact this is by far the most common 
type of the dibimadibi tenancy, The particular kind of crops 
is specified in each case, and a tenancy granted for, cay, 
cocoa, cannot be converted by the tenant for the cultivation 
of another crop. However, while the cocoa or coffee trees are 
still young, the farmer may inter-plant foodstuffs for which 
he is not accountable to the landlord. Similarly, after the 
division of the farm, the tenant may cultivate foodstuffs in 
between the cash crops on his portion of the farm for his own
u s e , ..........................................• .............
As the cultivation of permanent cash crops involves a 
permanent occupation of the land, a dibimadibi tenancy relating
to family land is not valid unless authorised by the family. 
An individual person holding the paramount title to a self- 
acquired land may, however, grant such a. tenancy without the 
authority of his family.
CHAPTER XIII
SUCCESSION TO PROPERTY
Different Types of Succession Distinguished
The term "succession*1 in law refers to the disposal of 
the rights and duties of a person, or some aspects of them, in 
favour of a subsequent holder. It is thus the process by which 
in law the subsequent holder is treated as if the right or 
interest of his predecessor had passed to him.
We may distinguish two types of succession: succession
inter vivos and succession post mortem. There is a succession 
inter vivos where the rights or duties of a previous holder 
pass to a subsequent holder in the life-time of the previous 
holder, whether voluntarily or involuntarily. There is a 
succession inter vivos when the holder of an interest in 
property alienates the same by gift or sale. Another example 
is when an office holder, such as a chief, is replaced by 
another incumbent voluntarily on his abdication or involuntarily
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on his deposition. Similarly, there may be succession inter 
vivos to interests in property when the property of an 
insolvent is sold in bankruptcy proceedings or when execution 
is levied on the property of a debtor and the goods are sold. 
The present work is not concerned with succession inter vivos.
Succession is post mortem if the rights or duties devolve
on the new holder as a result of the death of the previous
holder. In certain cases, notably succession to an office,
the predecessor may not be able to determine who should be his
successor, as legal qualifications and non-legal preference for
individual candidates may be the determinants. In the case of
a post mortem succession to an interest in property, however,
the predecessor may by his will determine who shall succeed
him. Failing a testamentary disposition, the interest may
devolve in accordance with an order of preference usually fixed
by law or determined by certain organs of society such as the
family among the Ewe and the statutory court in most modern
/
societies. Here, again, we are not concerned with succession 
consequent upon a will because a will, as we shall show later, 
is unknown to Ewe law. We are, therefore, concerned only with 
succession post mortem upon intestacy.
Succession, whether inter vivos or post mortem, may have 
two denotations. It may mean succession to inter-personal 
rights or succession to interests in property. Succession to 
inter-personal rights may refer to accession to a position or
an office, ranging from political ones like a king or chief to 
religious ones like a bishop or a fetish priest. A common type 
of such succession in Ghana, and particularly among the Ewe, is 
accession to political office, such as that of a chief or a 
linguistt. Another common type of succession is the assumption 
of the office of head of family* Succession to a chief and
other political functionaries among the Ewe has already been
1 2 | discussed, and so has succession to a head of family. We
I
I may, therefore, briefly discuss positional succession to an
i
| ordinary individual before we proceed to consider succession 
| to righits in property. Usually succession to such a position
i
' implies the assumption of the responsibilities of a guardian,
I a "father" or “mother*1, or the administrator of an estate.
Such porsitional succession does not imply succession to rights 
in prop<erty and the two should be distinguished.
An adult person among the Ewe, especially if he or she
has chi.ldren, occupies the position of a father or a mother to
his or !her children. On his or her death, therefore, some
i
| other pierson succeeds to the position of father or mother which
I
the deceased occupied in his lifetime. This positional succes-
i sor is kinown as tefenola or a “substitute11. Thus a positional
I
| successor to a father is known as to tefenola or “father- 
substitute“ and that of a mother is no tefenola or “mother-
1. See; pp. 71-74 supra.
2. See pp. 207-209 supra.
substitute11. That is why it is said that an Ewe man is never
without a father or a mother. However old he or she may be, on
the death of his parents, another close relative will step into
the shoes of his deceased parents.
When a father dies, that fatherfs brother, another male 
relative or one of the deceased’s own children, succeeds him 
as 11 father11 or to tefenola to his children. Such succession 
to the position is scarcely ever sinecure because the successor 
actually stands in loco parentis to the children, discharging 
the responsibilities of a father, especially if the children 
are still young. The responsibilities of such a successor 
include the maintenance of the children and responsibility for 
their education and general upbringing. As a “father11 the 
successor or to tefenola also administers the estate of the 
deceased in the interim until it is distributed to successors 
to the property rights, and the estate may remain in his hands 
for quite some time if the children of the deceased are young. 
But, however long the tefenola or positional successor may 
administer such property, he has no beneficial interest in it 
in that capacity. He is not even entitled as of right to 
reside in the house of the deceased, though he may do so if it 
is absolutely necessary for the efficient discharge of his 
functions. Those who are entitled to the beneficial enjoyment, 
the successors to the property, are usually the children and it
is to them that the positional successor or tefenola must 
ultimately deliver the property in proportions determined at 
a formal meeting of the family. What has just been outlined 
for a father also applies mutatis mutandis to succession to a 
mother *
As a rule there is only one tefenola or successor to the 
position of a deceased person in this sense. Succession to 
this position is according to a fixed formula, but the family 
always reserves the right to appoint a different person if the 
circumstances so require. If a man dies his eldest brother 
normally succeeds him as 11 father11 or to tefenola and it runs 
through that generation completely before descending on the 
next. Similarly a sister may be the successor to a woman or 
no tefenola. The eldest child, if an adult, may become the 
positional successor to his or her parent. In that case there 
is a titular parent for that child also. If, however, a grand­
father or grandmother is living, he or she has priority over 
everybody else in becoming the 11 father11 or “mother11 to the 
grandchildren. Although this is the normal pattern, a junior 
person may be appointed if the senior one declines or if, 
because of a strained personal relationship with the deceased 
or the children, he is unsuitable. From what has been said 
of the tefenola or positional successor, it follows that 
normally a childless person cannot have a successor in this 
sense; but a childless person who had succeeded another person
as 11 father*1 or “mother11 may in turn have such a successor.
The other type of succession is succession to property 
rights. Inter vivos succession to property rights will not 
be discussed here, because that may be properly considered 
under sale, gift and other kinds of alienation. We are 
presently concerned with post mortem succession to rights in 
property on intestacy. We may, therefore, describe a successor 
as a person who, by the rules of the devolution of rights in 
property, is entitled to the beneficial enjoyment of property 
left by a deceased person in his own right. The successor to 
property rights is known as domen.yila or nudula. that is “he 
who eats his things**. The successor or domenyila may also 
assume the other rights and obligations for and against the 
estate of the deceased; but this need not necessarily be so.
As a rule the children succeed to their fatherfs interests in 
property among the Ewe. All the children are joint successors 
or domenyilawo and, therefore, there is not usually a single 
successor. In a similar manner there are usually several 
automatic successors to a woman's interests in property.
We may contrast the position thus. On the death of a 
person there is one type of successor who steps into his or 
her shoes as “father" or “mother" to his children. This type 
of successor is known as tefenola or a “substitute**. Thre is 
usually only a single tefenola or positional successor in this 
sense and such a successor does not succeed to any interest in
the property of the deceased, unless he or she is also 
entitled to succeed to the property under a different legal 
right. For example, an adult child may succeed his father as
“father" to the rest of the children while, as a child himself,
he may he one of the successors to his interests in property. 
With the exception of such cases when one person is a successor 
in both senses, the general rule is that the successor to inter­
personal rights is not the same as the successor to property 
rights among the Ewe. Indeed, as will appear later, there are 
usually more than one successor, to interests in property but 
always one successor to the position of the deceased.
Some conclusions follow from this. Where a chief or head 
of family is survived by children, there are three types of 
successors to him on his death. The person who succeeds him 
as a chief or head of family would be different from his 
positional successor as “father" to his children. The succes­
sors to his interest in property or domenyilawo may be yet
different persons. A person without children and holding no 
other office may only have successors in respect of his self­
acquired property but no positional successors, unless he was 
in loco parentis to another deceased person's children.
The General Principle of Succession
Post mortem succession to rights in intestate property 
among the Northern Ewe-speaking people of Ghana is based upon 
the patrilineal principle. To say that succession to interests 
in property is patrilineal is, however, only an indication of 
a general principle governing the post mortem devolution of 
rights in property. It means that in principle the right to 
succeed post mortem to the interest in property, other than by 
virtue of a testamentary disposition, generally depends on 
relationship being traced through the male line from the 
proposed successor to the previous holder of the interest.
This is, however, only a general principle, distinguishable 
from matrilineal succession which confines the right to suc­
cession to blood relations traced through the female line. 
Neither “patrilineal succession1* nor “matrilineal succession1' 
by itself imports any clear and distinct rules for deciding 
which particular individuals are entitled to succeed to the 
rights. For in either case the right may devolve within the 
general principle but in accordance with different rules con­
ferring the right on different persons. Each system of suc­
cession, though classified as “patrilineal" or "matrilineal", 
therefore, requires a closer examination in relation to specific 
communities in order to ascertain the applicable rules.
As regards matrilineal succession, the basic principle, 
as we have just stated, is that the person succeeding to a 
right in intestate property does so by virtue of his relation­
ship traced through his mother and in the female line to the 
previous holder of the right in the said property. As several, 
or even many, persons may stand in this relationship to the 
intestate with varying degrees of remoteness, the identification 
of this general principle may not provide the answer in any 
particular circumstance to the question of which individual 
or group of persons may succeed to the property. For matrilineal 
succession can simply mean that a child succeeds to his own 
mother1s interest in property, thus strictly meaning maternal 
succession, Matrilineal succession may also mean that a man 
is succeeded in his property rights by his sister's children, 
which we may describe as avuncular succession. Examples of 
this are the Central Bantu peoples of Yao and Cewa, among 
whom matrilineal succession means that a man's heirs are his
i
sister's children. In other cases, notably the Akan of Ghana,
the rule stated by some authorities is that nephews are entitled
to succeed but are postponed to the mother and brothers of the 
2
deceased. In all these cases the right to succeed may be
1. See, e.g. A.R. Radcliffe-Brown & D. Forde, African Systems 
of Kinship and Marriage. O.U.P., London, I960, pp.232-233#
2. R.S. Rattray, Ashanti. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1923, p.40; 
J.B. Danquah, Akan Laws and Customs. Routledge, London, 1928, 
pp. 182-183; N.A. Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate 
Succession in Ghana. 1966, pp.96-99#
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affected by sex and age. Furthermore, there is the judicial 
opinion that matrilineal succession in Ghana means succession 
by the matrilineal family of the deceased, being persons 
descended from the same womb, such that the said family may 
appoint one or more of its members to manage the property with 
a right of beneficial e n j o y m e n t A c c o r d i n g  to this.proposition 
of the Ghanaian judicial customary law, no individual person 
has a right of automatic succession, the right of appointment 
being vested in the family to be exercised by way of preferment.
Patrilineal succession has no more certain meaning. Its 
basic principle is that the right to succeed to interests in 
property is derived from the relationship traced through one*s 
father. Without more, this might be taken to imply that all the 
children, both male and female, succeed to the interests in the 
property of their father. In most cases, however, it means that 
only the male children are entitled to succeed. Even in cases 
where the right to succeed to property is limited to male 
children, their individual entitlements may raise problems. In 
some cases, such as among the Kikuyu of Kenya, all the male 
children are corporately entitled to succeed and the property 
is shared among them on the basis .that an elder gets slightly 
more than a younger brother, Among other tribes, of which the
1. Amarfio v. A.yorkor. (195^) 1*+ W.A.C.A. 554; Larkai v. 
Amorkor« (1933) 1 W.A.C.A. 323.
Haya of Tanzania are an example, the principle of filioprimo-
geniture applies, so that the eldest male child alone succeeds
to all the property.'*' Among the Tswana the principle of filio-
primogeniture is pressed so far that, even if the eldest male
child should die, his rights devolve by the principle of
representation on his own first son who is the grandson of
the intestate. According to Schapera:
.... If the principal heir is dead, his eldest son 
will succeed to his rights, taking precedence over 
his father1s younger brothers. 2
Patrilineal succession may also mean that the right to succeed
to property is enjoyed not through onefs father directly but
through one’s father’s brother. Of the old Buganda patrilineal
system of succession Haydon says:
Prior to the reign of Kabaka Muteesa I the pattern of 
succession was for a man to succeed to the estate of 
his paternal uncle, a woman to succeed to the estate 
of her paternal aunt. 3
The Buganda law has now been changed by the Kabaka so that it
prefers a son and a grandson to the brother of the deceased.
So many are the variants of even patrilineal succession that
it is necessary to spell out more detailed rules in each case.
1. H. Cory and M.M. Hartnall, Customary Law of the Haya Tribe. 
International African Institute, London, 19A-5, PP* 1-2.
2. I. Schapera, A Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom. Internation­
al African Institute, London, 1955, p.231.
3. E.S, Haydon, Law and Justice in Buganda. Butterworths,
London, i9 6 0, p.21Zf.
As already stated the Ewe are a patrilineal community* As 
a general rule the patrilineal system among the Ewe implies 
patri-descent and patri-succession. The Ewe system of patri- 
descent has already been discussed as regards membership of the 
family."^ The rule here is that membership of the family is in 
principle traced through the male line of descent, that is 
through one’s father. As it is the families which form the 
sub-divisions, and the sub-divisions are the components of the 
divisions constituting the chiefdom, the principle of patri- 
descent determines a person’s citizenship of a particular chief­
dom. Of this there is hardly any doubt throughout all Eweland.
The principle of patri-succession determines the right of
succession not only to rights in property but also succession
to hereditary offices, such as that of a chief or a linguist.
Under this principle eligibility for hereditary offices depends
on membership of the patrilineal family on the basis of patri-
descent. This is the general rule among the Northern Ewe and
presumably among the oSher Ewe. The only known exception is the
case of succession to the office of Paramount Chief or Awoamefia
of the Anlo Ewe, to which certain matrilineal descendants are
*
also eligible. This exception, allowing matri-succession to 
be mixed with patri-succession with respect to the single office 
of Awoamefia. has been confused with patri-succession to 
interests in property. As a result it is sometimes stated
1. See pp. 10^-107 supra.
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erroneously that the rule applicable among the Anlo Ewe is 
matrilineal succession to property.
The reason for the exception which allows a unique mixture 
of patri-succession and matri-succession to the Paramount Stool 
of Anlo is historical. The Anlo tradition is that the Awoamefia 
left his ancestral stool, the symbol of office, in Notsie during 
the Ewe exodus from that walled city. When he wanted to re­
trieve the stool none of his own children was prepared to risk 
his life for the purpose. A son of Togbui Srifs sister, however, 
volunteered to undertake the hazardous task of returning to 
Notsie, whence they had fled from an autocratic and cruel ruler, 
to recover it.^ * On successfully accomplishing this feat which 
brought back the sacred stool, the Awoamefia decreed the 
maternal descendants to be also entitled to succeed to the office 
of paramount chief. It is, therefore, only a rare exception, 
dating from that historical incident and limited to the office 
of Awoamefia. It does not affect succession to other Anlo stools, 
let alone rights in property generally among the Anlo Ewe.
The general rule among the Ewe as we have stated, is that
succession to interests in property is patrilineaL As regards
ancestral or family property it means that the inherent right
to the occupation and use of such property is in principle
derived from membership of the family through onefs father.
Concerning self-acquired property the Ewe rule of patrilineal
1. D.K. Fiawoo, op.cit.. p.3^. On the Ewe exodus from Notsie, 
see pp. 30-31 supra.
succession means that children as of right succeed to their
father’s rights in property. The mixture of patri-succession
and matri-succession in respect of the single office of Awoamefia
of Anlo Ewe has, however, misled some writers to suggest that
succession to rights in property among some Ewe communities,
notably the Anlo Ewe, is matrilineal. For example, Manoukian,
although agreeing that succession is patrilineal in most Ewe
societies, yet adds that:
In other sub-tribes, for example, Anlo and Glidyi, 
individual property is transmitted matrilineally, a 
manfs heir being his sister’s son. 1
p
Presumably Manoukian relied on Ward, the latter reproducing the 
vieVif of Westermann.-^ It was not possible to ascertain the law 
of succession among the Glidzi Ewe in the Republic of Togo. It 
should be pointed out, however, that the primary source of this 
information, that is Westermann himself, accepts the basic 
proposition of patrilineal succession among the Ewe and explains 
that the idea of matrilineal succession was introduced to the 
Glidzi Ewe through contact with the Akan of the Gold Coast 
(Ghana).^ It is also stated by Westerman that immovable 
property among the Glidzi Ewe is inheritable automatically by 
the children of a deceased man, or, failing them, the brothers
of the deceased.^ It seems, therefore, that Westermann's
1. M. Manoukian, The Ewe-Speaking People of Togoland and the 
Gold Coast. I.A.I., London, 1952, p.2A#
2. B„E. Ward, The Social Organisation of the Ewe-speaking 
People. Unpublished M.A. thesis, Univ. of London, 19^9, P*93*
3. D. Westermann, Die Glidyi-Ewe in Togo. Berlin, 1935* p#26A. 
k. Ibid.
5. Ibid.
statement of matrilineal succession refers only to movable
property even among the people of Glidzi.
As far as the Anlo Ewe and the Northern Ewe of Ghana are
concerned, it is not correct to say that property is inherited
matrilineally. The rule is patrilineal succession, implying
the right of children to succeed to their father's estate. On
the occasions when this question was referred to the traditional
authorities of the Anlo Ewe, the answers indisputably indicate
the principle of patrilineal succession. In In re E.N. Tamakloe"^
the question of succession among the Anlo Ewe was referred to
the Paramount Tribunal of Anlo for an opinion on the law. The
opinion of the Tribunal, dated 21st March, 1945, was that:
One important point which must not be forgotten is that 
the senior boy or girl never automatically succeeds to 
the estate; an election ... must be done strictly in 
accordance with the rules of Native Custom, and in most 
cases the choice goes to the senior surviving son of the 
deceased when not proved to be a delinquent ... When the 
eldest surviving son is disqualified for any reason from 
succeeding, the choice is given to one of his fit younger 
brothers.
This view is often quoted but only to support the proposition 
that succession is not automatic. Looking at the words of the 
Anlo Tribunal, however, it is quite clear that it had only 
children of the deceased in mind. That is why it says that 
failing the eldest son the next son in seniority should assume 
the position. Whatever interpretation may be placed on the
1* In re Tamakloe. Unreported, Suit No. 78/44, High Court,
Accra.
declaration, its basis is patrilineal succession with the right
of succession in the children of the deceased. In any case
the Tribunal, to remove any doubt, made absolutely clear the
patrilineal nature of succession among the Anlo Ewe when in
the same opinion it said that:
According to Anlo customary laws children are the heirs 
and successors to their father’s real properties, i.e. 
farms, lands and houses, whilst nephews or nieces in­
herit the movable properties, i.e. personal effects.
This is not a mixed system of succession. As a general rule 
among the Ewe, the personal effects of a deceased person, whether 
a man or a woman, are distributed among relatives of both the 
paternal and maternal side. Only the expensive or valuable 
items are retained intact. Perhaps that explains why the Anlo 
Tribunal mentions the succession to ’’personal effects” by matri­
lineal relatives to emphasise that they are entitled to partake 
of the distribution of movables. The opinion of the Anlo 
Tribunal, however, leaves no doubt about the system of succes­
sion. It makes it clear that rights in what may really be 
referred to as property, that is farms, lands, houses and the 
like, are succeeded to by the children of the deceased.
Again in Attipoe v, Shoucaire.^  a case arising from In re 
Tamakloe just mentioned, the Paramount Tribunal of Anlo had no 
difficulty in making a declaration that the eldest son of the
1. Attipoe v. Shoucaire. Unreported, Land Court, Accra, 4th 
May, 194o.
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deceased was "successor11 to his father. This declaration, 
although its effect was whittled down by the Land Court, again 
emphasises the patrilineal system of succession among the Ewe.
The Land Court constituted by Coussey, J., surprisingly held 
that a declaration that the eldest son was his father's successor 
amounted only to a declaration that the eldest child.was among, 
the group of persons from whom a successor could be appointed. 
Certainly that was not what the Native Tribunal meant. However, 
assuming for the moment that the Land Court was right, then both 
the Native Tribunal and the Land Court accept that succession 
among the Anlo Ewe is patrilineal. For it is only in a patri­
lineal system of succession that a son of the deceased can be 
held to be the successor or even a possible successor to his 
father.
In another case, Khour.y v. Tamakloe.^  after considering the 
expert evidence of Fia Sri II, Paramount Chief of Anlo, Smith,
J., said:
The Fia is equally emphatic that succession is not a 
matter of right, but of appointment by a family meeting, 
and he goes on to say that the selection of a successor 
should be governed by seniority and that the eldest son 
should not be passed over in favour of a younger unless 
the former were considered unfit.
The substance of the exposition of the law by the Awoamefia of
Anlo is that the system of succession among the Anlo Ewe is
patrilineal, and that this among the Ewe implies a right of
1. Khour.y v. Tamakloe. Unreported, Suit No. 11/19^-8, Land
Court,, Accra, Ath January, 1950.
succession in the children of the deceased. That is why the 
rights of the male children are emphasised by the Awoamofia.
It is submitted that the law to be extracted from the above 
cases is that the principle of succession among the Anlo Ewe, 
as among the Northern Ewe of Ghana, is patrilineal succession 
to property. This is the law in all the chiefdoms of Northern 
Eweland. It is expressed in the maxim Ewe medua n.yroe nu o: 
to nu Ewe dua . that is "The Ewe do not succeed to property on 
the mother side: they succeed on the father side".
Succession to rights in property may relate to two types 
of property. One is ancestral property, normally referred to 
as family property. The other is the self-acquired property 
of an individual person. In both cases the principle is 
patrilineal succession. We are not presently concerned with 
family property, as entitlement to such property has already 
been discussed. It may, however, be reiterated that the main 
type of family property among the Northern Ewe is the family 
land. Entitlement to such property, as already explained, is 
by right of membership of the patrilineal family or dzotinu.
The patrilineal basis of the right to such ancestral property 
is indisputable. In Nunekpeku v. Amelefe^ the trial South Anlo 
Local Court "A", it is submitted, was right when in its own 
judgment it held that the defendant could not establish an 
inherent right of occupation and user of family land through
1. (1961) G.L.R. 301. This case has been discussed at some
length in pp. 108-113 supra.
a maternal connection with the family. The reversal of that 
judgment on appeal by Prempeh, J., it is respectfully submitted, 
was wrong because it ran counter to the generally accepted rules 
of Ewe law of patrilineal succession. Such issues only infre­
quently arise before the courts because they are such familiar 
rules of law that one would describe them as trite learning.
When the issue was raised in Agblevoe v. Dankradi.^  a case from 
Abutia, the decision of the Native Court of Appeal was of the 
same effect as that of the trial South Anlo Local Court in 
Nunekpeku v. Ametefe. which was unfortunately reversed by the 
High Court. The Asogli Native Appeal Court, Ho, in Agblevoe v . 
Dankradj. held:
It has also been agreed in evidence on record that the 
Defendant-Respondent maternally belongs to the Plaintiff's 
family which, in accordance with the native customary lav; 
among the Ewe speaking people, gives no absolute right to 
the Respondent over the disputed land. 2
It is hoped that the higher courts will accept this proposition 
as the basic law of entitlement to ancestral or family property 
among the Ewe. This is succession to the individual's dependent 
interest in family property. In addition there is also succes­
sion to interests in self-acquired property under the same rules. 
As far as Ewe law is concerned every person is presumed to 
die intestate; for Ewe law does not recognise any form of
testamentary disposition. The law of intestate succession,
n  Agblevoe v. Dankradi. Unreported. Asogli Native Appeal Court. 
Ho, Ath September, 1952, at p.17 of Civil Appeal Record Book,
2. Agblevoe v, Dankradi. ibid., at p.20 of Civil Appeal Record 
Book,
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therefore, applies to all the property belonging to the deceased
as self-acquired at the time of death, except for testamentary
dispositions validly made by him under the received law or a 
1
statute. If, however, he was survived by a spouse or an issue
pof a marriage under the Marriage Ordinance, or was himself an 
issue of such a marriage, then only one-third of the intestate 
estate is affected by these customary law rules of intestate 
succession, the other two-thirds falling for distribution under 
the relevant rules of English law. Similarly if the deceased 
was a party to a marriage under the Marriage of Mohammedans 
Ordinance^ and that marriage was duly registered, succession to 
the estate is subject to the provisions of the relevant school 
of Mohammedan law.
Interim Administration on Intestacy
As already noted, except in cases where a statute provides 
otherwise, every Ewe man and woman is presumed to have died 
intestate. This is particularly so because the nuncupative will 
which is recognised among some other Ghanaian communities is not 
of the same effect among the Ewe. On the occurrence of death, 
therefore, the first act with respect to the deceased1s estate is
1. i.e. the common law, the Wills Act, 1837 (7 Will, k & 1 
Viet, c.26) and the Wills (Amendment) Act, 1852 (15 & 16 Viet, 
c. 51).
2. Cap. 127.
3 . Cap. 129.
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to make provision for an interim administration pending the 
determination of the entitlements of his successors or 
domenyilawo. also known as nudulawo.
The first step in the interim administration of the 
intestate estate among the Ewe is the appointment of a positional 
successor or tefenola to the deceased in his personal capacity. 
Such a successor or tefenola. as we have already explained, is 
not the same as the successor to rights in the property or 
domen.yila. The positional successor or tefenola only steps 
into the shoes of the deceased in the personal capacity of 
"father" or "mother11 to. the children of the deceased, but with 
that goes the responsibility for the interim administration of 
the estate of the deceased. He is appointed or approved by 
the whole family or dzotinu at a formal meeting. The choice, 
however, is usually automatic because the family is in principle 
bound by established rules. If none of the children is of a 
mature age, the father of the deceased or one of the deceased1s 
brothers or some other close male relative in the patrilineal 
family is appointed tefenola or positional successor. The 
childrens1 grandfather or paternal uncle then becomes "father11 
or to tefenola to them. If some of the male children of the 
deceased are of a mature age, which here means more than the 
mere attainment of majority, one of them is appointed to succeed 
his father as "father11 to the rest of his brothers and sisters.
Usually but not invariably the child appointed as such a
successor is the eldest male child of the deceased. Where a .
child is appointed a positional successor or tefenola. there
is in addition a titular "father" or a classificatory father
to whom the children may refer matters of disagreement.
The same principle applies to the succession to a woman.
Owing to the generally inferior position of women a male child,
especially if he is older, may become the positional successor
to his mother but with the effective administration of the
movable property in the hands of the senior daughter. If none
of her children is mature enough to assume the position, an
appointment is made by the deceased woman's own patrilineal
family from that family and the appointee, usually a sister
of the deceased, becomes "mother" to her children.
The role of the tefenola or positional successor, as far
as the estate is concerned, is that of an interim administrator.
In Makata v. Ahorli^ the West African Court of Appeal, after
referring to a Government Report on succession among the Ewe,
defined the role of such a successor thus:
In the case of family property the eldest surviving 
brother acts as administrator and divides the property 
among the children of the deceased. 2
1. (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 169.
2. Makata v. Ahorli. (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 169, 172.
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From the context it is to be presumed that by "family property" 
the Court meant not ancestral family property but the self­
acquired property of a deceased member of the family; for it 
has been the opinion of the courts that self-acquired property 
becomes family property on death intestate. The statement is 
not strictly accurate because the division of the property among 
the children is done by the entire family or dzotinu and not by "the 
tefenola or positional successor alone. However, it is sub­
stantially accurate in underlining the role of the positional 
successor as that of an interim administrator of the estate.
A positional successor or tefenola is not by virtue of his 
office the head of family in Ewe law, even if we regard the 
children of the deceased as an immediate family as stated in 
Yawoga v. Yawoga.'*' As stated in the above passage from Makata 
v. Ahorli the tefenola or positional successor is usually a 
brother of the deceased. He is, therefore, not a member of the 
so-called immediate family originating from the deceased and 
hence cannot be its head. The legal position is not any dif­
ferent if, instead of the deceased*s brother, one of the 
deceased*s own children becomes the positional successor. In 
any case, as earlier submitted, the so-called immediate family 
does not exist in Ewe lav/ to which a head of family may be 
appointed.
1. (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 309.
The positional successor or tefenola is practically in the 
position of an administrator ad colligendum bona defuncti. He 
takes possession of all the estate and collects the assets of 
the deceased. Debts due to the estate are payable to him. Until 
the property is handed over to the heirs all debts and liabilities 
against the estate are enforceable against the tefenola. but are 
met out of the estate. If the liabilities exceed the assets of 
the estate, the tefenola is entitled to call on the domenyilawo 
or heirs or, failing them, the whole family or dzotinu. to con­
tribute to the discharge of the obligations. As, however, the 
tefenola is usually a brother or a child of the deceased, he 
would normally meet the obligations out of his own resources 
unless they are obviously too onerous.
Assuming that the assets exceed the liabilities, the 
tefenola administers them for the benefit of the domenyilawo or 
heirs. Out of the estate, for instance, he meets the oblig­
ations of the maintenance, education and up-bringing of the
j
children and other dependants of the deceased. He is entitled 
to re-imburse himself out of the estate for his expenses, but 
he is not, in the capacity of tefenola. a beneficiary of the 
estate. Therefore, on handing over the property to the domen­
yilawo or successors to the property, he is accountable in 
respect of his period of administration on the same principle as 
an administrator in English law."**
T~. Tamakloe v. Attipoe. Unreported. Civil Appeal No. 38/1952« 
West African Court of Appeal, 22nd June, 1953. Referred to and 
quoted in Ennin v. Prah. (1959) G.L.R. Zfif, if7-M3.
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The period of interim administration is not fixed and is 
determined by the circumstances of each case. Normally it lasts 
until such time as the successors to the property are old enough 
to manage the property by themselves. This means that where 
some of the children are adults at the time of the death of 
their father the period of interim administration may be very 
brief. Sometimes interim administration is terminated, or the 
tefenola is changed, if the domenyilawo. usually the children, 
have reason to believe that the tefenola is neglecting them or 
is using the property for his own benefit. Only the family can 
change the tefenola or terminate the period of administration. 
The formal termination of the interim administration is, there­
fore, decided by a full meeting of the family or dzotinu when 
the property is handed over to the successors to the rights in 
the property or domenyilawo. At that stage the tefenola becomes 
functus officio as far as the estate is concerned; but, unless 
earlier removed for good cause, he continues in the other 
position for life as a "parent" to the children of the deceased.
Distribution of Chattels and other Movables
It is not all the property of the deceased which goes to 
his successors or domenyilawo. Chattels and other personal 
effects are distributed among relatives, mainly in the patri­
lineal family but also including a number of beneficiaries who 
are maternal relations of the deceased.
Of a man's belongings the articles which fall for such 
general distribution include cloths and other clothing, sandals, 
chairs, knives, plates, cups, hoes, cutlasses and other items 
of small value. In the case of a woman the distributable items 
include clothes and other clothing, headkerchiefs, sandals, 
native chairs or nyonu kpukpo. plates, pots and cooking utensils, 
less valuable beads and ear-rings. So far as both males and 
females are concerned, only a few of the items enumerated above, 
and the less valuable among them, are distributed in this 
general manner. The bulk of them are reserved for the domen­
yilawo or successors to the rights in property. Certain items 
of property are in any case undistributable. Thus a man's gun, 
as a rule, goes to his eldest son; a man's tools of trade go 
to his eldest son, unless another child had been taught his 
trade when the latter is entitled to them; and, as a rule, 
a woman's axe and the big head-pan, whether made of wood 
(agbonu) or enamel (nutsotsogbe). go to the eldest daughter.
Land, other immovable property and valuable movable property 
are not distributed in this general way because they devolve as 
of right on the domenyilawo.
The articles given to beneficiaries under the general 
distribution become their property absolutely and are held by 
them as purchaser and they can dispose of them as they please. 
They are not thereafter recoverable. As a matter of fact, 
however, such articles are usually preserved as a memorial to
the deceased unless they are fungible.
The actual occasion for the distribution of the personal 
effects of a deceased person is a formal meeting of the family.
It is known as numekaka or numekafe. that is "searching the 
estate". In addition to the principal members of the deceased's 
patrilineal family, some members of his mother's family and 
other relatives are also invited to the meeting. It is presided 
over by the head of the patrilineal family. At this meeting the 
tefenola or positional successor first makes a public declaration 
of the properties in his possession. All other persons holding 
any property in favour of the estate disclose the nature and 
extent of such property. Even the children and brothers and 
sisters of the deceased are bound to make a full disclosure.
There is a belief that any concealment will lead to the death 
of the guilty person because the spirit of the deceased will 
pursue the secret beneficiary.
As far as practicable all the personal effects of the 
deceased are assembled before the gathering. The boxes are 
opened in the presence of all and the contents are noted. Any 
money "found in the box" is disclosed, and this includes both 
physical cash discovered in the box and money held elsewhere in 
favour of the estate. It is only after such an inventory is 
taken of all the property of the deceased that it is decided 
which items should be retained undistributed for the domenyilawo.
Before the general distribution of chattels some two per­
sons are entitled to choose some items for themselves. One of
them is the amedie or amedila. literally nthe person responsible 
for the burial"; the other is the tsidzoedola or "the boiler 
of the hot water". The positions of these two individuals may 
be briefly explained. In Ewe society every individual has two 
other persons, one male and the other female, who stand to him 
or her in the position of tovi (pi. toviwo) or "father's child". 
The toviwo are as a rule chosen from different families in the 
same sub-division or saame. None of them can, therefore, in 
fact be a child of one's father. In some areas such as Aveme, 
therefore, they are known as tofo tovi or "father's child in 
public", so as to distinguish them from the actual father's child 
who is also known as tovi. Especially on some ritual occasions 
touching the individual the toviwo have vital functions to per­
form. The male tovi. on the death of the person to whom he 
stands in that position, is regarded as officially responsible 
for the interment of the corpse. He inter alia offers ritual 
prayers by way of libation before the body can be placed in the 
coffin for burial, and in theory it is he who thereafter per­
forms the burial. He is, therefore, known as amedie or amedila. 
that is "the person responsible for the burial".^ The female 
tovi has the special responsibility of providing the hot water, 
or tsidzoe. with which the corpse is bathed before it is laid in 
state prior to the burial. The female tovi is, therefore, known 
as tsidzoedola. or "the boiler of the hot water".
1. He is, however, not a sexton.
The general rule is that the male tovi. now known as amedie 
or amedila. formally opens the boxes of the deceased at the 
family gathering or numekafe. He then chooses one item and places 
his foot on it. The process is known as afo dodo nu dzi or 
"stepping on a thing". The normal item taken in this way by the 
amedie is, in the.case of a deceased male, one of the cloths of. 
the deceased, taking care not to choose one of the best. In 
addition the male tovi or amedie formally takes possession of 
the gun of the deceased. As a rule, however, he is bound to 
release the gun to the person legally entitled to it, v/ho is 
usually the eldest son of the deceased, on a formal demand made 
by the latter with drinks or aha. In Abutia and a few areas 
different rules are stated but informants disagree. In those 
areas it is stated that, in addition to what he "stepped on", 
the amedie or male tovi is put to the choice of either a gun or 
a wife of the deceased. The general opinion in those areas is 
that if the amedie chooses the gun then he would have to release 
it thereafter to the entitled person; but if he chooses a wife 
then he would become married to her. A contrary opinion urged 
by other informants is that, as if he chooses a wife she would 
become permanently married to him, the amedie cannot be compelled 
to release the gun if he chooses that as an alternative to a 
wife. It was not possible to ascertain precisely this local 
variation as informants disagreed.
In the case of a deceased female the male tovi or amedie 
does not have much of a choice. The rule in that case is that 
the amedie chooses one item, usually a female cover-cloth which 
is only big enough for wrapping around his loins.
In all cases the female tovi. now tsidzoedola. takes the 
pot or ze in which hot water was boiled for bathing the corpse 
as well as the seat or kpukpo on which the body was placed when 
bathed. In addition, if the deceased was a man, the tsidzoedola 
gets nothing else except one other item chosen for her at the 
discretion of the gathering. If the deceased was a woman, 
however, the female tovi or tsidzoedola is additionally entitled 
to take one set of cloth or do tata deka. the deceased's stool, 
axe and the big head-pan used in going to farm, which is known 
as nutsotsogbe if it is an imported enamel pan or agbonu if 
carved out of wood. However, like a man's gun, the female tovi 
also* releases the axe (or fia) and the big head-pan (known as 
nutsotsogbe or agbonu) to the eldest daughter of the deceased 
or other entitled female member of the deceased's family. The 
articles are released on payment to the female tovi or tsidzoe­
dola of a nominal sum like 3d., which is known as "buying the 
head" or ta fefle.
After the amedie and tsidzoedola have taken their entitle­
ments the gathering, by consensus, distributes the chattels to 
the relatives. Those items which are not distributed are then 
entrusted to the positional successor or tefenola until another
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meeting to share them among the heirs or domen.yilawo. If the
I children or the domenyilav/o are of a mature age to manage the
I property, then this meeting or numekafe is also conveniently the 
occasion to share among them the portions of the estate to which 
they are entitled. For the extent of the estate is generally 
ascertained at this meeting. In most cases, however, the sharing 
of the estate among the domenyilav/o is postponed for some time. 
The maxim is wometsoa nu dzodzo dea vidze si o. or uwe do not 
place a hot thing in the hands of a small child11. Metaphorically 
the purpose of the postponement is to allow for a cooling-off 
period. The reason for it is that the postponement allows for 
a reasonable intervention of time, thus affording an opportunity 
for claims against the estate to be raised by even tardy
f
\ creditors. This makes possible a fair ascertainment of the
net assets before the estate is shared to the domenyilawo or
successors to the property.
The Individualfs Right to Succeed to Property
The general rule of Ewe law is that the family or dzotinu 
as such does not succeed to any interest in the self-acquired 
property of a deceased member of the family. Succession is by 
right, as it were, by the proximate next-of-kin traced patri- 
lineally. There are thus specific persons in each circumstance 
who have the right to succeed to property either individually 
or as a group. As a general proposition the children, as the
nearest next-of-kin, succeed to their father's interests in 
property as of right. Failing the children, the father of the
deceased, the deceased's brothers and sisters, or the deceased's 
brother^ children would, in that order of priority, be entitled 
| to succeed to the interest in the self-acquired property as 
domenyilawo. In the case of a deceased woman her children, 
since they belong to a different family, have only a life 
I interest in her self-acquired property. After the death of all
i
| the children, or if the woman had no children, her interest in
the property is succeeded to by the deceased woman's father,
brothers and sisters, or brothers' children, the peculiarly
feminine articles being given to the female members. The circle
of domenyilawo or persons entitled to succeed to property widens
as thoro is default through death or inability of the proximate
-b>
next-of-kin to succeed^the property. Since on the default of
t
the immediate group of entitled successors or domenyilawo the 
| right devolves on the next group, ultimately capable of embracing
i
| every member of the family or dzotinu. every member of the patri-
5 lineal family or dzotinu has a spes successionis in the self-
| acquired property of every other member. However, it is the
law among the Ewe that the family as a corporate entity does not 
in any circumstances succeed to any rights in the self-acquired 
property of an individual. The right to succeed to interests 
in property is determined in accordance with a fixed formula 
which is variable only in very compelling circumstances by the 
family.,
The propositions stated above are contradicted by judicial 
authority and the legal literature. The judicial customary law 
is that, upon the death intestate of any person, his self­
acquired property becomes family property and that it is the 
family, and not an individual, who succeeds to interests in the 
property. On the strength of the authorities, Ollennu says:
the correct statement of the law is that upon a person's 
death intestate, his self-acquired property vests in his 
ancestral family, which includes the immediate, the head 
and elders of the whole family. 1
Subsequently he stated more categorically that:
the first principle of the customary law of succession 
applicable to all tribes in Ghana is that upon a person's 
death intestate - male or female - his or her self­
acquired property becomes family property. 2
And he adds that
... it is the family which inherits and not an 
individual. 3
Agreeing with him is Bentsi-Enchill who also says:
... the fundamental rule on which all are agreed /is7 
that upon the death intestate of a person his self­
acquired property becomes family property, 4
and
The basic rule everywhere throughout Ghana is that upon 
the death intestate of a person, his or her self-acquired 
property becomes family property. This is so whether the 
family be patrilineal or matrilineal, 5
1. N.A. Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana. 
1962, pp.153-154.
2. N.A. Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession 
in Ghana. 1966, p.70.
3. Ibid,. at p.85* Also stated at pp. 123, 171 et passim,
4. K, Bentsi-Enchill, Ghana Land Law. 1964, p.l2(dT
5. Ibid.. p.134.
628.
These are sweeping generalisations in which I do not concur.
The learned authors, however, are supported by decided cases 
in the superior courts. In Amarfio v. Ayorkor.^  for instance, 
it was held by the West African Court of Appeal that on the 
death of Ayiku, a Ga, his interests in self-acquired property
p
vested in his family. Similarly in Larkai v. Amorkor the same 
Court stated that the self-acquired property of the intestate 
Ahuru Larkai became family property. It is not necessary to 
review all the cases in which this proposition has so often been 
stated that it has now become notorious. It is pertinent to 
point out, however, that none of the cases enunciating the rule 
of succession to property by the family has come from the 
Northern Ewe area. The applicability of the rule as regards 
succession to property among the Ewe cannot, therefore, be 
presumed.
Before proceeding to examine the Ewe cases on the point, 
however, we may draw attention to the lack of agreement among 
the advocates of the alleged rule that it is the family as such 
which succeeds to the self-acquired property of a deceased 
Ghanaian. The areas of disagreement are on the vital question
T. (195k) ~1 iTw. A. C. A. 55h.
2, (1933) I W.A.C.A. 323. ......................................
3. e.g, Ennin v. Prah. (1959) G.L.R. ZjifJ In re Eburahim. (1958) 
3 W.A.L.R. 317; Carboo v, Carboo. (196l) G.L.R. 83 (a Ningo 
case); Kwak.ye v. Tuba. (1961) G.L.R. 720; and Krakue v. Krabah. 
Unreported, Supreme Court of Ghana, Accra, 2ifth June, 1963^
of what constitutes the family for the purposes of such succes­
sion, as well as how the family as an entity acquires such 
property rights. Is it the entire family, corresponding to 
the dzotinu among the Northern Ewe, or the so-called immediate 
family, which succeeds? Ollennu is a great exponent of that 
school of thought which holds that the group which succeeds to 
an intestate estate is the "wider family". He says:
... it is the entire family, and not a branch of
it - not the immediate family, which succeeds, 1
p
In support of this view is Amarfio v. Ayorkor where it was held
by the West African Court of Appeal that the self-acquired
property of the deceased Ayiku did not devolve on the so-called
immediate family originating from the deceased but on the wider
Adaku-Mansah family. Then there is the Ghana Supreme Court case
of Krakue v, Krabah^ in which the majority judgment is that the
family which succeeds is the wider family. In Kwak.ye v. Tuba^
when a preliminary objection was taken to the right of the head
of the wider family to sue in respect of an intestate estate,
the right to sue was rejected on the sufficient ground that a
successor had been appointed who was the proper person to sue.
However, Ollennu, J., said:
.*, upon the death of a person intestate ,,, his self- 
acquired property becomes property of his whole family, 
the immediate and extended, together,
1, N.A. Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession 
in Ghana. 1966, p.123.
T. U35k) lifW.A.C.A. 55k.
3. Krakue v, Krabah, Unreported. Supreme Court. Accra, 2Ifth 
JuneT 1963:---------
I f .  Kwak.ye v .  Tuba. Unreported, High Court, Accra, 20th September 
1961, Different from but preliminary to Kwak.ye v .  Tuba. (1961) 
G.L.R. 720.
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There is thus judicial opinion in support of the view that the
family which succeeds to an intestate estate of its deceased
member is the wider family.
There is, however, no dearth of judicial authority for the
other view, that the family which succeeds to an intestate estate
is the so-called immediate family. Cases like Ennin v. Prah^
2and In re Eburahim readily come to mind. In the earlier of the
two cases, In re Eburahim. Adumua-Bossman, J,, said:
Too often when mention is made of the family of a person, 
attention is focussed on the wider family to which he 
belonged rather than his own immediate or small family,
i.e. the group of persons entitled by custom to inherit 
from him ... In our particular case, as the deceased 
and the parties are ... of the Fanti tribal group, one 
of the groups whose system of inheritance or succession 
is; matrilineal, the group of persons entitled by custom 
to* the beneficial enjoyment of his estate consists of all 
thie persons emanating or tracing from the same womb as 
the deceased. 3
The learned Judge proceeded to say that it is only upon the
failure of this immediate family that members of the wider
family are considered. Later in Ennin v. Prah the same Judge
dismissed the contention that the concurrence of the wider
family was necessary for the valid alienation of property left
intestaite by a deceased person and said:
The late Kofi Nkumfs properties could not devolve upon, 
and become vested in, the wider Twidan family of which 
he was a member in his lifetime. They devolved upon, and 
became vested in, his immediate family group. This con­
sisted of all who were descended matrilineally from the 
same womb as himself - his surviving brothers (if.any), 
his surviving sisters (if any), and the surviving children 
of his sisters, dead or alive, k
T. (1959) G.L.R. kk.
2. (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 317.
3. In re Eburahim. (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 317, 321. 
if. Ennin v. Prah' (1959) G.L.R. kk, k&.
He continued:
The Head and principal members of the wider Twidan family 
had no interest whatever in the properties left by the 
deceased Kofi Nkum. Their concurrence was not in any way 
necessary to alienation by the successor and/or Head of 
the deceased1s immediate family group, tracing from his 
mother. 1
It is pointed out by Ollennu that the . judgment in Ennin v. Prah 
was set aside by a consent judgment when that case went on a 
further appeal to the Supreme Court. A consent judgment, how­
ever, is one in which the contestants agree to a settlement 
without insisting on a judicial pronouncement of their respec­
tive legal rights. It could be, and often is, a compromise of 
claims* A consent judgment in the circumstances, therefore, 
while nullifying the order of the High Court, does not neces­
sarily affect the proposition of law on which it was based.
However, Ollennu contends further that, in any case, both 
In re Eburahim and Ennin v. Prah were decided per incuriam 
because the attention of the learned Judge was not directed to
the contrary but binding decisions of the West African Court of
2 3Appeal in Ghamson v. Wobill and Amarfio v. Ayorkor. Perhaps
I it is not enough judicial notice even if it is pointed out that
the Judge in both cases, that is Adumua-Bossman, J., had been
Counsel for the successful appellants in Ghamson v. Wobill and
1. Ennin v. Prah. (1959) G.L.R. A4, 47 ♦ See also Arthur v . 
A.yensu. (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 357, where the decision is to the 
same effect.
2. (1947) 12 W.A.C.A. 181.
3. (195**) 14 W.A.C.A. 554.
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knew of the decision therein. The important point, however,
! is that in Ghamson v, Wobill the argument in the West African 
j Court of Appeal turned largely on the question of whether the
r
Efutu lex loci rei sitae or the Fanti lex domicilii of the 
intestate and the parties should govern succession to, and 
therefore the capacity to alienate, title to immovable property
■
t situate in Winneba. Having decided that the choice of law
!
I rules in the English conflict of laws did not apply even by 
| analogy, and that Fanti law, therefore, applied, the question 
of the composition of the competent family was not specifically 
| considered by the West African Court of Appeal, The authority 
of that decision, it is submitted, is not therefore free from 
doubt,
1
, The other objection by Ollennu, a strong one, is that the
I attention of Adumua-Bossman, J,, was not drav/n to the Ga case
| of Amarfio v, Ayorkor which, as a decision of the West African
i
j  Court of Appeal, was binding on the learned Judge that the 
successor is the wider family. The equally strong answer to 
that, however, is that the learned Judge was fortified in his 
opinion of the law by other judgments of the same West African 
Court of Appeal, such as Larkai v, Amorkor^ and Tamakloe v,
p
Attipoe, In both these cases, which were specifically con­
sidered by Adumua-Bossman, J., in Ennin v, Prah, the West
T; (1933) 1 W.A.C.A'. 323.
2, Tamakloe v, Attipoe. Unreported, West African Court of
Appeal, Civil Appeal No, 38/32, 22nd June, 1953#
African Court of Appeal decided in favour of succession by 
the immediate family. In Larkai v. Amorkor the V/est African 
Court of Appeal specifically considered the question and 
expressly decided that the self-acquired property of an intes­
tate devolved on the immediate rather than the wider family.
The West African Court of Appeal, per Deane, C.J., said:
Nov/ the plaintiff has claimed this land as being the 
head of the Larkai family. Ahuru it is true was called 
Ahuru Larkai and it seems was a member of the Larkai 
family, but individually owned property of his would, 
on his death intestate, become the family property, not 
of the Larkai family, but of his own family ... Although 
Ahuru1s family is probably a sub-branch of the Larkai 
family, it is clear that the Larkai family has a much 
wider ambit and includes a far greater number of 
individuals than Ahurufs family could ever do .., In 
my opinion, therefore, it is certain that the plaintiff 
cannot succeed in this case as the head of the Larkai 
family since the Larkai family as such have no interest 
in this land which is not their family property but the 
property of the family of Ahuru , ... 1
When a judge is faced with contradictory judgments of the same 
superior Court, he decides which to follow. In any case it is 
submitted that, regardless of the authority of the decisions in 
In re Eiburahim and Ennin v. Prah. the decision of the West 
African Court of Appeal in Larkai v , Amorkor stands in its own 
right as authority in favour of the proposition that it is the 
immediate family which succeeds to the intestate estate of its 
members. There are, therefore* authorities in support of suc­
cession. both by the immediate family and by the wider family.
1. Larkai v, Amorkor, (1933) 1 W.A.C.A. 323, 330.
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! The apparent contradiction may perhaps be resolved on at
i
| least two grounds* The first is that both In re Eburahim and
i
| Enni.n v* Prah are Akan (Fanti) cases and in Akan law different
i
interests in intestate property devolve on the family itself 
as well as the sections of it which are described as immediate 
families* This explains the emphasis placed by the Court on
I the Interest of the so-called immediate family in the Akan
!
| cases. The second explanation follows from the first that,
i
| whil-e In re Eburahim and Ennin v* Prah are Akan cases, Amarfio
1 v * Ayorkor * on which Ollennu v/ould like to rely, is a Ga case*
The Ga lav; not being necessarily the same as Akan law, or Ewe 
law for that matter, the Court deciding an Akan case is not
 ^ bound to follow a decision involving the Ga law of succession.
Apart from Tamakloe v* Attipoe* none of the authorities
( examined so far relates to succession to property among the
i
| patrilineal Ewe* There is a notable change from the expression
I "family" to the term "children" when we examine the rules of 
succession among the Ewe as illustrated by the decided cases*
There is no Ewe case in which the right of the family to succeed
to the property of a deceased person has been canvassed* All 
the Ewe cases are based on the assumption that children succeed 
to their father's interests in property, and the question which 
has been before the courts is whether, of the entitled children, 
one or the other had been duly authorised to enter into succes­
sion* It is submitted, therefore, that the law among the Ewe is
that children succeed to the interest in their father's self­
acquired property as of right as next-of-kin* Failing children, 
other persons in proximity to the intestate as next-of-kin are 
entitled to succeed to interests in the property.
Taking the Ewe cases chronologically, the first is In re 
E.N.. Tamakloe*'*' When in that case a reference was made to the 
Paramount Tribunal of Anlo State on the law of succession, its 
report, dated 21st March, 1945, said:
According to Anlo customary laws children are the 
heirs and successors to the father's real properties *,*
Although the Tribunal did state that
One important point which must not be forgotten is that 
the senior boy or girl never automatically succeeds to 
the estate,
yet it went on to emphasise that
When the eldest surviving son is disqualified for any 
reason from succeeding, the choice is given to one of 
his fit younger brothers*
It is clear, therefore, that the Paramount Tribunal of Anlo
limits the right of succession to property to children and not
to the so-called immediate family, let alone the wider family*
p
In the second case of Attipoe v* Shoucaire the same Paramount 
Tribunal of Anlo had no inhibitions in making the declaration 
that the second defendant, as the eldest son of the late E.N,
Tamakloe, was the successor* By an inexplicable twisting of
1~. In re E.N* Tamakloe* Unreported Suit No* 78/44/ High Court, 
Accra.
2* Attipoe v* Shoucaire. Unreported, Land Court, Accra, 4th 
May, 194o.
the unequivocal- language of the Native Tribunal's declaration, 
the Land Court held that the said declaration amounted to 
nothing more than a declaration that the said defendant was 
one of those entitled to succeed his father* However, the 
interpretation placed on the declaration by the Land Court 
does not affect the central issue of the declaration, which is 
the recognition of the children's right to succeed to their 
father's interests in property.
1In another case, Khourv v, Tamakloet the law of the Anlo 
Ewe as stated by the Paramount Chief, Fia Sri II, Awoamefia of
Anlo, was accepted by Smith, J*, and expressed by him thus:
! _
In the second place the Fia is equally emphatic that 
succession is not a matter of right, but of appointment 
; by a family meeting, and he goes on to say that the
! selection of a successor should be governed by seniority
[ and that the eldest son should not be passed over in
favour of a younger unless the former were considered 
unfit*
In this case also, therefore, the right of the children to 
succeed to their father's property is basically accepted, so 
that the only question is one of priority inter se*
p
Finally in Tamakloe v* Attipoe the right to succeed to 
interests in property was recognised by the West African Court
I
j of Appeal as vested in the children of the deceased and the head
i
| of the family was held accountable to the children on releasing
1* Khoiur.y v* Tamakloe. Unreported, Land Court, Accra, 4th 
January, 1950.
2* Tamakloe v* Attipoe* Unreported, Civil Appeal No. 58/1952, 
West African Court of Appeal, 22nd June, 1953; referred to in 
Ennin v* Prah. (1959) G.L.R. 44, 48*
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the property to them. In that case Coussey, J,, said:
I can see no difference in principle in their liability 
to account both by English law and by the customary lav;, 
once it is appreciated that the 1st and 2nd Defendants 
have no beneficial interest in the estate of the deceased, 
and that their function, as Heads of the larger family is 
advisory and protective, i.e. to watch the interests of 
the children, and if necessary to convene meetings in 
matters affecting the deceasedfs estate. 1
All these cases from the Anlo Ewe area illustrate not only the
law of the Anlo Ewe but also that of the Northern Ewe that, on
a man’s death, it is his children who succeed to his interests
in property as of right. Without expressly stating it, it was
2the same principle that was applied in Yawoga v. Yawoga. a
case from the Ho District of Northern Eweland, In that case
the first defendant and his sister, Afua Yawoga, were the only
children of their father, Yawoga. The Land Court held that the
first defendant and his sister could together alienate title to
a self-acquired farm inherited from their father, without a
reference to the wider family or dzotinu. It was said by
Ollennu, J., :
Succession in the tribe to which the plaintiff and the 
first defendant belong is patrilineal. And it is admit­
ted that upon the death of the said Yawoga, his family, 
who became entitled to the property, consisted of his 
children and their descendants, 3
1. Tamakloe v. Attipoe. sunra. Quoted in Ennin v, Prah.
(1959) G.L.R. kk-i 4-8.
2. (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 309.
3. Yawoga v. Yawoga. (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 309, 310.
The learned Judge, in spite of the erroneous reference to the 
group as a "family", was correct in identifying the persons 
entitled to succeed to interests in the property. They are the 
children of the deceased and their descendants, excluding, of 
course, the descendants of the female children. In Yawoga v. 
Yawoga, therefore, if the first defendant did not have any 
issue, then the only two persons entitled to succeed to the 
self-acquired property of the deceased would have been the 
children of the deceased, that is the first defendant and his
sister. By whatever name they may be called, it is the same
persons, that is the children, who, as we have submitted, are 
the legally entitled persons to succeed to the interests in 
the property of their father and this is the decision in Yawoga 
v. Yawoga,
In Ahoklui v. Ahoklui^. a case from Ghi, Ollennu, J,, was
even more explicit in stating that children are the successors
to their father’s interests in property among the Ewe, In the
course of his judgment in that case the learned Judge said:
The parties being Ewes, the custom of succession is 
that children succeed to their father’s estate. It 
is only during minority of children who inherit property 
that a paternal uncle is made to take charge'and control
of the property until the children come of age. 2
T~. Ahoklui v. Ahoklui. Unreported. Land Court. Accra. 1st June. 
1959- Reproduced in N.A, Ollennu, Principles of Customary Land 
Law in Ghana. 1962, p.212.
2, Ahoklui v. Ahoklui. supra. Reproduced in N.A, Ollennu, 
Principles of Customary Land Law in Ghana. 1962, p.212, at p.21A.
It is submitted that the rule in Yawoga v, Yawoga. as elaborated
in Ahoklui v , Ahoklui. expresses the correct law of succession
among the Northern Ewe.
Bentsi-Enchill also, though insisting on succession by
the so-called immediate family, comes to identify the successors
in the patrilineal societies as being the children of the
deceased. He says:
It can be stated with confidence that the self-acquired 
property of a person dying intestate in a patrilineal 
community devolves not on the whole patrilineage, but on 
his immediate family - both as to title and as to rights 
of beneficial enjoyment. But what persons comprise this 
immediate family? .,, The group which is generally re­
garded as being beneficially entitled to the self-acquired 
property of a deceased intestate is the class of persons 
called his or her children, though the deceased's brothers- 
and sisters are often considered entitled to some share 
of this property. 1
As compared with matrilineal communities, Bentsi-Enchill1s
treatment of patrilineal succession is noticeably brief and
he approached it with some diffidence. Furthermore, he does
not seem to have considered the decision in Yawoga v. Yawoga
or the dictum in Ahoklui v. Ahoklui in this context. He could
otherwise have been more precise by stating the law simply that
the entitled successors to property are the children of the
deceased. As for the brothers and sisters of the deceased,
they only have a potential substitutionary claim to succeed,
what is usually referred to as a spes successionis. and their
right to succeed can be recognised only after that of the
children and of the father of the deceased.
1. K, Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit.. p.158.
6ifO,
When Manoukian considered the question of succession 
among the Ewe, because of the information given of matrilineal 
succession in some Ewe areas, she said that the rules differ. 
However, she was able to say that
t
[ In certain sub-tribes, including Ho, individual
| property is transmitted patrilineally; a man's heir
| is his son, 1................................................
|
i The Ho area mentioned by Manoukian is within Northern Eweland,
! and it is submitted that this is the rule in all these areas,
: Westerraann also agrees that among the Ewe a man's property is 
inherited by his children, but points out that the variation 
j allowing maternal relations to inherit some chattels in Glidzii
2
and a few areas is an importation of Akan ideas. Writing 
about the patrilineal Adangbe, Pogucki makes the observation
\
■3
that "Succession is patrilineal and automatic". He could 
| have said that of.the Ewe,
1
In spite of his own decisions recognising the right of the
children to succeed to the interests in the property of their
U 5| father in Yawoga v, Yawoga. and Ahoklui v , Ahoklui.J Ollennu,
! J,, rejected the same submission when it was made to him in the
r
Ningo (Ga-Adangbe) case of Carboo v, Carboo, This was a case
1, M. Manoukian, op,cit,, p ,24*
2, D. Westermann, Die Glidyi-Ewe in Togo. Berlin, 1935, P,26if,
3, R.J.H. Pogucki, op,cit,, vol, II, Land Tenure in Adangbe 
Law, p.39.
if. Supra,
3. Supra,
! 6, (1961) G.L.R. 83,
not cof succession to interests in property but of a grant of 
letters of administration. The administrator at the general 
law performs a function analogous to that of a positional suc*- 
cessor or tefenola at customary law, to manage the estate without 
necessarily succeeding to any beneficial interest in the 
property. There is, therefore, nothing inconsistent with, the . 
customary lav/ of succession in placing the administration of 
the estate, as the learned Judge did, in the hands of the 
brotlher of the deceased, v/ho had succeeded to the position of 
"father" or to tefenola to the children. In Ewe law the 
brother of the deceased is a proper person to take charge of 
the ^estate but the children cannot be postponed to him as 
successor to the property or domenyila. The decision itself, 
therefore, conforms to Ewe law. The learned Judge in Carboo 
v. Carboo. however, seems to have treated the positional 
successor (or tefenola) and the successor to property rights 
(or domenyila) as being the same. He, therefore, went beyond 
the specific issue of administration v/hich was before him and 
said :
It was submitted on behalf of the defendant that upon a 
Ningo man's death intestate his children inherit, and 
his property automatically vests in his children as upon 
a devise; and it is only when all the children are 
minors that some relative must be appointed to take 
charge of the property. I must say at once that this 
submission is a misconception, and is against all the 
fundamental principles of our customary law of succession. 1
1. Carboo v, Carboo. (1961) G.L.R. 83, 85.
Immediately after this he stated further that:
The most elementary principle of our customary law of 
succession is that upon a man's death intestate, his 
self-acquired property, real and personal, vests 
automatically in his family. That family may be 
the patrilineal family, or the matrilineal family, 
depending upon the tribe to.which the deceased be­
longed. 1
The learned Judge did not state the constitution of the family 
in which the property in this case vests on intestacy. That 
family, however, is the patrilineal family because the Ningo 
people are patrilineal. As regards the definition of the
inheriting patrilineal family, therefore, we may turn to the
. . 2
decision of the same Judge in Yawoga v, Yawoga, According to
Yawoga v, Yawoga the "family11 which succeeds to property con­
sists of the children of the deceased, together with their 
issue, if any. Is that not the same as the submission on 
behalf of the defendant and which the learned Judge rejected 
in Carboo v, Carboo? It is possible that the dictum of the 
learned Judge was given per incuriam because he did not direct 
his mind to Yawoga v. Yawoga which concerns another patrilineal 
community. He also did not consider his own dictum in Ahoklui 
v . Ahoklui.^  Similarly his attention was not drawn to the un­
reported decision of the West African Court of Appeal in 
Tamakloe v, Attipoe.^ which is quoted with approval in Ennin v .
Prah,^ that children succeed to the interests of their father
Tl Carboo v .  Carboo. (1961) G . L . R .  8 3 ,  85^»
2, Ibid,
3 .  S u p r a .
A, Supra.
5. 11959) G.L.R. bk, A8.
and that those who may manage the estate on their behalf may
not have any beneficial interest in it. Another explanation
may be that the Ningo rules of succession to property differ
from those of the Ewe, though both are patrilineal. If so,
then. Carboo v. Carboo must be confined to the Ningo community
because the decision in Yawoga v. Yawoga and the dictum in
Ahoklui v, Ahoklui represent the correct statement of the Ewe
law of succession. For it is not, as the learned Judge states
in Carboo v. Carboo. a fundamental principle of the customary
law of all Ghanaian communities, and certainly not of the Ewe,
that it is the family which succeeds to a man's interests in
property on intestacy.
The right to succeed to property without appointment by
the family is recognised by implication by Ollennu, J,, in
Summey v . Yohuno,^  While discussing the conditions essential
to the validity of a nuncupative will at customary law in
Summey v, Yohuno. one of the three conditions stated by
Ollennu, J,, is that
(2) the member of the family who would have succeeded 
the person making the will, had the latter died intestate, 
must be among the witnesses in whose presence the dec­
laration is made, 2
It is submitted that this means that even in a man's lifetime
the successor to his interest in property is known. Otherwise
1. (I960) G.L.R. 68.
2. Summey v. Yohuno (I960) G.L.R. 68, 71.
how could he be present, realising that a successor, unless he 
has an automatic right, cannot be appointed until after the 
death of the intestate? If a different person was present but 
was not the prospective successor the nuncupative will would, 
according to that case, be invalid. For it was after a general 
statement insisting on the. presence of other witnesses that 
the learned Judge made the special point emphasising that it 
was fatal if the prospective successor was not present, thus 
making him the one indispensable person. It is submitted that 
•this implies an automatic right of succession to interests in 
proper ty,
Furthermore Ollennu expressly recognises the automatic 
right in certain persons to succeed to property. For instance 
he recognises such a right in the father in a patrilineal 
society and in the mother in the matrilineal.^ However, after 
admitting the right of children and others to succeed, he says, 
"all these rules we have discussed are rules of practice, not 
rules of lav/".2 The question immediately arises as to what 
is a "rule of law" as distinguished from a "rule of practice" 
in customary law. Apparently the "rule of law" in customary
1. N.A. Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession 
in Ghana. 1966, p.90. This, however, is not wholly correct 
because, as will be explained later, in most of Northern Ewe 
areas the children have priority over the father of the deceased. 
See PP.676 & 682 infra«
2. N.A. Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession 
in Ghana. 1966, pp. 103, 176,
law is one judicially determined and the "rule of practice" 
is the customary lav/ actually practised and observed by the 
people. This dichotomy is resulting in decisions by the courts 
which have startled communities to which they apply. Customary 
lav/, however, ceases to be customary law unless it is a rule 
hallowed by long usage, acceptance and observance by the com­
munity. For these attributes, however, there is being substit­
uted the judicial fiat. It is suggested that it is essential 
to achieve a fusion and halt the growing cleavage illustrated 
by the dichotomy between judicial customary law and the prac­
tised customary lav/.
Reverting to the substantive question of succession, it 
v/ill be seen that the Ewe are not the only community granting 
the children of a deceased person the automatic right to succeed 
to their father's estate. In spite of the strong words of 
Ollennu, J., to the contrary in Carboo v. Carboo.'*' it has been 
stated by Pogucki, as we have seen, that among the Adangbe
p
"succession is patrilineal and automatic", children succeeding.
In the Nigerian case of Adesa.yo v. Taiwo.^ when relations 
claimed the property of the deceased as against the children of 
the deceased, the claim was rejected and Jibowu, Ag. F.C.J., 
said:
1. (1961) G.L.R. 83.
2. R.J.H. Pogucki, op.cit.. Vol. II, Land Tenure in Adangbe 
Customary Lav/, p.39. The same is true also of the Guang,
T. (1956) 1 F.S.C. 8k.
It is quite clear ... that real properties of a deceased 
person who had children surviving go to his children, and 
not to his uncles, aunts and cousins. There can, there­
fore, be no doubt that neither the plaintiffs nor the 
persons through whom they claim blood relationship ... 
could inherit or take a share of his real property which, 
by native law and custom, belongs to children and descen­
dants of the deceased. 1
The concluding words are identical with those used by Ollennu,
J,, in describing the right of succession of Ewe children in
2
Yawoga v. Yawoga. It represents Ewe law.
In his little book published in 192A, Ajisafe's statement
of Yoruba law of succession on this point is that:
Immovable property is inherited by the children and 
from the children to children's children, and so on 
in perpetuity. 3
The rule among the Yoruba as stated by Coker is that:
Among the Yorubas inheritance is generally through 
the father, and there is authority for the proposition 
that generally on the death of a father intestate, his 
property devolves on his children as family property. A
What Ajisafe and Coker say of the Yoruba could as well have
been written about the Ewe. For among the Ewe, the rule, we
must repeat, is that children succeed to the property of their
deceased father as of right.
Examples of the right of automatic succession to interests
in property are found in other parts of Africa. We have already
1. Adesa.yo v. Taiwo. (1956) 1 F.S.C. 8A, 85.
2. (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 309, 310.
3. A.K. Ajisafe, The Laws and Customs of the Yoruba People.
Routledge, London, 192A, p.8.
A. G.B.A. Coker, Family Property Among the Yorubas. 1966, p.AA.
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noted that among the Haya of Tanzania the right of succession 
to property is automatic on the basis of filioprimogeniture."1'
[
| In Buganda in Uganda the rule is that lla child of the blood
i
i p
I should inherit11, this being both patrilineal and automatic,
I Among the Tswana there is a right of automatic patrilineal
; succession to interests in property on the basis of filio-
j primogeniture, which is pressed so far that even if the eldest
: son of the deceased is himself dead, the eldest son of the
dead child succeeds to his rights, taking precedence over his
z
father 1s younger brothers. The'right of automatic succession 
to property, therefore, seems to be often found as a feature 
of patrilineal succession and is not a peculiarity of the
!
? Ewe,
f
i
f Children as Successors
The general proposition is that among the Ewe the children 
of a deceased person succeed to his interests in property as of 
right as the proximate next-of-kin. This proposition is also 
supported by the principle deducible from Yawoga v, Yawoga.**-
1, H, Cory and M,M. Hartnoll, Customary Law of the Ha.ya Tribe, 
International African Institute, London, 19^5, PP* 1-2.
2, E.S. Haydon, op,cit,, p,21A# •
3, I* Schapera, A'Handbook of Tswana Law and Custom. Inter­
national African Institute, London, 1955, p.231*
k. (1958) 3 W.A.L.H. 309,
6k8.
The way Ollennu, J., expressed it in Ahoklui v . Ahoklui. as we 
have seen, is that among the Ewe "the custom of succession is 
that children succeed to their fatherfs estate",'*' In interviews 
during field research it was represented to me that the family 
or dzotinu has authority to supersede a child for very compel­
ling reasons, However, so rare are such cases that throughout 
my field research no present or past instance could be cited 
to me when the surviving children of sound mind and body had 
been denied the right .to succeed to the interest in their 
father *s intestate property. It is suggested, therefore, that 
among the Ewe the so-called authority in the family to by-pass 
a child in the succession to his deceased father’s intestate 
estate is largely theoretical.
However, although the children have an indefeasible right 
to succeed to their father's property, there is no automatic 
right of priority inter se, nor is there an automatic right of 
entitlement to specific portions of the estate. The share of 
each clhild in the estate is a matter for the determination of 
the faimily or dzotinu. The only exception is that, if there is 
only one child and he is a male child, then his right to succeed 
to the entire estate is automatic as he cannot be postponed to 
other relations and there is nobody entitled to share with him. 
It is the same automatic entitlement if the deceased was child­
less but is survived by only one brother.
1, Ah-oklui v . Ahoklui. supra.
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This aspect of the devolution of intestate estate among 
the Ewe has not been well appreciated. The failure to apprec­
iate it is largely responsible for the misleading statements 
that ev/en among the Ewe succession to property by an individual 
is not automatic and that it is the family which succeeds. We 
must understand "automatic” here in two senses of collective 
entitlement and personal share. Succession by children, or 
failing them the other next-of-kin, is automatic in the sense 
of collective entitlement. All the children of the deceased 
are jointly entitled to all the inheritable estate, and if 
there is only one child who is male he is automatically en­
titled to all personally.
In the sense of personal shares in the estate, however, 
there are no automatic entitlements. It seems that the old 
rule was that the eldest male child took all the property and 
was thren under an obligation to maintain the rest of the child­
ren out of the estate.^ The principle of filioprimogeniture, 
however, has not survived the evolution of society and the 
introduction of a complex economy. Today it is still preferred 
to entrust the estate to the eldest male child on behalf of 
himsel:f and the other children until the property is shared,
1, cf . the principle of filioprimogeniture among the Haya of 
Tanzania in H, Cory and M.M. Hartnoll. op.cit.. pp. 1-2, and 
among the Tswana in I. Schapera, op.cit.. pp.230-231.
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or if sharing is not contemplated. The eldest child, however,
=has no legal right of priority today as against the other 
jchildren, and the elders have the right to exercise their own 
discretion in selecting which of the children shall take charge 
jOf the estate. While age is an important consideration, personal
j
.qualities may result in the selection of a younger child for 
the position.
It is against this background that one should understand
i
I the opinion of the Paramount Tribunal of Anlo in the cases that
!
jhad been referred to it. It is respectfully submitted that as
a result of a failure to grasp this point, the statements of
Ewe law have been misunderstood and misapplied by the judges
.of the higher courts, as by Ollennu both in his works'1" and in
p
his judicial capacity. Bentsi-Enchill and other authorities 
have also not escaped the same error. It is true that the 
cases in which they have been misapplied are not Ewe cases; 
but all the same they are instances of the misapplication of
the principle in the Ewe cases.
The declaration by the Paramount Tribunal of Anlo in 
In re E,N. Tamakloe^ is treated by Ollennu as supporting the
1. e.g. N.A, Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate 
Succession in Ghana. 1966, pp.87-90. ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ’ ’ .......
2. e.g. Kwakye v. Tuba. (1961) G.L.R. 720; Carboo v, Carboo. 
(1961) G .L .R . 83; Okoe v. Ankrah. (1961) G.L.R. 109; and 
Krakue v. Krabah. Unreported, Supreme Court of Ghana, Accra, 
(24th June, 1963.
|3. e.g. K. Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit.. pp. 126, 13^ -, 157.
|4. In re E.N. Tamakloe. Unreported, Suit No. 78/^4, High Court, 
Accra.
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proposition that succession to intestate property is not as 
of right among the Ewe and that the family has an unfettered 
choice in appointing a successor.'*' It is respectfully sub­
mitted that Ollennu missed the full import of the declaration 
of AnlO) customary lav; of succession. It is further submitted 
that the said declaration does not go beyond the children of 
the deceased and that' it means no more than that the family 
decides the order of priority as among the children. The 
relevant portion of the declaration by the Paramount Tribunal 
of Anlo may be quoted again. It runs thus:
One important point which must not be forgotten is that 
the senior boy or girl never automatically succeeds to 
the estate; an election by the deceased*s maternal and 
paternal relatives must be done strictly in accordance 
with the rules of native custom, and in most cases the 
choice goes to the senior son of the deceased, when not 
proved to be a delinquent, i.e. a drunkard, spend-thrift, 
litigious person, or general waster. When the eldest 
surviving son is disqualified for any reason from suc­
ceeding, the choice is given to one of his fit younger 
brothers. 2
The Tribunal was at pains to emphasise that if the eldest child 
was unsuitable the choice should go to ,!one of his fit younger 
brothers11 and not just another member of the family. It is a 
right vested in the children and not in the entire family. The 
Tribunal was only stating the guidelines as regards the respec­
tive claims of the children inter se. It is, therefore, a 
misapprehension to rely on this declaration for the wide
1. N.A. Ollennu. The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession in 
Ghana. 1966, pp.o7-8$. —
2. In re Tamakloe. supra.
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proposition that it is the family which succeeds to the estate
I
of an intestate member.
| In the same way the effect of the expert evidence given by
t
Togbui *Sri II, Awoamefia of Anlo, on the law of succession
ii
among the Anlo Ewe has been misunderstood. According to Smith,
j.,............................................
In the second place the Fia is equally emphatic that 
succession is not a matter of right, but of appoint­
ment by a family meeting, and he goes on to say that 
the selection of a successor should be governed by 
I seniority and that the eldest son should not b© passed
! over in favour of a younger unless the former were
| considered unfit. 1
Contrary to how this evidence has been construed, it is not to 
the effect that it is the family which succeeds to the estate. 
What Togbui Sri meant here was that, while it is the children 
(.who inherit, the management of the undivided estate is not as 
of right handed over to the eldest son on the simple principle 
| of filioprimogeniture. Although the principle of seniores 
priores is respected, the family has the discretion to choose
I
a younger child in preference to his elders if the circumstances 
so warrant it. It is respectfully submitted that, if so con­
strued, Togbui Sri was right and that this also represents the 
lav/ among the Northern Ewe.
The statements of the Ewe law of succession in In re 
Tamakloe. Attipoe v. Shoucaire. Khour.y v. Tamakloe. Yawoga v . 
Yawoga and Tamakloe v. Attipoe are all to the effect that
1. Khour.y v. Tamakloe. supra.
children succeed to their father's intestate estate as of right
hut that their respective entitlements are subject to the
determination of the family. For that reason the court went
so far as to state in Tamakloe v. Attipoe1 that, on handing
over the property to the children, the head of the wider family
is accountable, a decision which is otherwise inexplicable in
view of the consistent rule of judicial customary law that a
head of family is unaccountable.
The automatic right to succeed to property is perhaps not
an Ewe peculiarity. In the Fanti case of Poh v. Konaraba.^ it
was stated by Bossman, J., that:
,,, the right given to the family to elect or approve 
a person entitled to succeed cannot be exercised 
capriciously and contrary to customary law, A person 
who, by virtue of his relationship to the deceased, 
is entitled to succeed, cannot be passed over by the 
family unless he has disqualified himself ... 3
Being "entitled to succeed" is hardly different from the
general right of succession which we have been discussing.
Similarly, as we have already seen, in Summey v. Yohuno.^
Ollennu, J., emphasised that "the member of the family who
would have succeeded" on intestacy must be present when a
customary law will or samansiw is made, else it would be
invalid. This means that the successor is known even in the
1. Supra.
2. Tl957) 3 W.A.L.R. 7k.
3. Poh v. Konamba. (1957) 3 W.A.L.R. 7A, 81. Emphasis supplied. 
k. Summey v. Yohuno, (I960) G.L.P, 68, 71.
lifetime of the person to v/hose interest he would succeed. The 
application of the dicta in Poh v. Konamba and Summey v. Yohuno 
to tlhe Ewe circumstance means that those "entitled to succeed" 
are the children of the deceased.
The automatic right of succession is also stated by Sarbah 
for the matrilineal Fanti, among whom the entitled successors 
are the "real successor" (i,e, uterine brothers and sisters and 
issue of the sisters),^* The others, whom Sarbah calls "ordinary 
successors" and "extraordinary successors", are simply other 
members of the family with only a spes successionis. The 
terminology of Sarbah has been criticised, but the substance 
of his proposition has not been effectively assailed,^ Of the 
matrilineal Akan generally Danquah says the mother has the 
right to succeed to her child's intestate estate and says of 
her:
There is none to supersede her claim to succeed her 
son. If the mother steps in, in case of any con­
troversy, it is to be realised that she does so de 
jure. 3
It i;s doubtful whether Danquah's exposition is wholly correct. 
What Danquah says of the Akan mother, however, can also be said 
of the Ewe child because he has the legal right to succeed his 
father, especially if he is the sole child. Therefore, without
1. J.M. Sarbah, op.cit,. pp. 101-105.“
2. e.g. N.A. Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate 
Succession in Ghana. 1966, pp. 8 -^, 153-154 and K. Bentsi- 
Enchill, op.cit.. pp. 127-132.
3. J.B. Danquah, op.cit.. p.l83.
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concurring in his entire judgment, we agree with AkmffiO-
Addo„ J.S.C., as he then was, in his dissenting judgme;nt in
Kraikue v, Krabah'l' when he said:
A family cannot by manipulating the appointment o.f 
a successor shift the legal basis of inheritance, •.
Since family rights are always enjoyed in lineal* 
groups, the successor appointed . must come froi® 
the group entitled to the inheritance. Thus ther<© 
is a limit on the exercise of the rights of the 
family in this respect.
The? "group entitled to the inheritance*1 among the Ewe (Consists
of the children of the deceased man if he is survived ]by issue.
V/e repeat, therefore, that among the Ewe the persons entitled
as successors to property or domenyilawo are the children of
the? deceased. The family as such does not succeed. Heer.ce,
although it is the family which decides on the shares ftc which
eac:h child is entitled, the family is limited in this jfunction
to choosing from among the children. The effect is thc^-t, if
a miain is survived by only one child, his right to succeed to
the? <entire estate is automatic and the family becomes ifunctus
officio in the selection of a successor cr domenyilq arncl in
the? distribution of the estate.
1. Krakue v,^Krabah. Unreported, Supreme Court,.Accra', 
2i+t;h June, 1963. *
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Distribution of the Estate Among Successors
As already stated, the children, as the proximate next- 
of-kin, are entitled as of right to succeed to their father’s 
interests in property on intestacy. If the deceased is not 
survived by any child, other persons as next-of-kin are 
entitled to succeed to the estate, depending on proximity to 
the deceased in the pedigree. In either event, as we have seen, 
there is no automatic right to specifiable portions of the 
estate. The actual distribution or sharing of the deceased’s 
property among the entitled persons or domen.yilawo is a function 
of thee patrilineal family or dzotinu.
The body which determines what particular items of the 
intestate property an entitled person may succeed to is the 
family or dzotinu. It has already been explained that among 
the Northern Ewe there is no immediate family as distinguished 
from the wider family. However, for the avoidance of doubt, 
we may say that the family or dzotinu here is equivalent to the 
wider family in the scheme of those jurists who recognise the 
existence of immediate families.
Among those who maintain that there are immediate families 
as opposed to wider families, there is no unanimity of opinion 
as to which body is competent to appoint successors to property 
(i.e. domenyilawo) or share the intestate estate among them.
The view of one school, including Bentsi-Enchill,^ is that it
1. K. Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit.. p.l/+l.
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is the immediate family which has the beneficial interest in 
the property and which, therefore, has the right to deal with
the property. There are cases supporting this view, such as
1 2  ^Arthur v. Ayensu. In re Eburahim. and Ennin v. Prah.-^ There
appears, however, to be a confusion of two aspects of the matter. 
The persons entitled to succeed to the property, who are des­
cribed. by this school of thought as the immediate family, are 
confused with the body competent to appoint beneficiaries from 
that g;roup or share the property among them.
The other school, of which Ollennu is an exponent,^ holds 
the view that the appointment of successors is the responsibility 
of v/ha.t is described as the wider family. Cases relied upon
for this proposition include Amarfio v. Ayorkor^ and Krakue v .
6Krabah. As far as the Ewe are concerned- this latter view is
■■ ' ■ ■ M M * W
correct that the appointment of successors (domen.yilawo) or 
distribution of the estate is a responsibility of the wider 
family. Among the Ewe it is not necessary that the body appoint­
ing successors or sharing the estate among them should be the 
same a:s the group of persons entitled to the property.
1. (1957) 2 W.A.L.R. 557.
2. (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 317.
3. (1959) G.L.R.. kk...........................................
N.A. Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession
in Ghana. 1966, pp. 12A-125.
T. U35k) lit W.A.C.A. 55*t.
6. Krakue v. Krabah. Unreported, Supreme Court, Accra, 2Zfth
June, 1963.
An illustration of the Ewe position may he made by 
reference to a decided case. In Yawoga v. Yawoga^ it was 
agreed that the successors were the children of the deceased 
Yawoga and their descendants. In that case the only children 
of the deceased were the first defendant and his sister.
Children of a woman are excluded in the patrilineal Ewe system. 
Therefore, if the first defendant himself did not have any 
issue, then the only successors would have been the first 
defendant and his sister. In the scheme of those who contend 
that there are immediate families, these two persons would 
constitute the so-called immediate family. Indeed that is 
how they were regarded and described by Ollennu, J., in the 
instant case. If we follow those who contend that the successor 
is appointed, or the estate is distributed, by only the 
immediate family, we would have to say that the first defendant 
and his sister constituted the competent body. It is respect­
fully submitted that that is not Ewe law. In every case it 
is the entire family or dzotinu which makes the appointment 
or distribution of the estate. The family assesses the personal 
merits as well as the circumstances of those who are the suc­
cessors, and decides how the estate is to be distributed. The 
constitution of the family meeting for this purpose is the same 
as when any important deliberation takes place, such as to 
decide on the sale of family land. It means that the head of
1. (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 309.
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the family and the principal elders must be present*. Further­
more, other relations may and often are invited.
In agreeing with Ollennu that it is the "wider” family
I which determines the shares of the successors, we do not
[
I agree with him, however, that the said family is the successor
|
[ or that the family is not limited in its choice. As to.the
[
I first point, the competence of the dzotinu or family to deter-
I mine the shares of the successors, or to entrust the property
to one successor, is not the same as saying that the family
as an entity is entitled to the property. The Probate Court
performs similar functions in relation to both testate and
! intestate estates, but that Court itself is not a beneficiary.
: The role of the family in this respect may be considered as
! somewhat analogous to that of the Court in adjudicating upon
the entitlements of successors.
As regards the choice of successors and the determination
of their shares, the family is not unfettered in the exercise
of its discretion. We agree with Akuffo-Addo, J.S.C., in
Krakiue v. Krabah that:
... since family rights are always enjoyed in lineal 
groups the successors appointed ... must come from the 
group entitled to the inheritance. Thus there is a 
limit on the exercise of the rights of the family in 
this respect. 1
1. Krakue v.' Krabah. supra.
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This was the only condition on which the learned Judge was 
prepared to concede the right of the "wider family" to make the 
appointment of successors. Although the impression is given by 
Ollennu that the family is unfettered in its choice of succes­
sors, he corrects that impression by stating the proviso that, 
if an entitled person with a prior right is passed over arbit­
rarily or capriciously he can obtain a remedy by invoking the 
court* s intervention,^-
It is submitted, therefore, that there must be a qual­
ification to the sweeping proposition stated in the head-note 
to the? decision of the West African Court of Appeal in Makata 
v, AhQTli that
T’here are no rigid rules of intestate succession in 
Gold Coast native custom, but the elders of a family
o f  which a deceased was a member may appoint a suc­
cessor at their discretion. 2
Becausje of the above head-note^ Makata v. Ahorli is often cited
as authority for the proposition that the family may choose as
successor, in the sense of domenyila. whomsoever it pleases.
It is respectfully submitted that this is a misunderstanding
of the decision in that case. The head-note is misleading.
The West African Court of Appeal did not say that the question
of a successor is at the absolute discretion of the family.
±~. T O T  Ollennu. The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession" 
in Ghatna. 1966, p. 88.
2. Matkata v. Ahorli. (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 169. Field similarly
says of the Ga that "There are no rigid laws of inheritance as
a European understands codified law**; M.J, Field, Social 
Organisation of the Ga People, 19k0, p.k3. This is inapplicable 
to Ewe, The Ewe have .no "codified" lav/, but the law of succes­
sion is certain.
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In the first place the deceased in Makata v, Ahorli was not
survived by any issue. The case, therefore, is no authority
for the view that even children may be postponed to other
| relations at the discretion of the family. Secondly, the
appointment of a nephew to succeed to the property in this case,
instead of a brother on the failure of children, is but an
j exception which proves the general rule. The nephew had not
| only laboured with his uncle in the farms left intestate; in
the light of the particular facts of the case he was also 
; \ 
requested to shoulder part of the funeral expenses of his uncle,
a duty which would not ordinarily have devolved on him as he
was not a member of the deceased unclefs patrilineal family.
These were the facts and circumstances which justified a de-
l
r parture from the normal rule. It. was an exceptional case which 
must be treated as such. It does not by itself establish a 
wider rule of an unfettered discretion in the family. Excep­
tions of this type are rare but they exist in perhaps every 
legal system. In English law, for instance, a spouse who would 
have been entitled to his wife’s estate on intestacy would not 
be permitted to take the property if he was implicated in the 
death of his wife. Similarly in Ewe law an otherwise entitled 
person may not be permitted to succeed if the special circum­
stances make it undesirable that he should. It is not that 
"there is no codified or rigid law of inheritance" as the 
dictum in Makata v, Ahorli suggests.^- The law indeed is not
1, Makata v. Ahorli. (1956) 1 W.A.L.R. 169, 172.
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codified but it is explicit and certain among the Ewe. The 
Ewe law, however, is not applied mechanically. Hence,the 
particular circumstances of the case may defeat the right 
otherwise vesting in a prospective successor or domen.yila in
!
| Ewe lav/. Such circumstances may arise v/here the prospective
j  successor was not on speaking terms v/ith the deceased, where
| the deceased had been neglected either in health or in illness
[ in a manner repulsive to Ewe notions, or where the entitled 
i •
; successor had been cruel to the deceased. Similarly a distant 
j relative’s special relationship v/ith the deceased, as in the 
! case of the nephew and his uncle in Makata v. Ahorli. may
justify the conferment of a right of enjoyment of the intestate 
estate? on that relative. The discretion of the family, there- 
| fore, is not an absolute one among the Ewe. Like judicial 
discretion, the discretion of the Ewe family in the matter of 
succe£3sion to property is exerciseable only in conformity v/ith 
certain generally accepted rules which are stated hereunder.
These rules are stated with specific reference to children 
because in Ev/e law children are the normal successors to property 
as of right.~ Where the deceased is not survived by any issue 
the same rules apply with equal force but mutatis mutandis to 
other successors or domenyilawo. such,as the brothers and 
sisters of the deceased.
l"! The principle in cases like Makata v. Ahorli. (195&)
1 W.A.L.R. 169, 172; Yawoga v. Yawoga. supra: In re Tamakloe.
supra: Khoury v. Tamakloe. supra, and Ahoklui v . Ahoklui« supra.
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The first rule of Ewe lav/ of succession is that, where 
the deceased is survived by only one issue, that child succeeds 
to all his interests in property automatically as of right. A 
sole female child, however, succeeds to the interest in the 
estate but only for her own lifetime. After her death the 
interest in the property becomes inheritable as if the original 
holder had died intestate and without issue. The reason is 
that the female child1s own children are normally not members 
of her patrilineal family through which the right of succession 
is traced; even if such grandchildren are born into the same 
patrilineal family they would not count as the proximate next- 
of-kin traced unilineally through their own father. Another 
general rule is that if the intestate, had no issue but pre­
deceased his own father, the father automatically succeeds to 
all the estate absolutely as of right, in the same manner as a 
sole male child. The other rules which follow are subject to 
the above exceptions.
Where there are two or more children entitled to succeed, 
none of them can claim any specified portion of the estate.
None of them can, by the right of succession alone, claim a 
particular house or farm until it is allotted to him by a full 
meeting of the patrilineal family. . No single one of the chil- . 
dren, not even the eldest, nor any group of them, can alienate 
the interest in any portion of the estate. The right to 
succeed is not of itself enough to confer title until a specific 
allocation or distribution has been made by the family.
66k.
In the distribution of property among the children of an 
intestate, the old rule was that a child whose mother was not 
formally married to the deceased father was not entitled to 
any share. Such a child was known as asikevi. ahasivi or 
gbomevi. that is na child not born in wedlock'1. The asikevi. 
ahasivi or gbomevi was not illegitimate if his paternity was 
duly acknowledged by or on behalf of the father. For that 
reason he was fully entitled to the occupation and use of 
family property, such as land, vested in the father's family 
and h<e was fully eligible for succession to hereditary offices 
reserved for the members of that family.' It was only in res­
pect of the self-acquired property of the deceased father that 
he incurred a disability to succeed. This is similar to the 
disentitlement of a child procreated by a man in adulterous 
relations during the subsistence of a marriage under the Marriage 
Ordinance'1' who, though otherwise fully legitimate by the 
Ghanaian lex domicilii, cannot partake of the portion of the 
intestate estate which, under Section ^8 of that Ordinance,
p
devolves according to the relevant rules of English law. The 
explamation for the Ewe law disinheriting the asikevi. whose 
mothe:r was unmarried to the deceased, seems to be that it is 
presumed that his mother might not have assisted the deceased 
in building up the estate.
1. Cap. 127.
2. Coleman v. Shang. (1959) G.L.R. 390; Bamgbosie v. Daniel.
(1952) lit W.A.C.A. 115.
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The old rule, however, has now virtually disappeared in 
most chiefdoms. The general rule today is that the marriage of 
the child1 s mother to the father is irrelevant in conferring the 
right of succession on the child. The terms asikevi, ahasivi 
and gbomevi are, therefore, merely terms of social distinction 
today v;ithout implying any property disqualification. The.vital 
and decisive criterion today is whether the child has been duly 
acknowledged, whether in the lifetime of the deceased or post­
humously, as a child of the deceased. If paternity is thus 
established, the marital status of the mother is an irrelevant 
consideration as regards succession to property. The marital 
slat us of the mother is thus only a matter of evidentiary value 
in raising a rebuttable presumption of paternity. In the 
Nigerian (Yoruba) case of Savage v, MacFoy the contention that 
the right of succession vested in only the children of married 
mothers was rejected and the Court held that for the purposes 
of intestate succession to property it; made no difference whether 
the children were born in wedlock or not,^ It is submitted that 
this decision^forms to the general view of modern Ewe law.
There are, however, a few exceptions of chiefdoms where the 
old rule has persisted in some form, so that the child of an 
unmarried mother is held to be not fully entitled to succeed to 
the interest in his father's intestate estate. It is, however, 
not a total disinheritance. The severest rule is found in
1. Savage v, MacFoy. (1909) Ren. 50^ f.
V/usuta where it is stated that the child born in wedlock is 
entitled to a greater share of the property than that whose 
mother was unmarried to his father, even if the latter is senior 
in age. In Abutia it is simply stated that, as against a child 
whose mother was never married to his father, the child of a 
married mother, even if younger in age, is regarded as,senior. 
The result is that on the principle of seniores priores. he may 
be adjudged to be entitled to a greater share of the property, 
and he is first considered for taking care of the estate on 
behalf of the rest of the children if no division is contem­
plated, In Peki it is regarded only as a matter of prejudice 
where the child's mother was unmarried; but it may have the 
practical effect of a more favourable allottment of property 
to that child whose mother was married to the deceased.
The old rule, especially when the estate was not divided 
among the children, was that the principle of filioprimogeniture 
applied. Its implication was in the first place to eliminate 
female children in favour of the male ones, even if younger in 
age. As among the male children the principle' involved several 
elements. The children of unmarried women were regarded as 
junior to all those born of married mothers. Then as between 
the children of married mothers the status of the. wives deter^- 
mined seniority. The Ewe have various forms of marriage such as 
asiga or full ceremonial marriage, the asivi or marriage
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consequent upon b e t r o t h a l . I f  the mothers were all of the same 
statu.s in the sense that they had all gone through the same form 
of marriage with the deceased husband, then seniority inter se 
was determined by their respective dates of marriage to the 
decea.sed. The eldest male child of the most senior wife, as 
determined on the foregoing basis, was the.senior, child accord­
ing to the Ewe principle of filioprimogeniture. If none of the 
children was of a mother married to their father, then the 
senior male child was the eldest in age. The application of 
the Ewe principle of filioprimogeniture, as can be seen, did 
not rmake the choice necessarily fall on the eldest child in 
terms c)f age alone,
’When the principle of filioprimogeniture had its full sway, 
the estate v/as entrusted to the senior child who administered it 
for and. on behalf of himself and the other children. This may 
be described as a joint entitlement. It is the collapse of 
this principle under the pressure of a developing society and 
the introduction of a complex cash economy that has led to the 
regrettable practice today of dividing the estate among the 
child’.ren of the deceased. It is the collapse of the principle 
of filioprimogeniture that the Paramount Tribunal of Anlo wanted 
to emphasise when it said in its declaration in In re Tamakloe 
that:
Y] Cf . the children of the Ga "six cloth" marriageT Solomon 
v , Botchway. (1943) 9 W.A.C.A. 127 and Amarfio v. A.yorkor.nmmrw.A.c.A. 55*+.
One important point which must not be forgotten is that 
the senior boy or girl never automatically succeeds to 
the estate; an election ... must be done. 1
The effect of the declaration is that today the eldest child,
merely because of his seniority, cannot arrogate to himself
the right to exclusive succession or the right to manage or
deal v/ith the estate without the sanction of the family. The
strong v/ords of the declaration are, however, watered down by
the Paramount Chief of Anlo when, according to Smith, J., in
Khour.y v. Tamakloe^ the Fia said that
the selection of a successor should be governed by 
seniority and that the eldest son should not be 
passed over in favour of a younger unless the for­
mer were considered unfit.
Even in the olden days the senior child could be superseded in
favour of a younger one if the senior was unsuitable, and this
is still the case today. In that case it is said Foli zu Dzeha
or MFoli turns Dzeha". Among the Northern Eve the first male
child, even if not addressed by that name, is known as Foli,
the second is Dzeha, the third is Mensa, and the fourth is Anani,
and so on. Similarly the first female child is Agoe,. the
second is Gboo, the third is Mansa and the fourth is Anani.
Therefore, by saying Foli zu Dzeha. or "Foli turns Dzeha" it is
meant that the senior child is relegated to the position of a
junior.
Today the estate is, as a rule, divided among the children. 
1~] In re E.N. Tamakloe. supra.
2. Supra.
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The principle of filioprimogeniture, therefore, scarcely applies 
in its old form. If all the children are of the same mother the
estate is shared per capita among all the children of the de-
j ceased. If they are children of more than one mother, the
| property is divided on a per matres basis, that is according to
f
| the number of mothers; then there usually follows a further
! ' ...............................................................
I sub-division among each set of children. Where the property is
j  divided per capita among children of the same mother, the
principle of seniores priores only means that a senior child
gets a little more than the next junior one in a diminishing
order according to age. Where the property is divided per matres.
only the senior child of each mother counts for the purposes of
the division and he receives the share on behalf of himself and
I his brothers and sisters, pending a possible further sub-division
per capita. In all cases the descendants of a deceased male
child are considered as together entitled to the share of their
deceased parent on a per stirpes basis.
The position among the Ewe today, regrettable as it may be,
is that the estate left intestate by a deceased person is, as a
rule, divided among all the children. Ollennu, however, says
Real property left by a deceased member of the family is
... retained intact and undivided to avoid partitioning
which eventually brings about the sale of the property, 
and its loss to the family,' Such real property is re­
tained as family property, 1
1, N.A. Ollennu, The Lav; of Testate and Intestate Succession 
in Ghana. 1966, p.127-
670,
Unfortunately this is not true of Ewe society today. The 
general rule, on the contrary, is to divide the property among 
all the successors or domenyilawo. As Bentsi-Enchill has 
observed:
The tendency to hold landed property together as 
family property is perhaps stronger in matrilineages 
than in patrilineages, 1
The practice of dividing the estate among the successors is so 
common today among the Ewe that it is always expected. There 
is, therefore, hardly any property held together today by Ewe 
successors or domenyilawo as group property. Sometimes farms 
are physically divided. If there are two or more farms, the 
distributing family decides which of the successors shall 
inherit a particular farm. Houses are not usually shared by 
rooms-. Usually the whole house is given to one of the succes­
sors as against other property of comparable value to others.
If the house is not so allocated, then any rents or proceeds 
accruing from the property are shared among the successors.
As already stated, the self-acquired property of an 
individual does not become family property among the Ewe, though 
members of the family have severally a spes successionis in such 
property. Now the division of the property among the successors 
practically defeats the likelihood of the property ever becoming 
family property. The result is that there is no addition to 
family property today among the Ewe, so that family property 
properly so called consists principally of the ancestral lands.
1. K. Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit., p.170.
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No thanks-offering is provided when property is allotted 
to a successor. Ollennu says that acceptance of property on 
appoi.ntment as successor is evidenced by the presentation of a 
drink: or aseda to the family for his preferment. This customary 
procedure does not apply among the Ewe. Perhaps one explan­
ation, is that among.the Ewe succession .to rights in property on • 
intestacy is a general legal right and not just a "preferment" 
as Ollennu describes it. The role of the family among the Ewe 
is merely to act as an arbiter among persons who have a common 
right: in the property. If drink were to be offered on the basis 
of thanks for preferment, then there would normally be several 
"drinks" or thanks-offerings because the Ewe usually have several 
successors taking shares in the same estate. In the Ewe society 
ceremionies and formal occasions of this type are alv/ays marked 
by thie pouring of libation with drinks or aha. This is usually 
provided by only the eldest child or successor. It is not, how­
ever,, in the nature of akpedanu. the equivalent of aseda or 
thanks-offering among the Akan. It is simply for libation.
The last basic rule was that women were not entitled to 
succeed to rights in property except a few chattels. The maxim 
is nyonu gble de me&iana o. that is "palm fruits in the farm of 
a woman can never ripen". As a result women were not considered 
in the distribution of property on intestacy. Today the rule is
1, N.A, Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession 
in Ghana. 1966, p.107.
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not observed v/ith the same rigidity; but it is still the 
general principle that male successors are preferred to female 
ones. Even if there are older sisters they are postponed to a 
younger brother. As between brothers and sisters, immovable 
property is normally allotted to the male children. Furthermore 
the bulk of the property goes to. the male child even if he is 
younger than the female children, A problem arises in connection 
with the application of this principle in the case of a plurality 
of wives, if one of the wives has only female children. The 
general rule today is that such female children are entitled 
to the property on an equal footing with the male children on 
a per matres basis.^ Similarly a man survived by only daughters 
may have his property inherited by such female children.
Generally a woman succeeding to rights in property on 
intestacy is regarded as taking a life interest only, so that 
the interest in the property cannot devolve on her own children 
as it does in the case of male successors, A female successor 
to property cannot, therefore, alienate the interest in the 
inherited property inter vivos, nor does she possess any testa­
mentary capacity with respect to the property. It means that 
on the death of such a female successor the interest in the 
property falls once more to be inherited as an intestate estate 
of the original holder. In Kpedze and Ho, however, it is stated
that the rule is that a woman who is entitled to succeed, and
T~. But see Fietsu v. Fietsu. Unreported. Suit No. 51/51* Atando 
Native Court, Hohoe, 17th August, 1951, discussed infra, pp. 
677-679 , where it is held by implication that female children
are not entitled.
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does succeed, takes the property absolutely as a male successor, 
so that on her death the interest in the property devolves on 
her own children and the lineal descendants of her body unless 
she disposes of it. In that case the property is known as 
mama nu or ngrandmother1s thing” . On the extinction of the 
lineal descendants, of the female successor in such a case, the 
interest in the property reverts to the female successorfs 
patrilineal family to be succeeded to by those with the spes 
succossionls in that family.
All the above propositions are subject to the general con­
sideration that, as a rule, a deceased person’s estate is 
inherited by a person of his or her sex. The sex distinction, 
however, does not cover such items as immovable property and 
cash. It does mean, however, that peculiarly feminine articles 
go to female successors in the proximate group, and men members 
succeed to the interest in property usable by only men.
Table of' Succession: Deceased Male
Though subject to variation by the family in exceptional 
cases, the table of succession to intestate property is 
determined by a fixed formula. The right to succeed to property 
on intestacy is, as it were, as that of next-of-kin. On the 
failure of a prospective successor, therefore, the next set of 
persons in proximity to the deceased in the pedigree traced 
patrilineally become entitled to su'cceed. By the application of 
the formula it is possible to know in advance who possess the
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right of succession to a particular individual’s interests in 
property on intestacy.
For the purpose of determining who are his successors, the 
marital status of a deceased man is an irrelevant consideration. 
Even if the deceased is survived by a wife, the wife does not in 
that capacity have a right of succession. The right of successior 
to intestate property is legally enjoyable only by the members 
of the patrilineal family and a wife is not in Ewe lav; absorbed 
into her husband’s family by reason of marriage. That the 
deceased is survived by a wife and children to be maintained 
out of the estate may, however, influence the family in the 
appointment of a tefenola for the interim administration of the 
estate, as well as in deciding which of the legally entitled 
persons shall enjoy the property.
The first general rule is that, if a deceased male is
survived by children, the children are his next-of-kin and are
entitled to succeed to his interests in property as of right
on intestacy. If there are no children but children’s children,
such descendants have the right to succeed, priority being
determined among them in the descending order of the pedigree.
This was the principle also accepted in Yawoga v. Yawoga.'*' when
the Land Court held that in Ewe law a man’s successors are his
children and the descendants of those children. The same prop-
2
osition was also stated by Ollennu, J., in Ahoklui v . Ahoklui.
1. (1958) 3 W.A.L.H. 309.
2. Supra.
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As already explained, it is now irrelevant for this purpose 
that the mother of any of the children was not lawfully married 
to the deceased father. It is a necessary but sufficient 
requirement that the child’s paternity is acknowledged by or 
on behalf of the deceased father. Male children are preferred 
to daughters in the succession to the property of a man, even 
if such sons are younger.1 As a general rule a female child 
succeeding to an interest in her father’s property takes only 
a life interest in it.
If there are no children or descendants of children, the 
actual father of the deceased, if still living, is the successor 
to tine property or domen.yila. Ollennu seems to suggest that in 
any event the father of the deceased has priority over children
o
of the deceased in succession to the estate of the deceased.
The impression one gets, however, is that Ollennu is referring 
to the tefenola as a succ.essor only for the limited purpose of 
the interim administration of the estate; for he says that the 
father is the successor ’’until the family meet and make a formal 
appointment” . If Ollennu means the successor in the sense of 
an interim administrator of the estate, then we would agree with 
him because, until the children of the deceased are of a mature 
age, their grandfather may manage the property on their behalf.
T~. See pp.677 - 679 infra. Fietsu v. Fietsu. Unreported. Suit 
51/51, Atando Native Court, Hohoe, ?th August, 1951.
2, N.A, Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession 
in Ghana. 1966, pp. 90-91.
3. Ibid.
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If, however, by successor Ollennu means the successor to an 
interest in property or domen.yila then his proposition is at 
variance with the general Ewe law. The general rule among the 
Northern Ewe is that, as between the children of the deceased 
and -the father of the deceased (i.e. grandfather of the child­
ren)., the children have a prior right to succeed to the property. 
Only in Kpedze is it stated that the father of the deceased has 
priority over the deceased's children in succeeding to the 
intestate estate.
If the deceased is not survived by any child or descendants 
and the deceased’s own father had pre-deceased him, then the 
next set of persons entitled to succeed to the interest in the 
property are the brothers and sisters of the deceased. Two 
rules are applied here. The first is that as a general propos­
ition a brother is preferred to a sister. Accordingly even a 
younger brother is preferred to a sister of an older age. The 
second rule is that, if there are children of different mothers, 
those of the whole blood and their descendants in. the male line 
must be exhausted before those of the paternal half blood are 
allowed to succeed to the property. The conflict of these two 
rules is not always easy to resolve, especially if the childless 
deceased has only sisters of the whole blood and half-brothers, 
without any brother of the whole blood. The sisters of the whole 
blood, quite rightly it is submitted, contend that, being of the 
whole blood, they have priority over .half brothers. As sisters 
in such a case can only take a life interest in the property,
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the property would eventually devolve on the brothers of the 
half blood. The rule, however, is that half-brothers, because 
they are male, have priority over even sisters of the whole 
blood. In Fietsu v. Fietsu^ the plaintiff was a half-sister to 
the defendant, being born of the. same father but of different 
mothers. They were both pre-deceased by the plaintiff’s only 
brother of the whole blood, Augustine Komla Fietsu, who died 
intestate and childless. The deceased Augustine left two farms, 
one of which was self-acquired and the other was inherited from 
their father. The defendant claimed the inherited farm. The 
plaintiff sister, however, contended that, as the only sibling 
of the whole blood to the deceased, she was entitled to the farm 
inherited from their father because the property of their father 
had been divided on a per matres basis into two parts, as their 
father had two wives. The property, she contended, was there­
fore held by the deceased Augustine on behalf of all the children 
of their mother, of which she was the only surviving one. She 
claimed, therefore, to succeed to the interest in the farm on 
the original per matres basis. As regards the self-acquired 
farm of the deceased, the defendant conceded that the sister of 
the whole blood could succeed to the interest in that. An 
arbitration held' on the matter decided that the plaintiff sister 
was entitled to succeed not only to the self-acquired farm of 
her deceased brother of the whole blood, but also to that farm
T"] Fietsu v. Fietsu. Unreported, Suit No. 51/51, Atando 
Native Court, Hohoe, 7th August, 1951.
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which, on a per matres basis her brother of the whole blood had 
previously inherited from their father; for, as the deceased 
brother had succeeded to the interest in their father's farm 
on a per matres basis, he held it on behalf of all her mother's 
children. Being dissatisfied with the decision of the arbit­
rators, 'the defendant went into possession of the disputed farm, 
and drove away the labourers of his half-sister. The half- 
sister, therefore, sued. It was held by the Atando Native 
Court, Hohoe, that the plaintiff, as a woman, could not, as 
against a half-brother, succeed to the interest in the property, 
not even the self-acquired property of her brother of the whole 
blood'. The Atando Native Court said:
The arbitrators were quite wrong according to our Gbi 
native customary laws by transferring or giving the 
deceased's cocoa farms to the Plaintiff, being a woman. 
According to our Gbi native customary laws, although the 
Defendant and the late Augustine Fietsu were of one
father but of different mothers, yet he the Defendant is
the right person to inherit Augustine Fietsu and not 
rather the Plaintiff. The Defendant was rather generous 
to Plaintiff to leave out to Plaintiff the cocoa farm the 
late Augustine Fietsu made (i.e. his self-acquired prop­
erty); for according to our Gbi native customary laws, 
these two cocoa farms belong to the Defendant and not to 
the Plaintiff. 1
The proposition on which this decision is founded is that, in
the succession to the interest in property held by a deceased
man,, a male successor, is preferred to a female. That is. why,
even though the self-acquired farm of the deceased was not in
dispuite, the Native Court volunteered its opinion that the
1. Fietsu v. Fietsu. supra.
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interest in even that devolved on the defendant half-brother
CL
as against the sister of the whole blood. There is further
A
implication from the decision. The defendant half-brother was 
held entitled to take the property held by the deceased on a 
per matres basis even though a female child of the other wife 
was still alive. The implication then is that if the plaintiff 
sister were the only child of her mother, there would have, .been 
no division per matres because as a woman she could not succeed
to her father’s interest in property. It is doubtful whether
this decision will be followed that far in other chiefdoms, 
because in many areas it is now considered that female children
can take a life interest in the intestate estates of their
deceased fathers.
There is another aspect of Fietsu v, Fietsu which is worth 
noting. The arbitrators who made the award in the first instance 
consisted mainly of the head and the principal elders of the 
family. The Native Court, however, held that Ewe lav; of succes­
sion was fixed and that the family could not bend the rules 
even to solve such a difficult claim. In other words, the 
Native Court held that succession to rights in property is 
automatic as a matter of lav; and is not subject to any modific­
ation a t .the discretion of the family. This is generally 
correct and is contrary to the dictum in Makata v, Ahorli^that 
there are no fixed rules of succession in customary law and 
that the family exercises its discretion in appointing a 
successor.
1. (1956) 1 W.A.L.R'. 169.
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It is suggested by Ollennu that brothers and sisters have 
priority over children in succeeding to the intestate property 
of a deceased man.'*' Ollennu does not cite any authority for 
this proposition. His proposition, however, contradicts his 
own dictum in Ahoklui v, Ahoklui, and his decision in Yawoga 
v, Yawoga. when he held that among, the Ewe a man’s successors . 
are his children,^ In any case it is submitted that as a 
general proposition it is not true of Ewe law that children 
are superseded by brothers and sisters in the succession to 
the intestate estate of a man. Field research shows that in 
practically all Ewe chiefdoms children have priority over 
their father*s brothers in succeeding to the interests in their 
father’s property. Even children’s children have priority over 
brothers. The only area where it is stated that brothers (but 
not sisters) of the deceased have priority over the children 
of the deceased in succeeding to property is Aveme, but it is 
qualified that the children can insist on immediate succession. 
In a typical case before her, Annie Jiagge, J., an Ewe 
Judge, accepted the expert evidence of the customary lav/ of 
succession to intestate property in Kpeve in the Northern Ewe
area, as both parties agreed that the law was correctly stated.
The learned Judge, therefore, stated the law thus:
1. N.A. Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession 
in Ghana, 1966, p. 99- It seems that this is the Ga rule known 
to Ollennu because the same proposition is stated for the Ga 
in M.J. Field, Social Organisation of the Ga People. Crown 
Agents, 1950, p. 45-
2. Quoted at p .638 supra.
3- Yawoga v, Yawoga" (1938) 3 W.A.L.R, 309-
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Among the Kpeves, succession to real and personal 
properties is patrilineal. Children - sons and 
daughters - inherit their fathers as of right, but 
the daughters have only a life interest in the 
property descending to them from their father, 1
This, it is submitted, was correctly decided.
If there are no brothers of the v/hole blood living, 
children of the brothers (but not of the sisters) of the v/hole 
blood of the deceased succeed to rights in the intestate 
property. Failing them there come for consideration the 
paternal half-brothers and children of the paternal half- 
brothers of the deceased. Failing all these we move one 
step up to the brothers of the father of the deceased, that 
is paternal uncles. Descendants of the brothers of the father 
of the deceased then come next. On their failure we move fur­
ther up to the grandfather and the brothers of the grandfather 
and their own descendants. The right is thus traced upwards 
along the genealogical tree until a successor or domen.yila is 
found. There is, therefore, no notion of bona, vacantia which 
can ultimately vest in the family, the stool or the community 
as ultimus heres, A successor is bound to be found by tracing 
fur ther upwards.
The scheme we have outlined above presumes descent traced 
only patrilineally. Descendants of female members are not 
counted. Women are also as far as possible excluded from
succession to interests in intestate property other than
1. Golo v. Doh. Unreported, High Court, Ho, 12th November, 
1965. KLgested in (1965) Current Cases, paragraph 21k,
essentially feminine articles, as shown "by Fietsu v. Fietsu.^  
Particularly as the circle of possible successors widens further 
away from the deceased, the claims of women members of the 
family to succeed definitely fade away and they are no longer 
considered for succession.
In the light of the rules discussed above, we may set out 
in order of priority the table of succession to a man’s intes­
tate property thus:
"1, Children of the deceased, sons generally preferred 
to daughters, and daughters normally for a life 
interest only.
2. Patrilineal descendants of children of the deceased.
3* Father of the deceased.
4* Brothers of the whole blood.
5. Possibly sisters of the whole blood, and normally 
for a life interest only.
6. Descendants of brothers of the whole blood.
7. Brothers of the half blood.
8. Possibly sisters of the half blood, normally for 
a life interest only.
9. Descendants of brothers of the half blood.
10. Father’s brothers of the whole blood.
11. Descendants of father’s brothers of the whole blood.
12. Father’s brothers of the half blood.
13. Descendants of father’s brothers of the half blood,
14. Grandfather,
1. S'» uora.
683.
15. Grandfather’s brothers of the whole blood,
16. Descendants of grandfather1s brothers of the 
whole blood,
17. Grandfather’s brothers of the half blood,
18. Descendants cf grandfather’s brothers of the half 
blood,
19. Great grandfather,
20. Great grandfather’s brothers of the whole blood,
21. Descendants of great grandfather's brothers of the 
whole blood.
22. Great grandfather's brothers of the half blood.
23. Descendants of great grandfather’s brothers of the 
half blood,
2/|. Great great grandfather, his brothers and their 
descendants.
It is in practice hardly necessary to go as far as the descen- 
da.nts of the great great grandfather to find a successor, If 
it should be necessary to go beyond them, the successors are 
traced further upwards as indicated by the pattern of the table, 
always preferring brothers of the whole blood and their descen- ' 
dants. In all cases where descendants are entitled to succeed 
to> the property, the members of the older generation are first 
exhausted before the next generation is considered. As between 
descendants of the same generation there is a preference for 
ma_les over females.
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Table of Succession: Deceased Female
It is far more difficult to spell out the rules governing 
succession to interests in the property left intestate by a 
woman than that left by a man. Several principles are in 
conflict. There is the general recognition that in principle 
children should benefit from property left by their deceased 
parents. While these children often include males, and males 
are normally preferred to females in the succession to rights 
in property, property left by a deceased woman may be of a 
peculiarly feminine nature. Furthermore, in the patrilineal 
Ewe society the children of a woman do not belong to her 
family but to that of their father. Against this background 
must be applied the all-pervasive rule that in the matter of 
succession or domenyinyi the property must be retained within 
the patrilineal family of the deceased, whether a man or a 
woman. Unilineal descent within the patrilineal family, 
however, ends with a woman. There is, therefore, a reversion 
to those severally having a spes succesionis within the patri­
lineal family at any time that a female succeeds to the property, 
rightts. This is less common with succession to a manfs property 
because in that case the inherited interest is transmissible to 
the successor’s heirs.
As with a man, the marital status of a woman is itself 
irrelevant to the right of succession to her intestate estate.
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The explanation is that, even when married, a woman retains 
the original membership of her own family and does not acquire 
that of her husband, for the purposes of succession to 
interests in property. A married woman's debts and other 
liabilities fall on members of her own patrilineal family and 
not on her husband or members of her husband's family, even in 
her own lifetime. Similarly the husband or the husband's 
family members cannot succeed to interests in the property of 
the married woman. Indeed in many areas it is taboo for a 
widower to use the property of his deceased wife, and to 
violate the taboo is believed to be visited with an incurable 
illness leading to unavoidable death. All the personal be­
longings of a deceased wife are, therefore, taken out of the 
matrimonial home and often even the kitchen is broken down, 
lest the husband break the taboo by entering it.
There is no uniformity in the rules governing domen.yin.yi 
or succession to property left intestate by a woman who is 
survived by children. The difference may be the result of the 
interplay of the various principles which determine the right 
of succession among the Ewe. In some places, notably Abutia, 
Kpedze and Kpeve, the rule is that the children of a deceased 
woman are those entitled to succeed to her interests in property 
on intestacy. Children here include both male and female 
children. If there are male children, however, the male children
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succeed to the property on their own behalf and on behalf 
of their sisters. The reason for the preference of men even 
■ here is that, by making a man a successor or domenyila. the 
[ property is retained within the husband’s family or dzotinu to
I be enjoyed by the lineal descendants of the woman in the male
!
j line. Such property originating from a grandmother is also
i
j known as mama nu or ’’grandmother’s thing1*. Property inherited
fi
| by a child from his mother in these areas, therefore, remains
i
| permanently in the patrilineal family of the woman’s children
i
• and not in the woman's own family. If the woman had only
ti
j female children, the interest in the inherited property is
succeeded to by their own children, and so on until a male child 
is born, when he and his patrilineal descendants form the 
permanent line of successors or domenyilawo. In either event 
•there is always a reversion in members of the deceased woman’s 
own patrilineal family and the members of that family succeed
fche
to rights in the property on the extinction of the descendants 
of the body of the woman. In all cases, although male persons 
are said to succeed to the property legally, the actual posses­
sion and beneficial use of the property, especially feminine 
articles, are in the hands of the female members, such as 
daughters, and sisters.............................................
1. See, e.g. the Kpeve case of Golo v. Doh. Unreported, High 
Court, Ho, 12th November, 1965. Digested in (1965) Current 
Cases, paragraph 21k. Discussed in pp.690-691 infra.
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The rules in Abutia, Kpedze and Kpeve sacrifice at least 
two principles of the general Ewe law of succession or 
domenyinyi, By allowing the children to succeed to their 
motherfs property permanently, the general principle of patri­
lineal succession is not strictly adhered to. The result is 
that. one child, while succeeding to his -father's property 
under the principle of patrilineal succession, may at the same 
time also succeed to his mother's property under a special 
riule„ There is thus created a double right of succession. The 
second principle sacrificed is that which demands that the 
property, unless disposed of, shall remain in the patrilineal 
famiiy of the original acquirer. Under the Abutia, Kpedze and 
Kpeve rules the self-acquired property of a deceased woman, if 
surviLved by children, is not retained in her own family but in 
her husband's family, though not inheritable by the husband 
himself.
In most Ewe areas the Abutia, Kpedze and Kpeve rules are 
unacceptable, inasmuch as their application means that the 
members of the deceased woman's patrilineal family are deprived 
of the right to succeed to the woman's self-acquired intestate 
property. At the same time it is realised that it would be 
unjust to deny the children the benefit of their mother's 
property in favour of her patrilineal family. The rule adopted 
in most other areas, therefore, represents a via media. Hence 
in the majority of the Ewe areas, the rule is that children,
both male and female, succeed to their mother's interests in 
intestate property but only for the joint lives of the children.1 
After the death 01 the last child the interests in the property 
devolve as if the original female holder had died childless,
that is to be succeeded to by members of the original holder's
patrilineal family. As can be deduced from the nature of the 
rule, only immovable property like land, farms and houses can 
survive the joint lives of the children to devolve eventually 
on members of their mother's family. Movable property, espec­
ially personal effects, by their nature, hardly endure for 
so long in a form that v/ould make their return to the deceased 
woman's family worthwhile.
It is for this reason that a few areas, such as Gbi and
Kpando, have also devised another variant of the rule. In those
chiefdoms the children surviving a deceased woman succeed
absolutely and as of right to her interests in movable property,
including personal effects, the only possible exceptions being
items like very precious and expensive jewellery and beads.
The interests in exceptionally precious and expensive items
like valuable jewellery, as well as immovable property like
land, houses and farms are, however, succeeded to by the
members of the deceased woman's patrilineal family as ii she
had died childless. In most, but certainly not all, cases the
T. £ p p ; P . g .  t h e  Dodome-Tsikor case of Kpakpla v..._De_bleI 
Unreported, High Court, Ho, 7th May, 1965, digested in (1965) 
Current Cases, oaragraph 171 and discussed at pp. 690-691 
infra. Also the Ziavi case of bake v. Dop;be. Unreported, Native 
Tribunal of Ziavi, Ziavi, 6th July, 1946, discussed at pp. 
689-690 infra.
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children are in fact allowed in these areas to use even the 
expensive jewellery and immovable property of their deceased
mother during their own lifetime, provided they do not raise
any adverse claims against the title of the legal successor to 
the property* This ensures that jewellery, beads and immovable 
property., being of. durable character, remain, in the. deceased 
wo man 1s pa tri1in eal fami1y ,
The basis of the rule in most of these Ewe areas is that, 
as the interests in the immovable property revert to the deceased
womanfs patrilineal family, future generations of descendants of
that woman cannot succeed to any interest in such property. An 
example of the application of this rule is found in the case of 
Dake v. Dogbe, a case from Ziavi. In that case the plaintiff 
claimed the paramount titLe to the land in dispute nby right of 
succession’*. In his statement the plaintiff stated that the 
paramount title to the land was originally held by his father’s 
great grandmother called Gboo. From his great grandmother, 
however, he traced title through the male descendants to him­
self. The Native Tribunal of Ziavi held that the plaintiff 
must fail in his clAim, because any interest in property held 
by a woman reverts to her own family after the life interest 
of her children, and that a descendant of the son of a woman 
canno>t, therefore, claim to succeed to the interest in such 
property. The Native Tribunal said:
1. Dake v. Dogbe. Unreported, Native Tribunal of Ziavi,
Ziavi"j 6th July, 19k6, at p.kk of the Civil Record Book,
6 9 0 .
The Plaintiff adduced in his statement that the land 
in dispute belongs to his great grandmother. If these 
stories are true it is unfair; for amongst the Ewe 
speaking people the third or second generation cannot 
inherit any property maternally. 1
Against this may be cited the judgment of Annie Jiagge, J.,
2in Golo v. Doh where she stated the law in Kpeve thus:
Where self-acquired property descends to the daughter 
.from her mother, the daughter’s children may inherit
The self-acquired properties of a woman belong to 
her children, male and female alike ... On the death 
of a woman her family appoints one of her children to 
look after all her properties for herself and on be­
half of all her brothers and sisters ... On the death 
of a female child her issue step into their mother’s 
place and enjoy her portion of the proceeds of the 
estate. The grandchildren of a woman may inherit 
property descending from their grandmother provided 
that the property was self-acquired by the said 
(grandmother, 3
The decision in Dake v. Dogbe. a Ziavi case, is thus opposed to 
that in the Kpeve case of Golo v. Doh. It is, however, submit­
ted that both are right. The explanation is that the rules 
differ in the various chiefdoms. Thus the same Judge who decided 
Golo v. Doh applied the contrary principle, that is the Ziavi 
principle, in another case, Kpakpla v, Deble.^ a case from 
Dodome-Tsikor. In Kpakpla v. Deblef Annie Jiagge, J,, stated 
the rules of succession to the property of a woman thus:
1. Ibid.
2. Golo v. Doh. Unreported. High Court, Ho, 12th November, 
196p. Digested in (1963) Current Cases, paragraph 21A*
3. Ibid-
A. Kpakpla v. Deble, Unreported,. High Court, Ho, 7th May, 
1963V  Digested in (1965) Current Cases, paragraph 171#
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Y/here a woman dies she is succeeded by her father, 
or in his absence, the person who succeeded the 
father or stands in his stead. The self-acquired 
property of a deceased woman goes to her children.
On the, death of the last of the children the prop­
erty reverts to the mother’s family. Grandchildren 
do not normally inherit their grandmother’s property.
Every child belongs to his father’s clan. A grand­
child may inherit his grandmother only if he belongs 
to the same clan as the grandmother and both descend 
from the same ancestor. 1
V/e may say, therefore, that in each case the relevant rules of 
the particular community must be ascertained in order to deter­
mine who are the successors to the property of a deceased woman 
survived by children.
If a woman dies childless she is succeeded, as a rule, by 
her father and not by her mother. The principle here is that 
the property must remain in the patrilineal family of the 
deceased child and the mother belongs to a different family. 
Another reason is that, as a member of a different family, 
neither the mother nor the members of her family are respon­
sible for the debts and liabilities' of the daughter, whether 
during her lifetime or after her death; hence the mother 
cannot succeed to her daughter’s interests in property. That 
is why the father must succeed to his childless daughter’s 
interest in property in any case of intestacy. If it is the 
case of an older woman, the property may include farms, houses
1. Ibid.
2, Though a child may succeed to the interest in the property 
of his or her mother, even if only for life.
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or other immovable property, and in such a case the father may 
directly enjoy the property. In the case of a young girl, 
however, her property would consist principally of personal 
eifects, As most of these may be feminine articles, the mother 
may be the person in actual beneficial enjoyment though she is 
not the domen.yila or successor to the property.. In addition, 
in most chiefdoms the mother is entitled to one set of cloth 
(that is avo or do tata) and a few chattels which are given to 
her in her own right at the numekafe when the deceased’s personal 
belongings are distributed among the relations.
In the absence of a child or a father, the general rule is 
that the domenyilawo or group of persons entitled to succeed 
to the property of a deceased woman comprises the brothers and 
sisters of the woman. In the few areas where grandchildren are 
entitled to succeed, such maternal grandchildren may have 
priority over brothers and sisters of the deceased. Subject 
to this exception in favour of grandchildren, we may state the 
gteneral rule that, failing a child and a father,' the rule of 
succession to intestate property is essentially the same for 
both a man and a woman. The table already given for the , 
succession to interests in the property of a deceased male, 
therefore, applies also to the property of a deceased female 
who dies without a child or a father. There is, however, the 
q-ualification that in all cases the essentially feminine 
articles are given to female members of the group of successors
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or domenyilawo or they are used for life by their female 
child.ren ,
A woman is entitled to farm the family land of her own 
family. Like any farmer she has the prior right to re-occupy 
the a fuu or land left fallow by her. In the case of a deceased 
male farmer, this, prior right, of re-occupation devolves on.his 
own children,^ In the case of a deceased female farmer, how­
ever, as the right to the afuu or fallow land is enjoyable 
only by members of the family holding the paramount title to 
the land, her children, being members of a different family, 
canno>t succeed to the prior right of re-occupation. Hence 
it is: the father, or failing him the brothers and possibly 
the sisters, on whom the right devolves of re-occupying the 
afuu or fallow land left by a deceased woman on her family 
land, A fallow land being a part of the deceased woman1s 
husband1s family lands is not covered by this rule and is 
re-occupiable by the otherwise entitled member of the husbandfs 
family.
The rules discussed above apply with equal force even 
today, in spite of modern developments in property holding by 
women. Thus property acquired today by a woman, including 
bank accounts, shares and negotiable instruments, are all . . 
subject to these rules of succession unless otherwise provided 
by a statute or the common law.
1, See pp, 323-32A supra.
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Rights and Responsibilities of Successors
It has already been explained that the tefenola or 
positional successor is not also in that capacity the domen.yila 
or successor to the interest in property of a deceased person.^ 
A tef enola stands in the shoes of the deceased in the personal 
position of "father" or "mother" as the case may be, and may in 
that capacity administer the estate of the deceased until the 
successor or successors assume control. Normally there is only 
one tefenola or successor in this sense but several domen.yilawo 
or successors to property. As we have seen, however, the 
eldest son or a brother who is the tefenola may at the same 
time be a domen.yila. In that case he has a dual capacity; 
but except in such cases the positional successor is different 
from the successor to the deceased's interests in property.
A domen.yila or successor to property is not by virtue of 
the succession the head of the family among the Ewe. The 
failure to appreciate the distinction between a tefenola 
(positional successor) and domen.yila (successor to property) 
is largely responsible for the erroneous supposition that a 
successor to property is, by virtue of such succession, also 
the head of family. The confusion of the position of the 
dornenyila or successor to property with that of a head of 
family is often evident in the judicial customary law. In
1, See pp. 597-599 supra.
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Kwakye v . Tuba.^  Ollennu, J., said:
Learned Counsel failed to appreciate that the term 
1 head of family1 and ’successor1 are terms which mean 
one and the same thing, and are interchangeable and 
that the only time that they are used together as 
having separate denotations is where it is necessary 
to distinguish the head of an immediate family of a 
deceased from the head of a v;ider family of which the 
immediate family of the deceased is a branch. It is 
a distinction without a difference.
To say the least, this is a very doubtful proposition even as. 
applied to other Ghanaian communities. In any case, however, 
much this dictum may be applicable to other communities, it 
does mot represent Ewe law. In the first place we have already 
submitted that the Ewe do not have an immediate as distinguished 
from a wider family. There being no immediate family, it fol­
lows that the successor to any property cannot be head of any 
immediate family originating from the deceased person to whose 
interest he succeeds. However, assuming but not accepting 
that the Ewe have immediate families, it would still not be • 
the case that the successor to property is head of an immediate 
family simply by virtue of the succession. The Ewe positional 
successor or tefenola cannot be head of the so-called immediate 
family because he becomes functus officio as soon as the 
domenyilawo or successors to the property assume control of 
the estate. His role then remains only that of "father11 or
1. Kwaky e v , Tub a , Unreported, High Court, Accra, 20th 
September, 1961, Different from Kwakye v. Tuba. *1961) G.L.P. 
720. This view is also stated by Ollennu in his Principles of
Customary Land Law in Ghana. 1962, p #151.
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"mother11 to the children of the deceased. As regards the 
donenyilawo or successors to interests in property, they are 
not. heads of families either. If there is only one surviving 
child he "becomes the sole domen.yila or successor to the property, 
If,, as held in Yawoga v, Yawoga. the so-called immediate 
family of the Ewe consists of children of the deceased and 
their patrilineal descendants, then a sole child without des­
cendants would be the only constituent of the immediate family.
In that case the sole child would be the only member of the 
so-called immediate family, the only principal member of it, 
and its head of family! It is respectfully submitted that this 
is not Ewe law.
Let us, however, assume that the deceased, as often happens, 
is survived by several children. As we have already stated, the 
property in such a case is shared among all the children as 
do;menyilawo. If they are all children of the same mother it is 
diwided per capita, otherwise the division is on a per matres 
basis. There are, therefore, usually several persons who 
together succeed to the interest in the property, Which of 
these several successors is then head of the so-called immediate 
family? Can there be several joint heads of family? Certainly 
such.a scheme of.several joint heads of one family would render 
the position of head of family meaningless. It is also for 
the same reason that, even if the estate is kept undivided, the
1. (1958) 3 V/.A.L.R. 309,
person in charge of it is not ipso facto head of the so-called 
family. The property arrangement would not make such an admin­
istrator of the property a head of family. For the headship 
of a family does not end with only the administration of 
property. It also involves overall responsibility for the 
welfare of members, their, solidarity as. a kinship unit, and. . , 
their general conduct and other problems.
The absurdity of the proposition is seen even in Makata 
v, Ahorli,^ In that case a nephew, that is a sister’s son, was 
allowed to succeed to the interests in the property of the 
deceased. It could be argued on the strength of the dictum 
In Kv/akye v. Tuba that the nephev; thus became head of the 
family originating from his maternal uncle. It is respectfully 
submitted that this would be palpably wrong. It would be 
tantamount to appointing as head of family a person who is not 
a member of that family. Among the Ewe a right of enjoyment 
of property may be conferred on a stranger in the light of 
any special relationship with the deceased, as was done in 
Makata v. Ahorli. The headship of the family, however, is
limited to only members of that family. Among the patrilineal
Ewe the nephev/ succeeding to property in Makata v. Ahorli was 
not a member of the deceased’s family, whether the wider or the 
narrow. There can be no question of his being a member of the
1. (1956) 1 W.A.L.k. 169*
2. Kvvakye v, Tuba, Unreported, High Court, Accra, 20th
September, 19ol. Different from Kwakye v. Tuba (1961) G.L.E, 
720.
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"wider” family or dzotinu. as his connection with that unit
was through his mother. What of the so-called immediate family
originating from the deceased? Who are its members? According
to Ollennu, J, , the so-called immediate family among the
patrilineal Ewe consists of the deceasedfs children and their
descendants. For in Yawoga v. Yawoga he gives the answer thus:
It is admitted that upon the death of the said Yawoga, 
his family, who became entitled to the property, con­
sisted of his children and their descendants. 1
Nor; the nephew who succeeded to the interests in property in
Mairata v . Ahorli was neither a child of the deceased, nor a
descendant of a child of the deceased. He was, therefore, not
a member of the so-called immediate family. Similarly as a
maternal nephew he was not a member of a "family" comprising
thee brothers and sisters of the deceased and their descendants;
for descendants of females do not count for membership of the
Ewe family. We cannot, therefore, regard the nephew as head
of that family of which he was not a member, notwithstanding
that certain property rights had been conferred on him by a
special dispensation of the family,
A similar argument applies to a brother of the deceased.
Though a member of the deceased*s "wider" family or dzotinu. a
brother is not a child of the deceased nor a descendant of such
a child. He is, therefore, not a member of the deceased’s so-
called immediate family as defined in Yawoga v. Yawoga, Hence
1. Yawoga v. Yawoga (1958) 3 W.A.LEH. 309, 310,
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although a positional successor or tefenola to his deceased 
brother and managing the estate on behalf of the children of 
the deceased, he does not thereby become head of a family to 
which,, by definition, he does not belong. It is submitted, 
therefore, that among the Ewe a person does not become the head 
of family merely because of the succession.to interests in 
property left intestate. Different considerations apply in 
the succession to the largely administrative position of head 
of family and the beneficial enjoyment of property as a 
domeny/ila or successor to property.
T?he domenyilawo or successors to the property are the 
proper' persons to collect and receive the assets due to the 
estates. If the assets were previously known, a specified 
successor would have been empowered by the family to collect 
each particular asset. If not so specified, the eldest child 
or thee positional successor of the deceased collects the 
assets^ on behalf of all the successors to the estate. In 
either1 case the successor to the property (domen.yila) must 
make t:he demand as a matter of formality through the positional 
successor (tefenola). and the asset is receivable through the 
said t:efenola. It should be understood, however, that until the 
successors to the property enter into possession it is the 
tefenQ)la or positional successor of the deceased who collects 
the assets. It is partly for this reason that the property is 
usualLy not handed over to the heirs until some time after the 
death of the intestate.
Debts, liabilities and obligations against the estate are 
discharged by the successors to the estate. However, the claim 
must be laid formally against the tefenola or positional suc­
cessor, usually a brother or the eldest son of the deceased.
If the liabilities are known in good time, they are discharged 
out of the estate before the.net, amount is.divided among the 
successors to the property. If they are enforced after the 
distribution of the estate, it is a liability of all the 
do>menyilawo or successors to the property; but they contribute 
to« an extent approximating to the ratio in which the property 
had been divided among them. It is because the eldest child 
shouldere a greater share of the liabilities that he is also 
entitled to a larger share in the distribution of the property. 
Because of possible subsequent claims against the estate, the 
customary lav; requires that creditors of the estate should 
introduce themselves to the family of the deceased as soon as 
practicable after burial. The obligations are then met directly 
out of the estate instead of seeking contributions later from 
the individual heirs. The procedure stated by Ollennu is that
The customary law therefore requires that whilst the 
corpse of a deceased lies in state prior to burial all 
creditors of the deceased should appear and declare 
the debts due to them. 1
According to Ollennu the creditors must touch the bed on which
the corpse is lying, in testimony of the truth of their claims.
1. N.A. Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession 
in Ghana. 1966, p.21o.
This d-.oes not represent Ev;e lav/. It would he regarded as a 
grave and unpardonable insult to the family if, at the critical 
moment- when death has struck and tears are in their eyes, there 
shouldl be such a public proclamation of the indebtedness of 
their deceased member. Among the Ewe the claim is made some 
reasomable time after burial when the creditor must introduce 
himsel.f to the tefenola or positional successor with a small 
amount, of palm wine or deha. It is a private affair without 
! genorail publicity except among the members of the deceased*s 
family and that of the creditor. The claim, however, must be 
made .within a reasonable time, otherwise it may be repudiated; 
for vi'-gilantibus, non dormientibus. .jura subveniunt is in this 
contexrt edso a principle of Ewe law,
Al problem arises if the debts and liabilities exceed the 
assets of the estate. The solution profferred by Sarbah is 
that !!!the heir and his family” can absolve themselves of 
liability by giving the body of the deceased to ”the public” 
or the "company of the deceased” for burial.’*" Presumably 
"company” refers to the asafu company of the Akan, Not only 
do ase.fu companies of the Akan or Fanti style not exist among 
the Ewe, but the type of solution suggested by Sarbah is unheard 
of among the Ewe. Even in the. unlikely event of the. excess. 
lia.bdH.ity of the deceased being determined within the short time 
between death and burial the next- day, yet it would be grossly
1. J .11. Sarbah. op. cit.. p.108.
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offensive to Ewe notions, and it would constitute a permanent
disgrace and embarrassment to the family, to abdicate its
responsibility for the proper burial of the deceased member.
However deep he may be in debt, the deceased will be given a
burial by his own family,
. . T h e .solution suggested.by Danquah is. substantially, that. . ,
applied by Ewe law, Danquah cays:
If the debt is greater than the gross value of the 
property, the successor would be justified in calling 
on the other members of the family to assist in pay-, 
ing debts which have become veritable family debts, 1
i
J  The Ewq9 however, do not strictly regard the debts of a deceased 
person as 11 family debts” , any more than they regard his intestate 
I property as family property. The obligation is on the family to 
j discharge the debts of its deceased member, but just as a facet
i
| of the general responsibility of the family for its members 
| which exists even in their lifetime. For, even in the lifetime 
of the deceased, if he was seriously in debt his family was 
obliged to contribute to settle his liabilities. That is the 
reason why in the olden days any member of the family could be 
seized for another member’s debts. It is the same corporate 
responsibility which binds the family in respect of debts or 
obligations against the estate of the deceased. However, the 
family is not directly liable. First the tefenola or positional 
successor is taxed with liability. Although he may not be a
1. J,B, Danquah, Akan Laws and Customs, 1928, p,l8k.
successor to the estate, insofar as he now stands in loco parentii 
to the children or the successors to the estate, he would usually 
discharge the liability if he has the means. If the tefenola 
cannot, he calls on the successors to the estate or those who 
would have succeeded to the estate if it were solvent; for they 
ar e under a. legal duty to. meet , the liability. . V/hen. prospective. . 
successors to the estate are contributing, the elder contributes 
a little more than his next immediate junior, as he would have 
received more property if the estate were solvent. If the heirs 
cannot discharge the liabilities, the entire family, that is 
the d_zo_tinu« are liable. This obligation, it must be emphasised, 
falls only on members of the family or dzotinu who are known as 
nu deka dulawo or "those who eat one thing"; for, however 
remote may be the relationship to the deteased, each of them 
would have a spes successionis in any property left by the 
deceased. That is why the family cannot, except for very com­
pelling reasons, appoint just any person of their choice as 
successor to the estate. The right to succeed to property is 
matched with the correlative obligation to discharge the 
liabilities against the estate.
Today, however, it seems that liabilities in excess of the 
assets comprised in the insolvent estate cannot be enforced .
against either the successors or the family. For it has been 
decided that a successor to an estate is not liable to pay 
debts exceeding the assets which may have come into his hands.
1. Quabinah v. Chibbrah. (1875) Fen. 22.
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Furthermore, the Administration of Estates Act, 1961, seems 
(
to> limit the claims against the estate to the value of the 
estate, Under Section 1(2) (a) of that Act, -in default of the 
ap>poi:ntment of an executor or an administrator, an intestate 
estate vests according to customary law. In Ewe law this means 
that title to the property devolves. first on the tefenola .or . 
pO'Sitional successor without a beneficial enjoyment and sub­
sequently vests in the domenyilawo or successors to the propert 
in. the proportions determined by the family. Section 9A(2) of 
th'.e same Act, however, provides that:
1/here the estate of a deceased person is insolvent,
liis estate shall be administered as provided by lav/.
It. is not clear what is meant here by "law", Perhaps "law" 
here means law other than the customary law because the section 
fallows the express, provision for the application of customary 
law, where customary law was specified. If "law" in this 
se’Ction of the Act means the common law as contrasted with 
tire customary law, it means that the liability is limited to 
the value of the estate and that the creditors are paid accord­
ing to the category of their respective .debts. In this scheme, 
debts due to the state, then judgment debts and debts due upon 
recognissance, take priority in that order. It is only after 
them that contract debts and other voluntary debts are payable. 
T7 Act 63* ~  " ~"
2„ i,e, the central government.
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Debts due against a deceased married woman are not a 
responsibility of the surviving husband. They are liabilities 
pn the; deceased wifefs own estate and are met out of that
I
estate or by her positional successor, the successors to her 
interests in property or members of her own patrilineal family 
ps tne? case may be. As the husband does not succeed to any 
intere.'St in his wife’s property, so also is he not liable for 
::er debts. Similarly a wife is not liable for the debts of 
;ier de'cteascd husband. A husband who has the means would, 
aoweve.T _, pay the debts of his deceased wife and would be
expect.e d  to do so. A woman, on tho other hand, is not normally
\
pxpeot.ed to pay her deceased husband’s debts even if she can,
[
as tlii.s would be misinterpreted as a failure by the man’s
I
family- to discharge their obligations, a form of permanent
i
insult..
Tine next issue is who performs the funeral or kunu of a
deceased person. Among the Ewe this is a responsibility of the 
!
whole family or dzotinu. headed by the head of the family. It
peerns tlhat this is generally the rule throughout Ghana.^ The
I
|financ:i;al liability is shared by all members of the family and, 
among tlhe Northern Ewe, they are not entitled to be re-imbursed 
out of the estate, unless the funeral involved some special 
expenses such as transporting the dead body from a distant 
place., Older members of the family contribute more than the 
junior.’ ones.
T~. .Se;e, e.g. N.A. Ollennu. The Lav/ of Testate and Intestate 
Gucces;s:ion in Ghana. 1966, pp.68-70 and K. Bentsi-Enchill, 
op. cits. . pp. l6h-lb5.
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It; should not be understood, however, that there are no 
specific duties on some members of the family. In particular 
it is a; responsibility of the male children, if any, to provide 
the cof’fln for their deceased father or mother. If there are 
no male' children or if they are too young, the eldest brother 
of the deceased provides the coffin, unless, the father is alive 
when he' does so. A husband, however, provides the coffin for 
the burial of his dead wife, but not vice versa. The male 
children slaughter sheep to the deceased in most areas, all 
.the children of the same mother providing one sheep on a per 
matr on basis. As a rule graves are dug free of charge by all
i
able-bo died youth in the division, including those outside the
I
family.
All members of the family contribute money ad hoc for each 
funeral in sums usually fixed according to age and proximity in 
relationship to the deceased. Sometimes the final funeral 
[Obsequies of several members of the family are combined in order 
to reduce expenses. A single contribution is thus made to cover 
all. Tills forms the central fund in the hands of the head of 
the family in respect of every funeral. This central fund goes 
towards defraying the general costs of entertaining relatives 
and mou:rners with food and a profuse supply of drinks. Mourners 
attending funerals also offer monetary donations as well as 
drinks .and dishes of food for consumption during the funeral, 
thus reducing the expenses to members of the family. The bulk
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of the funeral expenses, however, are the responsibility of 
the tefenola or positional successor and the successors to the 
property (dornen.yilawo). Unless the expenses are particularly 
heavy and the estate is rich, the tefenola or positional suc­
cessor is not expected to recoup himself out of the estate or 
call .upon, the heirs, or .the. family to. refund, his expenses.
The dependants of the deceased are entitled to be maintained 
out of the estate. These dependants usually include the child­
ren and the wives of the deceased. While the estate is in his 
hands the tefenola or positional successor is responsible for 
the maintenance of both the deceased’s children and wives.
This rexpansibility practically ceases when the positional 
successor hands over the property to the domenyilawo or heirs. 
However, as the tefenola is in loco parentis to the children, 
he remains technically responsible for the maintenance of the 
children and this responsibility is a real one where the estate 
inherited is not substantial. Because the children are, as a 
rule, the successors to the property of their father, it is not 
strictly accurate to say that the successors must maintain the 
deceased’s children, which simply means that they must maintain, 
themselves. It is, therefore, only when an elder son is both a 
successor and the-person in charge of the undivided estate, 
jointly held, that we may say that he has a duty to maintain 
his other brothers and sisters. The children of a woman cannot 
legally claim maintenance out of their mother’s estate because 
maintenance is a responsibility of their father.
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A widow is entitled to maintenance out of her husbandfs 
estate while single and she is entitled to reside in the 
matrimonial home. Even if the estate is not enough the 
tefenola or positional successor still has a duty to maintain 
the widow out of his own resources. His duty does not cease 
on handing over the property to the heirs but it becomes less 
onerous because the heirs thereafter also become responsible 
for maintaining her-. Where a man’s estate is inherited by 
his own children the maintenance of his widows is not usually 
much of a problem; for the children, both as successors and 
as children of the widows, maintain their own mothers* There 
is, however, a problem if the inheriting children are not 
sons of the widow, in which case she may feel neglected by the 
children of a rival wife. There is no corresponding obligation 
on the successors of a deceased wife to maintain her surviving 
husband out of her estate.
The Successor’s Interest in Inherited Property
The domen.yila or person who succeeds to an interest in 
property in Ewe law takes absolutely as purchaser. If several 
domenyilawo take together in undivided shares they, as a group, 
hold the paramount title to the property, free from any 
interest in the family or dzotinu. This is possible because 
intestate property, as we have explained, does not become family 
property a.mong the Ewe. The only exception is in the case of a
woman successor to property who takes for life only.
The above proposition of Ewe law is contradicted by the
trend of legal opinion. It is the view of both Ollennu and
Bentsi-Enchill that a successor to property on intestacy does
not acquire the paramount title to the property, as in their
view such property is perpetually clothed, with.the character.
of family property. Bentsi-Enchill says:
a successor under customary law is noither the owner■ 
of the property of the deceased of which he is placed 
in charge, nor the exclusive possessor and enjoyer.of 
the deceased’s property. 1
Bentsi-Enchill, hov/ever, does not cite any authority for this 
proposition but relies on what he regards as a fundamental rule 
throughout Ghana that the self-acquired property of an intestate 
becomes family property on death. If it were true that an in­
testate estate in Ewe customary law became family property 
automatically, then- the force of this deduction from it would 
be Irresistible. For a single individual or some of them only, 
even as successors to property, cannot hold the absolute title 
in, or possess the legal capacity to dispose of, what belongs 
to the whole family. It is, hov/ever, not true that among the 
Ewe the intestate estate automatically becomes family property 
by the operation of lav/. Therefore, the deduction based on 
this assumption is also Inapplicable to the Ewe.
The same view is stated by Ollennu thus:
1. K, Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit.. p.15k#
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The interest which members of the family have in self- 
acquirer! property of an intestate member of the family 
is joint life interest of all of them, continuing as 
life interest for the survivor of them. The property 
cannot be disposed of by such life tenant or tenants 
either inter vivos or by testamentary disposition or 
otherwise as if it belongs to them by purchase, 1
Apart from his own decision in Mills v, Addy2 to that effect, 
Ollennu also does not cite any direct authority for this 
proposition but relies basically on the principle that the 
self-acquired property of an intestate automatically becomes 
family property. Even if Mills v, Add.y was rightly decided, 
it is a case from the matrilineal Ga community and it is sub­
mitted that it has no application among the patrilineal Ewe,
To fortify his opinion, however, Ollennu cites the case of
■5
ITusunukpe v, Ezegblor. a case from the Anlo Ewe area. In 
that case a daughter, the sole surviving child of a deceased 
father, sought to sell land which was her father’s self­
acquired property. It was correctly held by the Land Court 
that, although the present beneficial interest in the land 
was vested in the said daughter as successor to her father’s 
interest in the property, yet she was not capable of alien­
ating that interest in the property without the consent of 
the family. It is argued by Ollennu that this is authority
1. E.A. Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession 
in Ghana. 1966, p,231.
2. (1958) 3 W.A.L.R. 337*
3. Husunukpe v. Dzegblor, Unreported, Land Court, Accra. 2!fth 
November, 1951*
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for the view that a successor to property on intestacy has only 
a life interest in what he inherits. It is respectfully sub­
mitted that such a deduction is based on a misunderstanding 
of the basis of that decision.
To understand the decision in Husunukpe v. Dzegblor we 
must analyse the position of daughters as successors to intestate 
property. The old Ewe rule, still prevailing in some areas, was 
that a woman was incapable of inheriting property from her 
father. Although this rule has substantially changed in many 
places, it is still the rule in most Ewe areas that a daughter,
however old she may be, must be postponed to a non, even a
younger brother, in the succession to the interests in their
father’s estate. Therefore, even today, it is only when there
are no sons that a daughter may succeed to the interests in 
her father’s property, as did the sole daughter as the only 
surviving child of the deceased in Husunukpe v, Dzegblor.
V/hat, then, is the interest of a daughter in such an 
inherited property? The general rule among the Ewe is that a 
daughter succeeding to‘her father’s interest in property on 
intestacy is incapable of having an interest therein subsisting 
beyond her lifetime and that the interest so held by her in 
such property is not transmissible to her own children. In 
other words, as a general rule, a woman has only a life Interest 
in any property to which she succeeds from her father. This 
is how it was put by Annie Jiagge, J., in the Kpeve case of
Golo v. Doh:
Children - sons and daughters - inherit their fathers 
as of right, but the daughters have only a life interest 
in the property descending to them from their father.
On the death of a daughter her father’s property reverts 
to her father’s family. A daughter cannot, therefore, 
make any absolute disposition of property inherited from 
her father. Her children do not inherit such property. 1
This,, it.is submitted, . i.s .the. rationale 6f the . decision in . . . 
Husunukne v. Dzegblor. It was the.case of a daughter attempt­
ing to alienate title to property in which, because she was a 
daughter, she had only a life Interest as a successor. If she 
were an inheriting son, the right to sell could not have been ' 
challenged among the Northern Ewe,_ It is submitted, therefore, 
that Husunukpe v. Dzegblor must be limited to its own facts as 
a narrow proposition that generally a female successor to an 
interest in intestate property is incapable of disposing of 
that interest. It does not support a wider proposition among 
the Ewe that every successor to property is incapable of alien­
ating the interest to which he has succeeded.
Against Husunukpe v. Dzegblor may be contrasted Yawoga v,
2
Yawoga, In Yawoga v. Yawoga the first defendant and his sister 
were the only children of their father. Without the consent or 
even the knowledge of the head and other members of the family 
or dzotinu. the first defendant sold the farm he had inherited
1,' Golo v. Doh. Unreported, High Court, Ho, 12th November,
1965* Digested in (1965) Current Cases, paragraph 21k*
2. (1958) 3 W.A.L.N. 309*
as his father!s self-acquired property. It is true that he did 
inform his only sister but that was scarcely necessary. That 
she was informed could be explained on the ground of the special 
brotherly relationship, a relationship which would be a reason 
for the sister to expect to be informed even if the first 
defendant were selling his own self-acquired property. In any 
case, although we do not know for how much the farm was sold, 
the fact that the sister was given only a paltry sum of £2 out 
of the purchase price shows that the first defendant did not 
sell jointly with his sister.. The first defendant, as the only 
son of the deceased, was entitled to sell and he did sell as 
holder of the paramount interest once he succeeded to the self­
acquired property of his father. The other members of his 
family who severally had a spes succossionis in the property 
did not protest because they could not have objected to the 
sale. Only the successor’s own son challenged the validity of 
the sale but, as should be expected, he failed.
It Is submitted, therefore, that among the Ewe a successor 
to property on intestacy takes the entire interest of his pre­
decessor in title, unless she is a woman when she takes only a 
life interest in it. The successor to intestate property has 
in it the same full title which is conferred on the relations 
in respect of articles distributed among them at the numekafe. 
which articles become irrecoverable. Ac such holder of the 
absolute title, like a purchaser, the Ewe successor in turn
passes the interest in the property on to his own children and 
successors on intestacy. He can dispose of his interest in the 
property by testamentary disposition as well as by alienation 
inter vivos, as did the first defendant in Yawoga v , Yawo ga.
The property does not fall into the family pool on the death 
of the successor.. For.an Ewe.successor to property or domenylla 
does not have only a life interest in the property he inherits. 
The spes succossionls which other members of the family or 
dzotinu have in such property is not contingent on the death of 
the present successor to the interest in the property. The 
possibility of the other members of the family or dzotinu ever 
succeeding to the interest in the property can only arise in the 
event of the extinction of the patrilineal descendants of the 
original successor without previously disposing of the property 
effectively. It is because of this power of disposal and 
alienation that, except for the ancestral lands, there is hardly 
any family property properly so called among the Northern Ewe 
of Ghana. Apart from the ancestral lands, property among the 
Northern Ewe is individualised as far as title and the power of 
alienation are concerned, but it is largely communal in.use 
inasmuch as members of the family are freely allowed as a rule
to enjoy the property of their members. ......................
If the inherited property is kept intact and undivided, 
it is still subject to the same power of disposal by the 
successors acting together. For itkis still not family property
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but the property of as many successors or domenyilawo as there 
are. No single one of them, however, can dispose of any portion 
unless that portion has been specifically allocated to him as 
successor.
The position of a tefenola or positional successor must be 
contrasted and not confused with that of a domen.yila or successor 
to an interest in property in this respect. A tefenola. no 
matter for how long he administers the estate, lacks the 
capacity to alienate it because he has no beneficial interest 
in it, and the property is not transmissible to his own child­
ren or heirs.
Apart from female successors, special successors to 
interests in property may also lack the capacity to alienate 
title-to the property in their hands. An example is the 
maternal nephev/ who succeeded to the property of his uncle in 
the patrilineal Ewe community in Makata v, Ahorli,1 The nephew 
was not an ordinary successor to all the interests of his 
maternal uncle. He was only a life tenant as a result of a 
concession from the family in recognition of his special services 
to the deceased, which included making the farms with him and 
also paying a substantial part of the deceased’s funeral expenses. 
Hence the West African Court of Appeal, though confirming, the 
plaintiff nephew in possession because he had been placed in 
possession by the dispensation of the family, defined his
1. (1956) 1 W.A.L.R, 169,
716.
interest thus:
I would allow the appeal and restore the judgment of the 
Native Court hut I would qualify the declaration of title 
claimed by the Plaintiff by the limitation that he is 
entitled to possession of the farms described during his 
lifetime only ... Upon his death the Plaintiff’s sons or 
family will have no inherent right to inherit. It will be 
for the council of the family of Boshua to decide who 
next inherits the properties. 1
This is clearly only a limited interest. It was found necessary 
to define the interest of the nephew with such precision but for 
only one reason. Unless this limitation was placed on his in­
terest, he could be presumed to have succeeded to the interests 
in the property in the normal way, which is as purchaser. For, 
why was the definition of his life interest necessary if, as is 
contended by some authorities, a successor to property takes the 
property only for life any way? It is submitted that in Makata 
v. Ahorli the Test African Court of Appeal impliedly accepted it 
that an Ewe successor to property takes absolutely as purchaser 
or takes the highest interest held by his predecessor in title, 
■whichever is greater. That is why that Court went to the trouble 
of defining the nephew’s life interest, v/hich is short of that of 
a normal domen.yila or successor to property in Ewe law.
As an Ewe successor to property holds the absolute interest 
in it as purchaser, he is not accountable to anybody, not even
to the'family, V/edo not agree with Bentsi-Enchill, therefore,'
2that a successor to property or domen.yila is accountable.
1. Makata v. Ahorli. (1956) 1 V/.A.L.E. 169, 1 Ih.
2. K. Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit.. p,156.
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A positional successor, on the other hand, is' accountable not 
to the family as such but to the heirs,^ though the family may 
go into account with him in order to determine the extent of 
the estate before distribution, A successor to the property 
who is managing it on behalf of himself and the other successors 
is also accountable to his colleagues but not to the family.
Since a successor to property on intestacy takes absolutely 
both as of right and as a result of the determination of his 
portion by the family, he cannot subsequently be dispossessed 
of the property. A special successor who is not entitled to 
succeed to the property as of right but is granted a special 
dispensation by the family, such as the nephew in Makata v ,
Ahor11. may, however, be removed if he deals with the property 
in a. manner which may defeat the spes successionis of the 
proximate next-of-kin. Similarly a tefenola or positional 
successor can be removed from management of the property, We 
would say, therefore, that the only persons who can be removed 
or dispossessed are tefenolawo or positional successors in 
interim administration and beneficiaries enjoying only a life 
interest in the intestate property.
The Ewe Levirate
The levirate or "widow inheritance” has been known among
the Ewe from time immemorial and is known as ahosi dede. However,
1, Tamakloe v. Attipoe. sumra. Quoted in Snnin v, Prah. (1959) 
G.X.3. kk, kW. '
r 
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whatever may have been the rule in the past, it is today not 
obligatory on the widow or ahosi to be remarried into the family 
of her deceased husband. As Manoukian puts-it:
The levirate is approved, though widows may
refuse this marriage. 1
If the widow declines to be re-married into her former husband’s 
family, she cannot be compelled to refund the marriage consider-
j
ation or tanu. Conversely the family of the deceased husband is 
not obliged to find another husband for the widow, though 'they 
would try to do so.
When the family finds a new husband for the widow, he is 
hardly ever one of the deceased husband’s heirs; for a man’s 
heirs are usually his children, often the widow’s own children, 
and, among the Ewe, the children cannot marry their own mother 
or their father’s wives. Sometimes the choice is one of the 
brothers of the deceased; but generally this is frowned upon 
today as "too close". The usual practice today seems to be to 
choose a male member within the husband’s family or dzotinu« 
who is not necessarily a brother of the deceased. It usually 
turns out, therefore, that the person who marries the widow under 
the system of levirate is neither the tefenola or positional 
successor (who is usually a brother) nor one of the heirs (who, 
as a rule, are the children). In some areas, notably Abutia, 
the widow may be married by the amedie, also known as the male 
tovt„ if he chooses the widow as alternative to the gun of the
1. II. Manoukian, op. cit.. p.25*
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deceased.^ In that case the widow is re-married outside the 
family or dzotinu of the deceased but within the same sub­
division or saame, for the male tovi is as a rule chosen from 
a different family within the same sub-division.
The five system of nvidow inheritance” certainly differs 
from .that of the other, communities of Ghana, • As regards the ■ ■ 
Ashanti, it has been stated by Rattray that the successor to
the interests in property inherits the wives of the deceased
pm  the same way that he inherits the manfs other property.
This view is also urged by Ollennu who says
According to custom if there is only one widow the 
f a m i l y  formally declare her to be a wife of the 
successor ... 3
The other wives, according to Ollennu, are distributed. The
b 5
same view is also shared by Field ‘ and Bentsi-Enchill,
It seems that none of the above writers had considered the
patrilineal Eve law of succession to property vis-a-vis "widow
inheritance". Among the Ewe, as we have already explained,
there are usually several successors to the interests in a man’s
property. Which of these successors will the family "formally
declare" to be married to the widow? Furthermore, as a rule,
a man's successors are his children in the Ewe society, and the
1. See jp. 623 supra.
2. R.S. Rattray, Ashanti. Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1923,
PP. 29, 78-79.
3. N.A. Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession 
in Ghana, i9 6 0 , p.22o.
A. M.J. Field, Akim Kotoku. Crown Agents, London, 19kS, p.115.
5. K, Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit.. p.152.
children cannot marry their own mother and the other wives of
their deceased father. The position of a positional successor,
as standing in loco parentis to the children, is also often
occupied by one of the deceased’s own children, usually the
eldest son. The Ewe arrangement, therefore, is to choose another
nan from the same family, formerly usually, but now rarely, the
deceased’s b r o the r, as the new husband,
On the obligation of the successor to marry the deceased’s
widow, and of the widow’s obligation to accept the successor as
her new husband, Field, 'writing about the Akim Kotoku of the
Eastern Eegion of Ghana, says:
If the man who inherits the widows does not want thorn 
as wives, he may publicly release them - just as a man 
may dismiss a wife who has not been unfaithful - by 
giving them ’road money*. In such a case he is usually
made to give them portions of the farms that they have
helped his uncle or brother to make. The children of 
such wives are still his responsibility ....
If the widow herself objects .to becoming the wife of her 
husband’s successor, she is not forced to it, but while 
she remains dependent on him she must perform a wife’s 
secondary duties, such as cooking and working on the 
farm. If she wishes to leave him altogether and go to- 
another town or marry some other man, she can do so only 
on terms on which any marriage is dissolved by the wife, 
that is, her people must return marriage fees paid by 
her husband, 1
These propositions are accepted by Ollennu who says
The customary law as set out by Field ... is in substance
the same as the law which obtains in all the different 
tribes throughout Ghana, 2
1. T-l.J. Field, Akim Kotoku. Crown Agents, London, 1913, p. 115*
2, IT.A. Ollennu, The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession 
in Ghana. 1966, p.2256
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The came propositions are also stated by Ollennu, J., in 
0 u arte y v , Mar t e'.y,1 With great respect, it is submitted that 
Field’s account of the law of widow Inheritance in Akim Kotoku 
is not of general application in all Ghanaian communities and 
certainly not in that form among the Ewe, Neither is Quarte.y 
v , Mar toy good law among the . Ewe in. this.respect. It is not 
true among the Ewe that the widow has the only two alternatives 
open to her of either marrying the successor to her husband's 
property or refunding the marriage consideration or tanu. 
Similarly the successor to property is also not constrained to 
make a choice between tailing the widow to wife or divorcing her 
with a lump sura compensation as "road money" or modpga. The 
fallacy underlying these propositions is the assumption that 
In all cases the successors to interest in property possess the 
legal capacity to take the widows to wife. This fallacy 
explodes In the application of the propositions to the northern 
Ewe, when it is realised that the successors to a man’s interests 
in property are usually his- own children who cannot marry their 
own mother and other wives of their father.
The second assumption with which we cannot agree is that 
the marriage is still subsisting even after the death of the 
husband. To establish this Ollennu repeats the -oft-stated view. , 
■'hat an African marriage is not simply a union of individuals
1. Quart e.y v. Mart e.y« (1959) G.L.K. 377, 381.
but of their families. There is no doubt that an African 
marriage does deeply involve the two families who thereby 
become related by affinity. Like the matches often arranged 
between royal families in Europe and elsewhere, the African 
families are always involved, at times over-involved, in 
forging out marital unions, ■ and,-when formed, are concerned 
with their maintenance and stability. However, to over­
emphasise this aspect, as is often done, at the expense of 
the personal love and personal relationship of African couples, 
is a misconception of the legal as well as the social impli­
cations of an African marriage of today. An African marriage, 
c>r at least an Ewe marriage, does not moan that the two 
families of the original spouses are permanently "married” 
to each, other. Hence, among the Ewe, at any rate, the present 
m'± ew is that the death of either of the spouses automatically 
dissolves the marriage. Y/ere it otherwise the converse would 
also be true that if the wife pre-deceases the husband then 
the deceased wife’s family must either provide a new wife for 
the husband or else refund the marriage consideration or tanu 
in order to dissolve the marital bond. This, it is submitted, 
is not Ewe law.
The' basis of the Ewe' system of "widow inheritance" or 
ahosi dede is not the assumption that the marriage subsists 
beyond the death of either spouse. This may be the explanation 
why, unlike the Akim Kotoku law stated by Field, no return of
723,
the marriage consideration or tanu is demanded if the widow 
refuses to be inherited as a wife by the successor to the 
deceased husband1s property. Similarly the successor is not 
obliged to pay the widow a lump sum compensation as ’’road money” 
or modpga if he does not wish to marry her. Neither is the Ewe 
widow under any circumstances entitled to any portion of the, 
deceased husband’s farms or other property as compensation.
In Ewe law a widow is regarded for practically all purposes as 
a feme sole. Hence, even in those days when a wife’s child, 
however conceived, belonged to her husband, any child born by 
a widow even while still a widow did not belong to her deceased 
llunhand’s family but to her par amour. The only exception is 
a posthumous child conceived before the husband’s death: he
is a child of the deceased husband.
The 1evirate or ahosi dede among the Ewe can at best be 
described as a scheme of social security of which the widow may 
avail herself and which benefits the children of the deceased
a.s well. It is not a legal obligation on any of the parties.
0:n the side of the widow the scheme ensures that, in the moment 
of her grief, the family of her departed husband wrould immed­
iately provide for her a new man of the same blood relationship 
to maintain her. as.before. . That, is .why the choice is not auto-, 
mati'C and does not follow the right of succession to interests 
in property; for, unless a man of the right calibre can be
1 . See pp. 161-162 supra.
found, a poor substitute would not serve the social objectives 
of the scheme. As far as the children of the deceased are 
concerned, they would not be too badly shaken by the loss of 
their father, as they would move into the new matrimonial 
home of a man who, even in the lifetime of their father, was 
a classificatory father. Together with any new children to be 
born, they would all be enjoying the same hereditary property 
and offices as members of the same family, thus minimising the 
friction normally found among siblings of the half blood. The 
new husband, of the same family as the deceased, would treat 
the children of the deceased as his own, as indeed they are 
in the classificatory sense. It is primarily for such reasons 
that the Ewe scheme of levirate or ahosi dede operates. -
As evidence that the previous marriage terminates with the 
death of the husband, the widow’s family must be formally 
notified if she is retained in the family under the levirate 
scheme. This is not a re-marriage as such, and marriage con­
sideration or tanu is not paid afresh. The widow’s family, 
however, must be notified with drinks or aha to signify that a 
new husband has been found for the widow. It is not certain 
whether the family of the widow can ordinarily veto the new 
arrangement. However, as even during the subsistence of the 
marriage the woman does not lose the protection of her own
family, her family may object to the levirate i- the deceased
husband or members of his family had been cruel or unkind to
the widow or if the marriage had generally been unsuccessful.
The new husband under the Ewe levirate is not a ghost 
husband but an actual husband. Accordingly, any children born 
out of the union are children of the new husband and not of the 
deceased husband. This is perhaps different from the rule in 
other societies. For, according to Field, for instance, 
children born to the new husband under the levirate among the 
Ga of Ghana are counteu as the children of the deceased brother.^ 
-he oojective of the Ewe levirate is not to tfraise seed” to the 
deceased husband.
Although Hi ere is no obligation on the successor to marry 
the widow of the deceased, nor on the widow to marry the succes­
sor, there is an obligation to maintain the widow. The right to 
maintenance also includes the right of the widow, while still 
a widow, to reside in the matrimonial home of her deceased 
husband. The widow, however, has no specifiable share in her
deceased husband’s estate. Accordingly, as held in Quartey v .
2
Martey. she cannot maintain an action to enforce a claim 
against any portion of the estate. The entitlement of the 
widow to maintenance lasts only dum sola, though not necessarily 
dum casta; but, as she is not entitled to any specifiable share 
in the estate, her unchastity may in fact substantially reduce 
the amount of maintenance she gets.
1. M.J. Field, Social Organisation of the Ga People. Crown 
Agents, London, 19^0, p.J+L.
2. (1959) G.L.3. 377.
Testamentary Disposition
Strictly speaking, the making of wills is unknown to Ewe 
law. The Ewe, therefore, have no name for the nuncupative will 
of the type found in some other Ghanaian communities. A dying 
man may declare his own wishes as regards the devolution of his 
property on' his death. Such a declaration, especially because 
of a mixture of reverence for the dead and the fear of the 
departed spirits, is given great weight in the deliberations 
oT the family in allocating shares to successors to the estate, 
and those indicated by the deceased. It is, however, not binding
the.
an a will on^family, and the beneficiary under the declaration 
cannot enforce his claim at Ewe law. If the deceased wished to 
benefit a particular individual, he could make to him a gift 
inter vivos which should vest in his own lifetime. Unless this 
was done, the family is entirely at liberty to vary or even 
ignore the terms of the purported declaration so that the 
established rules of succession to intestate property may 
apply.
In Gbi it was stated that, although the dying declaration 
would be listened to v/ith attention, yet after the death of the 
decla_rant the family would simply say prayers by way of libation 
and vary or nullify the "dispositions” by the deceased as they 
thought fit, for if everybody had disposed of his property in 
that manner nothing would be left in the family. In Aveme it 
tated that if a man made a dying declaration while on hisV I CL O O
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deathbed it would be patiently noted. After his death, however, 
if the dispositions contained therein were not reasonable in the 
eyes of the family, the family would set aside the declaration 
as coming from a man who, because of bodily affliction, was not
of the proper mental balance.
The.Akan in particular, and.it seems. also.the Ga, have a ■ ■ 
customary law form of will known generally as samansiw, By the 
samansiw the Akan or Ga individual may make an oral or nuncup­
ative will touching, but touching only, his own self-acquired
1 ? property. In Sumrney v, Yohuno~ Ollennu, J., set out the
essential requirements of a valid customary law will thus:
(1 ) the disposition must be made in the’ presence of
witnesses, who must hear what the declaration is and 
know its c on t en t s ;
(2 ) the member of the family who would have succeeded
the person mailing the will, had the latter died intestate, 
must be among the witnesses in whose presence the dec­
laration is made; and
(3 ) there must be acceptance, by or on behalf of the 
beneficiaries, indicated by the giving and receiving 
of !drinks1, 3 .
The first two requirements are designed to ensure publicity for 
at least two reasons. One is to inform the prospective heir 
that he has been disinherited,, thereby avoiding future litigatior.
1. See, e-.g, J.M. Sarbah, op,cit, . p.97; 2,S. Bat tray.
Ashanti, 1923, pp.237-239; J.B. Danquah, op,cit,» p.198; v 
K, Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit,. pp.193-212; and IT.A. Ollennu, 
The Law of Testate and Intestate Succession in Ghana, 1966, 
pn.270-27
2* (I960) G.L.R. 68.
3. Sumrney v. Yohuno, (I960) G.L.R, 68, 71.
The second is to satisfy the beneficiaries of the will-as to the 
testamentary capacity of the testator, as the dispositions would 
be invalid to the extent that they relate to family property in 
the hands of the testator.
The third requirement is what one finds grossly offensive 
to Ewe notions. This is the requirement that the disposition . . 
under the nuncupative will, to be effective, must be accepted by 
or on behalf of the beneficiaries with drinks during the life­
time of the testator. Among the Ewe it would be regarded as 
the height of indiscretion.by a prospective beneficiary to 
present drinks as a thanks-offering or akpedanu to a dying man
►
who has indicated that - the beneficiary should succeed to some 
or all of his interests in property. For the prospective bene­
ficiary to thank a declarant who is lying helpless on his death­
bed., in the throes of death pangs, would be construed by the Ewe 
as the expression of an anxiety to see the early end of the 
declarant. This is a grave moment when death is imminent, and 
the Ewe would not suffer a beneficiary to intervene during the 
care of the sick in order to perfect his own mundane expec­
tations of property by having the dispositions formally con­
firmed by the presentation of any form of thanks-offering to 
the . dying man. To attempt to"" do. so even in the case of a ■ ■ ■
declarant who is in health will, to say the least, be inter­
preted as encompassing his death! For the reason of the 
requirement of thanks-offering alone, if not for any other
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reason, no valid nuncupative will can be found among the Ewe in
accordance with the stipulations in Sumrney v. Yohuno.^
V/e might pause to ask if, even among the Akan, a valid
samansiw or nuncupative will can he made within the requirements
2 3set out in S u. rn m ey v , Yo him o . In Br oh bey v , Ky ere the customary
law nuncupative will was held as valid but it was not stated that
any thanks-offering or aseda was presented in that case. It
was only noted that the mailing of the will was confirmed with
the "great oath". In Sumrney v. Yohuno itself the essential
requirements were spelt out by Ollennu, J., only to show that
the nuncupative will in that case was invalid. It is the came
b R
with Akcle v. Co fie * and In re Abakah. ^ the nuncupative will
being declared invalid in both cases for failure to satisfy the
essential requirements. Certainly such a customary law will,
especially as judicially defined, is not known to Ewe law.
It seems that the samansiw is a comparatively recent
innovation even among the Akan. V/e are told by Sarbah that the
6custom of making wrills is "of modern growth". An -old man m
1. (I960) G.L.R. 68
2. - Ibid.
3. (1936) 3 V/.A.C.A. 106.
A. Akele v, Cofie. (1961) G.L.R. 33A.
5. (1937) 3 V/.A.L.R. 236.
6. J.M. Sarbah, op.cit.. p.97. Rattray is not in entire 
agreement but thinks that the samansiw probably existed before 
the advent of European rule: R.S. Rattray, Ashanti« 1923, P.239-
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Gbi observed to me that the Akan had developed the nuncupative 
will or samansiw merely to make provision for their own children 
on the realisation of the unwisdom of their system of rnatri- 
lineal succession to rights in property on intestacy. Whether 
7/e agree with that old man or not, it is noteworthy that 
Rattrayfs account of the samansiw among the Ashanti concen­
trates almost wholly on benefiting a man1s children, children 
who because of the matrilineal system of succession do not fall 
within the group of successors.^ The same concern for children 
is also regarded by Bentsi-Enchill as the basis of the develop­
ment of the customary law will or samansiw. He says:
A man's children and wife or wives help him to 
clear the land and to farm, and he can and often 
does apportion cleared areas to them by way of 
gift ... But he may not have done so by the time 
he dies. The 'samansiw* or death-bed disposition 
or nuncupative will probably has its most charac­
teristic occasion and inspiration in the last 
minute realisation of the need to make adequate 
provision for one's children. 2
The Ewe child, however, succeeds to the property of his father
as of right. Hence, although occasionally a father may wish
to disinherit a notoriously recalcitrant or prodigal child, or
to benefit another relation, an institutionalised form of will
has not been developed among the Ewe, The father's intentions
are made manifest in the declaration which,, though lacking the .
1. R.S, Rattray, Ashanti, 1923, pp.238-239.
2, K, Bentsi-Enchill, op.cit.„ p.1A3.
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legal effect of a will, receives considerable weight in the 
counsel of the family. It is perhaps the same with other 
tribes. Of the Adangbe of Ghana, Pogucki says:
Nuncupative wills, which are an important form
of Al^an customary law, appear seldom. 1
"Declarations of wishes as to one's successor are made 
among the Ewe in several circumstances. A chief may declare 
before his death whom he would like to succeed him on the 
stool. An individual may indicate who may step into his shoes 
as "father" to his children, and he may also indicate who 
should succeed to his interest in a particular item of his 
property. All these, however, are not in the nature of a 
nuncupative will with any binding legal effect. The bene­
ficiary or appointee is not expected to indicate his acceptance. 
His inaction is enough; for it is only when the beneficiary 
or appointee wishes to reject the property or the position that 
he has to express his renunciation. Just as a dying chief's 
indication of his successor is regarded as an indication of 
a. personal preference which is not binding on the living, so 
a.lso are "dispositions" relating to self-acquired property 
not treated as being of a binding force. In either case, how­
ever, such an opinion of the deceased is highly respected.
With this explanation, therefore, we may say that Ewe law does 
not recognise a nuncupative will as being of a binding legal 
effect.
1. R.J.H. Pogucki, op.cit., Vol. II, Land Tenure in Adangbe 
Customary Law, p.39.
APPENDIX
LIST OF PRINCIPAL INFORMANTS
ABUTIA
Togbe Kodzo Gidi, Fiaga of Abutia
Amega Gabriel Amanie, Stoolfather of Fiaga
Togbe Okai Debra of Abutia Teti
Togbe Keh Kwasi VII, Senior Omankrado
Togbe Bediaku III of Abutia Teti
Togbe Adza Asamoah, Asafofiaga
AKOME
Amega Koku Debra, Stoolfather of Fiaga as Acting Fiaga 
Mr. S.K. Agbodza, Linguist
ANFOEGA
Togbe Tepre Hodo III, Fiaga of Anfoega 
Amega Christian Amoa, Stoolfather of Fiaga 
About three other elders of the Paramount Stool
AVEME
Togbe Gazari IV, Fiaga of Aveme
Amega Paul Komi Tsendzi, Stoolfather of Fiaga
Togbe Drah, Chief Fetish Priest and Chief of Aveme-Dra
Togbe Desufoli IV of Aveme-Dadiase
AWUDOME
Togbe Adai Kwasi X, Fiaga of Awudome 
The Fia of Awudome-Avenui
GBI
Amega Kwami Hoedienukpor, Stoolfather of Fiaga, as Acting Fiaga 
Amega Christoph Anku Kludze 
Togbe Osai of Gbi-Godenu 
Several other informants
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HO
Togbe Afede Asor II, Agbogbomefia of Ho 
Amega Akpo, Stoolfather 'of Agbogbomefia 
Togbe Anyawoe Kwasi, Asafofia
KPANDO
Togbe Yawo Asumadu VI, Chief of Kpando-Dzigbe and Miamefia or 
Left Wing Chief of Kpando, also Registrar of Akpini 
Native Court ,,B,t, now District Court Grade II, Kpando. 
Several other informants
KPEDZE
Togbe Atsridom IV, Fiaga of Kpedze 
Mr. Thompson Mensah Seraehia 
Mr. Kodzo Blege
MATSE
Amega Kro Klutse, Stoolfather of Fiaga, as Acting Fiaga 
About a dozen elders of the Paramount Stool
PEKI
Togbe Kodzo Dei XI, Deiga of Peki
Mr. Donkor, formerly Regent of the Paramount Stool
Togbe Gidi Mensah, Head of the Peki Royal Family
Amega Tutu Brempong, Royal Elder
Togbe Agubretu VI, Saamefia in Peki-Blengo
TAVIEFE
Togbe Bansa Kwami Ziga II, Fiaga of Taviefe 
Amega George Ziga, Stoolfather of Fiaga 
Amega Nelson Tsivor, Odikro in Taviefe-Avenya 
Mr. Yak Ziga
WUSUTA
Amega Alfred Kosi, Stoolfather of Wusuta-Wa 
Amega Atsu Kpogli, Chief Linguist of Wusuta.
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